area handbook series 

Armenia, Azerbaijan, 

and Georgia 

country studies 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, 

and Georgia 

country studies 

Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Edited by 
Glenn E. Curtis 
Research Completed 
March 1 994 



On the cover: Cultural artifacts from Georgia (upper 
left) and Azerbaijan (right), and folk costume from 
Armenia 



First Edition, First Printing, 1995. 

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia : country studies / Fed- 
eral Research Division, Library of Congress ; edited by 
Glenn E. Curtis. — 1st ed. 



p. cm.— (Area handbook series, ISSN 1057-5294) 
(DAPam ; 550-111) 



"Research completed March 1994." 
Includes bibliographical references (pp. 257-68) and 
index. 

ISBN 0-8444-0848-4 

1. Transcaucasia — Handbooks, manuals, etc. I. Curtis, 
Glenn E. (Glenn Eldon), 1946- . II. Library of Congress. 
Federal Research Division. III. Series. IV. Series: 



DAPam ; 550-111. 
DK509.A727 1995 
947'.9-dc20 



94-45459 
CIP 



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DA Pam 550-111 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, DC. 20402 



Foreword 



This volume is one in a continuing series of books prepared 
by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress 
under the Country Studies/Area Handbook Program spon- 
sored by the Department of the Army. The last two pages of this 
book list the other published studies. 

Most books in the series deal with a particular foreign coun- 
try, describing and analyzing its political, economic, social, and 
national security systems and institutions, and examining the 
interrelationships of those systems and the ways they are 
shaped by cultural factors. Each study is written by a multidisci- 
plinary team of social scientists. The authors seek to provide a 
basic understanding of the observed society, striving for a 
dynamic rather than a static portrayal. Particular attention is 
devoted to the people who make up the society, their origins, 
dominant beliefs and values, their common interests and the 
issues on which they are divided, the nature and extent of their 
involvement with national institutions, and their attitudes 
toward each other and toward their social system and political 
order. 

The books represent the analysis of the authors and should 
not be construed as an expression of an official United States 
government position, policy, or decision. The authors have 
sought to adhere to accepted standards of scholarly objectivity. 
Corrections, additions, and suggestions for changes from read- 
ers will be welcomed for use in future editions. 

Louis R. Mortimer 
Chief 

Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Washington, D.C. 20540-5220 



iii 



Acknowledgments 



The authors are indebted to numerous individuals and 
organizations who gave their time, research materials, and 
expertise on affairs in the nations of the Transcaucasus to pro- 
vide data, perspective, and material support for this volume. 

The collection of accurate and current information was 
assisted greatly by the contributions of Professor Stephen Jones 
of Mount Holyoke College, Dee Ann Holisky, Betty Blair of 
Azerbaijan International, and Joseph Masih of the Armenian 
Assembly of America. The authors acknowledge the generosity 
of individuals and public and private agencies — including Azer- 
baijan International, the Embassy of Azerbaijan, and the White 
House Photo Office — who allowed their photographs to be 
used in this study. 

Thanks also go to Ralph K. Benesch, who oversees the 
Country Studies/Area Handbook Program for the Department 
of the Army. In addition, the authors appreciate the advice and 
guidance of Sandra W. Meditz, Federal Research Division coor- 
dinator of the handbook series. Special thanks go to Marilyn L. 
Majeska, who supervised editing; Andrea T. Merrill, who man- 
aged production; David P. Cabitto, who designed the book 
cover and the illustrations on the title page of each chapter, 
provided graphics support, and, together with Thomas D. Hall, 
prepared the maps; and Helen Fedor, who obtained and orga- 
nized the photographs. The following individuals are gratefully 
acknowledged as well: Vincent Ercolano, who edited the chap- 
ters; Barbara Edgerton and Izella Watson, who did the word 
processing; Catherine Schwartzstein, who performed the final 
prepublication editorial review; Joan C. Cook, who compiled 
the index; and Stephen C. Cranton and David P. Cabitto, who 
prepared the camera-ready copy. 



v 



Contents 



Page 

Foreword iii 

Acknowledgments v 

Preface xiii 

Table A. Chronology of Important Events xv 

Introduction — xxiii 

Chapter 1. Armenia 1 

Glenn E. Curtis and Ronald G. Suny 

COUNTRY PROFILE 3 

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 9 

The Ancient Period 9 

Early Christianity 10 

The Middle Ages 11 

Between Russia and Turkey 11 

World War I and Its Consequences 15 

The Communist Era 17 

Nagorno-Karabakh and Independence 20 

PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT 25 

Topography and Drainage 26 

Climate 27 

Environmental Problems 27 

POPULATION AND ETHNIC COMPOSITION 29 

Population Characteristics 29 

Ethnic Minorities 31 

LANGUAGE, RELIGION, AND CULTURE 32 

Language 33 

Religion 33 

The Armenian Diaspora 35 

Culture 36 

EDUCATION, HEALTH, AND WELFARE 38 

Education 38 

Health 39 

Social Welfare 41 



vii 



THE ECONOMY 41 

Modern Economic History 42 

Natural Resources 44 

Agriculture 44 

Industry 45 

Energy 46 

Postcommunist Economic Reform 48 

Labor and the Standard of Living 51 

The National Financial Structure 52 

Transportation and Telecommunications 53 

Foreign Trade 56 

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 57 

Parliament 58 

The Presidency 59 

State Administrative Bodies 59 

The Judiciary 60 

The Constitution 60 

Local Government 61 

Political Parties 61 

Human Rights 62 

The Media 63 

FOREIGN RELATIONS 64 

Azerbaijan 64 

Georgia, Iran, and Turkey 65 

The Commonwealth of Independent States 67 

The United States 68 

NATIONAL SECURITY 70 

Geopolitical Situation 70 

The Military 72 

Internal Security 76 

Crime 77 

Prisons 77 

Chapter 2. Azerbaijan 79 

James Nichol 

COUNTRY PROFILE 81 

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 87 

Early History 87 

Within the Russian Empire 89 

Within the Soviet Union 91 

After Communist Rule 93 



viii 



PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT 99 

Topography and Drainage 99 

Climate 100 

Environmental Problems 100 

POPULATION AND ETHNIC COMPOSITION 101 

Population Characteristics 101 

The Role of Women 103 

Smaller Ethnic Minorities 103 

LANGUAGE, RELIGION, AND CULTURE 104 

Language 104 

Religion 106 

The Arts 107 

The Cultural Renaissance 109 

EDUCATION, HEALTH, AND WELFARE Ill 

Education Ill 

Health 113 

Social Welfare 114 

THE ECONOMY 115 

The Work Force 116 

Economic Dislocations 116 

Agriculture 117 

Industry 119 

Energy 119 

Economic Reform 122 

Foreign Trade 125 

Transportation and Telecommunications 126 

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 1 29 

The Appearance of Opposition Parties 129 

Legislative Politics 131 

The Presidential Election of 1992 131 

The Coup of June 1993 132 

Aliyev and the Presidential Election of 

October 1993 134 

The Constitution 135 

The Court System 136 

Human Rights and the Media 136 

FOREIGN RELATIONS 138 

The Foreign Policy Establishment 138 

Post-Soviet Diplomacy 139 

Relations with Former Soviet Republics 140 

ix 



NATIONAL SECURITY 141 

Forming a National Defense Force 141 

Russian Troop Withdrawal 142 

Force Levels and Performance 143 

Supply and Budgeting 144 

Aliyev's National Security Reform 145 

Crime and Crime Prevention 146 

Chapter 3. Georgia 149 

Darrell Slider 

COUNTRY PROFILE 151 

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 157 

Early History 157 

Within the Russian Empire 159 

Within the Soviet Union 162 

After Communist Rule 166 

Threats of Fragmentation 171 

PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT 175 

Topography 175 

Climate 176 

Environmental Issues 177 

POPULATION AND ETHNIC COMPOSITION 1 77 

Population Characteristics 177 

Ethnic Minorities 178 

LANGUAGE, RELIGION, AND CULTURE 181 

Language 181 

Religion 182 

The Arts 183 

EDUCATION, HEALTH, AND WELFARE 186 

Education 186 

Health 187 

Social Security 189 

THE ECONOMY 190 

Conditions in the Soviet System 190 

Obstacles to Development 191 

The Underground Economy 192 

Wages and Prices 192 

Banking, the Budget, and the Currency 194 

Industry 195 

Energy Resources 196 

Agriculture 198 



x 



Transportation and Telecommunications 199 

Economic Reform 203 

Foreign Trade 205 

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 206 

Establishing Democratic Institutions 206 

The 1990 Election 208 

The Gamsakhurdia Government 208 

Gamsakhurdia's Ouster and Its Aftermath 209 

New Parties and Shevardnadze's Return 210 

The Election of 1992 210 

Formation of the Shevardnadze Government 213 

The Judicial System 216 

The Constitution 218 

Human Rights 218 

The Media 219 

FOREIGN RELATIONS 219 

The Soviet and Gamsakhurdia Periods 220 

The Foreign Policy Establishment 221 

Revived Contacts in 1992 221 

Relations with Neighboring Countries 222 

NATIONAL SECURITY 226 

The Military Establishment 226 

The Russian Presence 227 

Draft Policy 227 

Arms Supply 228 

Internal Security 228 

Civilian National Security Organization 229 

Crime 229 

Long-Term Security 230 

Appendix. Tables 231 

Bibliography 257 

Glossary 269 

Index 273 

Contributors 295 

List of Figures 

1 Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Geographic 

Setting, 1994 xxii 

xi 



2 Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Topography and 



Drainage xxii 

3 Nagorno-Karabakh, 1994 xxvi 

4 Armenia, 1994 8 

5 The Empire of Tigran the Great, ca. 65 B.C 12 

6 Ethnic Groups in Armenia 32 

7 Transportation System of Armenia, 1994 54 

8 Azerbaijan, 1994 86 

9 Ethnic Groups in Azerbaijan 104 

10 Transportation System of Azerbaijan, 1994 128 

11 Georgia, 1994 156 

12 The Georgian Empire of Queen Tamar, ca. 1200 160 

13 Georgia in the Sixteenth Century 161 

14 Ethnic Groups in Georgia 180 

15 Transportation System of Georgia, 1994 202 



xii 



Preface 



At the end of 1991, the formal liquidation of the Soviet 
Union was the surprisingly swift result of partially hidden 
decrepitude and centrifugal forces within that empire. Of the 
fifteen "new" states that emerged from the process, many had 
been independent political entities at some time in the past. 
Aside from their coverage in the 1991 Soviet Union: A Country 
Study, none had received individual treatment in this series, 
however. Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies is the 
first in a new subseries describing the fifteen post-Soviet repub- 
lics, both as they existed before and during the Soviet era and 
as they have developed since 1991. This volume covers Arme- 
nia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, the three small nations grouped 
around the Caucasus mountain range east of the Black Sea. 

The marked relaxation of information restrictions, which 
began in the late 1980s and accelerated after 1991, allows the 
reporting of nearly complete data on every aspect of life in the 
three countries. Scholarly articles and periodical reports have 
been especially helpful in accounting for the years of indepen- 
dence in the 1990s. The authors have described the historical, 
political, and social backgrounds of the countries as the back- 
ground for their current portraits. In each case, the authors' 
goal was to provide a compact, accessible, and objective treat- 
ment of five main topics: historical background, the society and 
its environment, the economy, government and politics, and 
national security. 

In all cases, personal names have been transliterated from 
the vernacular languages according to standard practice. Place- 
names are rendered in the form approved by the United States 
Board on Geographic Names, when available. Because in many 
cases the board had not yet applied vernacular tables in trans- 
literating official place-names at the time of printing, the most 
recent Soviet-era forms have been used in this volume. Conven- 
tional international variants, such as Moscow, are used when 
appropriate. Organizations commonly known by their acro- 
nyms (such as IMF— International Monetary Fund) are intro- 
duced by their full names. Autonomous republics and 
autonomous regions, such as the Nakhichevan Autonomous 
Republic, the South Ossetian Autonomous Region, and the 
Abkhazian Autonomous Republic, are introduced in their full 



xiii 



form (before 1991 these also included the phrase "Soviet 
Socialist"), and subsequently referred to by shorter forms 
(Nakhichevan, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia, respectively) . 

Measurements are given in the metric system; a conversion 
table is provided in the Appendix. A chronology is provided at 
the beginning of the book, combining significant historical 
events of the three countries. To amplify points in the text of 
the chapters, tables in the Appendix provide statistics on 
aspects of the societies and the economies of the countries. 

The body of the text reflects information available as of 
March 1994. Certain other portions of the text, however, have 
been updated. The Introduction discusses significant events 
and trends that have occurred since the completion of 
research; the Country Profiles include updated information as 
available; and the Bibliography lists recently published sources 
thought to be particularly helpful to the reader. 



xiv 



Table A. Chronology of Important Events 



Period 



Description 



EARLY HISTORY 
95-55 B.C 



Armenian Empire reaches greatest size and influence under Tigran 
the Great. 



66 B.C. 



Romans complete conquest of Caucasus Mountains region, includ- 
ing Georgian kingdom of Kartli-Iberia. 



30 B.C. Romans conquer Armenian Empire. 

AD. 100-300 Romans annex Azerbaijan and name it Albania. 

ca. 310 Tiridates III accepts Christianity for the Armenian people. 

330 Ring Marian III of Kartli-Iberia accepts Christianity for the Geor- 

gian people. 



FIFTH-SEVENTH 
CENTURIES 



First golden age of Armenian culture. 



ca. 600 



Four centuries of Arab control of Azerbaijan begin, introducing 
Islam in seventh century. 



645 
653 



Arabs capture Tbilisi. 

Byzantine Empire cedes Armenia to Arabs. 



NINTH-TENTH 
CENTURIES 



806 
813 



Arabs install Bagratid family to govern Armenia. 

Armenian prince Ashot I begins 1,000 years of rule in Georgia by 
Bagratid Dynasty. 



862-977 



Second golden age of Armenian culture, under Ashot I and Ashot 
III. 



ELEVENTH- Byzantine Greeks invade Armenia from west, Seljuk Turks from 

FOURTEENTH east; Turkish groups wrest political control of Azerbaijan from 

CENTURIES Arabs, introducing Turkish language and culture. 



1099-1125 



David IV the Builder establishes expanded Georgian Empire and 
begins golden age of Georgia. 



Period 



Description 



1000-late 1200s 
1100s-1300s 

1200-1400 

1375 

1386 

FIFTEENTH CEN- 
TURY 

SIXTEENTH CEN- 
TURY 

1501 

1553 

EIGHTEENTH 
CENTURY 

ca. 1700 

1762 

NINETEENTH 
CENTURY 

1801 
1811 
1813 
1828 

1872 



Golden age of Azerbaijani literature and architecture. 

Cilician Armenian and Georgian armies aid European armies in 
Crusades to limit Muslim control of Holy Land. 

Mongols twice invade Azerbaijan, establishing temporary dynasties. 

Cilician Armenia conquered by Mamluk Turks. 

Timur (Tamerlane) sacks Tbilisi, ending Georgian Empire 

Most of modern Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia become part of 
Ottoman Empire. 

Azerbaijani Safavid Dynasty begins rule by Persian Empire. 
Ottoman Turks and Persians divide Georgia between them. 



Russia begins moving into northern Azerbaijan as Persian Empire 
weakens. 

Herekle II reunites eastern Georgian regions in kingdom of Kartli- 
Kakhetia. 



After Herekle IPs appeal for aid, Russian Empire abolishes Bagratid 
Dynasty and begins annexation of Georgia. 



Georgian Orthodox Church loses autocephalous status in Russifica- 
tion process. 



Treaty of Gulistan officially divides Azerbaijan into Russian (north- 
ern) and Persian (southern) spheres. 



Treaty of Turkmanchay awards Nakhichevan and area around Ere- 
van to Russia, strengthening Russian control of Transcaucasus 
and beginning period of modernization and security. 



Oil industry established around Baku, beginning rapid expansion. 



Period 



Description 



1878 

1891 

1895 

TWENTIETH 
CENTURY 

ca. 1900 

1908 

1915 

1917 

1918 

1920 

1921 
1922 

1936 

1936-37 

1943 
1946 

1959 



"Armenian question" emerges at Congress of Berlin; disposition of 
Armenia becomes ongoing European issue. 

First Armenian revolutionary party formed. 

Massacre of 300,000 Armenian subjects by Ottoman Turks. 



Radical political organizations begin to form in Azerbaijan. 

Young Turks take over government of Ottoman Empire with reform 
agenda, supported by Armenian population. 

Young Turks massacre 600,000 to 2 million Armenians; most survi- 
vors leave eastern Anatolia. 

Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia form independent Transcauca- 
sian federation. Tsar Nicholas II abdicates Russian throne; Bol- 
sheviks take power in Russia. 

Independent Armenian, Azerbaijani, and Georgian states emerge 
from defeat of Ottoman Empire in World War I. 

Red Army invades Azerbaijan and forces Armenia to accept commu- 
nist-dominated government. 

Red Army invades Georgia and drives out Zhordania government. 

Transcaucasian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic combines Arme- 
nia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia as single republic within Soviet 
Union. 

Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia become separate republics 
within Soviet Union. 

Purges under political commissar Lavrenti Beria reach their peak in 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. 

Autonomy restored to Georgian Orthodox Church. 

Western powers force Soviet Union to abandon Autonomous Gov- 
ernment of Azerbaijan, formed in 1945 after Soviet occupation of 
northern Iran. 

Nikita S. Khrushchev purges Azerbaijani Communist Party. 



Period 



Description 



1969 
ca. 1970 



Heydar Aliyev named head of Azerbaijani Communist Party. 

Zviad Gamsakhurdia begins organizing dissident Georgian national- 



1972 



Eduard Shevardnadze named first secretary of Georgian Commu- 
nist Party. 



1974 



Moscow installs regime of Karen Demirchian in Armenia to end 
party corruption; regime later removed for corruption. 



1978 



Mass demonstrations prevent Moscow from making Russian an offi- 
cial language of Georgia. 



1982 



Aliyev of Azerbaijan named full member of Politburo of Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union. 



1985 



Shevardnadze named minister of foreign affairs of Soviet Union 
and leaves post as first secretary of Georgian Communist Party. 



Late 1980s 



Mikhail S. Gorbachev initiates policies of glasnost and perestroiha 
throughout Soviet Union. 



1988 



Armenian nationalist movement revived by Karabakh and corrup- 
tion concerns. 



February 



Nagorno-Karabakh government votes to unify that autonomoi 
region of Azerbaijan with Armenia. 



December 



Disastrous earthquake in northern Armenia heavily damages Leni- 
nakan (nowGyumri). 



1989 April 



Soviet troops kill Georgian civilian demonstrators in Tbilisi, radical- 
izing Georgian public opinion. 



Spring 



Mass demonstrations in Armenia achieve release of Karabakh Com- 
mittee arrested by Soviets to quell nationalist movement. 



September 



Azerbaijan begins blockade of Armenian fuel and supply lines over 
Karabakh issue. 



Fall 



Azerbaijani opposition parties lead mass protests against Soviet rule; 
national sovereignty officially proclaimed. 



November 



Nagorno-Karabakh National Council declares unification of 
Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia. 



1990 January 



Moscow sends troops to Azerbaijan, nominally to stem violence 



Period 



Description 



against Armenians over Karabakh 



Spring 



Levon Ter-Petrosian of Armenian Pannational Movement chosen 
chairman of Armenian Supreme Soviet. 



October In first multiparty election held in Georgia, Gamsakhurdia's opposi- 

tionist party crushes communists; Gamsakhurdia named presi- 
dent. 



1991 January Georgian forces invade South Ossetia in response to independence 

movement there; fighting continues all year; Soviet troops invade 
Azerbaijan, ostensibly to halt anti-Armenian pogroms. 



April 
May 



After referendum approval, Georgian parliament declares Georgia 
independent of Soviet Union. 

Gamsakhurdia becomes first president of Georgia, elected directly 
in multiparty election. 



August Attempted coup against Gorbachev in Moscow fails. 

September Armenian voters approve national independence. 



October 



Azerbaijani referendum declares Azerbaijan independent of Soviet 
Union; Ter-Petrosian elected president of Armenia. 



December 



Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh declare independent state as 
fighting there continues; Soviet Union officially dissolved. 



1992 January 



March 



Gamsakhurdia driven from Georgia into exile by opposition forces. 
Shevardnadze returns to Tbilisi and forms new government. 



Spring 



Armenian forces occupy Lachin corridor linking Nagorno-Kara- 
bakh to Armenia. 



June 



Abulfaz Elchibey elected president of Azerbaijan and forms first 
postcommunist government there. 



July Cease-fire mediated by Russia's President Yeltsin in SouthOssetia. 

October Parliamentary election held in Georgia; Shevardnazde receives 

overwhelming support. 



Fall 



Fighting begins between Abkhazian independence forces and Geor- 
gian forces; large-scale refugee displacement continues through 
next two years. 



Period 



Description 



1993 June 
Fall 



October 



Military coup deposes Elchibey in Azerbaijan; Aliyev returns to 
power. 

Multilateral negotiations seek settlement of Karabakh conflict, with- 
out result; fighting, blockade, and international negotiation con- 
tinue into 1994. 



Shevardnadze responds to deterioration of Georgian military posi- 
tion by having Georgia join Commonwealth of Independent 
States, thus gaining Russian military support; Aliyev elected presi- 
dent of Azerbaijan. 



XX 



Introduction 



THE THREE REPUBLICS of Transcaucasia— Armenia, Azer- 
baijan, and Georgia — were included in the Soviet Union in the 
early 1920s after their inhabitants had passed through long and 
varied periods as separate nations and as parts of neighboring 
empires, most recently the Russian Empire. By the time the 
Soviet Union dissolved at the end of 1991, the three republics 
had regained their independence, but their economic weak- 
ness and the turmoil surrounding them jeopardized that inde- 
pendence almost immediately. By 1994 Russia had regained 
substantial influence in the region by arbitrating disputes and 
by judiciously inserting peacekeeping troops. Geographically 
isolated, the three nations gained some Western economic sup- 
port in the early 1990s, but in 1994 the leaders of all three 
asserted that national survival depended chiefly on diverting 
resources from military applications to restructuring economic 
and social institutions. 

Location at the meeting point of southeastern Europe with 
the western border of Asia greatly influenced the histories of 
the three national groups forming the present-day Transcauca- 
sian republics (see fig. 1; fig. 2). Especially between the twelfth 
and the twentieth centuries, their peoples were subject to inva- 
sion and control by the Ottoman, Persian, and Russian 
empires. But, with the formation of the twentieth-century 
states named for them, the Armenian, Azerbaijani, and Geor- 
gian peoples as a whole underwent different degrees of dis- 
placement and played quite different roles. For example, the 
Republic of Azerbaijan that emerged from the Soviet Union in 
1991 contains only 5.8 million of the world's estimated 19 mil- 
lion Azerbaijanis, with most of the balance living in Iran, across 
a southern border fixed by Persia and Russia in the nineteenth 
century. At the same time, slightly more than half the world's 
6.3 million Armenians are widely scattered outside the borders 
of the Republic of Armenia as a result of a centuries-long 
diaspora and step-by-step reduction of their national territory. 
In contrast, the great majority of the world's Georgian popula- 
tion lives in the Republic of Georgia (together with ethnic 
minorities constituting about 30 percent of the republic's pop- 
ulation), after having experienced centuries of foreign domi- 
nation but little forcible alteration of national boundaries. 



xxiii 




xxii 



The starting points and the outside influences that formed 
the three cultures also were quite different. In pre-Christian 
times, Georgia's location along the Black Sea opened it to cul- 
tural influence from Greece. During the same period, Armenia 
was settled by tribes from southeastern Europe, and Azerbaijan 
was settled by Asiatic Medes, Persians, and Scythians. In Azer- 
baijan, Persian cultural influence dominated in the formative 
period of the first millennium B.C. In the early fourth century, 
kings of Armenia and Georgia accepted Christianity after 
extensive contact with the proselytizing early Christians at the 
eastern end of the Mediterranean. Following their conversion, 
Georgians remained tied by religion to the Roman Empire and 
later the Byzantine Empire centered at Constantinople. 
Although Armenian Christianity broke with Byzantine Ortho- 
doxy very early, Byzantine occupation of Armenian territory 
enhanced the influence of Greek culture on Armenians in the 
Middle Ages. 

In Azerbaijan, the Zoroastrian religion, a legacy of the early 
Persian influence there, was supplanted in the seventh century 
by the Muslim faith introduced by conquering Arabs. Conquest 
and occupation by the Turks added centuries of Turkic influ- 
ence, which remains a primary element of secular Azerbaijani 
culture, notably in language and the arts. In the twentieth cen- 
tury, Islam remains the prevalent religion of Azerbaijan, with 
about three-quarters of the population adhering to the Shia 
(see Glossary) branch. 

Golden ages of peace and independence enabled the three 
civilizations to individualize their forms of art and literature 
before 1300, and all have retained unique characteristics that 
arose during those eras. The Armenian, Azerbaijani, and Geor- 
gian languages also grew in different directions: Armenian 
developed from a combination of Indo-European and non- 
Indo-European language stock, with an alphabet based on the 
Greek; Azerbaijani, akin to Turkish and originating in Central 
Asia, now uses the Roman alphabet after periods of official 
usage of the Arabic and Cyrillic alphabets; and Georgian, unre- 
lated to any major world language, uses a Greek-based alphabet 
quite different from the Armenian. 

Beginning in the eighteenth century, the Russian Empire 
constantly probed the Caucasus region for possible expansion 
toward the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea. These efforts 
engaged Russia in a series of wars with the Persian and Otto- 
man empires, both of which by that time were decaying from 



xxiv 



within. By 1828 Russia had annexed or had been awarded by 
treaty all of present-day Azerbaijan and Georgia and most of 
present-day Armenia. (At that time, much of the Armenian 
population remained across the border in the Ottoman 
Empire.) 

Except for about two years of unstable independence follow- 
ing World War I, the Transcaucasus countries remained under 
Russian, and later Soviet, control until 1991. As part of the 
Soviet Union from 1922 to 1991, they underwent approxi- 
mately the same degree of economic and political regimenta- 
tion as the other constituent republics of the union (until 1936 
the Transcaucasian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic 
included all three countries). The Sovietization process 
included intensive industrialization, collectivization of agricul- 
ture, and large-scale shifts of the rural work force to industrial 
centers, as well as expanded and standardized systems for edu- 
cation, health care, and social welfare. Although industries 
came under uniform state direction, private farms in the three 
republics, especially in Georgia, remained important agricul- 
turally because of the inefficiency of collective farms. 

The achievement of independence in 1991 left the three 
republics with inefficient and often crumbling remains of the 
Soviet-era state systems. In the years that followed, political, 
military, and financial chaos prevented reforms from being 
implemented in most areas. Land redistribution proceeded 
rapidly in Armenia and Georgia, although agricultural inputs 
often remained under state control. In contrast, in 1994 Azer- 
baijan still depended mainly on collective farms. Education 
and health institutions remained substantially the same central- 
ized suppliers as they had in the Soviet era, but availability of 
educational and medical materials and personnel dropped 
sharply after 1991. The military conflict in Azerbaijan's 
Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region put enormous stress 
on the health and social welfare systems of combatants Arme- 
nia and Azerbaijan, and Azerbaijan's blockade of Armenia, 
which began in 1989, caused acute shortages of all types of 
materials (see fig. 3). 

The relationship of Russia to the former Soviet republics in 
the Transcaucasus caused increasing international concern in 
the transition years. The presence of Russian peacekeeping 
troops between Georgian and Abkhazian separatist forces 
remained an irritant to Georgian nationalists and an indica- 
tion that Russia intended to intervene in that part of the world 



xxv 




Stepanakert* 



Shusha 



i 



International boundary 
Region capital 
Populated place 
Railroad 
Road 



NOTE - Status of Nagorno-Karabakh 
under negotiation in 1994. 



10 Kilometers 



/ 

r 

RAN 



Figure 3. Nagorno-Karabakh, 1994 



when opportunities arose. Russian nationalists saw such inter- 
vention as an opportunity to recapture nearby parts of the old 
Soviet empire. In the fall of 1994, in spite of strong nationalist 
resistance in each of the Transcaucasus countries, Russia was 
poised to improve its economic and military influence in 
Armenia and Azerbaijan, as it had in Georgia, if its mediation 
activities in Nagorno-Karabakh bore fruit. 



xxvi 



The countries of Transcaucasia each inherited large state- 
owned enterprises specializing in products assigned by the 
Soviet system: military electronics and chemicals in Armenia, 
petroleum-based and textile industries in Azerbaijan, and 
chemicals, machine tools, and metallurgy in Georgia. As in 
most of the nations in the former Soviet sphere, redistribution 
and revitalization of such enterprises proved a formidable 
obstacle to economic growth and foreign investment in Arme- 
nia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. Efforts at enterprise privatization 
were hindered by the stresses of prolonged military engage- 
ments, the staying power of underground economies that had 
defied control under communist and postcommunist govern- 
ments, the lack of commercial expertise, and the lack of a legal 
infrastructure on which to base new business relationships. As a 
result, in 1994 the governments were left with oversized, ineffi- 
cient, and often bankrupt heavy industries whose operation 
was vital to provide jobs and to revive the national economies. 
At the same time, small private enterprises were growing rap- 
idly, especially in Armenia and Georgia. 

In the early 1990s, the Caucasus took its place among the 
regions of the world having violent post-Cold War ethnic con- 
flict. Several wars broke out in the region once Soviet authority 
ceased holding the lid on disagreements that had been fer- 
menting for decades. (Joseph V. Stalin's forcible relocation of 
ethnic groups after redrawing the region's political map was a 
chief source of the friction of the 1990s.) Thus, the three 
republics devoted critical resources to military campaigns in a 
period when the need for internal restructuring was para- 
mount. 

In Georgia, minority separatist movements — primarily on 
the part of the Ossetians and the Abkhaz, both given intermit- 
tent encouragement by the Soviet regime over the years — 
demanded fuller recognition in the new order of the early 
1990s. Asserting its newly gained national prerogatives, Georgia 
responded with military attempts to restrain separatism forc- 
ibly. A year-long battle in South Ossetia, initiated by Zviad Gam- 
sakhurdia, post-Soviet Georgia's ultranationalist first president, 
reached an uneasy peace in mid-1992. Early in 1992, however, 
the violent eviction of Gamsakhurdia from the presidency 
added another opponent of Georgian unity as the exiled Gam- 
sakhurdia gathered his forces across the border. 

In mid-1992 Georgian paramilitary troops entered the Ab- 
khazian Autonomous Republic of Georgia, beginning a new 



xxvii 



conflict that in 1993 threatened to break apart the country. 
When Georgian troops were driven from Abkhazia in Septem- 
ber 1993, Georgia's President Eduard Shevardnadze was able to 
gain Russian military aid to prevent the collapse of the country. 
In mid-1994 an uneasy cease-fire was in force; Abkhazian forces 
controlled their entire region, but no negotiated settlement 
had been reached. Life in Georgia had stabilized, but no per- 
manent answers had been found to ethnic claims and counter- 
claims. 

For Armenia and Azerbaijan, the center of nationalist self- 
expression in this period was the Nagorno-Karabakh Autono- 
mous Region of Azerbaijan. After the Armenian majority there 
declared unification with Armenia in 1988, ethnic conflict 
broke out in both republics, leaving many Armenians and Azer- 
baijanis dead. For the next six years, battles raged between 
Armenian and Azerbaijani regular forces and between Arme- 
nian militias from Nagorno-Karabakh ("mountainous Kara- 
bakh" in Russian) and foreign mercenaries, killing thousands 
in and around Karabakh and causing massive refugee move- 
ments in both directions. Armenian military forces, better sup- 
plied and better organized, generally gained ground in the 
conflict, but the sides were evened as Armenia itself was devas- 
tated by six years of Azerbaijani blockades. In 1993 and early 
1994, international mediation efforts were stymied by the 
intransigence of the two sides and by competition between Rus- 
sia and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE — see Glossary) for the role of chief peace negotiator. 

Armenia 

Armenia, in the twentieth century the smallest of the three 
republics in size and population, has undergone the greatest 
change in the location of its indigenous population. After 
occupying eastern Anatolia (now eastern Turkey) for nearly 
2,000 years, the Armenian population of the Ottoman Empire 
was extinguished or driven out by 1915, adding to a diaspora 
that had begun centuries earlier. After 1915 only the eastern 
population, in and around Erevan, remained in its original 
location. In the Soviet era, Armenians preserved their cultural 
traditions, both in Armenia and abroad. The Armenian peo- 
ple's strong sense of unity has been reinforced by periodic 
threats to their existence. When Armenia, Azerbaijan, and 
Georgia gained their independence in 1991, Armenia pos- 



xxviii 



sessed the fewest natural and man-made resources upon which 
to build a new state. Fertile agricultural areas are relatively 
small, transportation is limited by the country's landlocked 
position and mountainous terrain (and, beginning in 1989, by 
the Azerbaijani blockade), and the material base for industry is 
not broad. A high percentage of cropland requires irrigation, 
and disorganized land privatization has delayed the benefits 
that should result from reducing state agricultural control. 
Although harvests were bountiful in 1993, gaps in support sys- 
tems for transport and food processing prevented urban popu- 
lations from benefiting. 

The intensive industrialization of Armenia between the 
world wars was accomplished within the controlled barter sys- 
tem of the Soviet republics, not within a separate economic 
unit. The specialized industrial roles assigned Armenia in the 
Soviet system offered little of value to the world markets from 
which the republic had been protected until 1991. Since 1991 
Armenia has sought to reorient its Soviet-era scientific- 
research, military electronics, and chemicals infrastructures to 
satisfy new demands, and international financial assistance has 
been forthcoming. In the meantime, basic items of Armenian 
manufacture, such as textiles, shoes, and carpets, have 
remained exportable. However, the extreme paucity of energy 
sources — little coal, natural gas, or petroleum is extracted in 
Armenia — always has been a severe limitation to industry. And 
about 30 percent of the existing industrial infrastructure was 
lost in the earthquake of 1988. Desperate crises arose through- 
out society when Azerbaijan strangled energy imports that had 
provided over 90 percent of Armenia's energy. Every winter of 
the early 1990s brought more difficult conditions, especially 
for urban Armenians. 

In the early 1990s, the Armenian economy was also stressed 
by direct support of Karabakh self-determination. Karabakh 
received massive shipments of food and other materials 
through the Lachin corridor that Karabakh Armenian forces 
had opened across southwestern Azerbaijan. Although Kara- 
bakh sent electricity to Armenia in return, the balance of trade 
was over two to one in favor of Karabakh, and Armenian credits 
covered most of Karabakh's budget deficits. Meanwhile, Arme- 
nia remained a command rather than a free-market economy 
to ensure that the military received adequate economic sup- 
port. 



xxix 



In addition to the Karabakh conflict, wage, price, and social 
welfare conditions have caused substantial social unrest since 
independence. The dram (for value of the dram — see Glos- 
sary), the national currency introduced in 1992, underwent 
almost immediate devaluation as the national banking system 
tried to stabilize international exchange rates. Accordingly, in 
1993 prices rose to an average of 130 percent of wages, which 
the government indexed through that year. The scarcity of 
many commodities, caused by the blockade, also pushed prices 
higher. In the first post-Soviet years, and especially in 1993, 
plant closings and the energy crisis caused unemployment to 
more than double. At the same time, the standard of living of 
the average Armenian deteriorated; by 1993 an estimated 90 
percent of the population was living below the official poverty 
line. 

Armenia's first steps toward democracy were uneven. Upon 
declaring independence, Armenia adapted the political sys- 
tem, set forth in its Soviet-style 1978 constitution, to the short- 
term requirements of governance. The chief executive would 
be the chairman of Armenia's Supreme Soviet, which was the 
chief legislative body of the new republic — but in independent 
Armenia the legislature and the executive branch would no 
longer merely rubber-stamp policy decisions handed down 
from Moscow. 

The inherited Soviet system was used in the expectation that 
a new constitution would prescribe Western-style institutions in 
the near future. However, between 1992 and 1994 consensus 
was not reached between factions backing a strong executive 
and those backing a strong legislature. 

At the center of the dispute over the constitution was Levon 
Ter-Petrosian, president (through late 1994) of post-Soviet 
Armenia. Beginning in 1991, Ter-Petrosian responded to the 
twin threats of political chaos and military defeat at the hands 
of Azerbaijan by accumulating extraordinary executive powers. 
His chief opposition, a faction that was radically nationalist but 
held few seats in the fragmented Supreme Soviet, sought to 
build coalitions to cut the president's power, then to finalize 
such a move in a constitution calling for a strong legislature. As 
they had on other legislation, however, the chaotic delibera- 
tions of parliament yielded no decision. Ter-Petrosian was able 
to continue his pragmatic approach to domestic policy, priva- 
tizing the economy whenever possible, and to continue his 
moderate, sometimes conciliatory, tone on the Karabakh issue. 



xxx 



Beginning in 1991, Armenia's foreign policy also was dic- 
tated by the Karabakh conflict. After independence, Russian 
troops continued serving as border guards and in other capaci- 
ties that Armenia's new national army could not fill. Armenia, a 
charter member of the Russian-sponsored Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS — see Glossary), forged security agree- 
ments with CIS member states and took an active part in the 
organization. After 1991 Russia remained Armenia's foremost 
trading partner, supplying the country with fuel. As the Kara- 
bakh conflict evolved, Armenia took a more favorable position 
toward Russian leadership of peace negotiations than did Azer- 
baijan. 

The dissolution of the Soviet Union made possible closer 
relations with Armenia's traditional enemy Turkey, whose 
membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO — see Glossary) had put it on the opposite side in the 
Cold War. In the Karabakh conflict, Turkey sided with Islamic 
Azerbaijan, blocking pipeline deliveries to Armenia through its 
territory. Most important, Turkey withheld acknowledgment of 
the 1915 massacre, without which no Armenian government 
could permit a rapprochement. Nevertheless, tentative con- 
tacts continued throughout the early 1990s. 

In spite of pressure from nationalist factions, the Ter-Petro- 
sian government held that Armenia should not unilaterally 
annex Karabakh and that the citizens of Karabakh had a right 
to self-determination (presumably meaning either indepen- 
dence or union with Armenia). Although Ter-Petrosian main- 
tained contact with Azerbaijan's President Heydar Aliyev, and 
Armenia officially accepted the terms of several peace propos- 
als, recriminations for the failure of peace talks flew from both 
sides in 1993. 

The United States and the countries of the European Union 
(EU) have aided independent Armenia in several ways, 
although the West has criticized Armenian incursions into 
Azerbaijani territory. Humanitarian aid, most of it from the 
United States, played a large role between 1991 and 1994 in 
Armenia's survival through the winters of the blockade. Arme- 
nia successively pursued aid from the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF — see Glossary), and the World Bank (see Glossary). 
Two categories of assistance, humanitarian and technical, were 
offered through those lenders. Included was aid for recovery 
from the 1988 earthquake, whose destructive effects were still 



xxxi 



being felt in Armenia's industry and transportation infrastruc- 
ture as of late 1994. 

After the Soviet Union collapsed, Armenia's national secu- 
rity continued to depend heavily on the Russian military. The 
officer corps of the new national army created in 1992 
included many Armenian former officers of the Soviet army, 
and Russian institutes trained new Armenian officers. Two Rus- 
sian divisions were transferred to Armenian control, but 
another division remained under full Russian control on Arme- 
nian soil. 

Internal security was problematic in the transitional years. 
The Ministry of Internal Affairs, responsible for internal secu- 
rity agencies, remained outside regular government control, as 
it had been in the Soviet period. This arrangement led to cor- 
ruption, abuses of power, and public cynicism, a state of affairs 
that was especially serious because the main internal security 
agency acted as the nation's regular police force. The distrac- 
tion of the Karabakh crisis combined with security lapses to 
stimulate a rapid rise in crime in the early 1990s. The political 
situation was also complicated by charges of abuse of power 
exchanged by high government officials in relation to security 
problems. 

By the spring of 1994, Armenians had survived a fourth win- 
ter of acute shortages, and Armenian forces in Karabakh had 
survived the large-scale winter offensive that Azerbaijan 
launched in December 1993. In May 1994, a flurry of diplo- 
matic activity by Russia and the CIS, stimulated by the new 
round of fighting, produced a cease-fire that held, with some 
violations, through the summer. A lasting treaty was delayed, 
however, by persistent disagreement over the nationality of 
peacekeeping forces that would occupy Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan 
resisted the return of Russian troops to its territory, while the 
Russian plan called for at least half the forces to be Russian. On 
both diplomatic and economic fronts, new signs of stability 
caused guarded optimism in Armenia in the fall of 1994. 

The failure of the CSCE peace plan, which Azerbaijan sup- 
ported, had caused that country to mount an all-out, human- 
wave offensive in December 1993 and January 1994, which ini- 
tially pushed back Armenian defensive lines in Karabakh and 
regained some lost territory. When the offensive stalled in Feb- 
ruary, Russia's minister of defense, Pavel Grachev, negotiated a 
cease-fire, which enabled Russia to supplant the CSCE as the 
primary peace negotiator. Intensive Russian-sponsored talks 



xxxii 



continued through the spring, although Azerbaijan mounted 
air strikes on Karabakh as late as April. In May 1994, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-Karabakh signed the CIS-sponsored 
Bishkek Protocol, calling for a cease-fire and the beginning of 
troop withdrawals. In July the defense ministers of the three 
jurisdictions officially extended the cease-fire, signaling that all 
parties were moving toward some combination of the Russian 
and the CSCE peace plans. In September the exchange of 
Armenian and Azerbaijani prisoners of war began. 

Under these conditions, Russia was able to intensify its 
three-way diplomatic gambit in the Transcaucasus, steadily 
erasing Armenians' memory of airborne Soviet forces landing 
unannounced as a show of strength in 1991. In the first half of 
1994, Armenia moved closer to Russia on several fronts. A Feb- 
ruary treaty established bilateral barter of vital resources. In 
March Russia agreed to joint operation of the Armenian 
Atomic Power Station at Metsamor, whose scheduled 1995 
reopening is a vital element in easing the country's energy cri- 
sis. Also in March, Armenia replaced its mission in Moscow 
with a full embassy. In June the Armenian parliament approved 
the addition of airborne troops to the Russian garrison at 
Gyumri near the Turkish border. Then in July, Russia extended 
100 billion rubles (about US$35 million at that time) for reacti- 
vation of the Metsamor station, and Armenia signed a US$250 
million contract with Russia for Armenia to process precious 
metals and gems supplied by Russia. In addition, Armenia con- 
sistently favored the Russian peace plan for Nagorno-Kara- 
bakh, in opposition to Azerbaijan's insistence on reviving the 
CSCE plan that prescribed international monitors rather than 
combat troops (most of whom would be Russian) on Azer- 
baijani soil. 

Armenia was active on other diplomatic fronts as well in 
1994. President Ter-Petrosian made official visits to Britain's 
Prime Minister John Major in February (preceding Azer- 
baijan's Heydar Aliyev by a few weeks when the outcome of the 
last large-scale campaign in the Karabakh conflict remained in 
doubt) and to President William J. Clinton in the United States 
in August. Clinton promised more active United States support 
for peace negotiations, and an exchange of military attaches 
was set. While in Washington, Ter-Petrosian expressed interest 
in joining the NATO Partnership for Peace, in which Azer- 
baijan had gained membership three months earlier. 



xxxiii 



Relations with Turkey remained cool, however. In 1994 Tur- 
key continued its blockade of Armenia in support of Azer- 
baijan and accused Armenia of fostering rebel activity by 
Kurdish groups in eastern Turkey; it reiterated its denial of 
responsibility for the 1915 massacre of Armenians in the Otto- 
man Empire. In June these policies prompted Armenia to 
approve the security agreement with Russia that stationed Rus- 
sian airborne troops in Armenia near the Turkish border. In 
July Armenia firmly refused Turkey's offer to send peacekeep- 
ing forces to Nagorno-Karabakh. Thus, Armenia became an 
important player in the continuing contest between Russia and 
Turkey for influence in the Black Sea and Caucasus regions. 
Armenians considered the official commemoration by Israel 
and Russia of the 1915 Armenian massacre a significant 
advancement in the country's international position. 

Early in 1994, Armenia's relations with Georgia worsened 
after Azerbaijani terrorists in Georgia again sabotaged the nat- 
ural gas pipeline supplying Armenia through Georgia. Delayed 
rail delivery to Armenia of goods arriving in Georgian ports 
also caused friction. Underlying these stresses were Georgia's 
unreliable transport system and its failure to prevent violent 
acts on Georgian territory. Pipeline and railroad sabotage inci- 
dents continued through mid-1994. 

The domestic political front remained heated in 1994. As 
the parliamentary elections of 1995 approached, Ter-Petro- 
sian's centrist Armenian Pannational Movement (APM), which 
dominated political life after 1991, had lost ground to the right 
and the left because Armenians were losing patience with eco- 
nomic hardship. Opposition newspapers and citizens' groups, 
which Ter-Petrosian refused to outlaw, continued their accusa- 
tions of official corruption and their calls for the resignation of 
the Ter-Petrosian government early in the year. Then, in mid- 
1994 the opposition accelerated its activity by mounting anti- 
government street demonstrations of up to 50,000 protesters. 

In the protracted struggle over a new constitution, the 
opposition intensified rhetoric supporting a document built 
around a strong legislature rather than the strong-executive 
version supported by Ter-Petrosian. By the fall of 1994, little 
progress had been made even on the method of deciding this 
critical issue. While opposition parties called for a constitu- 
tional assembly, the president offered to hold a national refer- 
endum, following which he would resign if defeated. 



xxxiv 



Economic conditions were also a primary issue for the 
opposition. The value of the dram, pegged at 14.5 to the 
United States dollar when it was established in November 1993, 
had plummeted to 390 to the dollar by May 1994. In Septem- 
ber a major overhaul of Armenia's financial system was under 
way, aimed at establishing official interest rates and a national 
credit system, controlling inflation, opening a securities mar- 
ket, regulating currency exchange, and licensing lending insti- 
tutions. In the overall plan, the Central Bank of Armenia and 
the Erevan Stock Exchange assumed central roles in redirect- 
ing the flow of resources toward production of consumer 
goods. And government budgeting began diverting funds from 
military to civilian production support, a step advertised as the 
beginning of the transition from a command to a market econ- 
omy. This process included the resumption of privatization of 
state enterprises, which had ceased in mid-1992, including full 
privatization of small businesses and cautious partial privatiza- 
tion of larger ones. In mid-1994 the value of the dram stabi- 
lized, and industrial production increased somewhat. As 
another winter approached, however, the amount of goods and 
food available to the average consumer remained at or below 
subsistence level, and social unrest threatened to increase. 

In September Armenia negotiated terms for the resumption 
of natural gas deliveries from its chief supplier, Turkmenistan, 
which had threatened a complete cutoff because of outstand- 
ing debts. Under the current agreement, all purchases of Turk- 
men gas were destined for electric power generation in 
Armenia. Also in September, the IMF offered favorable interest 
rates on a loan of US$800 million if Armenia raised consumer 
taxes and removed controls on bread prices. Armenian officials 
resisted those conditions because they would further erode liv- 
ing conditions. 

Thus in mid-1994 Armenia, blessed with strong leadership 
and support from abroad but cursed with a poor geopolitical 
position and few natural resources, was desperate for peace 
after the Karabakh Armenians had virtually won their war for 
self-determination. With many elements of post-Soviet eco- 
nomic reform in place, a steady flow of assistance from the 
West, and an end to the Karabakh conflict in sight, Armenia 
looked forward to a new era of development. 

Azerbaijan 

Azerbaijan, the easternmost and largest of the Transcauca- 



xxxv 



sus states in size and in population, has the richest combina- 
tion of agricultural and industrial resources of the three states. 
But Azerbaijan's quest for reform has been hindered by the 
limited contact it had with Western institutions and cultures 
before the Soviet era began in 1922. 

Although Azerbaijan normally is included in the three-part 
grouping of the Transcaucasus countries (and was so defined 
politically between 1922 and 1936), it has more in common 
culturally with the Central Asian republics east of the Caspian 
Sea than with Armenia and Georgia. The common link with 
the latter states is the Caucasus mountain range, which defines 
the topography of the northern and western parts of Azer- 
baijan. A unique aspect of Azerbaijan's political geography is 
the enclave of the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic, created 
by the Soviet Union in 1924 in the area between Armenia and 
Iran and separated from the rest of Azerbaijan by Armenian 
territory. In 1924 the Soviet Union also created the Nagorno- 
Karabakh Autonomous Region within Azerbaijan, an enclave 
whose population was about 94 percent Armenian at that time 
and remained about 75 percent Armenian in the late 1980s. 

Beginning in the last years of the Soviet Union and extend- 
ing into the 1990s, the drive for independence by Nagorno- 
Karabakh's Armenian majority was an issue of conflict between 
Armenia, which insisted on self-determination for its fellow 
Armenians, and Azerbaijan, which cited historical acceptance 
of its sovereignty whatever the region's ethnic composition. By 
1991 the independence struggle was an issue of de facto war 
between Azerbaijan and the Karabakh Armenians, who by 1993 
controlled all of Karabakh and much of adjoining Azerbaijan. 

The population of Azerbaijan, already 83 percent Azer- 
baijani before independence, became even more homoge- 
neous as members of the two principal minorities, Armenians 
arid Russians, emigrated in the early 1990s and as thousands of 
Azerbaijanis immigrated from neighboring Armenia. The 
heavily urbanized population of Azerbaijan is concentrated 
around the cities of Baku, Gyandzha, and Sumgait. 

Like the other former Soviet republics, Azerbaijan began in 
1991 to seek the right combination of indigenous and "bor- 
rowed" qualities to replace the awkwardly imposed economic 
and political imprint of the Soviet era. And, like Armenia and 
Georgia, Azerbaijan faced the complications of internal politi- 
cal disruption and military crisis in the first years of this pro- 
cess. 



xxxvi 



For more than 100 years, Azerbaijan's economy has been 
dominated by petroleum extraction and processing. In the 
Soviet system, Azerbaijan's delegated role had evolved from 
supplying crude oil to supplying oil-extraction equipment, as 
Siberian oil fields came to dominate the Soviet market and as 
Caspian oil fields were allowed to deteriorate. Although 
exploited oil deposits were greatly depleted in the Soviet 
period, the economy still depends heavily on industries linked 
to oil. The country also depends heavily on trade with Russia 
and other former Soviet republics. Azerbaijan's overall indus- 
trial production dropped in the early 1990s, although not as 
drastically as that of Armenia and Georgia. The end of Soviet- 
supported trade connections and the closing of inefficient fac- 
tories caused unemployment to rise and industrial productivity 
to fall an estimated 26 percent in 1992; acute inflation caused a 
major economic crisis in 1993. 

Azerbaijan did not restructure its agriculture as quickly as 
did Armenia and Georgia; inefficient Soviet methods contin- 
ued to hamper production, and the role of private initiative 
remained small. Agriculture in Azerbaijan also was hampered 
by the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, which was an important 
source of fruits, grain, grapes, and livestock. As much as 70 per- 
cent of Azerbaijan's arable land was occupied by military forces 
at some stage of the conflict. 

In spite of these setbacks, Azerbaijan's economy remains the 
healthiest among the three republics, largely because unex- 
ploited oil and natural gas deposits are plentiful (although out- 
put declined in the early 1990s) and because ample electric- 
power generating plants are in operation. Azerbaijan has been 
able to attract Western investment in its oil industry in the post- 
Soviet years, although Russia remains a key oil customer and 
investor. In 1993 the former Soviet republics remained Azer- 
baijan's most important trading partners, and state bureaucra- 
cies still controlled most foreign trade. Political instability in 
Baku, however, continued to discourage Turkey, a natural trad- 
ing partner, from expanding commercial relations. 

The political situation of Azerbaijan was extremely volatile 
in the first years of independence. With performance in 
Nagorno-Karabakh rather than achievement of economic and 
political reform as their chief criterion, Azerbaijanis deposed 
presidents in 1992 and 1993, then returned former communist 
party boss Heydar Aliyev to power. In 1992, in the country's 
first and only free election, the people had chosen Abulfaz 



xxxvii 



Elchibey, leader of the Azerbaijani Popular Front (APF), as 
president. Meanwhile, the Azerbaijani Communist Party, for- 
mally disbanded in 1991, retained positions of political and 
economic power and was key in the coup that returned Aliyev 
to power in June 1993. Former communists dominated policy 
making in the government Aliyev formed after his rubber- 
stamp election as president the following October. However, 
the APF remained a formidable opposition force, especially 
critical of any sign of weakness on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. 

During the transition period, the only national legislative 
body was the Melli-Majlis (National Council), a fifty-member 
interim assembly that came under the domination of former 
communists and, by virtue of postponing parliamentary elec- 
tions indefinitely, continued to retain its power in late 1994. 
Aliyev promised a new constitution and democratic rule, but 
he prolonged his dictatorial powers on the pretext of the con- 
tinuing military emergency. Work on a new constitution was 
begun in 1992, but the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and politi- 
cal turmoil delayed its completion; meanwhile, elements of the 
1978 constitution (based on the 1977 constitution of the Soviet 
Union) remain the highest law of the land, supplemented only 
by provisions of the 1991 Act of Independence. 

Azerbaijan's post-Soviet foreign policy attempted to balance 
the interests of three stronger, often mutually hostile, neigh- 
bors — Iran, Russia, and Turkey — while using those nations' 
interests in regional peace to help resolve the Karabakh con- 
flict. The Elchibey regime of 1992-93 leaned toward Turkey, 
which it saw as the best mediator in Karabakh. Armenia took 
advantage of this strategy, however, to form closer ties with Rus- 
sia, whose economic assistance it needed desperately. Begin- 
ning in 1993, Aliyev sought to rekindle relations with Russia 
and Iran, believing that Russia could negotiate a positive settle- 
ment in Karabakh. Relations with Turkey were carefully main- 
tained, however. 

Beginning in 1991, Azerbaijan's external national security 
was breached by the incursion of the Armenian separatist 
forces of Karabakh militias and reinforcements from Armenia. 
Azerbaijan's main strategy in this early period was to blockade 
landlocked Armenia's supply lines and to rely for national 
defense on the Russian 4th Army, which remained in Azer- 
baijan in 1991. Clashes between Russian troops and Azerbaijani 
civilians in 1991 and the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, 



xxxvin 



led Russia to a rapid commitment for withdrawal of troops and 
equipment, which was completed in mid-1993. 

Under those circumstances, a new, limited national armed 
force was planned in 1992, and, as had been done in Armenia, 
the government appealed to Azerbaijani veterans of the Soviet 
army to defend their homeland. But the force took shape 
slowly, and outside assistance — mercenaries and foreign train- 
ing officers — were summoned to stem the Armenian advance 
that threatened all of southern Azerbaijan. In 1993 continued 
military failures brought reports of mass desertion and subse- 
quent large-scale recruitment of teenage boys, as well as whole- 
sale changes in the national defense establishment. 

In the early 1990s, the domestic and international confu- 
sion bred by the Karabakh conflict increased customs viola- 
tions, white-collar crime, and threats to the populace by 
criminal bands. The role of Azerbaijanis in the international 
drug market expanded noticeably. In 1993 the Aliyev govern- 
ment responded to these problems with a major reform of the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs, which had been plagued by cor- 
ruption and incompetence, but experts agreed that positive 
results required a more stable overall atmosphere. 

In December 1993, Azerbaijan launched a major surprise 
attack on all fronts in Karabakh, using newly drafted personnel 
in wave attacks, with air support. The attack initially over- 
whelmed Armenian positions in the north and south but ulti- 
mately was unsuccessful. An estimated 8,000 Azerbaijani troops 
died in the two-month campaign, which Armenian authorities 
described as Azerbaijan's best-planned offensive of the conflict. 

When the winter offensive failed, Aliyev began using diplo- 
matic channels to seek peace terms acceptable to his constitu- 
ents, involving Russia as little as possible. Already in March, the 
chairman of the Azerbaijani parliament had initiated a private 
meeting with his opposite number from Armenia, an event 
hailed in the Azerbaijani press as a major Azerbaijani peace ini- 
tiative. Official visits by Aliyev to Ankara and London early in 
1994 yielded little additional support for Azerbaijan's position. 
(Turkey remained suspicious of Aliyev's communist back- 
ground.) 

At this point, Azerbaijan reasserted its support for the CSCE 
peace plan, which would use international monitors rather 
than military forces to enforce the cease-fire in Karabakh. Per- 
haps with the goal of avoiding further military losses, Aliyev 
approved in May the provisional cease-fire conditions of the 



xxxix 



Bishkek Protocol, sponsored by the CIS. That agreement, 
which softened Azerbaijan's position on recognizing the sover- 
eignty of Nagorno-Karabakh, was subsequently the basis for 
terms of a true armistice. 

Azerbaijan's official position on armistice conditions 
remained unchanged, however, during the negotiations of the 
summer and fall of 1994, in the face of Armenia's insistence 
that only an armed peacekeeping force (inevitably Russian) 
could prevent new outbreaks of fighting. During that period, 
sporadic Azerbaijani attacks tended to confirm Armenia's judg- 
ment. At the same time, Aliyev urged that his countrymen take 
a more conciliatory position toward Russia. Aliyev argued that 
the Soviet Union, not Russia, had sent the troops who had 
killed Azerbaijanis when they arrived to keep peace with Arme- 
nia in 1990 and that Azerbaijan could profit from exploiting 
rather than rejecting the remaining ties between the two coun- 
tries. 

In May Aliyev signed the NATO Partnership for Peace 
agreement, giving Azerbaijan the associate status that NATO 
had offered to East European nations and the former republics 
of the Soviet Union in late 1993. The same month, Aliyev 
received a mid-level United States delegation charged with dis- 
cussing diplomatic support for the Nagorno-Karabakh peace 
process, Caspian Sea oil exploration by United States firms, 
and bilateral trade agreements. 

In July Aliyev extended his diplomacy to the Muslim world, 
visiting Saudi Arabia and Iran in an effort to balance his diplo- 
matic contacts with the West. Iran was especially important 
because of its proximity to Karabakh and its interest in ending 
the conflict on its border. Iran responded to offers of economic 
cooperation by insisting that any agreement must await a peace 
treaty between Azerbaijan and Armenia. 

In the fall of 1994, a seventeen-point peace agreement was 
drafted, but major issues remained unresolved. Azerbaijani 
concerns centered on withdrawal of Armenian forces from 
Azerbaijani territory and conditions that would permit Azer- 
baijani refugees to return home. (An estimated 1 million Azer- 
baijanis had fled to other parts of Azerbaijan or Iran from 
occupied territory.) The top priorities for Armenia were ensur- 
ing security for Armenians in Karabakh and defining the status 
of the region prior to the withdrawal of forces. 

A second result of the failed winter offensive of 1993-94 was 
a new crackdown by the Aliyev government on dissident activ- 



xl 



ity. Early in 1994, censors in the Main Administration for Pro- 
tecting State Secrets in the Press sharply increased censorship 
of material criticizing the regime, and the government cut the 
supply of paper and printing plates to opposition newspapers. 
In May a confrontation between Aliyev loyalists and opponents 
in the Melli-Majlis resulted in arrests of opposition leaders and 
reduction in the number of members required for a quorum to 
pass presidential proposals. 

The issue behind the May dispute was Aliyev's handling of 
the Karabakh peace process. A variety of opposition parties and 
organizations claimed that the Bishkek Protocol had betrayed 
Azerbaijan by recognizing the sovereignty of Nagorno-Kara- 
bakh. A new coalition, the National Resistance Movement, was 
formed immediately after the May confrontation in the Melli- 
Majlis. The movement's two principles were opposition to rein- 
troduction of Russian forces in Azerbaijan and opposition to 
Aliyev's "dictatorship." By the end of the summer, however, the 
movement had drawn closer to Aliyev's position on the first 
point, and the announcement of long-delayed parliamentary 
elections to be held in the summer of 1995 aimed to defuse 
charges of dictatorship. Draft election legislation called for 
replacing the "temporary" Melli-Majlis with a 150-seat legisla- 
ture in 1995. 

In October 1994, a military coup, supported by Prime Minis- 
ter Suret Huseynov, failed to topple Aliyev. Aliyev responded by 
declaring a two-month state of emergency, banning demonstra- 
tions, and taking military control of key positions. Huseynov, 
who had signed the Bishkek Protocol as Azerbaijan's represen- 
tative, was dismissed. 

Price and wage levels continued to reduce the standard of 
living in Azerbaijan in 1994. Between mid-1993 and mid-1994, 
prices increased by an average of about sixteen times; from 
November 1993 to July 1994, the state-established minimum 
wage more than doubled. To speed conversion to a market 
economy, the ministries of finance and economics submitted 
plans in July to combine state-run enterprises in forms more 
suitable for privatization. Land privatization has proceeded 
cautiously because of strong political support for maintaining 
the Soviet-era state-farm system. In mid-1994 about 1 percent 
of arable land was in private hands, the bureaucratic process 
for obtaining private land remained long and cumbersome, 
and state allocation of equipment to private farmers was mea- 
ger. 



xli 



Meanwhile, in 1994 currency-exchange activity increased 
dramatically in Azerbaijani banks, bringing more foreign cur- 
rency into the country. The ruble remained the most widely 
used foreign unit in 1994. In June, at the insistence of the IMF 
and the World Bank, the National Bank of Azerbaijan stopped 
issuing credit that lacked monetary backing, a practice that 
had fueled inflation and destabilized the economy. 

The main hope for Azerbaijan's economic recovery lies in 
reviving exploitation of offshore oil deposits in the Caspian 
Sea. By 1993 these deposits had attracted strong interest 
among British, Norwegian, Russian, Turkish, and United States 
firms. Within a consortium of such firms, Russia would likely 
have a 10 percent share and provide the pipeline and the main 
port (Novorossiysk on the Black Sea) for export of Azerbaijan's 
oil. An agreement signed in September 1994 included United 
States, British, Turkish, Russian, and Azerbaijani oil companies. 

In the early 1990s, the development of Azerbaijan's foreign 
trade was skewed by the refusal of eighteen nations, including 
the United States, Canada, Israel, India, and the Republic of 
Korea (South Korea), to import products from Azerbaijan as 
long as the blockade of Armenia continued. At the same time, 
many of those countries sold significant amounts of goods in 
Azerbaijan. Overall, in the first half of 1994 one-third of Azer- 
baijan's imports came from the "far abroad" (all non-CIS trad- 
ing partners), and 46 percent of its exports went outside the 
CIS. In that period, total imports exceeded total exports by 
US$140 million. At the same time, the strongest long-term 
commercial ties within the CIS were with Kazakhstan, Russia, 
Turkmenistan, and Ukraine. 

Like Armenia, Azerbaijan was able to improve internal con- 
ditions only marginally while awaiting the relief of a final peace 
settlement in Karabakh. Unlike either of its Transcaucasus 
neighbors, however, Azerbaijan had the prospect of major 
large-scale Western investment once investment conditions 
improved. Combined with potential oil earnings, diplomatic 
approaches by President Aliyev in 1994 to a number of foreign 
countries, including all of Azerbaijan's neighbors, seemed to 
offer it a much-improved postwar international position. A 
great deal depended, however, on the smooth surrender of 
wartime emergency powers by the Aliyev government and on 
accelerating the stalled development of a market economy. 



xlii 



Georgia 



Georgia possesses the advantages of a subtropical Black Sea 
coastline and a rich mixture of Western and Eastern cultural 
elements. A combination of topographical and national idio- 
syncracies has preserved that cultural blend, whose chief impe- 
tus was the Georgian golden age of the twelfth and early 
thirteenth centuries, during long periods of occupation by for- 
eign empires. Perhaps the most vivid result of this cultural 
independence is the Georgian language, unrelated to any 
other major tongue and largely unaffected by the languages of 
conquering peoples — at least until the massive influx of techni- 
cal loanwords at the end of the twentieth century. 

Since independence, Georgia has had difficulty establishing 
solid political institutions. This difficulty has been caused by 
the distractions of continuing military crises and by the chronic 
indecision of policy makers about the country's proper long- 
term goals and the strategy to reach them. Also, like the other 
Transcaucasus states, Georgia lacks experience with the demo- 
cratic institutions that are now its political ideal; rubber-stamp 
passage of Moscow's agenda is quite different from creation of 
a legislative program useful to an emerging nation. 

As in Azerbaijan, Georgia's most pressing problem has been 
ethnic separatism within the country's borders. Despite Geor- 
gia's modest size, throughout history all manifestations of a 
Georgian nation have included ethnic minorities that have 
conflicted with, or simply ignored, central power. Even in the 
golden age, when a central ruling power commanded the most 
widespread loyalty, King David the Builder was called "King of 
the Abkhaz, the Kartvelians, the Ran, the Kakhetians, and the 
Armenians." In the twentieth century, arbitrary rearrangement 
of ethnic boundaries by the Soviet regime resulted in the 
sharpening of various nationalist claims after Soviet power 
finally disappeared. Thus, in 1991 the South Ossetians of Geor- 
gia demanded union with the Ossetians across the Russian bor- 
der, and in 1992 the Abkhaz of Georgia demanded recognition 
as an independent nation, despite their minority status in the 
region of Georgia they inhabited. 

As in Armenia and Azerbaijan, influential, intensely nation- 
alist factions pushed hard for unqualified military success in 
the struggle for separatist territory. And, as in the other Trans- 
caucasus nations, those factions were frustrated by military and 
geopolitical reality: in Georgia's case, an ineffective Georgian 



xliii 



army required assistance from Russia, the imperialist neighbor 
against whom nationalists had sharpened their teeth only three 
years earlier, to save the nation from fragmentation. At the end 
of 1993, Russia seemingly had settled into a long-term role of 
peacekeeping and occupation between Georgian and Abkha- 
zian forces. 

The most unsettling internal crisis was the failed presidency 
of Zviad Gamsakhurdia, once a respected human rights advo- 
cate and the undisputed leader of Georgia's nationalist opposi- 
tion as the collapse of the Soviet Union became imminent. In 
1991 Gamsakhurdia's dictatorial and paranoid regime, fol- 
lowed by the bloody process of unseating him, gave Georgia a 
lasting reputation for instability that damaged prospects for 
foreign investment and for participation in international orga- 
nizations. 

The failure of the one-year Gamsakhurdia regime necessi- 
tated a new political beginning that coincided with the estab- 
lishment of Eduard Shevardnadze as head of state in early 
1992. Easily the most popular politician in Georgia and facing 
chronically fragmented opposition in parliament, Shevard- 
nadze acquired substantial "temporary" executive powers as he 
maneuvered to maintain national unity. At the same time, his 
hesitation to imitate Gamsakhurdia's grab for power often left 
a vacuum that was filled by quarreling splinter parties with 
widely varied agendas. Shevardnadze preserved parts of his 
reform program by forming temporary coalitions that dis- 
solved when a contentious issue appeared. Despite numerous 
calls for his resignation, and despite rampant government cor- 
ruption and frequent shifts in his cabinet between 1992 and 
1994, there were no other serious contenders for Shevard- 
nadze's position as of late 1994. 

Shevardnadze also used familiarity with the world of diplo- 
macy to reestablish international contacts, gain sympathy for 
Georgia's struggle to remain unified, and seek economic ties 
wherever they might be available. Unlike Armenia and Azer- 
baijan, Georgia did not arouse particular loyalty or hostility 
among any group of nations. In the first years of indepen- 
dence, Shevardnadze made special overtures to Russia, Turkey, 
and the United States and attempted to balance Georgia's 
approach to Armenia and Azerbaijan, its feuding neighbors in 
the Transcaucasus. 

The collapse of the Soviet Union changed Georgia's eco- 
nomic position significantly, although industrial production 



xliv 



already was declining in the last Soviet years. In the Soviet sys- 
tem, Georgia's assignment was mainly to supply the union with 
agricultural products, metal products, and the foreign cur- 
rency collected by Georgian tourist attractions. This specializa- 
tion made Georgia dependent on other Soviet republics for a 
wide range of products that were unavailable after 1991. Nei- 
ther diversification nor meaningful privatization was possible, 
however, under the constant upheaval and energy shortages of 
the early 1990s. In addition, powerful organized criminal 
groups gained control of large segments of the national econ- 
omy, including the export trade. 

After the January 1992 fall of Gamsakhurdia's xenophobic 
regime, the maintenance of internal peace and unity was a crit- 
ical national security issue. Although some progress was made 
in establishing a national armed force in 1994, paramilitary 
organizations — the Mkhedrioni (horsemen) and the National 
Guard — remained influential military forces in the fall of 1994. 
The small size and the poor organization of those groups had 
forced the request for Russian troop assistance in late 1993, 
which in turn renewed the national security dilemma of occu- 
pation by foreign troops. Meanwhile, civilian internal security 
forces, of which Shevardnadze took personal control in 1993, 
gained only partial victories over the crime wave that accompa- 
nied Georgia's post-Soviet upheavals. A series of reorganiza- 
tions in security agencies failed to improve the protection of 
individuals against random crime or of the economic system 
against organized groups. 

Through most of 1994, the Abkhazian conflict was more 
diplomatic than military. In spite of periodic hostilities, the 
uneasy truce line held along the Inguri River in far northwest- 
ern Georgia (in the campaign of October 1993, Georgian 
forces had been pushed out of all of Abkhazia except the far 
northern corner) . The role of the 3,000 Russian peacekeepers 
on the border, and their relationship with United Nations 
(UN) observers, was recognized by a resolution of the UN 
Security Council in July. Throughout that period, the issue of 
the return of as many as 300,000 Georgian refugees to Abkha- 
zia was the main sticking point of negotiations. The Abkhaz saw 
the influx of so many Georgians as a danger to their sover- 
eignty, which Georgia did not recognize, and the refugees' 
plight as a bargaining chip to induce further Georgian with- 
drawal. No settlement was likely before the refugee issue was 



xlv 



resolved. Meanwhile, supporting the refugees placed addi- 
tional stress on Georgian society. 

A legal basis for the presence of Russian troops in Georgia 
had been established in a status-of-forces treaty between the 
two nations in January 1994. The treaty prescribed the author- 
ity and operating conditions of the Group of Russian Troops in 
the Caucasus (GRTC), which was characterized as on Georgian 
territory for a "transitional period." In the summer of 1994, 
high-level bilateral talks covered Georgian-Russian military 
cooperation and further integration of CIS forces. 

The Georgian economy continued to struggle in 1994, 
showing only isolated signs of progress. At the beginning of the 
year, state monopolies were reaffirmed in vital industries such 
as tea and food processing and electric power. By May, however, 
after prodding from the IMF, Shevardnadze began issuing 
decrees that eased privatization conditions. This policy spurred 
a noticeable acceleration of privatization in the summer of 
1994. When the new stimulus began, about 23 percent of state 
enterprises had been privatized, and only thirty-nine joint-stock 
companies had formed out of the more than 900 large firms 
designated for that type of conversion. A voucher system for 
collecting private investment funds, delayed by a shortage of 
hard currency, finally began operating. But the state economic 
bureaucracy, entrenched since the Soviet era, was able to slow 
the privatization process when dispersal of economic power 
threatened its privileged position in 1994. 

Between mid-1993 and mid-1994, prices rose by an average 
of 300 percent, and inflation severely eroded the government- 
guaranteed minimum wage. (In August the minimum wage, 
which was stipulated in coupons [for value of the coupon — see 
Glossary], equaled US$0.33 per month.) Often wages were 
withheld for months because of the currency shortage. In Sep- 
tember the government raised price standards sharply for basic 
food items, transportation, fuel, and services. Lump-sum pay- 
ments to all citizens, designed to offset this cost, failed to reach 
many, prompting new calls for Shevardnadze's resignation. 
Under those conditions, most Georgians were supported by a 
vast network of unofficial economic activities. 

In mid-1994 unemployment was estimated unofficially at 1.5 
million people, nearly 50 percent of Georgia's working-age 
population. The exchange rate of the Georgian coupon stabi- 
lized in early 1994 after many months of high inflation, but by 
that time the coupon had been virtually displaced in private 



xlvi 



transactions by the ruble and the dollar. The national financial 
system remained chaotic — especially in tax collection, customs, 
and import-export operations. The first major state bank was 
privatized in the summer of 1994. In August parliament 
approved a major reform program for social welfare, pricing, 
and the financial system. 

In July 1994, a Georgian-Russian conference on economic 
cooperation discussed transnational corporations and con- 
cluded some contracts for joint economic activities, but most 
Russian investors demanded stronger legal guarantees for their 
risks. Numerous Western firms established small joint ventures 
in 1994, but the most critical investment project under discus- 
sion sought to exploit the substantial oil deposits that had been 
located by recent Australian, British, Georgian, and United 
States explorations in the Black Sea shelf near Batumi and Poti. 
A first step in foreign involvement, an oil refinery near Tbilisi, 
received funding in July, but the Western firms demanded 
major reform of commercial legislation before expanding their 
participation. 

Georgia experienced a major energy crisis in the winter of 
1993-94; following the crisis, in mid-1994 Turkmenistan drasti- 
cally reduced natural gas supplies because of unpaid debts. 
Some fuel aid was expected for the winter of 1994-95 from 
Azerbaijan, the EU, Iran, and Turkey. The output of the 
domestic oil industry increased sharply in mid-1994. As winter 
approached, Georgia also offered Turkmenistan new assur- 
ances of payment in return for resumption of natural gas deliv- 
ery. 

Georgia's communications system, a chronically weak infra- 
structure link that also had discouraged foreign investment, 
began integration into world systems in early 1994 when the 
country joined international postal, satellite, and electronic 
communications organizations. Joint enterprises with Austra- 
lian, French, German, Turkish, and United States communica- 
tions companies allowed the upgrading of the national 
telephone system and installation of fiber-optic cables. 

In the first half of 1994, the most frequent topic of govern- 
ment debate was the role of Russian troops in Abkhazia. By that 
time, opposition nationalist parties had accepted the Russian 
presence but rejected Abkhazian delays in allowing the return 
of refugees and Shevardnadze's tolerance of those delays. In 
May Shevardnadze overcame parliament's objections to new 
concessions to the Abkhaz by threatening to resign. The new 



xlvii 



agreement passed, and opposition leaders muted their 
demands for Shevardnadze's ouster in the belief that Russia 
was seeking to replace him with someone more favorable to 
Russian intervention. Nevertheless, in the fall of 1994 few 
Georgian refugees had returned to Abkhazia. 

Shevardnadze's exercise of extraordinary executive powers 
remained a hot issue in parliament. One faction called for 
reduced powers in the name of democracy, but another 
claimed that a still stronger executive was needed to enforce 
order. In a July poll, 48 percent of respondents said the govern- 
ment was obstructing the mass media. Although the 1992 state 
of emergency continued to restrict dissemination of informa- 
tion, the Georgian media consistently presented various oppo- 
sition views. Likewise, the Zviadists, Gamsakhurdia's 
supporters, although banned from radio and television, contin- 
ued to hold rallies under the leadership of a young radical, 
Irakli Tsereteli. 

In 1994 the government took steps to improve the internal 
security situation. In the latest of a long series of organizational 
and leadership shuffles, Shevardnadze replaced the Emer- 
gency Committee, which had been headed by former Mkhedri- 
oni leader Jaba Ioseliani, with the Emergency Coordinating 
Commission, headed by Shevardnadze, and gave the commis- 
sion a vague mandate to coordinate economic, political, 
defense, and law-enforcement matters. Ioseliani, whose com- 
mand of the Mkhedrioni still gave him great influence, became 
a deputy head of the commission. 

Shevardnadze's attempt to form a new, one-battalion Geor- 
gian army was delayed throughout the first half of 1994. The 
Ministry of Defense continued drafting potential soldiers (a 
very high percentage of whom evaded recruitment) for the 
Georgian armed forces and streamlining its organization. In 
September the national budget had not yet allocated wages, 
and sources of rations and equipment had not been identi- 
fied — mainly because parliament had not passed the necessary 
legislation. Ministry of Defense plans called for the country's 
remaining state farms to be designated for direct military sup- 
ply, as was the practice in the Soviet era. The disposition of 
existing paramilitary forces remained undecided as of late 
1994. 

The intelligence service had been reorganized in late 1993 
to include elite troops mandated to fight drug smuggling and 
organized crime. In the spring of 1994, new agencies were 



xlviii 



formed in the State Security Service to investigate fiscal crimes 
and to combat terrorism. And in August 1994, the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs announced a major new drive against orga- 
nized crime and drug traffickers throughout Georgia. Parlia- 
ment and local jurisdictions offered indifferent support, 
however. 

In 1994 Georgia began solving some of its most critical 
problems — laying a political base for a market economy, solidi- 
fying to a degree Shevardnadze's position as head of state, sta- 
bilizing inflation, and avoiding large-scale military conflict. But 
long-term stability will depend on comprehensive reform of 
the entire economy, eradication of the corruption that has per- 
vaded both government and economic institutions, redirection 
of resources from the Abkhazian conflict into a civilian infra- 
structure suitable for international trade (and for major loans 
from international lenders), and, ultimately, finding political 
leaders besides Shevardnadze who are capable of focusing 
Georgians' attention on building a nation, rather than on 
advancing local interests. All those factors will influence the 
other major imponderable: Russia's long-term economic and 
political influence in Georgia, which increased greatly in late 
1993 and in the first half of 1994. 

October 18, 1994 

* * * 

In the months following preparation of this manuscript, a 
number of significant events occurred in the three countries of 
the Transcaucasus. Cease-fires in two major conflicts, between 
Abkhazia and Georgia and between Armenia and Nagorno- 
Karabakh on one side and Azerbaijan on the other, remained 
in effect despite periodic hostilities. Although the two sets of 
peace talks continued to encounter fundamental differences, 
signs of compromise emerged from both in the first months of 
1995, with the assistance of international mediators. All three 
countries continued efforts to stabilize their economies, 
reduce crime, and normalize political systems distorted by 
lengthy states of emergency. 

At the beginning of 1995, Armenia had made the most 
progress toward economic recovery and political stability, 
although its population suffered another winter of privation 
because of Azerbaijan's fuel blockade. In December a summit 



xlix 



of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE, formerly the CSCE) had succeeded in merging OSCE 
and Russian peace efforts on Nagorno-Karabakh for the first 
time in an accord signed in Budapest. Russia was expected to 
become the head of the OSCE Minsk Group, which had been 
negotiating on behalf of Western Europe for the previous two 
years. In return, Russia accepted OSCE oversight of peacekeep- 
ing in the conflict zone. Armenia's President Ter-Petrosian 
reported the opening of three defense plants and full staffing 
of the Armenian Army in 1994, improving Armenia's national 
security position. 

In November 1994, the World Bank announced loans to 
Armenia of US$265 million for infrastructural, agricultural, 
and energy applications. The bank cited Armenia's new reform 
program to control inflation and expand the private sector, 
together with the first increase in Armenia's gross national 
product (GNP — see Glossary) since independence, as the rea- 
sons for this investment. In December the reform package 
went into effect. Expected to improve the standing of President 
Ter-Petrosian's embattled government, the reform included 
substantial reduction of the government's budget deficit, which 
had caused many workers to go unpaid and others, including 
teachers, to accept barely subsistence wages. The second major 
reform measure was ending government subsidies for basic sta- 
ples, including bread and utilities — a stringency measure 
highly unpopular in the short term but calculated to attract 
more international assistance. The price of bread rose by ten 
times as soon as the new law went into effect. In late 1994 and 
early 1995, Armenia also continued reestablishing commercial 
ties with Iran by signing a series of three economic treaties cov- 
ering taxation, free trade, and capital investments. Beginning 
in 1992, commercial activity between the two countries had 
doubled annually, and the pace was expected to accelerate 
markedly in 1995. 

Although the Armenian government's preparations for 
another winter of hardship under the Azerbaijani blockade 
were more extensive than in previous years, conditions for the 
average Armenian were barely better than the year before. In 
the winter of 1994-95, Armenia's chronic fuel shortage, and 
the rising social unrest caused by it, were relieved somewhat by 
a new fuel agreement with Georgia and Turkmenistan. The 
pact provided for substantial increases in delivery of Turkmen 
natural gas through the Georgian pipeline. Although this mea- 



1 



sure increased the daily electricity ration from one hour to two 
hours, long-term fuel increases depended on additional negoti- 
ations and on the payment of Armenia's substantial debt to 
Turkmenistan. In January the State Duma, the lower house of 
Russia's parliament, was considering a major grant of credit to 
Armenia, which would be used in reopening the Armenian 
Atomic Power Station at Metsamor. The arrangement would be 
a major step in solidifying economic ties with Russia, which also 
has given technical assistance for the plant. 

According to Armenian Ministry of Industry figures, 40 per- 
cent of the country's 1994 industrial output, worth a total of 
US$147 million, was sold for hard currency. Among the main 
customers were Iran, Syria, the United Arab Emirates, Cyprus, 
Belgium, and several North African countries. Although 
machine-building industries did not work at full capacity in 
1994 because of a reduced market in Russia, industry was 
buoyed by the resumption of full production at the Nairit 
Chemical Plant after several years of shutdown. Nairit was 
expected to produce goods worth US$60 million per month in 
1995. 

Armenia's state commission for privatization began voucher 
distribution to the public in October 1994. At that point, 
vouchers for ten enterprises were available, with another fifty 
due for consideration in February 1995. High profitability was 
the chief criterion for listing enterprises for privatization. The 
Nairit plant and the Armenian Electrical Machine Plant, Arme- 
nia's largest and most profitable industrial facilities, were con- 
verted to private joint-stock enterprises in January 1995. 

In Azerbaijan, hopes for economic improvement continued 
to depend on foreign investment in offshore oil deposits in the 
Caspian Sea. Those hopes were subdued somewhat by disagree- 
ments over the September 1994 agreement of Western, Rus- 
sian, and Iranian oil interests to aid Socar, Azerbaijan's state oil 
company, to develop offshore deposits in the Caspian Sea. 

Throughout the last months of 1994, Russia insisted that its 
10 percent share of the new deal was unfair on the grounds 
that all Caspian countries should have equal access to Caspian 
resources. Russia also continued strong opposition to a new 
pipeline through Iran to Turkey, which the Western partners 
favored. The Western firms were dismayed by Azerbaijan's offer 
of a share of its oil deal to Iran, by the political uncertainty that 
seemed to escalate in Azerbaijan after the oil deal was signed, 
and by the rapid deterioration of existing Caspian fields, many 



li 



of which were deserted in early 1995. Experts agreed that 
world oil prices would play an important role in Azerbaijan's 
profit from the agreement. 

In December 1994, Russia's military occupation of its sepa- 
ratist Chechen Autonomous Republic (Chechnya) closed the 
main rail line from Russia, the chief trade route to other CIS 
republics and elsewhere. Replacement trade routes were 
sought through Iran, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates. At 
the same time, hyperinflation continued, spurred by full liber- 
alization of prices to conform with IMF credit requirements. 
The 1995 budget deficit equaled 20 percent of the gross 
domestic product (GDP — see Glossary). Foreign credit, espe- 
cially loans from Turkey, was being used to provide food and 
social services — needs exacerbated by the continuing influx of 
Karabakh refugees. Economic reform, meanwhile, was delayed 
by more immediate concerns. Most industries were operating 
at about 25 percent of capacity during the winter of 1994—95. 

In the last months of 1994, Russia struggled to maintain 
influence in Azerbaijan. Its position was threatened by 
approval of the multinational Caspian oil deal in September 
and by the Azerbaijani perception that the West was restraining 
Armenian aggression in Karabakh. In November President 
Aliyev met with Russia's President Boris N. Yeltsin, who offered 
300,000 tons of Russian grain and the reopening of Russian 
railroad lines in an apparent effort to increase Russia's influ- 
ence throughout the Transcaucasus. Azerbaijani opposition 
parties, led by the Azerbaijani Popular Front (APF), continued 
to predict that Aliyev's overtures to Russia would return Russia 
to a dominant position in Azerbaijani political and economic 
affairs. Experts predicted, however, that Russia would continue 
to play a vital economic role; at the end of 1994, about 60 per- 
cent of Azerbaijan's trade turnover involved Russia. 

In early 1995, the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh's status contin- 
ued to stymie the peace talks jointly sponsored in Moscow by 
the OSCE and Russia under the Budapest agreement of 
November 1994. Although Azerbaijan had signed several agree- 
ments with Nagorno-Karabakh as a full participant, the extent 
of the region's autonomy remained a key issue, as did the terms 
of the liberation of Azerbaijan's Lachin and Shusha regions 
from Armenian occupation. The Azerbaijani position was that 
the principals of the negotiations were Armenia and Azer- 
baijan, with the respective Armenian and Azerbaijani commu- 
nities in Nagorno-Karabakh as "interested parties." (At the end 



In 



of 1994, an estimated 126,000 Armenians and 37,000 Azerbaija- 
nis remained in the region.) Azerbaijan lodged an official pro- 
test against Russian insistence that the Karabakh Armenians 
constituted a third principal. In February presidents Aliyev and 
Ter-Petrosian met with presidents Nursultan Nazarbayev of 
Kazakhstan and Shevardnadze of Georgia in Moscow and 
expressed optimism that the nine-month cease-fire would hold 
until complete settlement could be reached. Nazarbayev and 
the presidents of Russia and Ukraine offered to be guarantors 
of stability in Nagorno-Karabakh if Azerbaijan would guarantee 
the region's borders. 

After the unsuccessful coup against him by Prime Minister 
Suret Huseynov in October 1994, Azerbaijan's President Hey- 
dar Aliyev maintained his position. Despite loud opposition 
from the APF and other parties, Aliyev appeared to occupy a 
strong position at the beginning of 1995. In early 1995, friction 
developed between Aliyev and Rusul Guliyev, speaker of the 
Melli-Majlis, each accusing the other of responsibility for wors- 
ening socioeconomic conditions. Former president Abulfaz 
Elchibey remained a vocal critic of Aliyev and had a substantial 
following in the APF. 

In Georgia, the unresolved conflict with the Abkhazian 
Autonomous Republic remained the most important issue. 
The repatriation of Georgian refugees to Abkhazia, a process 
conducted very slowly by Abkhazian authorities in the early 
autumn of 1994, ended completely between November 1994 
and January 1995. Opposition parties in Georgia, especially the 
National Liberation Front led by former prime minister Tengiz 
Sigua, increased their pressure on the government to take 
action, likening Abkhazia to Russia's secessionist Chechen 
Autonomous Republic, which Russia invaded in December 
1994. (In fact, the official position of the Shevardnadze govern- 
ment supported the Russian move, both because of the parallel 
with Abkhazia and because of the need for continued Russian 
military monitoring of the cease-fire.) In January an attempted 
march of 1,400 armed Georgian refugees into Abkhazia was 
halted by Georgian government troops, and organizer Tengiz 
Kitovani, former minister of defense, was arrested for having 
organized the group. Although the UN adopted resolutions in 
January condemning the Abkhazian refugee policy, UN offi- 
cials saw little hope of a rapid change in the situation in 1995. 

The issue of human rights continued to dog the Shevard- 
nadze administration in late 1994 and early 1995. In February 



Uii 



1995, the Free Media Association of Georgia, which included 
most of the country's largest independent newspapers, offi- 
cially protested police oppression and confiscation of newspa- 
pers. Newspaper production had already been restricted since 
the beginning of winter because of Georgia's acute energy 
shortage. 

The Georgian political world was shocked by the assassina- 
tion in December 1994 of Gia Chanturia, leader of the moder- 
ate opposition National Democratic Party and one of the 
country's most popular politicians. Responsibility for the act 
was not established. Chanturia's death escalated calls for resig- 
nation of the Cabinet of Ministers, an outcome made more 
likely by the parliament's failure to pass Shevardnadze's pro- 
posed 1995 budget and by continued factionalism within the 
cabinet. 

An important emerging figure was Minister of Defense 
Vardiko Nadibaidze, an army general entrusted in 1994 with 
developing a professional Georgian military force that would 
reduce reliance on outside forces (such as Russia's) to protect 
national security. At the end of 1994, Georgian forces were esti- 
mated at 15,000 ground troops, 3,000 air and air defense per- 
sonnel, and 1,500 to 2,000 in the coastal defense force. 

Economic reform continued unevenly under the direction 
of Vice Premier for Economics Temur Basilia. By design, infla- 
tion and prices continued to rise in the last months of 1994, 
and rubles and dollars remained the chief currency instead of 
the Georgian coupon. In a November 1994 poll, one-third of 
respondents said they spent their entire income on food. Dis- 
tribution of privatization vouchers among the population was 
scheduled to begin in mid-1995. In November 1994, more than 
1,500 enterprises had been privatized, most of them classified 
as commercial or service establishments. A group of Western 
and Japanese, donors pledged a minimum of US$274 million in 
credits to Georgia in 1995, with another US$162 million avail- 
able pending "visible success" in economic reform. 

In Geneva, peace talks between the Georgian government 
and the Abkhazian Autonomous Republic reached the eigh- 
teen-month mark; the major points of disagreement continued 
to be the political status of Abkhazia and the repatriation of 
Georgian refugees. The Abkhazian delegation insisted on 
equal status with Georgia in a new confederation. The Russian 
and UN mediators proposed a federal legislature and joint 
agencies for foreign policy, foreign trade, taxation, energy, 



liv 



communications, and human rights, providing Abkhazia sub- 
stantially more autonomy than it had had when Georgia 
became independent but leaving open the question of relative 
power within such a system. In early February 1995, prelimi- 
nary accord was reached on several points of the mediators' 
proposal. 

As 1995 began, prospects for stability in the Transcaucasus 
were marginally better than they had been since the three 
countries achieved independence in 1991. Much depended on 
continued strong leadership from presidents Aliyev, Shevard- 
nadze, and Ter-Petrosian, on a peaceful environment across 
the borders in Russia and Iran, and on free access to the natu- 
ral resources needed to restart the respective national econo- 
mies. 



February 28, 1995 Glenn E. Curtis 



Iv 



Chapter 1. Armenia 



Armenian folk costume 



Country Profile 



Country 

Formal Name: Republic of Armenia. 
Short Form: Armenia. 
Term for Citizens: Armenian (s). 
Capital: Erevan. 

Date of Independence: September 23, 1991. 

Geography 

Size: Approximately 29,800 square kilometers. 

Topography: Dominated by Lesser Caucasus range, running 
across north and then turning southeast to Iran. Armenian 
Plateau to southwest of mountains. Plateau, major feature of 
central Armenia, slopes gradually downward into Aras River 
valley, which forms border with Turkey to west and Iran to 
south. 

Climate: Mountains preclude influence from nearby seas; 
temperature and precipitation generally determined by 
elevation: colder and wetter in higher elevations (north and 
northeast). In central plateau, wide temperature variation 
between winter and summer. 

Society 

Population: By official 1994 estimate, population 3,521,517; in 
1994 annual growth rate about 1.1 percent; 1991 population 
density 112.6 persons per square kilometer. 

Ethnic Groups: In 1989 census, Armenians 93.7 percent, 
Azerbaijanis 2.6 percent, Kurds 1.7 percent, and Russians 1.6 
percent. 

NOTE — The Country Profile contains updated information as available. 



3 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

Languages: Official state language Armenian, spoken by 96 
percent of population. Russian first language of 2 percent, 
second language for about 40 percent of population. 

Religion: Approximately 94 percent of population belongs to 
Armenian Apostolic Church. Other religions include Russian 
Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Protestant denominations, and 
Islam. 

Education and Literacy: Education compulsory through 
secondary school. Literacy estimated at 100 percent. In early 
1990s, substantial changes, begun in previous centralized 
Soviet system, emphasized national heritage. 

Health: Nominal continuation of Soviet-era guarantee of 
universal care, but health care system deteriorated under stress 
of independence and Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Severe 
shortage of basic medical supplies in early 1990s, and many 
clinics and hospitals closed. 

Economy 

Gross National Product (GNP): Estimated at US$2.7 billion in 
1992, or US$780 per capita. In 1992 growth rate -46 percent. 
Economic growth crippled after 1989 by Azerbaijani blockade 
of fuel and other materials and by demands of Nagorno- 
Karabakh conflict. 

Agriculture: After privatization in 1990, assumed larger share 
of economy; most land privately owned by 1993. Farms small 
but relatively productive. Main crops grains, potatoes, 
vegetables, grapes, berries, cotton, sugar beets, tobacco, figs, 
and olives. 

Industry and Mining: Dominant light manufacturing products 
include footwear, woven clothing, and carpets. Nonferrous 
metallurgy, machine building, electronics, petrochemicals, 
fertilizers, and building materials most important heavy 
industries. Mining resource base broad, including copper, 
molybdenum, gold, silver, and iron ore, but little developed. 

Energy: Nearly all energy supplied from abroad, causing severe 
shortage under blockade of early 1990s. Natural gas, delivered 
from Turkmenistan via Georgia pipeline, frequently blocked. 
Hydroelectric plants main domestic source; natural gas supply 



4 



Armenia 



from Russia intermittent because of pipeline damage. 

Exports: In 1990 worth US$2.1 billion. Principal items textiles, 
shoes, carpets, machines, chemical products, processed foods, 
and metal products. Postcommunist export markets shifted 
toward Turkey and Iran, but traditional ties with Russia and 
Eastern Europe remained. License controls eased in 1992. 
Total export trade, severely constricted by blockade, about 
US$135.6 million in 1993. 

Imports: In 1990 worth US$2.8 billion. Principal items light 
industrial products, industrial raw materials, fuels, and energy. 
Principal import suppliers Russia, Turkmenistan, Belarus, 
Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. Nearly all energy and much food 
imported. 

Balance of Payments: Estimated in 1992 as US$137 million 
deficit. 

Exchange Rate: Dram introduced November 1993, to become 
exclusive national currency early 1994. May 1994 rate about 
390 drams per US$1. Second national unit, luma (100 to the 
dram), introduced February 1994. 

Inflation: Dram devalued as Russian ruble devalued, early 
1994, against United States dollar. Prices raised in steep 
periodic increments, including 30 percent rise March 1994. 
Prices in 1993 rose 130 percent as fast as wages. 

Fiscal Year: Calendar year. 

Fiscal Policy: Highly centralized government system, with no 
regional authority. Indexation of salaries and prices and 
currency devaluation used to balance supply and demand. 
Taxes added and changed 1992-93 to improve national 
income. 

Transportation and Telecommunications 

Highways: In 1991 about 11,300 kilometers of roads, of which 
10,500 hard-surface. 

Railroads: In 1992 total mainline track about 825 kilometers, 
none of which standard gauge. International lines to 
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Iran, and Turkey. Service disrupted in 
early 1990s. 

Civil Aviation: Ten usable airports, six with hard-surface run- 



5 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

ways. Zvartnots Airport, near Erevan, only airport accom- 
modating large jets. State Airlines Company of Armenia 
national airline. 

Inland Waterways: None. 

Ports: None. 

Pipelines: Natural gas pipeline 900 kilometers in 1991; service 
disrupted in early 1990s. 

Telecommunications: Direct-dial telephone system with 200 
circuits and international service in 1991. Radio and television 
controlled by State Committee for Television and Radio 
Broadcasting. Armenian and Russian television broadcasts 
available to 100 percent of population via International 
Telecommunications Satellite Organization (Intelsat) satellite. 
Thirteen radio stations broadcast domestically in Armenian, 
Kurdish, and Russian. 

Government and Politics 

Government: National government with most administrative 
powers. Thirty-seven districts with local legislative and 
executive organs. National legislature unicameral Supreme 
Soviet of 248 members. Highest executive organ, Council of 
Ministers, appointed by president with consent of prime 
minister, who is named by president with consent of 
parliament. Presidency, given broad emergency powers during 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, most powerful government office. 
Legislative process cumbersome and fragmented, delaying 
passage of new constitution and other vital legislation. As of 
1994, reform of Soviet-era judicial system awaited new 
constitution. 

Politics: Since independence in 1991, presidency, most 
ministries, and parliamentary plurality held by members of 
Armenian Pannational Movement. Main opposition parties 
Liberal Democratic Party and Armenian Revolutionary 
Federation. First multiparty election 1991. Many minority 
parties represented in parliament, with coalitions on specific 
issues. 

Foreign Relations: In early 1990s, foreign policy determined 
strongly by Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with Azerbaijan. Some 
rapprochement with traditional enemies Turkey and Iran. 



6 



Armenia 



Limited relations established with Western Europe. Close ties 
with Russia and accords with other members of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States. Worldwide Armenian 
diaspora facilitates foreign support. 

International Agreements and Memberships: Member of 
United Nations, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. 

National Security 

Armed Forces: Armenian Army divided into army, air force, 
and air defense forces; total forces about 50,000, including 
reserves. In 1994 about 20,000 active troops, including border 
guards and internal security troops, supplied mainly by 
conscription. About 2,000 troops in air force and 2,000 in air 
defense forces. Reserve call-up available in crisis, although 
reserve support weaker in postcommunist era. One Russian 
division remained in Armenia in 1994. 

Major Military Units: National army formed in 1992 to 
emphasize maneuverability and response to attack. Highest 
organizational level brigade, each with 1,500 to 2,500 troops 
and divided into three or four battalions. Air defense forces 
reinvigorated and new military aviation program established in 
early 1990s. Most of two Russian motorized divisions 
transferred to Armenian control in 1992. Much equipment 
obtained from Russian units formerly stationed in Armenia. 

Military Budget: Estimated in 1992 at US$33.8 million. 

Internal Security: Run by State Administration for National 
Security. Border troops supplemented by Russian forces along 
Iranian and Turkish borders. Militia used as regular police 
force of somewhat over 1,000 troops; duties include drug 
detection. Some units of former Committee for State Security 
(KGB) function under Armenian control. 



7 



4 



) Gyumri 

/ 



Spitak 



\ Echmiadzin 



Razdan. 



Erevan 



TURKEY 





- International boundary 


® 


National capital 


© 


Populated place 


NOTE 


Status of Nagorno-Karabakh 




under negotiation in 1994. 





25 50 Kilometers 





25 50 Miles 



mm 



Boundary representation 

' 45 



Figure 4. Armenia, 1994 



8 



ARMENIAN CIVILIZATION HAD its beginnings in the sixth 
century B.C. In the centuries following, the Armenians with- 
stood invasions and nomadic migrations, creating a unique cul- 
ture that blended Iranian social and political structures with 
Hellenic — and later Christian — literary traditions. For two mil- 
lennia, independent Armenian states existed sporadically in 
the region between the northeastern corner of the Mediterra- 
nean Sea and the Caucasus Mountains, until the last medieval 
state was destroyed in the fourteenth century. A landlocked 
country in modern times, Armenia was the smallest Soviet 
republic from 1920 until the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 
1991 (see fig. 4). The future of an independent Armenia is 
clouded by limited natural resources and the prospect that the 
military struggle to unite the Armenians of Azerbaijan's 
Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region with the Republic of 
Armenia will be a long one. 

Historical Background 

The Armenians are an ancient people who speak an 
Indo-European language and have traditionally inhabited the 
border regions common to modern Armenia, Iran, and Tur- 
key. They call themselves hai (from the name of Hayk, a leg- 
endary hero) and their country Haiastan. Their neighbors to 
the north, the Georgians, call them somekhi, but most of the 
rest of the world follows the usage of the ancient Greeks and 
refers to them as Armenians, a term derived according to leg- 
end from the Armen tribe. Thus the Russian word is armianin, 
and the Turkish is ermeni. 

The Ancient Period 

People first settled what is now Armenia in about 6000 B.C. 
The first major state in the region was the kingdom of Urartu, 
which appeared around Lake Van in the thirteenth century 
B.C. and reached its peak in the ninth century B.C. Shortly 
after the fall of Urartu to the Assyrians, the Indo- 
European-speaking proto-Armenians migrated, probably from 
the west, onto the Armenian Plateau and mingled with the 
local people of the Hurrian civilization, which at that time 
extended into Anatolia (present-day Asian Turkey) from its 
center in Mesopotamia. Greek historians first mentioned the 



9 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

Armenians in the mid-sixth century B.C. Ruled for many centu- 
ries by the Persians, Armenia became a buffer state between 
the Greeks and Romans to the west and the Persians and Arabs 
of the Middle East. It reached its greatest size and influence 
under King Tigran II, also known as Tigranes or Tigran the 
Great (r. 95-55 B.C.). During his reign, Armenia stretched 
from the Mediterranean Sea northeast to the Mtkvari River 
(called the Kura in Azerbaijan) in present-day Georgia (see fig. 
5). Tigran and his son, Artavazd II, made Armenia a center of 
Hellenic culture during their reigns. 

By 30 B.C., Rome conquered the Armenian Empire, and for 
the next 200 years Armenia often was a pawn of the Romans in 
campaigns against their Central Asian enemies, the Parthians. 
However, a new dynasty, the Arsacids, took power in Armenia 
in A.D. 53 under the Parthian king, Tiridates I, who defeated 
Roman forces in A.D. 62. Rome's Emperor Nero then concili- 
ated the Parthians by personally crowning Tiridates king of 
Armenia. For much of its subsequent history, Armenia was not 
united under a single sovereign but was usually divided 
between empires and among local Armenian rulers. 

Early Christianity 

After contact with centers of early Christianity at Antioch 
and Edessa, Armenia accepted Christianity as its state religion 
in A.D. 306 (the traditional date — the actual date may have 
been as late as A.D. 314), following miracles said to have been 
performed by Saint Gregory the Illuminator, son of a Parthian 
nobleman. Thus Armenians claim that Tiridates III (A.D. 238- 
314) was the first ruler to officially Christianize his people, his 
conversion predating the conventional date (A.D. 312) of Con- 
stantine the Great's legalization of Christianity on behalf of the 
Roman Empire. 

Early in the fifth century A.D., Saint Mesrop, also known as 
Mashtots, devised an alphabet for the Armenian language, and 
religious and historical works began to appear as part of the 
effort to consolidate the influence of Christianity. For the next 
two centuries, political unrest paralleled the exceptional devel- 
opment of literary and religious life that became known as the 
first golden age of Armenia. In several administrative forms, 
Armenia remained part of the Byzantine Empire until the mid- 
seventh century. In A.D. 653, the empire, finding the region 
difficult to govern, ceded Armenia to the Arabs. In A.D. 806, 



10 



Armenia 



the Arabs established the noble Bagratid family as governors, 
and later kings, of a semiautonomous Armenian state. 

The Middle Ages 

Particularly under Bagratid kings Ashot I (also known as 
Ashot the Great or Ashot V, r. A.D. 862-90) and Ashot III (r. 
A.D. 952-77), a flourishing of art and literature accompanied a 
second golden age of Armenian history. The relative prosperity 
of other kingdoms in the region enabled the Armenians to 
develop their culture while remaining segmented among juris- 
dictions of varying degrees of autonomy granted by the Arabs. 
Then, after eleventh-century invasions from the west by the 
Byzantine Greeks and from the east by the Seljuk Turks, the 
independent kingdoms in Armenia proper collapsed, and a 
new Armenian state, the kingdom of Lesser Armenia, formed 
in Cilicia along the northeasternmost shore of the Mediterra- 
nean Sea. As an ally of the kingdoms set up by the European 
armies of the Crusades, Cilician Armenia fought against the ris- 
ing Muslim threat on behalf of the Christian nations of Europe 
until internal rebellions and court intrigue brought its down- 
fall, at the hands of the Central Asian Mamluk Turks in 1375. 
Cilician Armenia left notable monuments of art, literature, the- 
ology, and jurisprudence. It also served as the door through 
which Armenians began emigrating to points west, notably 
Cyprus, Marseilles, Cairo, Venice, and even Holland. 

The Mamluks controlled Cilician Armenia until the Otto- 
man Turks conquered the region in the sixteenth century. 
Meanwhile, the Ottoman Turks and the Persians divided Cau- 
casian Armenia to the northeast between the sixteenth and 
eighteenth centuries. The Persians dominated the area of mod- 
ern Armenia, around Lake Sevan and the city of Erevan. From 
the fifteenth century until the early twentieth century, most 
Armenians were ruled by the Ottoman Turks through the millet 
(see Glossary) system, which recognized the ecclesiastical 
authority of the Armenian Apostolic Church over the Arme- 
nian people. 

Between Russia and Turkey 

Beginning in the eighteenth century, the Russian Empire 
played a growing role in determining the fate of the Arme- 
nians, although those in Anatolia remained under Turkish con- 
trol, with tragic consequences that would endure well into the 
twentieth century. 



11 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 




100 200 300 400 Kilometers 



100 200 300 Miles 

f ZZL 

Source: Based on information from David Marshall Lang, Armenia: Cradle of 
Civilization, London, 1980, 132. 

Figure 5. The Empire of Tigran the Great, ca. 65 B. C. 

Russian Influence Expands 

In the eighteenth century, Transcaucasia (the region 
including the Greater Caucasus mountain range as well as the 
lands to the south and west) became the object of a 
military-political struggle among three empires: Ottoman Tur- 
key, tsarist Russia, and Safavid Persia. In 1828 Russia defeated 
Persia and annexed the area around Erevan, bringing thou- 
sands of Armenians into the Russian Empire. In the next half- 
century, three related processes began to intensify the political 
and national consciousness of the ethnic and religious commu- 
nities of the Caucasus region: the imposition of tsarist rule; the 
rise of a market and capitalist economy; and the emergence of 
secular national intelligentsias. Tsarism brought Armenians 
from Russia and from the former Persian provinces under a 



12 



Armenia 



single legal order. The tsarist system also brought relative peace 
and security by fostering commerce and industry, the growth of 
towns, and the building of railroads, thus gradually ending the 
isolation of many villages. 

In the mid-nineteenth century, a major movement toward 
centralization and reform, called the Tanzimat, swept through 
the Ottoman Empire, whose authority had been eroded by cor- 
ruption and delegation of control to local fiefdoms. Armenian 
subjects benefited somewhat from these reforms; for instance, 
in 1863 a special Armenian constitution was granted. When the 
reform movement was ended in the 1870s by reactionary fac- 
tions, however, Ottoman policy toward subject nationalities 
became less tolerant, and the situation of the Armenians in the 
empire began to deteriorate rapidly. 

National Self-Awareness 

The Armenians themselves changed dramatically in the 
mid-nineteenth century. An intellectual awakening influenced 
by Western and Russian ideas, a new interest in Armenian his- 
tory, and an increase in social interaction created a sense of 
secular nationality among many Armenians. Instead of conceiv- 
ing of themselves solely as a religious community, Armenians — 
especially the urban middle class — began to feel closer kinship 
with Christian Europe and greater alienation from the Muslim 
peoples among whom they lived. 

Lacking faith in reform within the empire, Armenian lead- 
ers began to appeal to the European powers for assistance. In 
1878 Armenian delegates appeared at the Congress of Berlin, 
where the European powers were negotiating the disposition of 
Ottoman territories. Although Armenian requests for Euro- 
pean protection went largely unanswered in Berlin, the "Arme- 
nian question" became a point of contention in the complex 
European diplomacy of the late nineteenth century, with Rus- 
sia and Britain acting as the chief sponsors of Armenian inter- 
ests on various issues. 

The Armenian independence movement began as agitation 
on behalf of liberal democracy by writers, journalists, and 
teachers. But by the last decade of the nineteenth century, 
moderate nationalist intellectuals had been pushed aside by 
younger, more radical socialists. Armenian revolutionary par- 
ties, founded in the early 1890s in Russia and Europe, sent 
their cadres to organize in Turkey. Because of the 
self-destruction of one major party, the Social Democratic 



13 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

Hnchaks, and the relative isolation of the liberals and the 
"internationalist" Social Democrats in the cities of Transcauca- 
sia, the more nationalist of the socialist parties, the Armenian 
Revolutionary Federation (ARF, also known as the Dashnak, a 
shortened form of its Armenian name), emerged by the early 
twentieth century as the only real contender for Armenian loy- 
alties. The ARF favored Armenian autonomy in both the Rus- 
sian and the Ottoman empires rather than full independence 
for an Armenia in which Russian- and Ottoman-held compo- 
nents would be unified. 

In the last decades of the nineteenth century, the Arme- 
nians' tendency toward Europeanization antagonized Turkish 
officials and encouraged their view that Armenians were a for- 
eign, subversive element in the sultan's realm. By 1890 the 
rapid growth of the Kurdish population in Anatolia, combined 
with the immigration of Muslims from the Balkans and the 
Caucasus, had made the Armenian population of Anatolia an 
increasingly endangered minority. In 1895 Ottoman suspicion 
of the westernized Armenian population led to the massacre of 
300,000 Armenians by special order of the Ottoman govern- 
ment. 

Meanwhile, on the other side of the Russian border, Arme- 
nian churches and schools were closed and church property 
was confiscated in 1903. Tatars massacred Armenians in several 
towns and cities in 1905, and fifty-two Armenian nationalist 
leaders in Russia were tried en masse for underground activi- 
ties in 1912. 

The Young Turks 

The Armenian population that remained in the Ottoman 
Empire after the 1895 massacre supported the 1908 revolution 
of the Committee of Union and Progress, better known as the 
Young Turks, who promised liberal treatment of ethnic minori- 
ties. However, after its revolution succeeded, the Young Turk 
government plotted elimination of the Armenians, who were a 
significant obstacle to the regime's evolving nationalist agenda. 

In the early stages of World War I, Russian armies advanced 
on Turkey from the north, and the British attempted an inva- 
sion from the Mediterranean. Citing the threat of internal 
rebellion, the Ottoman government ordered large-scale round- 
ups, deportations, and systematic torture and murder of Arme- 
nians beginning in the spring of 1915. Estimates vary from 
600,000 to 2 million deaths out of the prewar population of 



14 



Armenia 



about 3 million Armenians. By 1917 fewer than 200,000 Arme- 
nians remained in Turkey. 

Whatever the exact dimensions of the genocide, Armenians 
suffered a demographic disaster that shifted the center of the 
Armenian population from the heartland of historical Armenia 
to the relatively safer eastern regions held by the Russians. Tens 
of thousands of refugees fled to the Caucasus with the retreat- 
ing Russian armies, and the cities of Baku and Tbilisi filled with 
Armenians from Turkey. Ethnic tensions rose in Transcaucasia 
as the new immigrants added to the pressures on the limited 
resources of the collapsing Russian Empire. 

World War I and Its Consequences 

As was the case for most of Europe, World War I changed 
Armenia's geopolitical situation. The war also precipitated an 
ethnic disaster of rare magnitude and brought the Armenians 
who remained in their native territory into a new type of 
empire. 

Postwar Realignment 

Between 1915 and 1917, Russia occupied virtually the entire 
Armenian part of the Ottoman Empire. Then in October 1917, 
the Bolshevik victory in Russia ended that country's involve- 
ment in World War I, and Russian troops left the Caucasus. In 
the vacuum that remained, the Armenians first joined a Trans- 
caucasian federation with Azerbaijan and Georgia, both of 
which, however, soon proved to be unreliable partners. The 
danger posed by the territorial ambitions of the Ottoman 
Turks and the Azerbaijanis finally united the Caucasian Arme- 
nian population in support of the ARF program for autonomy. 
In May 1918, an independent Armenian republic was declared; 
its armies continued to fight on the Allied side south of the 
Caucasus until the Ottoman Empire surrendered in October 
1918. The independent republic endured from May 1918 to 
December 1920. In the new government, ARF leaders R.I. Ka- 
chazuni and A.I. Khatisian became prime minister and foreign 
minister, respectively. 

The Republic of Armenia included the northeastern part of 
present-day eastern Turkey, west along the Black Sea coast past 
Trabzon and southwest past Lake Van. But Armenia's precari- 
ous independence was threatened from within by the terrible 
economic conditions that followed the war in the former Otto- 
man Empire and, by 1920, by the territorial ambitions of Soviet 



15 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

Russia and the nationalist Turks under Kemal Ataturk. Ataturk 
had rehabilitated Turkey rapidly under a new democratic sys- 
tem, but the ruling party still hoped to create a larger state by 
taking territory in western Armenia from which Armenians 
had been driven. In defending its independence, the Republic 
of Armenia waited in vain, however, for the material and mili- 
tary aid promised at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. The 
Allies' memories of the 1915 massacre faded as war weariness 
and isolationism dominated their foreign policy. 

In agreeing to the 1920 Treaty of Sevres, the World War I 
Allies and Turkey recognized Armenian independence; as part 
of the treaty, Armenia received some disputed territory in what 
had been the Ottoman Empire. However, most of western 
Armenia remained in Turkish hands. Eastern Armenia, rav- 
aged by warfare, migration, and disease, had an Armenian pop- 
ulation of only 720,000 by 1920. Caught between the advancing 
Turks and the Red Army, which had already occupied neigh- 
boring Azerbaijan, in November 1920 the ARF government 
made a political agreement with the communists to enter a coa- 
lition government. The Treaty of Aleksandropol', signed by this 
government with Turkey in 1920, returned Armenia's northern 
Kars district to Turkey and repudiated the existence of Arme- 
nian populations in newly expanded Turkey. 

Into the Soviet Union 

In 1922 Armenia was combined with Azerbaijan and Geor- 
gia to form the Transcaucasian Soviet Federated Socialist 
Republic (TSFSR), which was a single republic of the Soviet 
Union until the federation was dissolved and each part given 
republic status in 1936. When the TSFSR was formed, the new 
Soviet government in the Armenian capital of Erevan ruled 
over a shrunken country with a devastated economy and few 
resources with which to feed the populace and rebuild itself. In 
integrating their republic into the newly forming Soviet Union, 
Armenian communists surrendered the sovereignty that the 
independent republic had enjoyed briefly. Although it elimi- 
nated rival political parties and restricted the range of public 
expression, the new government promoted Armenian culture 
and education, invited artists and intellectuals from abroad to 
return to Armenia, and managed to create an environment of 
greater security and material well-being than Armenians had 
known since the outbreak of World War I. 



16 



Folk dancers celebrating Armenian Independence Day 

(May 28, 1918) in Erevan 
Courtesy Azarian Churukian 

The Communist Era 

During the rule of Joseph V. Stalin (in power 1926-53), 
Armenian society and its economy were changed dramatically 
by Moscow policy makers. In a period of twenty-five years, 
Armenia was industrialized and educated under strictly pre- 
scribed conditions, and nationalism was harshly suppressed. 
After Stalin's death, Moscow allowed greater expression of 
national feeling, but the corruption endemic in communist 
rule continued until the very end in 1991. The last years of 
communism also brought disillusionment in what had been 
one of the most loyal republics in the Soviet Union until the 
late 1980s. 

Stalinist Restructuring 

Stalin's radical restructuring of the Soviet economic and 
political systems at the end of the 1920s ended the brief period 
of moderate rule and mixed economy under what was known 
as the New Economic Policy (see Modern Economic History, 
this ch.). Under Stalin the Communist Party of Armenia (CPA) 
used police terror to strengthen its political hold on the popu- 



17 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

lation and suppress all expressions of nationalism. At the 
height of the Great Terror orchestrated by Stalin in 1936-37, 
the ranks of CPA leaders and intellectuals were decimated by 
Lavrenti Beria, political commissar for the Transcaucasian 
republics. 

Stalin's enforced social and economic engineering 
improved literacy and education and built communications 
and industrial infrastructures where virtually none had existed 
in tsarist times. As they emerged from the Stalin era in the 
1950s, Armenians were more mobile, better educated, and 
ready to benefit from the less repressive policies of Stalin's suc- 
cessor, Nikita S. Khrushchev (in power 1953-64). The years of 
industrialization had promoted an upward social mobility 
through which peasants became workers; workers became fore- 
men or managers; and managers became party and state offi- 
cials. 

Communism after Stalin 

After Stalin's death in 1953, Moscow granted the republic 
more autonomy in decision making, which meant that the local 
communist elite increased its power and became entrenched 
in Armenian politics in the 1950s and 1960s. Although overt 
political opposition remained tightly restricted, expressions of 
moderate nationalism were viewed with greater tolerance. Stat- 
ues of Armenian national heroes were erected, including one 
of Saint Vartan, the fifth-century defender of Armenian Chris- 
tianity. 

Even as Armenia continued its transformation from a basi- 
cally agrarian nation to an industrial, urban society — by the 
early 1980s, only a third of Armenians lived in the countryside- 
the ruling elite remained largely unchanged. As a result, cor- 
ruption and favoritism spread, and an illegal "second econ- 
omy" of black markets and bribery flourished. In 1974 Moscow 
sent a young engineer, Karen Demirchian, to Erevan to clean 
up the old party apparatus, but the new party chief soon 
accommodated himself to the corrupt political system he had 
inherited. 

The New Nationalism 

Three issues combined by 1988 to stimulate a broad-based 
Armenian nationalist movement. First, the urbanization and 
industrialization of Armenia had brought severe ecological 
problems, the most threatening of which was posed by a 



18 



Armenia 



nuclear power plant at Metsamor, west of Erevan. Second, 
many Armenians were angered by the pervasive corruption 
and arrogance of the communist elite, which had become 
entrenched as a privileged ruling class. Third and most imme- 
diate, Armenians were increasingly concerned about the status 
of Nagorno-Karabakh, an autonomous region of Azerbaijan 
having nearly 200,000 Armenians living under Azerbaijani rule, 
isolated from mainstream Armenian culture. 

Control of Nagorno-Karabakh (the conventional geo- 
graphic term is based on the Russian for the phrase "mountain- 
ous Karabakh") had been contested by the briefly independent 
republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan after World War I. In 
1924 the Soviet government designated the region an autono- 
mous region under Azerbaijani jurisdiction within the TSFSR. 
At the time, 94.4 percent of the estimated 131,500 people in 
the district were Armenian. Between 1923 and 1979, the Arme- 
nian population of the enclave dropped by about 1,000, com- 
prising only about 76 percent of the population by the end of 
the period. In the same period, the Azerbaijani population 
quintupled to 37,000, or nearly 24 percent of the region's pop- 
ulation. Armenians feared that their demographic decline in 
Nagorno-Karabakh would replicate the fate of another histori- 
cally Armenian region, Nakhichevan, which the Soviet Union 
had designated an autonomous republic under Azerbaijani 
administration in 1924. In Nakhichevan the number of Arme- 
nians had declined from about 15,600 (15 percent of the total) 
in 1926 to about 3,000 (1.4 percent of the total) in 1979, while 
in the same period immigration and a higher birth rate had 
increased the Azerbaijani population from about 85,400 (85 
percent) to 230,000, or nearly 96 percent of the total. 

In addition to fearing the loss of their numerical superiority, 
Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh resented restrictions on the 
development of the Armenian language and culture in the 
region. Although the Armenians generally lived better than 
Azerbaijanis in neighboring districts, their standard of living 
was not as high as that of their countrymen in Armenia. Hostile 
to the Azerbaijanis, whom they blamed for their social and cul- 
tural problems, the vast majority of Karabakh Armenians pre- 
ferred to learn Russian rather than Azerbaijani, the language 
of Azerbaijan. As early as the 1960s, clashes occurred between 
the Karabakh Armenians and the Azerbaijanis, and Armenian 
intellectuals petitioned Moscow for redress of their situation in 
N agor no-Kar abakh . 



19 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

A series of escalating attacks and reprisals between the two 
sides began in early 1988. Taking advantage of the greater free- 
dom introduced by the glasnost (see Glossary) and perestroika 
(see Glossary) policies of Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev 
(in power 1985-91) in the late 1980s, Armenians held mass 
demonstrations in favor of uniting Nagorno-Karabakh with 
Armenia. In response to rumored Armenian demands, Azer- 
baijanis began fleeing the region. A two-day rampage in the 
industrial town of Sumgait, northwest of Baku, resulted in the 
deaths of more than 100 Armenians. During 1988, while Mos- 
cow hesitated to take decisive action, Armenians grew increas- 
ingly disillusioned with Gorbachev's programs, and 
Azerbaijanis sought to protect their interests by organizing a 
powerful anti-Armenian nationalist movement. 

Nagorno-Karabakh and Independence 

The conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh (often called simply 
Karabakh) served as a catalyst for nationalist movements fol- 
lowing the precipitous decline of the Soviet Union in the late 
1980s (see fig. 3). In the early 1990s, the struggle defied all 
negotiating efforts of the West and Russia. 

Karabakh as a National Issue 

The protests of the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh 
against Azerbaijani rule began in the spirit of perestroika, but 
the movement evolved quickly into a political organization, the 
Karabakh Committee, a broad anticommunist coalition for 
democracy and national sovereignty. In the confusion follow- 
ing the earthquake that devastated northern Armenia in 
December 1988, Soviet authorities tried to stem the growing 
opposition to their rule by arresting the leaders of the commit- 
tee. The attempt by the CPA to rule in Armenia without sup- 
port from Armenian nationalists only worsened the political 
crisis. In March 1989, many voters boycotted the general elec- 
tions for the Soviet Union's Congress of People's Deputies. 
Massive demonstrations were held to demand the release of 
the members of the committee, and, in the elections to the 
Armenian Supreme Soviet, the legislative body of the republic, 
in May, Armenians chose delegates identified with the Kara- 
bakh cause. At that time, the flag of independent Armenia was 
flown for the first time since 1920. The release of the Karabakh 
Committee followed the 1989 election; for the next six months, 



20 



Armenia 



the nationalist movement and the Armenian communist lead- 
ership worked as uncomfortable allies on the Karabakh issue. 

Gorbachev's 1989 proposal for enhanced autonomy for 
Nagorno-Karabakh within Azerbaijan satisfied neither Arme- 
nians nor Azerbaijanis, and a long and inconclusive conflict 
erupted between the two peoples. In September 1989, Azer- 
baijan began an economic blockade of Armenia's vital fuel and 
supply lines through its territory, which until that time had car- 
ried about 90 percent of Armenia's imports from the other 
Soviet republics. In June 1989, numerous unofficial nationalist 
organizations joined together to form the Armenian Pan- 
national Movement (APM), to which the Armenian govern- 
ment granted official recognition. 

The Karabakh Crisis Escalates, 1989 

The Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict escalated steadily in the 
summer and fall of 1989. Both the APM and the newly formed 
Azerbaijani Popular Front (APF) called for abolition of the 
Special Administrative Committee that Gorbachev had estab- 
lished to manage Nagorno-Karabakh. The Armenians held to 
their position that the region must become part of Armenia, 
and radical Azerbaijanis called for abolition of Karabakh 
autonomy. As hundreds of thousands of Azerbaijanis demon- 
strated in Baku, their government further restricted the flow of 
goods and fuel into Karabakh and Armenia. In August 1989, 
Karabakh Armenians responded by electing their own National 
Council, which declared the secession of Karabakh from Azer- 
baijan and its merger with Armenia. The Armenian Supreme 
Soviet then declared the Karabakh National Council the sole 
legitimate representative of the Karabakh people. The Azer- 
baijani Supreme Soviet responded by abrogating the autonomy 
of both Karabakh and Nakhichevan. 

Although the declarations and counter-declarations of mid- 
1989 were ultimately declared invalid by the Supreme Soviet of 
the Soviet Union, and although both Armenia and Azerbaijan 
continued to be governed by communist parties, neither 
republic was willing to obey Moscow's directives on the Kara- 
bakh issue. In November 1989, in frustration at its inability to 
bring the parties together, the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet 
Union abolished the Special Administrative Committee and 
returned direct control of Karabakh to Azerbaijan. Rejecting 
Moscow's decision, the Armenian Supreme Soviet declared 
Karabakh a part of Armenia in December 1989. 



21 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

After more than two years of the Karabakh conflict, Arme- 
nia had gone from being one of the most loyal Soviet republics 
to complete loss of confidence in Moscow. Gorbachev's unwill- 
ingness to grant Karabakh to Armenia and his failure to end 
the blockade convinced Armenians that the Kremlin consid- 
ered it politically advantageous to back the more numerous 
Muslims. Even the invasion of Azerbaijan by Soviet troops in 
January 1990, ostensibly to stop pogroms against Armenians in 
Baku, failed to dampen the growing anti-Soviet mood among 
Armenians (see Within the Soviet Union, ch. 2). 

A New Political Climate 

The resignation of Suren Harutiunian as first secretary of 
the CPA in April 1990 and the triumph of the APM in the elec- 
tions of the spring and summer of 1990 signaled the end of the 
old party elite and the rise of a new Armenian political class 
that had matured during the two years of tensions over Kara- 
bakh. The newly elected Armenian parliament (which retained 
the Soviet-era name Supreme Soviet or Supreme Council) 
chose Levon Ter-Petrosian instead of the new CPA first secre- 
tary as its chairman, and hence as head of state of the republic. 

With the APM in power and the communists in opposition, 
the transition from Soviet-style government to an independent 
democratic state began in earnest. The new government faced 
a nearly complete collapse of order in the republic. Buildings 
were seized by armed men in Erevan, and several independent 
militia groups operated in Erevan as well as on the Azerbaijani 
frontier. Frustrated by the Azerbaijani blockade and deter- 
mined to defend their republic and Karabakh, members of 
Armenia's Fidain (whose name was taken from an Arabic term 
literally meaning "one who sacrifices himself " and recalling 
the Armenian freedom fighters of the turn of the century) 
raided arsenals and police stations to arm themselves for the 
coming battles. In July Gorbachev demanded immediate disar- 
mament of the Armenian militias and threatened military 
intervention if they did not comply. In response, Ter-Petro- 
sian's government itself disarmed the independent militias and 
restored order in Erevan. 

On August 23, 1990, Armenia formally declared its inten- 
tion to become sovereign and independent, with Nagorno- 
Karabakh an integral part of what now would be known as the 
Republic of Armenia rather than the Armenian Soviet Socialist 
Republic. The Armenian nation was defined broadly to include 



22 



Armenia 



not only those living in the territory of the republic but also the 
worldwide Armenian emigre population. 

In redefining Armenian national interests, the government 
acknowledged — but temporarily put aside — the painful ques- 
tion of Armenian genocide, having in mind improved relations 
with traditional enemies Turkey and Iran. This policy 
prompted strong criticism from extreme nationalist groups 
that wanted to recover territory lost to Turkey in World War I. 
The CPA was also vehemently critical. 

Independence 

In January 1991, the Armenian Supreme Soviet decided not 
to participate in Gorbachev's planned referendum on preserv- 
ing the Soviet Union. In March the parliament announced 
that, instead, the republic would hold its own referendum in 
September, in compliance with the procedure outlined in the 
Soviet constitution for a republic to secede. Although literal 
compliance would mean that Armenia would not be fully inde- 
pendent for five years after the referendum, Moscow soon 
moved to change Armenia's course. Without notifying the 
Armenian government, Moscow sent paratroopers to the 
republic in early May, ostensibly to protect Soviet defense 
installations in Armenia. Ter-Petrosian's official statement in 
reaction characterized the move as a virtual declaration of war 
by the Soviet Union. 

In August 1991, when a self-proclaimed emergency commit- 
tee attempted to overthrow Gorbachev and take control in 
Moscow, the Armenian government refused to sanction its 
actions. Fearing an extension of the Soviet incursion of May, 
Ter-Petrosian approached the Moscow coup very cautiously. 
The republic's Defense Committee secretly resolved to have 
the Armenian armed forces go underground and wage guer- 
rilla warfare. Ter-Petrosian, who believed that Gorbachev's per- 
sonal blunders, indecisiveness, and concessions to conservative 
communists were to blame for the coup, was overjoyed when 
the conservatives were defeated. But the coup itself convinced 
Armenians of the need to move out of the Soviet Union as rap- 
idly as possible, and it validated Ter-Petrosian's refusal to partic- 
ipate in the revival of the Soviet Union advocated by 
Gorbachev. 

Within two months of the coup, Armenians went to the 
polls twice. In September 1991, over 99 percent of voters 
approved the republic's commitment to independence. The 



23 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

immediate aftermath of that vote was the Armenian Supreme 
Soviet's declaration of full independence, on September 23, in 
disregard of the constitution's restraints on secession. Then in 
October, Ter-Petrosian was elected overwhelmingly as presi- 
dent of the republic. He now had a popular mandate to carry 
out his vision of Armenian independence and self-sufficiency. 

As political changes occurred within the republic, armed 
conflict continued in Nagorno-Karabakh during 1991. Arme- 
nia officially denied supporting the "Nagorno-Karabakh 
defense forces" that were pushing Azerbaijani forces out of the 
region; Armenia also accused the Soviet Union of supporting 
Azerbaijan as punishment for Armenia's failure to sign Gor- 
bachev's new Union Treaty. In turn, Azerbaijan called Armenia 
an aggressor state whose national policy included annexation 
of Azerbaijani territory. 

Postindependence Armenia 

Two immediate tasks facing independent Armenia were 
rebuilding its devastated economy and strengthening its fledg- 
ling democratic institutions. But the escalating war in Nagorno- 
Karabakh and the effective blockade of the republic by the 
Azerbaijanis led to a total collapse of the economy. By early 
1993, the government seemed helpless before mounting eco- 
nomic and political problems. The last remaining oil and gas 
pipelines through neighboring Georgia, which itself was being 
torn by civil and interethnic war, were blown up by saboteurs. 
To survive the cold, Armenians in Erevan cut down the city's 
trees, and plans were made to start up the nuclear power plant 
at Metsamor. In February 1993, demonstrations called for the 
resignation of the government, but Ter-Petrosian responded by 
naming a new cabinet headed by Hrant Bagratian. 

While economic and political conditions deteriorated 
within Armenia, the military position of the Armenians in the 
Karabakh struggle improved dramatically. Various peace nego- 
tiations sponsored by Iran, Russia, Turkey, and a nine-nation 
group from the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (CSCE — see Glossary) had begun in 1991 and sporadi- 
cally had yielded cease-fires that were violated almost immedi- 
ately. In the spring of 1992, while the Azerbaijani communists 
and the nationalist Azerbaijani Popular Front fought for con- 
trol in Baku, Karabakh Armenian forces occupied most of 
Nagorno-Karabakh, took the old capital, Shusha, and drove a 
corridor through the Kurdish area around Lachin to link 



24 



Armenia 



Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia. But the immediate result of 
this victory was the collapse of Russian-sponsored peace negoti- 
ations with Azerbaijan and the continuation of the war. 

Beginning a counteroffensive in early summer, the Azer- 
baijanis recaptured some territory and created thousands of 
new refugees by expelling Armenians from the villages they 
took. In midsummer this new phase of the conflict stimulated a 
CSCE-sponsored peace conference, but Armenia stymied 
progress by demanding for the first time that Nagorno-Kara- 
bakh be entirely separate from Azerbaijan. 

By the end of 1992, the sides were bogged down in a bloody 
stalemate. After clearing Azerbaijani forces from Nagorno- 
Karabakh and the territory between Karabakh and Armenia, 
Armenian troops also advanced deep into Azerbaijan proper — 
a move that brought condemnation from the United Nations 
(UN) Security Council and panic in Iran, on whose borders 
Armenian troops had arrived. In the first half of 1993, the 
Karabakh Armenians gained more Azerbaijani territory, 
against disorganized opposition. Azerbaijani resistance was 
weakened by the confusion surrounding a military coup that 
toppled the APF government in Baku and returned former 
communist party boss Heydar Aliyev to power. 

The coup reinvigorated Russian efforts to negotiate a peace 
under the complex terms of the three parties to the conflict: 
the governments of Armenia and Azerbaijan, and the increas- 
ingly independent and assertive Karabakh Armenians. CSCE 
peace proposals were uniformly rejected during this period. 
Although Russia seemed poised for a triumph of crisis diplo- 
macy on its borders, constant negotiations in the second half of 
1993 produced only intermittent cease-fires. At the end of 
1993, the Karabakh Armenians were able to negotiate with the 
presidents of Azerbaijan and Russia from a position of power: 
they retained full control of Nagorno-Karabakh and substantial 
parts of Azerbaijan proper (see After Communist Rule, ch. 2). 

Physical Environment 

Armenia is located in southern Transcaucasia, the region 
southwest of Russia between the Black Sea and the Caspian 
Sea. Modern Armenia occupies part of historical Armenia, 
whose ancient centers were in the valley of the Aras River and 
the region around Lake Van in Turkey. Armenia is bordered on 
the north by Georgia, on the east by Azerbaijan, on the south 



25 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

by Iran, on the southwest by the Nakhichevan Autonomous 
Republic of Azerbaijan, and on the west by Turkey (see fig. 1) . 

Topography and Drainage 

Twenty-five million years ago, a geological upheaval pushed 
up the earth's crust to form the Armenian Plateau, creating the 
complex topography of modern Armenia (see fig. 2). The 
Lesser Caucasus range extends through northern Armenia, 
runs southeast between Lake Sevan and Azerbaijan, then 
passes roughly along the Armenian-Azerbaijani border to Iran. 
Thus situated, the mountains make travel from north to south 
difficult. Geological turmoil continues in the form of devastat- 
ing earthquakes, which have plagued Armenia. In December 
1988, the second largest city in the republic, Leninakan (now 
Gyumri), was heavily damaged by a massive quake that killed 
more than 25,000 people. 

About half of Armenia's area of approximately 29,800 
square kilometers has an elevation of at least 2,000 meters, and 
only 3 percent of the country lies below 650 meters. The lowest 
points are in the valleys of the Aras River and the Debet River 
in the far north, which have elevations of 380 and 430 meters, 
respectively. Elevations in the Lesser Caucasus vary between 
2,640 and 3,280 meters. To the southwest of the range is the 
Armenian Plateau, which slopes southwestward toward the 
Aras River on the Turkish border. The plateau is masked by 
intermediate mountain ranges and extinct volcanoes. The larg- 
est of these, Mount Aragats, 4,430 meters high, is also the high- 
est point in Armenia. Most of the population lives in the 
western and northwestern parts of the country, where the two 
major cities, Erevan and Gyumri (which was called Aleksan- 
dropol' during the tsarist period), are located. 

The valleys of the Debet and Akstafa rivers form the chief 
routes into Armenia from the north as they pass through the 
mountains. Lake Sevan, 72.5 kilometers across at its widest 
point and 376 kilometers long, is by far the largest lake. It lies 
2,070 meters above sea level on the plateau. Terrain is most 
rugged in the extreme southeast, which is drained by the Bar- 
gushat River, and most moderate in the Aras River valley to the 
extreme southwest. Most of Armenia is drained by the Aras or 
its tributary, the Razdan, which flows from Lake Sevan. The 
Aras forms most of Armenia's border with Turkey and Iran as 
well as the border between Azerbaijan's adjacent Nakhichevan 
Autonomous Republic and Iran. 



26 




Gyumri) caused by 1988 earthquake 
Courtesy John Filson 

Climate 

Temperatures in Armenia generally depend upon elevation. 
Mountain formations block the moderating climadc influences 
of the Mediterranean Sea and the Black Sea, creating wide sea- 
sonal variations. On the Armenian Plateau, the mean midwin- 
ter temperature is 0°C, and the mean midsummer temperature 
exceeds 25°C. Average precipitation ranges from 250 millime- 
ters per year in the lower Aras River valley to 800 millimeters at 
the highest altitudes. Despite the harshness of winter in most 
parts, the fertility of the plateau's volcanic soil made Armenia 
one of the world's earliest sites of agricultural activity. 

Environmental Problems 

A broad public discussion of environmental problems 
began in the mid-1980s, when the first "green" groups formed 
in opposition to Erevan's intense industrial air pollution and to 
nuclear power generation in the wake of the 1986 reactor 
explosion at Chernobyl'. Environmental issues helped form the 
basis of the nationalist independence movement when environ- 
mental demonstrations subsequently merged with those for 
other political causes in the late 1980s. 



27 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

In the postcommunist era, Armenia faces the same massive 
environmental cleanup that confronts the other former Soviet 
republics as they emerge from the centralized planning sys- 
tem's disastrous approach to resource management. Bv 1980 
the infrequencv of sightings of Mount Ararat, which looms 
about sixty kilometers across the Turkish border, became a 
symbol of worsening air pollution in Erevan. 

In independent .Armenia,, environmental issues divide soci- 
ety (and scientists) sharply into those who fear "environmental 
time bombs" and those who view resumption of pollution- 
prone industrial operations as the onlv means of improving the 
country's economv, In the earlv 1990s, the latter group blamed 
Armenia's economic woes on the role played bv the former in 
closing major industries. 

In 1994 three national environmental laws were in effect: 
the Law on Environmental Protection., the Basic Law on the 
Environment, and the Law on Mineral Resources. The Council 
of Ministers. Armenia's cabinet, includes a minister of the envi- 
ronment. However, no comprehensive environmental protec- 
tion program has emerged, and decisions on environmental 
policy have been made on an ad hoc basis. 

Environmental conditions in .Armenia have been worsened 
bv the .Azerbaijani blockade of supplies and electricity from 
outside. Under blockade conditions, the winters of 1991-92. 
1992-93, and 1993-94 brought enormous hardship to a popu- 
lation lacking heat and electric power. (The large-scale felling 
of trees for fuel during the winters of the blockade has created 
another environmental crisis. ) The results of the blockade and 
the failure of diplomatic efforts to lift it led the government to 
propose reconstruction of the .Armenian Atomic Power Station 
at Metsamor, which was closed after the 1988 earthquake 
because of its location in an earthquake-prone area and which 
had the same safety problems as reactors listed as dangerous in 
Bulgaria. Russia, and Slovakia. .After heated debates over start- 
up continued through 1993.. French and Russian nuclear con- 
sultants declared operating" conditions basically safe. 
Continuation of the blockade into 1994 gave added urgency to 
the decision (see Energy this ch.). 

Another environmental concern is a significant drop in 
Lake Sevan's water level because of drawdowns for irrigation 
and the diversion of water to hydroelectric plants to compen- 
sate for the electric power lost through the inactivity of the 
nuclear plant at Metsamor. This crisis was addressed in 1992-93 



28 



Armenia 



by construction of a tunnel to divert water into the lake from 
the Arpa River. Engineers estimated that once the project is fin- 
ished, the tunnel will allow 500 million cubic meters of water to 
be drawn from the lake annually, while maintaining a constant 
water level. The Ministry of the Environment reported that the 
lake's water level had dropped by fifty centimeters in 1993. 
Experts said that this drop brought the level to within twenty- 
seven centimeters of the critical point where flora and fauna 
would be endangered. 

Among major industrial centers closed to curtail pollution 
were the Nairit Chemical Plant, the Alaverdy Metallurgical 
Plant, and the Vanadzor Chemical Combine. Economic 
requirements triumphed over environmental considerations 
when the Soviet-era Nairit plant was reopened in January 1992 
after being closed in 1989 because of the massive air pollution 
it caused. Newly independent Armenia needed the income 
from foreign sales of Nairit rubber and chemical products, 
many of which had been assigned exclusively to that plant 
under the Soviet system and were still unavailable elsewhere to 
the former Soviet republics in the early 1990s. Up-to-date envi- 
ronmental safety technology and adherence to international 
standards were promised at Nairit when the decision to resume 
production was announced. 

Population and Ethnic Composition 

The forces of history have wrought dramatic changes on the 
boundaries of the various Armenian states; the population's 
size and the ethnic makeup of those states have also been 
strongly affected. In the twentieth century, particularly signifi- 
cant changes resulted from Turkish efforts to exterminate 
Armenians during World War I and from the large-scale emi- 
gration of Azerbaijanis from Armenia in the early 1990s. 

Population Characteristics 

The origins of the Armenian people are obscure. According 
to ancient Armenian writers, their people descend from Noah's 
son Japheth. A branch of the Indo-Europeans, the Armenians 
are linked ethnically to the Phrygians, who migrated from 
Thrace in southeastern Europe into Asia Minor late in the sec- 
ond millennium B.C., and to the residents of the kingdom of 
Urartu, with whom the Armenians came into contact around 
800 B.C. after arriving in Asia Minor from the West. Although 
ethnologists disagree about the precise timing and elements of 



29 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

this ethnic combination (and even about the origin of the term 
Armenian), it is generally agreed that the modern Armenians 
have been a distinct ethnic group centered in eastern Anatolia 
since at least 600 B.C. 

In the nineteenth century, the Armenians were the most 
urban of the Transcaucasian peoples, but they were also the 
most dispersed. A merchant middle class was the most power- 
ful social group among the Armenians, although the church 
and secular intellectuals also provided leadership. Armenians 
pioneered exploitation of the oil deposits in and around Baku, 
and the economic growth of the ancient Georgian capital, 
Tbilisi, was largely an enterprise of Armenian merchants and 
small industrialists. 

The massacres and displacements that occurred between 
1895 and 1915 removed nearly all the Armenian population in 
the Turkish part of historical Armenia. In 1965 the Soviet 
Union estimated that 3.2 million Armenians lived in all its 
republics. The Turkish census the same vear showed only 
33,000 .Armenians in Turkey, most of them concentrated in the 
far west in Istanbul. In 1988 .Armenia's population declined bv 
176,000, reversing a trend over the previous decade, in which 
average population growth was 1.5 percent per vear. According 
to the 1989 census, the population of Armenia was about 
3,288,000, an increase of 8 percent from the 1979 census fig- 
ure. An official estimate in 1991 put the population at 
3,354,000, an increase of 2 percent since 1989. In 1989 Arme- 
nians were the eighth largest nationality in the former Soviet 
Union, totaling 4,627,000. At that time, only about two-thirds 
of the Armenians in the Soviet Union lived in Armenia. Some 
11.5 percent lived in Russia, 9.4 percent in Georgia, 8.4 percent 
in Azerbaijan, and the remaining 4 percent in the other repub- 
lics. In recent years, .Armenian refugees from .Azerbaijan, Geor- 
gia, Russia, and the Central Asian republics have settled in 
.Armenia, compounding an already severe housing shortage. 
The number of Armenians living in other countries, primarily 
France, Iran, Lebanon, Syria, and the United States, has been 
estimated at between 3 million and 9 million. 

In 1991 Armenia's population density, 112.6 persons per 
square kilometer, was second only to that of Moldavia (now 
Moldova) among the Soviet republics. About 68 percent of the 
population lives in urban areas and 32 percent in rural areas. 
In 1990 Armenia's capital, Erevan, had a population of 1.2 mil- 
lion, or about 37 percent of the population of the republic: the 



30 



View of Erevan 

Courtesy A. James Firth, United States Department of Agriculture 



second largest city, Leninakan, had 123,000 residents. The 
twelfth largest city in the former Soviet Union, Erevan is the 
second largest in the Caucasus region, after Tbilisi. 

In 1979 Armenian families residing in Armenia averaged 
4.5 persons, including an average of 4.3 for urban families and 
4.8 average for rural families. This average was larger than 
those of the Baltic, Georgian, Moldavian, and predominantly 
Slavic republics of the Soviet Union but less than the family 
averages of the Soviet Muslim republics. In 1989 average life 
expectancy was 71.9 years (69.0 years for males and 74.7 years 
for females). The birth rate was 21.6 live births per 1,000 popu- 
lation; the death rate was 6.0 per 1,000. 

Ethnic Minorities 

Ethnically the most homogeneous of the Soviet republics, 
Armenia had few problems with ethnic minorities during the 
Soviet period. According to the last Soviet census, conducted in 
1989, Armenians made up 93.3 percent of Armenia's popula- 
tion, Azerbaijanis 2.6 percent, Russians 1.6 percent, and Mus- 
lim Kurds and Yezidi (Christian Kurds) together 1.7 percent. 
Fewer than 30,000 others, including Greeks and Ukrainians, 
lived in the republic in 1989. During the Soviet period, the 



31 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 




25 50 Miles 



Figure 6. Ethnic Groups in Armenia 



republic's largest non-Armenian group was the Azerbaijanis. By 
1989, however, almost all of the Azerbaijanis, who had num- 
bered 161,000 in 1979, either had been expelled or had emi- 
grated from Armenia (see fig. 6). The figure for the 1989 
census included 77,000 Azerbaijanis who had returned to their 
native country but were still considered residents of Armenia. 

Language, Religion, and Culture 

Through the centuries, Armenians have conscientiously 
retained the unique qualities of their language and art forms, 
incorporating influences from surrounding societies without 
sacrificing distinctive national characteristics. Religion also has 



32 



Armenia 



been a strong unifying force and has played a political role as 
well. 

Language 

The Armenian language is a separate Indo-European 
tongue sharing some phonetic and grammatical features with 
other Caucasian languages, such as Georgian. The Iranian lan- 
guages contributed many loanwords related to cultural sub- 
jects; the majority of the Armenian word stock shows no 
connection with other existing languages, however, and some 
experts believe it derives from extinct non-Indo-European lan- 
guages. The distinct alphabet of thirty-eight letters, derived 
from the Greek alphabet, has existed since the early fifth cen- 
tury A.D. Classical Armenian (grabar) is used today only in the 
Armenian Apostolic Church as a liturgical language. Modern 
spoken Armenian is divided into a number of dialects, the 
most important of which are the eastern dialect (used in Arme- 
nia, the rest of Transcaucasia, and Iran) and the western dia- 
lect (used extensively in Turkey and among Western emigres). 
The two major dialects differ in some vocabulary, pronuncia- 
tion, grammar, and orthography. 

In the Soviet period, schools in Armenia taught in both 
Armenian and Russian; in a republic where over 95 percent of 
the people claimed Armenian as their native language, almost 
all of the urban population and much of the rural population 
knew at least some Russian. At the end of the Soviet period, 
91.6 percent of Armenians throughout the Soviet Union con- 
sidered Armenian to be their native language, and 47.1 per- 
cent of Armenians were fluent in Russian. 

Religion 

Mostly Christians since the early fourth century A.D. , the 
Armenians claim to represent the first state to adopt Christian- 
ity as an official religion. The independent Armenian church 
considers its founders to have been the apostles Bartholomew 
and Thaddeus and officially calls itself the Armenian Apostolic 
Church. (It is also referred to as the Armenian Orthodox 
Church or the Gregorian Church.) The conversion of Armenia 
by Saint Gregory the Illuminator occurred by about A.D. 314, 
although the traditional date is A.D. 306. Armenian Christians 
then remained under the powerful combined religious and 
political jurisdiction of the Roman Empire until the sixth cen- 
tury. At that point, the Armenian church asserted its indepen- 



33 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

dence by breaking with the Byzantine doctrine of Christ's dual 
(divine and earthly) nature, which had been expressed offi- 
cially by the Council of Chalcedon in A.D. 451. 

Since the schism, the Armenian Apostolic Church has been 
in communion only with the monophysite churches (those 
believing that the human and divine natures of Christ consti- 
tute a unity) of Egypt, Syria, and Ethiopia. Rather than 
embrace the monophysite doctrine, however, the Armenian 
church holds that Christ had both a divine and a human 
nature, inseparably combined in a complete humanity that was 
animated by a rational soul. 

Although the Armenian Apostolic Church often is identi- 
fied with the Eastern Orthodox churches of Eastern Europe, 
Russia, and Georgia, the Armenian church has been juridically 
and theologically independent since the early Middle Ages. As 
a national church, it has played a vital role in maintaining 
Armenian culture, through the preservation and expansion of 
written traditions and as a cultural focus for Armenians scat- 
tered around the world. In the long periods when Armenians 
did not have a state of their own, their church was both a polit- 
ical and a spiritual leader, and religion was at the center of the 
Armenian national self-image. Under the millet system by which 
the Ottoman Empire ruled subject peoples, the patriarch of 
Constantinople was recognized as the head of the Armenian 
community, and the Russian Empire treated the catholicos, the 
titular head of the Armenian Apostolic Church, as the most 
important representative of the Armenian people. 

The Armenian Apostolic Church is headed by Vazgen I, 
supreme catholicos of all Armenians, who resides in the holy 
city of Echmiadzin, west of Erevan. The membership of the 
church is split between a majority that recognizes the supreme 
catholicos without qualification and a minority that recognizes 
the catholicos of Cilicia, whose seat is at Antilyas in Lebanon. 
Closely affiliated with the Armenian Revolutionary Federation 
(ARF), the minority branch of the church was hostile to any 
accommodation with communist regimes while Armenia was 
under Soviet rule. Both branches of the church have been 
closely identified with the movement for national indepen- 
dence, however. A split occurred within the United States 
membership of the Armenian Apostolic Church in 1933, when 
ARF sympathizers assassinated the Armenian archbishop of 
New York. Two factions remained distinct in the United States 
in the early 1990s. 



34 



Armenia 



Two additional patriarchates in Jerusalem and Istanbul lack 
the status of full catholicates. Three dioceses are located in 
other former Soviet republics, and twenty bishoprics function 
in other countries. Total church membership was estimated at 
4 million in 1993. The Armenian Orthodox Academy and one 
seminary provide religious training. 

About 94 percent of the population of Armenia belongs to 
the Armenian Apostolic Church. Small Roman Catholic and 
Protestant communities also exist in Armenia. Catholic mis- 
sionaries began converting Armenians in the Ottoman and 
Persian empires in the early modern era, and American Protes- 
tant missionaries were active in the nineteenth century. The 
Kurdish population, which totaled 56,000 in 1993, is mostly 
Muslim but also includes many Christians. Kurds now consti- 
tute the largest Muslim group in Armenia because most Azer- 
baijani Muslims emigrated in the early 1990s. A Russian 
Orthodox community also exists. 

The Armenian Diaspora 

Beginning in the eleventh century, a long series of inva- 
sions, migrations, conversions, deportations, and massacres 
reduced Armenians to a minority population in their historic 
homeland on the Armenian Plateau. Under these conditions, a 
large-scale Armenian diaspora of merchants, clerics, and intel- 
lectuals reached cities in Russia, Poland, Western Europe, and 
India. Most Armenians remaining in historical Armenia under 
the Ottoman Empire in the fifteenth century survived as peas- 
ant farmers in eastern Anatolia, but others resettled in Con- 
stantinople, Smyrna, and other cities in the empire. There they 
became artisans, moneylenders, and traders. In the nineteenth 
century, the political uncertainties that beset the Ottoman 
Empire prompted further insecurity in the Armenian popula- 
tion. Finally, the Young Turk government either massacred or 
forcibly removed the vast majority of Armenians from the east- 
ern Anatolian provinces in 1915 (see Between Russia and Tur- 
key, this ch.). 

Today about half the world's Armenians live outside Arme- 
nia. Armenian communities have emerged in the Middle East, 
Russia, Poland, Western Europe, India, and North America, 
where Armenians have gained a reputation for their skill in 
crafts and in business. Although accurate statistics are not avail- 
able, the Armenian diaspora is about equally divided between 
the 1.5 million Armenians in the other republics of the former 



35 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

Soviet Union and a similar number in the rest of the world. 
The postcommunist Republic of Armenia has officially defined 
the Armenian nation to include the far-flung diaspora, a policy 
in accord with the feelings of many diaspora Armenians. 

A common theme in Armenian discourse is the need to pre- 
serve the culture and heritage of the Armenian people 
through education and mobilization of younger members of 
the community. In this task, the Republic of Armenia enjoys 
the enthusiastic support of the international Armenian com- 
munity, which sees a new opportunity to impart information to 
the rest of the world about Armenian culture — and especially 
to rectify perceived inattention to the tragedy of 1915. 

The Armenian diaspora maintains its coherence through 
the church, political parties (despite their mutual hostilities), 
charitable organizations, and a network of newspapers pub- 
lished in Armenian and other languages. Armenian emigres in 
the United States have endowed eight university professorships 
in Armenian studies. With the reemergence of an independent 
Armenia, diaspora Armenians have established industries, a 
technical university, exchange programs, and medical clinics in 
Armenia. Several prominent diaspora Armenians have served 
in the Armenian government. 

Culture 

The international Armenian community remains loyal to 
strong cultural traditions, many of which have enriched the 
societies into which Armenians emigrated. Cultural tradition 
has been a means of maintaining a sense of national unity 
among widely dispersed groups of Armenians. 

Literature and the Arts 

The Armenians became active in literature and many art 
forms at a very early point in their civilization. Urartian metal- 
working and architecture have been traced back to about 1000 
B.C. The beginning of truly national art is usually fixed at the 
onset of the Christian era. The three great artistic periods coin- 
cided with times of independence or semi-independence: from 
the fifth to the seventh century; the Bagratid golden age of the 
ninth and tenth centuries; and the era of the kingdom of 
Lesser Armenia in the twelfth to fourteenth centuries. 

Of especially high quality in the earlier periods were work in 
gold and bronze, as well as temples, military fortifications, and 
aqueducts. In the early Christian era, classical church architec- 



36 



Armenia 



ture was adapted in a series of cathedrals. The circular domes 
typical of Armenian churches were copied in Western Europe 
and in Ottoman Turkey. The best example of the distinctive 
architectural sculpture used to adorn such churches is the early 
tenth-century Church of the Holy Cross on an island in Lake 
Van. The architecture of contemporary Erevan is distinguished 
by the use of pinkish tufa stone and a combination of tradi- 
tional Armenian and Russian styles. 

Armenian painting is generally considered to have origi- 
nated with the illumination of religious manuscripts that 
thrived from the ninth to the seventeenth century. Armenian 
painters in Cilicia and elsewhere enriched Byzantine and West- 
ern formulas with their unique use of color and their inclusion 
of Oriental themes acquired from the Mongols. Many unique 
Armenian illuminated manuscripts remain in museums in the 
West. 

The nineteenth century saw a blooming of Armenian paint- 
ing. Artists from that period, such as the portrait painter 
Hacop Hovnatanian and the seascape artist Ivan Aivazovsky, 
continue to enjoy international reputations. Notable figures of 
the twentieth century have included the unorthodox Alex- 
ander Bazhbeuk-Melikian, who lived a persecuted existence in 
Tbilisi, and the emigre surrealist Arshile Gorky (pseudonym of 
Vosdanik Adoian), who greatly influenced a generation of 
young American artists in New York. Other emigre painters in 
various countries have continued the tradition as well. 

The Armenian literary tradition began early in the fifth cen- 
tury A.D. with religious tracts and histories of the Armenians. 
The most important of these were written by Agathangelos, 
Egishe, Movses Khorenatsi, and Pavstos Buzand. A secular liter- 
ature developed in the early modern period, and in the eigh- 
teenth century Armenian Catholic monks of the Mekhitarist 
order began publishing ancient texts, modern histories, gram- 
mars, and literature. In the nineteenth century, Armenians 
developed their own journalism and public theater. Khachatur 
Abovian wrote the first Armenian novel, Verk Haiastani (The 
Wounds of Armenia), in the early 1840s. Armenian literature 
and drama often depict struggles against religious and ethnic 
oppression and the aspirations of Armenians for security and 
self-expression. 

National Traditions 

Major Armenian holidays commemorate both religious and 



37 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

historical events. Besides Christmas and Easter, the most impor- 
tant holidays are Vartanants, the day marking the fifth-century 
defense of Christianity against the Persians, and April 24, 
which commemorates the 1915 genocide of the Armenians in 
Turkey. 

At times of celebration, Armenians enjoy traditional circle 
dances and distinctive national music. Their music and their 
cuisine are similar to those of other Middle Eastern peoples. A 
typical Armenian meal might include lamb, rice pilaf, egg- 
plant, yogurt, and a sweet dessert such as paklava (baklava). 
Armenians pride themselves on their close family ties, hospital- 
ity, and reverence for their national language and culture, an 
appreciation that is passed from one generation to the next. 

Education, Health, and Welfare 

In the first years of independence, Armenia made uneven 
progress in establishing systems to meet its national require- 
ments in social services. Education, held in particular esteem 
in Armenian culture, changed fastest of the social services, 
while health and welfare services attempted to maintain the 
basic state-planned structure of the Soviet era. 

Education 

A literacy rate of 100 percent was reported as early as 1960. 
In the communist era, Armenian education followed the stan- 
dard Soviet model of complete state control (from Moscow) of 
curricula and teaching methods and close integration of edu- 
cation activities with other aspects of society, such as politics, 
culture, and the economy. As in the Soviet period, primary and 
secondary school education in Armenia is free, and comple- 
tion of secondary school is compulsory. In the early 1990s, 
Armenia made substantial changes to the centralized and regi- 
mented Soviet system. Because at least 98 percent of students 
in higher education were Armenian, curricula began to 
emphasize Armenian history and culture. Armenian became 
the dominant language of instruction, and many schools that 
had taught in Russian closed by the end of 1991. Russian was 
still widely taught, however, as a second language. 

In the 1990-91 school year, the estimated 1,307 primary and 
secondary schools were attended by 608,800 students. Another 
seventy specialized secondary institutions had 45,900 students, 
and 68,400 students were enrolled in a total of ten postsecond- 
ary institutions that included universities. In addition, 35 per- 



Men playing checkers at old-age home in Erevan 
Courtesy A. James Firth, United States Department of Agriculture 

cent of eligible children attended preschools. In the 1988-89 
school year, 301 students per 10,000 population were in special- 
ized secondary or higher education, a figure slightly lower than 
the Soviet average. In 1989 some 58 percent of Armenians over 
age fifteen had completed their secondary education, and 14 
percent had a higher education. In 1992 Armenia's largest 
institution of higher learning, Erevan State University, had 
eighteen departments, including ones for social sciences, sci- 
ences, and law. Its faculty numbered about 1,300 and its stu- 
dent population about 10,000. The Erevan Architecture and 
Civil Engineering Institute was founded in 1989. Eight other 
institutions of higher learning, all located in Erevan, teach agri- 
culture, fine arts and theater, economics, music, applied sci- 
ence and technology, medicine, pedagogy and foreign 
languages, and veterinary medicine. 

Health 

The social and economic upheavals that followed the earth- 
quake of 1988 combined with the political collapse of the 
Soviet Union to create a catastrophic public health situation in 
Armenia. According to Soviet statistics published between 1989 
and 1991, the incidence of tuberculosis, viral hepatitis, and 



39 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

cancer were among the lowest in the Soviet republics (see table 
2, Appendix). In 1990 the rates of infant mortality and mater- 
nal mortality, 17.1 and 34.6 per 1,000 population, respectively, 
were also among the lowest rates in the Soviet Union. 

The level of medical care declined rapidly in the late 1980s 
and the early 1990s, however, largely because of the Azerbaijani 
blockade and the additional stress caused by war casualties. 
Even in 1990, Armenia ranked lowest among the republics in 
hospital beds per 1,000 population and exactly matched the 
Soviet Union average for doctors per 1,000 population. Before 

1991 Armenia had acquired stocks of medical supplies and 
equipment, thanks largely to the Western aid projects that fol- 
lowed the 1988 earthquake. By 1992, however, the trade block- 
ade had made the supply of such basic items as surgical gloves, 
syringes, and chlorine for water purification unreliable. In the 
escalating medical crisis that resulted from this vulnerability, 
elderly people and newborns were particularly at risk; in late 

1992 and early 1993, healthy infants reportedly were dying in 
hospitals because of the cold and the lack of adequate equip- 
ment. 

In December 1992, President Ter-Petrosian declared Arme- 
nia a disaster area and appealed to the UN Security Council to 
focus on the crisis in the republic. Government officials esti- 
mated that without emergency humanitarian aid some 30,000 
people would die. Early in 1993, the United States launched 
Operation Winter Rescue to send needed assistance to Arme- 
nia. In June Project Hope sent US$3.9 million worth of medi- 
cine from the United States. From mid-1992 to mid-1993, 
United States medical assistance totaled US$20 million. 

All hospitals in Armenia are under the jurisdiction of the 
Ministry of Health or the Erevan Health Department. In 1993 
about 29,900 hospital beds were available. Hospitals generally 
had surgical, physical therapy, pediatric, obstetric/ gynecologi- 
cal, and infectious disease wards. But according to reports, by 

1993 more than half the hospitals in Armenia had ceased func- 
tioning because electricity, heat, or supplies were lacking. 

Thirty-seven polyclinics serve the rural areas, which have no 
comprehensive health centers; such clinics are each designated 
to provide basic medical services to about 10,000 people. Sixty- 
two outpatient centers specialize in child or adult medicine in 
urban areas. Immunizations against certain diseases are given 
to most infants before they are one year old: in 1991 some 95 



40 



Armenia 



percent of infants were immunized against poliomyelitis, 88 
percent against diphtheria, and 86 percent against pertussis. 

Between 1986 and 1994, two cases of acquired immune defi- 
ciency syndrome (AIDS) were reported in Armenia: one for- 
eigner who was subsequently deported, and one Armenian 
who contracted the disease in Tanzania and was treated in 
Armenia. Experts believe that the Azerbaijani blockade has 
acted to limit the incidence of AIDS. Although no AIDS clinics 
are operating, some research has been conducted. In 1992 
Armenian scientists announced the discovery of a possible 
treatment compound. 

Social Welfare 

The social safety net also weakened drastically in the first 
years of independence. Beginning in 1989, a large share of 
national expenditures on welfare services went to the victims of 
the earthquake. In the early 1990s, Armenia nominally 
retained the Soviet-era system of social services (retirement, 
survivor, and disability pensions; allowances to the parents of 
newborn children; sick and maternity leave; unemployment 
compensation; and food subsidies). In the early 1990s, how- 
ever, acute budget shortages brought severe cuts in almost all 
the social welfare programs of the Soviet era and their replace- 
ment by intermittent foreign aid programs. The Ministry of 
Labor and Social Security allocates social benefits and charita- 
ble aid from outside the country. In 1993 only 35 percent of 
those officially considered unemployed received jobless bene- 
fits (see Labor and the Standard of Living, this ch.). 

The Economy 

In 1991, Armenia's last year as a Soviet republic, national 
income fell 12 percent from the previous year, and per capita 
gross national product (GNP — see Glossary) was 4,920 rubles, 
just 68 percent of the national average for the Soviet Union. In 
large part because of the earthquake of 1988, the Azerbaijani 
blockade that began in 1989, and the collapse of the internal 
trading system of the Soviet Union, the Armenian economy of 
the early 1990s remained far below its 1980 production levels. 
In the first two years of independence (1992-93), inflation was 
extremely high, productivity and national income dropped 
dramatically, and the national budget ran large deficits. 



41 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

Modern Economic History 

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the territory of 
present-day Armenia was a backward agricultural region with 
some copper mining and cognac production. From 1914 
through 1921, Caucasian Armenia suffered from war, revolu- 
tion, the influx of refugees from Turkish Armenia, disease, 
hunger, and economic misery. About 200,000 people died in 
1919 alone. At that point, only American relief efforts saved 
Armenia from total collapse. 

The first Soviet Armenian government regulated economic 
activity stringently, nationalizing all economic enterprises, req- 
uisitioning grain from peasants, and suppressing most private 
market activity. This first experiment in state control ended 
with the advent of Soviet leader Vladimir I. Lenin's New Eco- 
nomic Policy (NEP) of 1921-27. This policy continued state 
control of the large enterprises and banks, but peasants could 
market much of their grain, and small businesses could func- 
tion. In Armenia the NEP years brought partial recovery from 
the economic disaster of the post-World War I period. By 1926 
agricultural production in Armenia had reached nearly 
three-quarters of its prewar level. 

By the end of the 1920s, Stalin's regime had revoked the 
NEP and established a state monopoly on all economic activity. 
Once this occurred, the main goal of Soviet economic policy in 
Armenia was to turn a predominantly agrarian and rural 
republic into an industrial and urban one. Among other 
restrictions, peasants now were forced to sell nearly all their 
output to state procurement agencies rather than at the mar- 
ket. From the 1930s through the 1960s, an industrial infrastruc- 
ture was constructed. Besides hydroelectric plants and canals, 
roads were built and gas pipelines were laid to bring fuel and 
food from Azerbaijan and Russia. 

The Stalinist command economy, in which market forces 
were suppressed and all orders for production and distribution 
came from state authorities, survived in all its essential features 
until the fall of the Soviet government in 1991. In the early 
stages of the communist economic revolution, Armenia under- 
went a fundamental transformation into a "proletarian" society. 
Between 1929 and 1939, the percentage of Armenia's work 
force categorized as industrial workers grew from 13 percent to 
31 percent. By 1935 industry supplied 62 percent of Armenia's 
economic production. Highly integrated and sheltered within 
the artificial barter economy of the Soviet system from the 



42 



American University of Armenia, formerly Communist Party 

Higher School, Erevan 
Courtesy Monica O'Keefe, United States Information Agency 

1930s until the end of the communist era, the Armenian econ- 
omy showed few signs of self-sufficiency at any time during that 
period. In 1988 Armenia produced only 0.9 percent of the net 
material product (NMP — see Glossary) of the Soviet Union 
(1.2 percent of industry, 0.7 percent of agriculture). The 
republic retained 1.4 percent of total state budget revenue, 
delivered 63.7 percent of its NMP to other republics, and 
exported only 1.4 percent of what it produced to markets out- 
side the Soviet Union. 

Armenian industry was especially dependent on the Soviet 
military-industrial complex. About 40 percent of all enterprises 
in the republic were devoted to defense, and some factories 
lost 60 to 80 percent of their business in the last years of the 
Soviet Union, when massive cuts were made in national 
defense expenditures. As the republic's economy faces the 
prospect of competing in world markets in the mid-1990s, the 
greatest liabilities of Armenian industry are its outdated equip- 
ment and infrastructure and the pollution emitted by many of 
the country's heavy industrial plants (see Environmental Prob- 
lems, this ch.). 



43 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

Natural Resources 

Although Armenia was one of the first places where humans 
smelted iron, copper is the most important raw material mined 
there today. Deposits of zinc, molybdenum, gold, silver, baux- 
ite, obsidian, and semiprecious stones, as well as marble, gran- 
ite, and other building materials, are also present. Significant 
expansion is believed possible in the exploitation of most of 
those materials, which until the mid-1990s had been largely 
untouched. Some oil deposits have been identified, but the 
complex geology of the region makes recovery difficult and 
expensive. In 1993 an American expedition tentatively identi- 
fied further deposits of natural gas and oil, but exploitation was 
not expected for several years. 

Agriculture 

Armenia has 486,000 hectares of arable land, about 16 per- 
cent of the country's total area. In 1991 Armenia imported 
about 65 percent of its food. About 10 percent of the work 
force, which is predominantly urban, is employed in agricul- 
ture, which in 1991 provided 25.7 percent of the country's 
NMP. In 1990 Armenia became the first Soviet republic to pass 
a land privatization law, and from that time Armenian farm- 
land shifted into the private sector at a faster rate than in any 
other republic. However, the rapidity and disorganization of 
land reallocation led to disputes and dissatisfaction among the 
peasants receiving land. Especially problematic were allocation 
of water rights and distribution of basic materials and equip- 
ment. Related enterprises such as food processing and hot- 
house operations often remained in state hands, reducing the 
advantages of private landholding. 

By 1992 privatization of the state and collective farms, which 
had dominated Armenian agriculture in the Soviet period, had 
put 63 percent of cultivated fields, 80 percent of orchards, and 
91 percent of vineyards in the hands of private farmers. The 
program yielded a 15 percent increase in agricultural output 
between 1990 and 1991. In 1993 the government ended restric- 
tions on the transfer of private land, a step expected to increase 
substantially the average size (and hence the efficiency) of pri- 
vate plots. At the end of 1993, an estimated 300,000 small farms 
(one to five hectares) were operating. In that year, harvests 
were bountiful despite the high cost of inputs; only the disas- 
trous state of Armenia's transportation infrastructure pre- 



44 



Armenia 



vented relief of food shortages in urban centers (see 
Transportation and Telecommunications, this ch.). 

Agriculture is carried out mainly in the valleys and on the 
mountainsides of Armenia's uneven terrain, with the highest 
mountain pastures used for livestock grazing. Fertile volcanic 
soil allows cultivation of wheat and barley as well as pasturage 
for sheep, goats, and horses. With the help of irrigation, figs, 
pomegranates, cotton, apricots, and olives also are grown in 
the limited subtropical conditions of the Aras River valley and 
in the valleys north of Erevan, where the richest farmland is 
found. Armenia also produces peaches, walnuts, and quinces, 
and its cognac enjoys a worldwide reputation. 

Irrigation is required for most crops, and the building of 
canals and a system of irrigation was among the first major state 
projects of the Soviet republic in the 1920s. By the 1960s, ara- 
ble land had been extended by 20 percent, compared with 
pre-Soviet times. Most farms had electricity by the early 1960s, 
and machinery was commonplace. In the Soviet era, women 
made up most of the agricultural work force; a large percent- 
age of the younger men had responded to the Soviet industrial- 
ization campaign by migrating to urban centers. In 1989 farms 
were operating about 13,400 tractors and 1,900 grain and cot- 
ton combines. 

The principal agricultural products are grains (mostly wheat 
and barley), potatoes, vegetables, grapes, berries, cotton, sugar 
beets, tobacco, figs, and olives. In 1989 Armenia produced 
200,000 tons of grain, 266,000 tons of potatoes, 485,000 tons of 
vegetables, 117,000 tons of sugar beets, 170,000 tons of fruit, 
119,000 tons of grapes, 105,000 tons of meat, 491,000 tons of 
milk, and 561,000 tons of eggs. 

Industry 

The most important elements of Armenian heavy industry 
are metalworking, machinery manufacture, electronics, and 
the production of chemicals, petrochemicals, fertilizers, and 
building materials (see table 3, Appendix). In 1993, with the 
aid of British and Russian specialists, a chemical combine was 
designed to streamline production and marketing of Armenia's 
chemical products, which had been among the republic's most 
profitable outputs in the Soviet system. In the later Soviet 
period, the country became known for its high-quality scien- 
tific research, particularly in computer science, nuclear and 
elementary particle physics, and astrophysics. An estimated 30 



45 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

percent of Armenia's industrial production infrastructure was 
destroyed or damaged by the earthquake of 1988. 

In the Soviet period, Armenian industry contributed trucks, 
tires, elevators, electronics, and instruments to the union econ- 
omy, but several of the plants in those sectors also were lost in 
1988. In the years of the Azerbaijani blockade, heavy industrial 
production has declined sharply because the supply of fuels 
and electricity has been limited and the price of raw materials 
has become prohibitive. 

Armenian plants were an important part of the Soviet mili- 
tary-industrial complex, producing a variety of equipment. In 
the early 1990s, the Armenian Ministry of Defense attempted 
to re-establish agreements with the defense establishments of 
Russia and other member countries of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS — see Glossary). Such a move would 
enable Armenia to resume production of sophisticated elec- 
tronic air defense components, which would significantly bol- 
ster the domestic economy. 

Armenia's most important light consumer products are knit- 
ted clothing and hosiery, canned goods, aluminum foil for 
food packaging, and shoes. Most durable consumer goods are 
imported (see table 4, Appendix). In 1993 production of con- 
sumer products declined even more sharply than other sectors. 
Food imports increased dramatically to compensate for a 58 
percent drop in domestic food processing from 1991 to 1992. 

Overall industrial production in 1993 was about 60 percent 
of that in 1992, but the percentage rose steadily through 1993 
after a very slow beginning. Food production for 1993, how- 
ever, was only 50 percent of the 1992 amount, retail sales were 
58 percent, and paid services to the population were 32 per- 
cent. 

Energy 

In 1990 Armenia produced less than 1 percent of its energy 
requirement, which was filled by imports from Russia (50 per- 
cent) and other republics of the Soviet Union. In the late 
Soviet era, Armenia had a share in the Joint Transcaucasian 
Power Grid, but that arrangement and short-term supply agree- 
ments with Azerbaijan ended with the Nagorno-Karabakh con- 
flict. The 1988 earthquake destroyed the largest nonnuclear 
thermoelectric plant; the two remaining plants are located 
south of Erevan and near Razdan, northeast of Erevan. 



46 



Woman feeding chickens in a rural village 
Courtesy Aline Taroyan 

Hydroelectric plants provide 30 percent of domestic elec- 
tricity, but the output of the largest producer, the Razdan 
Hydroelectric Plant, was cut drastically because of its negative 
effect on the water level of its source, Lake Sevan. By early 
1994, however, a fifth hydroelectric generating unit was under 
construction, with international funding, to help alleviate the 
energy shortage. Planners are also considering construction of 
two medium-sized hydroelectric stations on the Dzoraget and 
Debet rivers in the far north, or 300 to 450 small stations on 
lakes. The obstacle to such plans is the high cost of importing 
technology. 

In the early 1990s, severe shortages of energy led to black- 
outs, periodic shutdowns of the subway system, inadequate 
heating of urban buildings, and the further decline of industry. 
Schools, institutes, and universities were closed through the 
winters of 1991-92 and 1992-93. 

In the 1980s, Soviet planners had attempted to improve 
Armenia's power generation capacity by building the Arme- 
nian Atomic Power Station at Metsamor. However, that station's 
two reactors were shut down after the 1988 earthquake to avoid 
future earthquake damage that might cause an environmental 
catastrophe. The heat and power crisis caused by the Azer- 



47 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

baijani blockade instituted in 1989 caused the government to 
reconsider use of Metsamor, despite the station's location in 
earthquake-prone northern Armenia and the possibility of a 
terrorist attack that could release large amounts of radiation. 

In 1993 Metsamor had an estimated capacity to provide 20 
percent of Armenia's energy requirements. Plans were made 
for startup of one of the two reactors by 1995 after careful 
equipment testing and international technical assistance — with 
the provision that the plant would remain closed if alternative 
sources of power could relieve the acute shortage of the prior 
three years. 

In 1993 the delivery of electric power to industrial consum- 
ers was cut to one-third of the 1992 level. Under continued 
blockade conditions, the winter of 1993-94 brought acute 
shortages of coal, heating oil, and kerosene to heat homes and 
city apartment buildings and to keep industries running. Sig- 
nificant deposits of high-quality coal have been identified in 
Armenia, with holdings estimated at 100 million tons. But 
exploitation would require massive deforestation, a conse- 
quence that is considered environmentally prohibitive. In Sep- 
tember 1993, Turkmenistan agreed to deliver 8.5 million cubic 
meters of natural gas per day during the winter, as well as kero- 
sene and diesel fuel in 1994. (Turkmenistan was already an 
important fuel supplier to postcommunist Armenia.) Although 
Georgia guaranteed full cooperation in maintaining gas deliv- 
ery through its pipeline into Armenia, in 1993 explosions on 
the line interrupted the flow twelve times. Azerbaijani groups 
in Georgia were assumed to be responsible for the bombings. 

Postcommunist Economic Reform 

When Mikhail S. Gorbachev began advocating economic 
reform in the late 1980s, Armenians introduced elements of 
the free market and privatization into their economic system. 
Cooperatives were set up in the service sector, particularly in 
restaurants — although substantial resistance came from the 
CPA and other groups that had enjoyed privileged positions in 
the old economy. In the late 1980s, much of the Armenian 
economy already was operating either semi-officially or ille- 
gally, with widespread corruption and bribery. The so-called 
mafia, made up of interconnected groups of powerful officials 
and their relatives and friends, sabotaged the efforts of reform- 
ers to create a lawful market system. When the December 1988 
earthquake brought millions of dollars of foreign aid to the 



48 




Woman working in a cognac factory, Erevan 
Woman working in a shoe repair shop, Erevan 
Courtesy Aline Taroyan 



49 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

devastated regions of Armenia, much of the money went to 
corrupt and criminal elements. 

Beginning in 1991, the democratically elected government 
pushed vigorously for privatization and market relations, 
although its efforts were frustrated by the old ways of doing 
business in Armenia, the Azerbaijani blockade, and the costs of 
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In 1992 the Law on the Pro- 
gram of Privatization and Destatization of Incompletely Con- 
structed Facilities established a state privatization committee, 
with members from all political parties. In mid-1993 the com- 
mittee announced a two-year privatization program, whose first 
stage would be privatization of 30 percent of state enterprises, 
mostly services and light industries. The remaining 70 percent, 
including many bankrupt, nonfunctional enterprises, were to 
be privatized in a later stage with a minimum of government 
restriction, to encourage private initiative. For all enterprises, 
the workers would receive 20 percent of their firm's property 
free of charge; 30 percent would be distributed to all citizens by 
means of vouchers; and the remaining 50 percent was to be dis- 
tributed by the government, with preference given to members 
of the labor organization. A major problem of this system, how- 
ever, is the lack of supporting legislation covering foreign 
investment protection, bankruptcy, monopoly policy, and con- 
sumer protection. 

In the first postcommunist years, efforts to interest foreign 
investors in joint enterprises were only moderately successful 
because of the blockade and the energy shortage. Only in late 
1993 was a department of foreign investments established in 
the Ministry of Economics, to spread information about Arme- 
nian investment opportunities and improve the legal infra- 
structure for investment activity. A specific goal of this agency is 
creating a market for scientific and technical intellectual prop- 
erty. 

A few Armenians living abroad made large-scale invest- 
ments. Besides a toy factory and construction projects, 
diaspora Armenians built a cold storage plant (which in its first 
years had little produce to store) and established the American 
University of Armenia in Erevan to teach the techniques neces- 
sary to run a market economy. 

Armenia was admitted to the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF — see Glossary) in May 1992 and to the World Bank (see 
Glossary) in September. A year later, the government com- 
plained that those organizations were holding back financial 



50 



Armenia 



assistance and announced its intention to move toward fuller 
price liberalization and the removal of all tariffs, quotas, and 
restrictions on foreign trade. Although privatization had 
slowed because of the catastrophic collapse of the economy, 
Prime Minister Hrant Bagratian informed United States offi- 
cials in the fall of 1993 that plans had been made to embark on 
a renewed privatization program by the end of the year. 

Labor and the Standard of Living 

The abrupt termination of economic relations with many 
former Soviet republics, each concerned with its own immedi- 
ate needs, forced reduction of the work force and plant clos- 
ings in Armenia. In the years following, the effects of the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict continued and exacerbated the 
trend. In 1991 some 39 percent of the active work force was 
employed in industry and construction; 21 percent in the arts, 
education, and health; 19 percent in agriculture and forestry; 7 
percent in transportation and communications; and 6 percent 
in commerce and food services (see table 5, Appendix). 

About 96,000 persons were officially classified as unem- 
ployed in September 1993, a 55 percent increase since the 
beginning of the year. Another 150,000 workers were expected 
to apply for government support grants before the end of 1993. 

About 800,000 Armenians (approximately one-quarter of 
the population) were homeless in 1991. Especially hard-hit by 
unemployment was the highly skilled work force that had been 
employed in the Soviet military-industrial complex until that 
sector of the economy was severely cut in the late 1980s. Con- 
version of plants to civilian production progressed slowly in the 
early 1990s; according to one estimate, 120,000 jobs were lost 
during this process. 

In 1988 the Armenian living standard was slightly lower 
than that of the Soviet Union as a whole. The per capita con- 
sumption by Armenians was 12 percent below the average for 
Soviet republics. Average daily nutritional consumption was 
2,932 calories, of which 45 percent was grains and potatoes (see 
table 6, Appendix). 

After the fall of the Soviet Union, living standards in Arme- 
nia fell precipitously. By the end of 1993, the decrease in pro- 
duction, shortages of food and fuel, and hyperinflation had 
reduced the living standard of an estimated 90 percent of 
Armenians to below the official poverty line. In the winter of 
1993-94, average monthly income was enough to pay for rent 



51 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

and public transportation, plus either ten eggs or 300 grams of 
butter. Fish and bread, still under price controls, were the only 
affordable staple foods. Average per capita housing space in 
1993 was fifteen square meters. 

The National Financial Structure 

The various aspects of Armenia's financial system were 
reformed or replaced piecemeal in the early 1990s, with the 
national cash flow severely restricted by the strangulation of 
foreign trade and diversions to support military operations and 
emergency humanitarian needs (see table 7, Appendix). 

Banking 

Banking reforms in Armenia moved somewhat more slowly 
than in other former Soviet republics. In late 1991, the special- 
ized state banks of the Soviet system were converted into joint- 
stock commercial banks, and some new commercial banks 
were formed. But the State Bank of Armenia (Gosbank Arme- 
nia) and the Bank for Foreign Economic Affairs remained offi- 
cial branches of central state banks in Moscow. The 
consequence was diminished local control over monetary pol- 
icy. 

A new Central Bank of Armenia was not fully established 
until early 1994, and even then the bank was not entirely free 
of state control. The global financial community considers the 
bank's independence vital to normalization of Armenia's inter- 
national financial dealings, along with stabilization of the dram 
(for value of the dram — see Glossary), the national currency 
established in 1993, and regularization of the dispersal of state 
pension allowances. In 1993 official exchange rates for the 
dram were as much as 100 percent more than black-market 
rates, which economists consider the more accurate value. 
Because of a shortage of hard currency in 1993, banks tried to 
restrict sales of hard currency that would further diminish the 
exchange value of the dram. 

The National Budget 

The tax base of the 1992 budget was to include a new value- 
added tax (VAT — see Glossary), several excise taxes, and a 
revised system of enterprise and personal income taxes. Hard- 
currency export earnings were to be taxed at 25 percent. The 
fastest-growing expenditure categories were national defense 
and allowances to citizens to mitigate the effects of price liber- 



52 



Armenia 



alization. The 1992 budget called for a cut of about 45 percent 
in real expenditures (equivalent to a nominal increase of 155 
percent), which would still leave a deficit of 1.2 billion rubles, 
or 11 percent of total expenditures. Budgets were extremely 
difficult to plan because of the Azerbaijani blockade and the 
unpredictable inflation rate. 

Price Policy 

In mid-1990 the government introduced a three-stage price 
reform program, implementation of which was severely hin- 
dered by the contraction of the national economy. The pur- 
pose of the first stage was to improve agricultural production 
incentives by raising government procurement prices for staple 
products. The second stage raised wholesale prices and tariffs 
to bring them closer to world market levels and to stimulate 
price negotiations. The third stage fixed prices (usually at 
increases of 300 to 500 percent) for food, medicine, utilities, 
and transportation, but it freed the prices of most other items. 
Experts believed that prices would not reach true equilibrium 
until the end of shortages caused by the blockade. 

Between December 1992 and September 1993, annual price 
increases for various goods and services ranged from nearly 
600 to over 1,200 percent. Whereas the average monthly 
increase for all expenditures in 1993 was 23 percent, the rate 
fell considerably in the second half of the year. By the summer 
of 1993, monthly increases had fallen below 17 percent. 

Transportation and Telecommunications 

Armenia's mountainous topography, landlocked location, 
and antagonistic neighbors have made movement of goods and 
maintenance of a transportation system difficult. Despite these 
problems, however, the country's air, rail, and highway net- 
works serve the nation's needs adequately. Domestic movement 
of goods is occasionally hampered by poor maintenance of 
roads. In addition, since independence in 1991, movement of 
goods across international borders has frequently been dis- 
rupted because many of the country's important rail and high- 
way links with the outside world pass through Azerbaijan. 
Beginning in 1989, complete stoppage of international trade 
across this border led to escalating food and fuel shortages in 
Armenia. 

In 1991 Armenia had 11,300 kilometers of roads, of which 
about 10,500 kilometers were paved. Most roads radiate from 



53 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 



GEORGIA / 




National capital 
• Populated place 
1111 Railroad 

Road 

Airport 

NOTE - Status of Nagorno-Karabakh 
under negotiation in 1994. 

25 50 Kilometers 



\^Megri 



/ r 



25 



50 Miles 



Figure 7. Transportation System of Armenia, 1994 



Erevan, and in the western part of the country four-lane high- 
ways connect major cities (see fig. 7). The main route for inter- 
national travel of passengers and goods before the start of the 
conflict with Azerbaijan was Route M24, which leads northeast 
out of Erevan to connect with Route M27, the principal east- 
west highway across the Caucasus Mountains. Other major 
highways extend southeast from the capital to southern Arme- 
nia and to Azerbaijan's Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic 
and west to the populated areas of western Armenia and to the 
Turkish border. 

In 1992 Armenia had about 100,000 state-owned vehicles 
(automobiles, trucks, taxis, and buses). Observers noted, how- 



54 



Armenia 



ever, that at any given time about one-third of these vehicles 
were inoperable because of poor maintenance and unavailabil- 
ity of spare parts. Average vehicle age in 1992 was 6.5 years. 

Armenia had 825 kilometers of mainline railroad track in 
1992, excluding several small industrial lines. Most lines are 
1.520-meter broad gauge, and the principal routes are electri- 
fied. The rail system is roughly configured like a " Y " and has 
lines radiating from a central point just south of Erevan. The 
northeast branch roughly parallels Route M24 to Azerbaijan. 
About 85 percent of all goods used in Armenia are imported by 
rail, and before the conflict with Azerbaijan, most came via this 
rail line. Closure of the line at the international border during 
the early 1990s has caused severe disruption to the Armenian 
economy. The southern branch of the line extends south 
toward the Turkish border, where it turns southeast into 
Nakhichevan. The war with Azerbaijan has stopped service on 
this segment of the rail system as well. 

In 1994 the last operative portion of the country's rail lines 
was the northwest branch of the "Y," which winds through the 
populated areas of northwestern Armenia before crossing into 
Georgia. A short spur of this line at Gyumri connects with the 
Turkish rail system. However, a difference in gauge with the 
Turkish system means that goods crossing the Turkish border 
must undergo a time-consuming reloading process. 

In 1991 Armenia Railways, the state-owned rail system, oper- 
ated with 100 electric and eighty diesel locomotives. Delays in 
the delivery of spare parts from Russia have been a nagging 
problem in the maintenance of the system. Cannibalization of 
rolling stock to obtain parts has severely reduced service. 

Erevan's new subway system was still largely under construc- 
tion in the early 1990s. In 1994 nine stations had opened on 
the first ten-kilometer section of heavy-rail line. This first line 
connected Erevan's industrial area with the downtown area and 
the main rail station. Work on an additional four kilometers 
was slowed by the 1988 earthquake. Plans called for an eventual 
system of forty-seven kilometers organized into three lines. 

Armenia's principal airport, Zvartnots, is about seven kilo- 
meters from downtown Erevan. With a runway approximately 
2,700 kilometers long, the airport can handle airplanes as large 
as the Russian Tu-154 and IL-86 or the Boeing 727. In 1993 the 
airport handled about 34,000 tons of freight. The State Airlines 
Company of Armenia, the new state-run airline, provides direct 
or nonstop service to about a dozen cities of the former Soviet 



55 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

Union, as well as to Paris. The Russian and Romanian national 
airlines also provide regular international air service into Ere- 
van. Since the beginning of the conflict with Azerbaijan, fuel 
shortages have curtailed expansion of passenger and cargo ser- 
vice, however. Several other airports elsewhere in Armenia 
have paved runways, but most are used for minor freight trans- 
port. Although air cargo has the potential to relieve the effects 
of the Azerbaijani blockade of land routes, efforts to fly in avia- 
tion kerosene were frustrated in 1993 by corruption in the 
Main Administration for Aviation and by high prices charged 
by Russian suppliers. 

Armenia's one major natural gas pipeline branches off the 
main Transcaucasian line that runs from Russia through Geor- 
gia to Baku. The Armenian spur begins in western Azerbaijan 
and reaches its main terminus in Erevan. In all, Armenia has 
900 kilometers of natural gas pipeline. Armenia imports most 
of its fuel and, before the conflict with Azerbaijan, imported 80 
percent of its fuel from Azerbaijan via the pipeline or in rail 
tanker cars. Like Armenia's rail and highway links, the pipeline 
from Azerbaijan has been closed by the Azerbaijani blockade. 

In 1991 the American Telephone and Telegraph Company 
installed 200 long-distance circuits in Armenia, which gave the 
republic the capacity, available elsewhere in the former Soviet 
Union only in Moscow, to receive direct-dial international calls. 
Radio and television are controlled by the State Committee for 
Television and Radio Broadcasting. Ten AM and three FM 
radio stations broadcast from Erevan, Kamo, and Sisian. Broad- 
casts are in Armenian, Kurdish, and Russian to points within 
Armenia, and in those languages plus Arabic, English, French, 
Persian, Spanish, and Turkish to points outside the country. 
The single television station broadcasts in Armenian and Rus- 
sian. According to Soviet statistics of the late 1980s, between 90 
and 95 percent of Armenian homes had radios or televisions. 
No statistics are available for the blockade years, but experts 
believe that under blockade conditions substantially fewer 
Armenians have had regular access to broadcast information. 

Foreign Trade 

In the Soviet period, Armenia traded almost solely with the 
union's other republics. A foreign trade organization (FTO) 
controlled each product group, and exports by each Armenian 
enterprise were determined by the State Planning Committee 
(commonly known by its Russian acronym, Gosplan) in Mos- 



56 



Armenia 



cow. Enterprises had no control over the size or destination of 
shipments of their products. Together with Estonia and Tajiki- 
stan, Armenia had the highest level of imports among the 
Soviet republics. Its exports consisted mostly of semifinished 
goods that needed processing in other republics. 

In the years since the breakup of the Soviet Union, Arme- 
nia's economy has been hurt by the need to import much of its 
food and almost all of its oil and gas. In 1989 the FTO monop- 
oly was removed, allowing enterprises to seek their own buyers 
and sellers abroad. In 1992 the government removed most 
state controls over foreign trade. Export licensing continued to 
protect enterprises from fraud and to enforce domestic market 
quotas. In the early 1990s, most of Armenia's exports went to 
Russia, Eastern Europe, and various developing countries (see 
table 8, Appendix). By January 1992, Armenia had signed bilat- 
eral trade protocols with most of the former Soviet republics. 
To ensure flexibility in the face of future price liberalization, 
prices were to be set in direct negotiation between enterprises. 
Enterprises were not strictly bound by protocols signed by their 
respective governments, although quotas remained a possibil- 
ity. At this stage, all payments were to be in rubles. 

In 1990 Armenia's largest sources of export income were 
light industrial products (mostly knit clothing, shoes, and car- 
pets), machines and metal products, processed foods, and 
chemical products. The highest total expenditures on imports 
were for light industrial products, processed foods, chemical 
products, energy and fuels, and unprocessed agricultural prod- 
ucts. In 1990 Armenia showed a trade deficit of 869 million 
rubles in industrial goods and a deficit of 278 million rubles in 
agricultural goods. 

In April 1992, Armenia became the first former Soviet 
republic to sign a comprehensive bilateral trade agreement 
with the United States and the first to receive most-favored- 
nation status. Canada soon followed in granting Armenia simi- 
lar status. In planning future trade, Armenia expected to rely 
heavily on foreign markets for products from its newly orga- 
nized complex of chemical enterprises, for which demand was 
identified in the former Soviet republics, Eastern Europe, Iran, 
Syria, Turkey, Argentina, and Australia. 

Government and Politics 

The Republic of Armenia declared its sovereignty on August 
23, 1990, and became an independent state a year later, on Sep- 



57 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

tember 23, 1991. In October 1991, Levon Ter-Petrosian, who 
had been elected democratically as chairman of the Armenian 
Supreme Soviet under the Soviet system in 1990, was chosen 
president of the republic in a six-candidate election. As of early 
1994, Armenia was a reasonably stable democratic state, 
although its party structure was fractious and its legislative 
branch ineffectual. Because no consensus could be reached on 
a new constitution, a standoff between parliament and the 
president remained unresolved in early 1994. 

Parliament 

The 248 members of Armenia's unicameral parliament 
(Geraguin khorhurt in Armenian, officially retaining the term 
"Supreme Soviet" from the communist era) are elected for five- 
year terms and meet for six months each year. The prime min- 
ister and the Council of Ministers, which together constitute 
the executive branch of the government, are chosen from par- 
liament. Although half the members of parliament (124) must 
be present for a quorum, a majority of the votes of the entire 
body (125) is needed to pass laws. In the early 1990s, because 
more than 160 members were rarely present and the ruling 
party did not have a majority in the body, the parliament was 
proving unable to act decisively on major legislative issues. 
Moreover, a two-thirds majority of the parliament (165) is 
needed to override a presidential veto. In the absence of a con- 
stitution, however, the parliament has issued laws regulating 
the relations and powers of the branches of government. 

The Presidium, the parliament's executive body, administers 
parliament when it is not in session. The Presidium is made up 
of the president of the republic (whose title is also chairman of 
parliament), two deputies, the secretary of the parliament, and 
the twelve chairmen of the permanent parliamentary commit- 
tees. Often laws are initiated by the president of the republic, 
sent to the Presidium for review, and then passed on to appro- 
priate committees before being reviewed and voted upon by 
the whole parliament. (Besides permanent committees, the 
parliament can create temporary committees to deal with spe- 
cific issues.) 

Once parliament passes a law, the president of the republic, 
who also may participate in parliamentary debates, must sign 
or veto within two weeks. In early 1994, parliament had not yet 
passed legislation replacing Soviet-era laws in several major 
areas: criminal and civil codes, administrative violations, mar- 



58 



Armenia 



riage and family, labor rights and practices, land tenure, and 
housing. 

The Presidency 

As it has developed in the 1990s, the Armenian presidency is 
the most powerful position in government. More than a cere- 
monial head of state, the president is the most active proposer 
of new legislation, the chief architect of foreign and military 
policy, and, during Armenia's prolonged state of national 
emergency, the unchallenged center of government power in 
many areas. 

Levon Ter-Petrosian, a former philologist and a founding 
member of the Karabakh Committee, became the first presi- 
dent of independent Armenia in 1991. Ter-Petrosian has occu- 
pied the political center of Armenian politics as the single most 
important politician in the country and the principal advocate 
of moderate policies in the face of nationalist emotionalism. 
The parliamentary plurality that Ter-Petrosian's party, the 
Armenian Pannational Movement (APM), enjoyed at the for- 
mation of the republic in 1991 enhanced presidential authority 
at the expense of parliament, where the majority of seats were 
divided among many parties. Beginning in 1992, Ter-Petrosian 
took several controversial unilateral actions on major issues, 
which brought accusations of abuse of power. 

State Administrative Bodies 

The Council of Ministers, which performs the everyday 
activities of the executive branch of government, is presided 
over by the prime minister, who reports directly to the presi- 
dent and to parliament. The prime minister is named by the 
president but must be approved by parliament. The members 
of the council are appointed by joint decision of the president 
and the prime minister. 

The Council of Ministers underwent a series of changes in 
the early 1990s as Ter-Petrosian sought a prime minister with 
whom he could work effectively. As a result, four men occupied 
that position between 1991 and 1993. The principal source of 
friction within government circles is factional disagreement 
about the appropriate elements and pace of economic reform. 
In the first years of independence, most of the members of the 
council have belonged to the APM. In 1994 the Council of Min- 
isters included the following ministries: agriculture, architec- 
ture and urban planning, communications, construction, 



59 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

culture, defense, economics, education, energy and fuel, envi- 
ronment, finance, food and state procurement, foreign affairs, 
health, higher education and science, industry, internal affairs, 
justice, labor and social security, light industry, national secu- 
rity, natural resources, trade, and transportation. 

In addition to the regular ministries, state ministries coordi- 
nate the activities of ministries having overlapping jurisdic- 
tions. State ministers rank higher than regular ministers. In 
1994 there were six state ministries: agriculture, construction, 
energy and fuel, humanitarian assistance, military affairs, and 
science and culture. State agencies have responsibilities similar 
to those of ministries, but they are appointed by and report 
directly to the president. Seven state agencies were operating 
in 1994. 

The Judiciary 

With no constitution in place, the structure of the new 
Armenian judiciary remains unformalized. Most judges are 
holdovers from the Soviet period, and the power to appoint 
judges has not been decided between the legislative and execu- 
tive branches. Appointment and training of new judges are 
high priorities in replacing the Soviet judicial system with an 
independent judiciary. 

District courts are the courts of first instance. Their judges 
are named by the president and confirmed by the parliament. 
The Supreme Court, whose chief justice is nominated by the 
president and elected by a simple majority of parliament, pro- 
vides intermediate and final appellate review of cases. The 
court includes a three-member criminal chamber and a three- 
member civil chamber for intermediate review and an eleven- 
member presidium for final review. The full, thirty-two-mem- 
ber court provides plenary appellate review. 

The general prosecutor is nominated by the president and 
elected by parliament. The general prosecutor's office moves 
cases from lower to higher courts, oversees investigations, pros- 
ecutes federal cases, and has a broad mandate to monitor the 
activities of all state and legal entities and individual citizens. 
The general prosecutor appoints district attorneys, the chief 
legal officers at the district level. 

The Constitution 

As of early 1994, adoption of a constitution for the Republic 
of Armenia remained a controversial and unresolved project. 



60 



Armenia 



In the meantime, the 1978 constitution, a replica of the Soviet 
Union's 1977 document, remained in effect except in cases 
where specific legislation superseded it. At the end of 1992, the 
president and the APM parliamentary delegates presented a 
draft constitution. They put forward a revised version in March 
1993. Then, after nearly a year's work, a bloc of six opposition 
parties led by the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF) 
presented an alternative constitution in January 1994 that 
would expand the parliament's power, limit that of the presi- 
dent, expand the authority of local government, allow Arme- 
nians everywhere to participate in governing the republic, and 
seek international recognition of the 1915 massacre. As 1994 
began, observers expected a long struggle before parliament 
adopted a final version. 

Local Government 

The republic is divided into thirty-seven districts, or gavar- 
ner, each of which has a legislative and administrative branch 
replicating the national structures. Pending adoption of a new 
constitution prescribing a division of power, however, all major 
decisions are made by the central government and are merely 
implemented by the district administrations. 

Political Parties 

During Armenia's seventy years as a Soviet republic, only 
one party, the Communist Party of Armenia (CPA), was 
allowed legal status. As a branch of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union, it ruled under the direct orders of the leadership 
in Moscow. Following the collapse of communist authority, two 
major parties and dozens of minor ones competed for popular- 
ity along with the remnants of the CPA. 

In the years following independence, the most vocal and 
powerful opposition party was the Armenian Revolutionary 
Federation (ARF). Founded in 1890, the ARF was the ruling 
party in the Republic of Armenia in 1918-20; forbidden under 
the communist regimes, the ARF built a strong support net- 
work in the Armenian diaspora. When the party again became 
legal in 1991, its foreign supporters enabled it to gain influ- 
ence in Armenia out of proportion to its estimated member- 
ship of 40,000. With a platform calling for a coalition 
government, greater power for the parliament at the expense 
of the executive, and a strong social welfare program, the ARF 
gained eighteen seats in the 1992 parliamentary election. 



61 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), founded in 1921, calls 
for privatizing the economy and rapidly establishing all possi- 
ble conditions for a free-market economy. It also backs a strong 
system of state social welfare and recognition of Nagorno-Kara- 
bakh's independence. The LDP had seventeen seats in parlia- 
ment in 1994. 

Former dissident Pariur Hairikian heads the National 
Self-Determination Union, which has called for a coalition gov- 
ernment based on proportional representation of each party. 
With only one seat in parliament, the union takes a radical- 
right position on most issues. Extreme nationalist parties with 
racist ideologies also have small followings. Most opposition 
parties have been critical of Ter-Petrosian's Nagorno-Karabakh 
policy; in 1992 they formed the so-called National Alliance to 
coordinate their foreign policy positions. Because of parlia- 
ment's institutional weakness, oppositionists frequently have 
organized massive public rallies demanding the president's res- 
ignation. 

In the first years of independence, the ruling elite came pri- 
marily from the Armenian Pannational Movement (APM), the 
umbrella organization that grew out of the Karabakh move- 
ment. In the 1992 parliamentary election, the APM gained 
fifty-five seats, easily giving it a plurality but leaving it vulnera- 
ble when opposition coalitions formed on individual issues. 
The next largest delegation, that of the ARF, had twelve seats. 
In 1993 the failure of Ter-Petrosian's government to bring the 
Karabakh conflict to an end, its own willingness to compromise 
on the Karabakh question, and the daily grind of fuel and food 
shortages reduced the popularity of the ruling nationalist 
movement. 

Human Rights 

In April 1991, Armenia signed the International Covenant 
of Civil and Political Rights and accepted it as domestic law, 
superseding all existing laws on the subject. That covenant 
includes the right to counsel; the presumption of innocence of 
the accused; the right to privacy; prohibition of arbitrary arrest; 
freedom of the press, religion, political expression and assem- 
bly, and movement; minority rights; and prohibition of discrim- 
ination. Since 1991 specific legislation has further guaranteed 
freedom of the press and prohibited discrimination in educa- 
tion, language, and employment. Rights of the accused, how- 



62 



Armenia 



ever, remain undefined pending Armenia's acceptance of 
international conventions on that subject. 

In 1993 several human rights organizations were active in 
Armenia: the Helsinki Assembly, which represented the inter- 
national Helsinki Watch; the League of Human Rights; parlia- 
ment's Committee on Human Rights; a national group called 
Avangard; and a branch of the international Sakharov Fund. 

In 1993 the National Self-Determination Union accused the 
Ter-Petrosian government of a state terrorism policy that 
included the assassination of individuals within the union and 
others opposed to government policy. The most publicized 
incident was the murder in 1993 of Marius Yuzbashian, a 
former chief of the Armenian branch of the Committee for 
State Security (Komitet gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti — KGB). 

The Media 

In the Soviet era, the officially sanctioned source of public 
information was Armenpress, the state news agency assigned to 
disseminate the propaganda of the CPA. In the post-Soviet 
years, Armenpress has remained the primary source of infor- 
mation for independent newspapers in Armenia and for peri- 
odicals in the diaspora. Under those conditions, the agency has 
required continued state funding to maintain its information 
flow to foreign customers, of whom seventeen had reciprocal 
information supply agreements with Armenpress in early 1994. 
Meanwhile, the agency has adopted a more neutral position in 
its reporting. 

Early in 1994, the Ministry of Justice reported that twenty- 
four magazines, nine radio stations, twenty-five press agencies, 
and 232 newspapers were active. Several national newspapers 
represent a variety of political viewpoints. Hayastani Hanrapetu- 
tiun (Republic of Armenia) is the official daily newspaper of 
the Supreme Soviet, published in Armenian and Russian ver- 
sions. Golos Armenii (The Voice of Armenia), published daily in 
Russian, is the official organ of the CPA. Azatamart (Struggle 
for Freedom) and Hazatamart (Battle for Freedom) are weekly 
organs of the ARF. Hazg (Nation) is published by the Party of 
Democratic Freedom. Other newspapers include Grakan Text 
(Literary Paper), published by the Armenian Union of Writers; 
Hayk (Armenia), a publication of the APM; Ria Taze (New 
Way); and Yerokoian Yerevan (Evening Erevan). In 1993 thirteen 
major magazines and journals covered science and technology, 
politics, art, culture, and economics; the group also included 



63 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

one satirical journal, one journal for teenagers, and one for 
working women. 

Foreign Relations 

While it has been engaged in the Nagorno-Karabakh con- 
flict with Azerbaijan, Armenia also has sought international sta- 
tus and security in new bilateral relations and membership in 
international organizations. In the first years of independence, 
Armenia became a member of the UN, the IMF, the World 
Bank, the CSCE, and the CIS. Located in a region that is 
already unstable, in the early 1990s the three republics of Tran- 
scaucasia gained the attention of world leaders because of the 
potential for a wider war on the northern tier of the Middle 
Eastern states. The resulting aid and efforts at mediation have 
had mixed results. 

Azerbaijan 

Since the outbreak of fighting in 1988, Nagorno-Karabakh 
has been the principal foreign policy issue for Armenia, creat- 
ing a huge drain on its financial and human resources. By the 
end of 1993, estimates of the number killed in the conflict 
ranged from 3,000 to 10,000. The fighting between Armenians 
and Azerbaijanis repeatedly has threatened to involve not only 
other CIS member states but also Turkey and Iran, whose bor- 
ders have been approached and even crossed during the con- 
flict. 

In a speech to the UN in September 1992, Ter-Petrosian 
stated his government's official position that Armenia had no 
territorial claims against Azerbaijan, but that the people of 
Nagorno-Karabakh could not be denied the right of 
self-determination. Advocating the protection of the region by 
means of permanent international guarantees, Armenia 
repeatedly called for cease-fires and negotiations between Azer- 
baijan and Nagorno-Karabakh, and between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan, to resolve the issue. In 1992 the Armenian parlia- 
ment passed a law prohibiting the government from signing 
any document recognizing Azerbaijani authority over Kara- 
bakh. But at that point, Ter-Petrosian resisted advocating 
Armenian recognition of Karabakh's independence, which 
would raise yet another obstacle to peace. 

The ARF, the party most supportive of the Nagorno-Kara- 
bakh government and its army, called for more forceful prose- 
cution of the war and recognition of the independent status of 



64 



Armenia 



Karabakh. In early 1993, the ARF began advocating a binding 
referendum on the status of the region rather than its return to 
Armenia. 

In 1993 the CSCE made repeated but fruitless efforts to 
maintain cease-fires and to bring the warring parties together 
for peace talks. Although years of preliminary discussions had 
finally resolved the details of how a conference would be held, 
the negotiations of the CSCE's multinational Minsk Group had 
not resulted in a single meeting by the end of 1993. There were 
other efforts at peacemaking. A joint meeting of thirty-three 
states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO — see 
Glossary) and the former Warsaw Pact (see Glossary) 
expressed its concern, Iran attempted separate mediation 
between Azerbaijan and Armenia, and Russian and CIS leaders 
(most notably Russia's President Boris N. Yeltsin) also negoti- 
ated brief cease-fires. In 1993 Ter-Petrosian also maintained 
telephone contact with Azerbaijan's president, Heydar Aliyev. 

The situation was complicated by the often unpredictable 
actions of the government in Nagorno-Karabakh. In December 
1991, Nagorno-Karabakh declared itself an independent state, 
and its armed forces often operated independently of the gov- 
ernment of the Republic of Armenia. However, the region and 
its army remained largely dependent on food, medicine, weap- 
ons, and moral support from Armenia, especially from the 
ARF. 

Georgia, Iran, and Turkey 

Armenians have long been a significant part of the urban 
population of Georgia, particularly in Tbilisi. Two districts in 
southern Georgia are predominantly Armenian. The dictato- 
rial regime of Zviad Gamsakhurdia, which ruled Georgia from 
late 1990 until early January 1992, was extremely intolerant of 
all ethnic minorities. More than 70,000 Armenians were caught 
in the crossfire of the Georgian government's conflict with 
Abkhazian separatists, which reached crisis proportions in the 
fall of 1993. In this struggle, extreme Georgian nationalists 
attempted to drive the Armenian population from the country 
in order to create a homogeneous Georgia. The crisis in Ab- 
khazia had immediate repercussions for Armenia when fight- 
ing resulted in the severing of Georgia's Black Sea railroad, a 
lifeline from Russia to Armenia. The republic thus was cut off 
from many supplies, particularly grain. In early 1993, when a 
natural gas pipeline running through Georgia was repeatedly 



65 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

blown up, the Armenian government sharply demanded that 
the Georgian leader, Eduard Shevardnadze, make a greater 
effort to secure the necessary flow of gas to Armenia. 

Armenia has had better relations with Iran, although Iran 
has been worried about the presence of Armenian troops occu- 
pying Azerbaijani territory just across its border. Two-thirds of 
the world's Azerbaijanis live in Iran, and the Tehran govern- 
ment fears that emigres would spread Azerbaijani nationalism 
among the Azerbaijani population of northern Iran. Armenian 
troops have at times been no more than twenty kilometers 
from the Iranian border. On several occasions, Iran attempted 
to mediate the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, but unforeseen 
actions by the Karabakh forces frustrated these efforts. 

Armenia's traditional enemy in the twentieth century has 
been Turkey. Among outstanding sources of conflict, the most 
painful and long-lasting has been the Turkish refusal to recog- 
nize the deportations and massacres of Ottoman Armenians in 
1915 as a deliberate, state-sponsored act of genocide. Many 
Armenians, particularly those associated with the ARF, aspire to 
restore Armenian control over the lands of historical Armenia 
that are now under Turkish sovereignty. Although many Arme- 
nian emigres remain hostile toward Turkey today, the Ter- 
Petrosian government has made improved relations with 
Ankara a high priority because of the possibility of opening 
new supply routes and hard-currency markets for Armenian 
products. 

Although no Armenian politician is willing to retract the 
demand that the Ottoman genocide of 1915 be acknowledged, 
those around the Armenian president have resisted raising 
issues likely to alienate Turkey. In late 1992, when Foreign Min- 
ister Raffi Hovannisian spoke about the outstanding differ- 
ences between Turks and Armenians in a speech in Istanbul, 
he was swiftly removed from office. On the Nagorno-Karabakh 
issue, the Turkish government usually has sided with Azer- 
baijan, particularly during the time of the Azerbaijani Popular 
Front government in Baku (May 1992-June 1993). Nationalist 
voices in Turkey have protested Armenian advances against 
Azerbaijan, and periodically Turkey has prevented Western 
humanitarian aid from reaching Armenia. Turkish nationalist 
factions also have accused Armenia of aiding Kurdish rebels in 
eastern Turkey. 



66 



Armenia 



The Commonwealth of Independent States 

Increasingly through the early 1990s, the Republic of Arme- 
nia's isolation led the government to look for allies beyond 
Transcaucasia. Ter-Petrosian appealed to foreign governments 
and to Armenians abroad for material aid to carry the people 
through the harsh winters. As the rapprochement with Turkey 
in 1991-92 brought few concrete benefits, Armenia steadily 
gravitated toward a closer relationship with Russia. Early in 
1993, Ter-Petrosian met with Yeltsin in Moscow to discuss deliv- 
eries of oil and natural gas to the blockaded republic. The Rus- 
sian minister of defense, Pavel Grachev, negotiated a brief 
cease-fire in Nagorno-Karabakh in April. Armenia remained in 
the ruble zone, the group of countries still using Russian rubles 
as domestic currency, often in parallel with a new national cur- 
rency such as Armenia's dram. In 1992 and 1993, large-scale 
credit payments from the Central Bank of Russia were vital in 
supporting Armenia's national budget. 

Immediately after Armenia declared itself independent, 
Ter-Petrosian joined in an economic community with seven 
other republics — but he refused to enter a political union at 
that point. In December 1991, however, he signed the Alma- 
Ata Declaration, making Armenia a founding member of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). From that time, 
Armenia has played an active role in the CIS, signing an accord 
on military cooperation with Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, 
Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. 

In May 1993, Ter-Petrosian announced Armenia's support 
of a Russo-Turkish-American plan for settlement of the Kara- 
bakh conflict. When Aliyev returned to power in June, Ter- 
Petrosian spoke by telephone directly with the new leader of 
Azerbaijan, and together they agreed that Azerbaijan and 
Nagorno-Karabakh must begin direct negotiations. Azer- 
baijan's entry into the CIS in September 1993 was seen by some 
as giving Russia a mandate to solve the Karabakh problem. Ter- 
Petrosian reiterated his conditions for peace: Karabakh was to 
be recognized as a full party to the negotiations, all blockades 
were to be ended, and the CSCE-sponsored Minsk Group nego- 
tiations were to settle all political and legal questions on the sta- 
tus of Karabakh. 

Russia was a logical mediator. Not only did it have military 
bases and equipment in the region, but Russian troops were 
still guarding the border between Armenia and Turkey. Russia 
consistently asserted its hegemonic role in Transcaucasia, 



67 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

opposed the designs of Turkey and Iran in the region, and was 
even wary of the United States being a mediator in the region 
without specific Russian invitation or acquiescence. After 
Yeltsin won a struggle with the Russian parliament in Septem- 
ber 1993 and both Georgia and Azerbaijan had joined the CIS, 
Russia resumed its role as the primary mediator of conflicts in 
Transcaucasia. 

Russia has asserted hegemony in the region in several ways. 
It has repeatedly claimed the right to protect the major link 
from Russia to Armenia that passes through conflict-plagued 
Abkhazia and Georgia. In September 1993, Russia requested a 
revision of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE 
Treaty — see Glossary), which had been negotiated between 
NATO and the Warsaw Pact in 1990, in order to achieve an 
increase in the number of Russian tanks and heavy weapons in 
the Caucasus. Although NATO perceived an increased military 
influence in the formulation of this more assertive Russian pol- 
icy, Western policy makers recognized that at the end of 1993 
Russia was the only power in position to play a meaningful 
peacekeeping role in the region. 

The United States 

Independent Armenia enjoys good relations with the 
United States and the European Union (EU). The United 
States recognized the Republic of Armenia in December 1991, 
and a United States embassy opened in Erevan in February 
1992. General United States and Armenian strategic interests 
in common include the promotion of internal democracy, just 
termination of the Karabakh conflict, and stability in the 
former Soviet Union that would prevent the resurgence of an 
authoritarian, imperialist Russia. United States policy toward 
Armenia must weigh the special relationships of the United 
States with Russia and NATO ally Turkey. In the first post-Soviet 
years, the United States has given more aid per capita to Arme- 
nia than to any other former Soviet republic. At the same time, 
the United States has withheld trade privileges from Azerbaijan 
because of that country's economic blockade of Armenia. 

Armenians have been able to influence American policy to a 
limited degree through the diaspora in the United States, but 
their interests and those of the United States are not always 
congruent. Given its special relationship with Turkey, the 
United States has been reluctant to recognize the events of 
1915 as genocide. On several occasions, the United States criti- 



68 



Loading butter from United States Department of Agriculture onto 
Armenian trucks at Zvartnots Airport, near Erevan, after collapse of 

Soviet Union, February 1992 
Courtesy A. James Firth, United States Department of Agriculture 

cized Armenian aggression against Azerbaijan outside of Kara- 
bakh. Yet both the United States and Russia, as well as the 
CSCE countries in general, agree that a solution to the Kara- 
bakh conflict must be based on recognition of existing borders 
and the rights of minorities. 

In the first winters of the 1990s, many Armenians were on 
the brink of starvation, and the basic needs of the population 
were sustained only through foreign aid. In December 1991, 
the United States Department of Agriculture and the Diocese 
of the Armenian Church in America arranged for the diocese 
to distribute food shipments valued at US$15 million in Arme- 
nia. Through Operation Provide Hope, the United States gov- 
ernment sent food and medical supplies worth over US$6 
million to Armenia in the first eight months of 1992. When the 



69 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

United States Agency for International Development (AID) 
authorized US$1 million to the American Bar Association for a 
program to provide legal experts to the member states of the 
CIS, Armenia became the first country where legislators 
worked with these legal specialists. The Peace Corps arrived in 
Erevan in August 1992, followed in the fall by AID and the 
United States Information Agency (USIA). 

National Security 

As a nation, Armenia has not had a great tradition of mili- 
tary success, even at the largest extent of the Armenian 
Empire. In the Soviet period, Armenian troops were thor- 
oughly integrated into the Soviet army, and Armenian plants 
contributed sophisticated equipment to Soviet arsenals. After 
independence Armenia profited from some aspects of this 
close association, and a strong Russian military presence is 
expected to remain for some time. 

Geopolitical Situation 

As a small country, Armenia has had an unfavorable geopo- 
litical situation, with no neighbors likely to provide support 
and security. Lacking an outlet to the sea, Armenia is sur- 
rounded by Muslim Turkey and Azerbaijan, both of which gen- 
erally have been hostile to Armenia's interests: the militant 
Islamic republic of Iran; and a Georgia torn by civil war. By 
1990 Armenia's traditional reliance on Russia had weakened 
because of internal political conditions — the Karabakh move- 
ment had an anti-Russian orientation — and because of the 
retreat of post-Soviet Russia from military involvement on 
many fronts. 

In the early 1990s, the major external threat to Armenia 
came from Azerbaijan. A state with twice the population of 
Armenia, with significant unrecovered oil reserves in the Cas- 
pian Sea, and with great potential for securing Western capital 
for industrial development, Azerbaijan possessed considerable 
resources with which to fight a long war in Karabakh. In early 
1994, the Armenian Army was considered the most combat- 
ready force in the three states of Transcaucasia. However, 
experts attributed Armenian combat successes in the conflict 
in 1992-93 to the political instability in Baku, to regional divi- 
sions within Azerbaijan, and to the greater unity and determi- 
nation of the Armenian forces in Karabakh (see Forming a 
National Defense Force, ch. 2). 



70 



Armenia 



In the years following independence, Armenia saw its future 
security based on ending the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, 
improving its relations with all its neighbors, and gaining aid 
and support from the great global powers and organizations — 
the United States, Russia, the CSCE, and the UN. Once it 
joined the CIS, Armenia adhered to the organization's security 
arrangements. In March 1992, Armenia joined Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, and Russia in an agreement on the status of gen- 
eral-purpose forces, and it joined seven other CIS republics in 
an agreement on the financing, supply, production, and devel- 
opment of military equipment. On May 15, 1992, Armenia, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan met 
in Tashkent and signed the Treaty on Collective Security. 
According to this pact, former Soviet armed forces were per- 
mitted to remain in the signatory republics by mutual agree- 
ment. Armenia and several other republics agreed to 
apportion former Soviet weapons to conform to the CFE 
Treaty. By that agreement, Armenia was to receive 875 units of 
heavy materiel (tanks, artillery, aircraft, and helicopters), the 
same number as Georgia and Azerbaijan. 

Armenia's location between two larger states, Russia and 
Turkey, has long forced it to orient its policies to favor one or 
the other. Until the late Soviet period, Armenia generally 
favored its Orthodox neighbor and depended on the Russian 
or Soviet state for its national security. In 1945 Stalin raised the 
matter of regaining Armenian territory from Turkey, but the 
issue quietly expired with the dictator in 1953. After indepen- 
dence was officially proclaimed in 1991, Armenia's member- 
ship in the new CIS became a national security issue because it 
seemingly prolonged Russian occupation. The prevailing view 
in the early 1990s, however, was that isolation from reliable alli- 
ances was the greater threat. 

In the decades after World War II, relations between Arme- 
nians and Turks degenerated. The Turks became embittered 
by acts of Armenian terrorism against Turkish citizens in other 
countries, especially in the 1970s, which served to remind the 
world of the genocide issue. Starting in the 1980s, Turkey 
began aspiring to play a major role in European affairs and to 
exert leadership among the Central Asian Muslim nations that 
emerged from the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. These for- 
eign policy goals encouraged Turkish ambivalence toward 
Armenian objectives in Nagorno-Karabakh. However, tradi- 
tional Turkish nationalism demanded alliance with Muslim 



71 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

Azerbaijan, and eastern Turkey remained a heavily fortified 
area after the end of the Cold War — about 50,000 Turkish 
troops were on the Armenian border in early 1994. In turn, 
Armenia saw its collective security treaty with the CIS and the 
presence of Russian troops in Armenia as restraints on the 
nationalist impulse in Turkish policy making. 

The Military 

Influenced by the requirements of supporting the forces of 
Nagorno-Karabakh against Azerbaijan and the long-term objec- 
tive of military self-reliance, Armenia has worked toward mak- 
ing the Armenian Army a small, well-balanced, combat-ready 
defense force. Chief architects of the force were General Norat 
Ter-Grigoriants, a former Soviet deputy chief of staff who 
became overall commander of the new Armenian Army; 
Vazgan Sarkisian, named the first minister of defense; and 
Vazgan Manukian, who replaced Sarkisian in 1992. 

As expressed by the military establishment during the plan- 
ning stage, Armenia's military doctrine called for maintenance 
of defensive self-sufficiency that would enable its army to repel 
an attack by forces from Azerbaijan or Turkey, or both. That 
concept was refuted, however, by radical nationalists who advo- 
cated a more aggressive posture, similar to that of the Israeli 
army in defending a "surrounded" land, of maintaining the 
armed forces at a high degree of readiness to inflict crippling 
losses on an enemy within days. Both doctrines emphasized 
small, highly mobile, well-trained units. The specific outcome 
of the debate over military doctrine has been concealed as a 
matter of national security. Although legislation on defense 
forces called for 1 percent of the population to be in the armed 
forces, active-duty strength in 1994 was estimated at 20,000, 
including border troops. By that time, the Ministry of Defense 
had increased its goal to a standing army of 50,000, to be sup- 
plemented in wartime by a reserve call-up. 

A top defense priority in 1994 was improving control of the 
Zangezur region, the vulnerable, far southeastern corridor bor- 
dering Iran and flanked by Azerbaijan's Nakhichevan Autono- 
mous Republic and Azerbaijan proper. The program for 
Zangezur includes new military installations, especially on the 
Iranian border, as well as a new bridge and a new natural gas 
pipeline into Iran. 

The army and the Ministry of Defense have structures simi- 
lar to those of their counterparts in the former Soviet Union, 



72 



Armenia 



except that the highest organizational level of the Armenian 
forces is a smaller unit, the brigade, rather than the traditional 
division, to maximize maneuverability. Plans call for brigades of 
1,500 to 2,500 troops to be divided into three or four battal- 
ions, in the manner of the paramilitary forces of the Karabakh 
Armenians. 

Regular Forces 

In 1992 the Ministry of Defense appealed to Armenian offic- 
ers who had had commissions in the Soviet army to help form 
the new force to defend their homeland against Azerbaijan and 
to build a permanent national army. Although substantial spe- 
cial benefits were offered, the new professional officer corps 
was not staffed as fully as hoped in its first two years. In espe- 
cially short supply were officer specialists in military organiza- 
tional development — a critical need in the army's formative 
stage. In 1994 most Armenian officers still were being trained 
in Russia; the first 100 Armenian-trained officers were to be 
commissioned in the spring of 1994. Plans called for officer 
training to begin in 1995 at a new national military academy. 

Eighteen-year-old men constitute the primary pool of con- 
scripts. New trainees generally are not sent into combat posi- 
tions. The Armenian public was hostile to conscription in the 
Soviet period; the practice of assigning Armenian recruits to all 
parts of the Soviet Union prompted large demonstrations in 
Erevan. That attitude continued in the post-Soviet period. In 
the first two years of the new force, recruitment fell far short of 
quotas. The draft of the fall of 1992, for example, produced 
only 71 percent of the quota, and widespread evasion was 
reported. 

Conscripts generally lack equipment and advanced training, 
and some units are segregated by social class. Officer elitism 
and isolation are also problems, chiefly because the first lan- 
guage of many officers is Russian. Desertion rates in 1992-93 
were extremely high. In early 1994, the defense establishment 
considered formalizing the status of the large number of volun- 
teers in the army by introducing a contract service system. 

In 1992 the republic established the Babajanian Military 
Boarding School, which admitted qualified boys aged fourteen 
to sixteen for training, leading to active military service. By 
agreement with Russian military institutions, graduates could 
continue training in Russia at the expense of the Armenian 
Ministry of Defense. A class of 100 was expected to graduate in 



73 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

1994. The lack of military training schools is rated as a serious 
problem. Armenian cadets and junior officers study at military 
schools in Russia and other CIS states, and senior officers 
spend two to three years at academies in Russia and Belarus. A 
military academy for all armed services was in the planning 
stage in 1994. 

The Karabakh Self-Defense Army consists mostly of Arme- 
nians from Karabakh or elsewhere in Azerbaijan, plus some vol- 
unteers from Armenia and mercenaries who formerly were 
Soviet officers. The Karabakh forces reportedly are well armed 
with Kalashnikov rifles, armor, and heavy artillery, a high per- 
centage of which was captured from Azerbaijani forces or 
obtained from Soviet occupation troops. Significant arms and 
materiel support also came from Armenia, often at the 
expense of the regular army. By 1994 the Karabakh Self- 
Defense Army was building an infrastructure of barracks, train- 
ing centers, and repair depots. Defeats that Armenians 
inflicted on Azerbaijan in 1993 were attributed by experts 
largely to the self-defense forces, although regular Armenian 
forces also were involved. 

The Armenian air defense forces, virtually nonexistent in 
1991, were equipped and organized as part of the military 
reform program of Ter-Grigoriants. Air defense units and the 
air force each had about 2,000 troops in 1994. The new mili- 
tary aviation program of the air force has been bolstered by the 
recruitment of Soviet-trained Armenian pilots, and new pilots 
receive training at the Aviation Training Center, run by the 
Ministry of Defense. Some modern training aircraft are avail- 
able at the center. Pilots receive special housing privileges, 
although their pay is extremely low. Some Soviet-made Mi-8, 
Mi-9, and Mi-24 helicopters are available to support ground 
troops, but only one squadron of aircraft was rated combat- 
ready in 1994. Most of Armenia's fixed-wing aircraft, inherited 
from the Soviet Union, were unavailable because of poor main- 
tenance. 

Reserves 

After independence the Soviet-era Volunteer Society for 
Assistance to the Army, Air Force, and Navy (see Glossary), part 
of the centralized reserve system of the Soviet army, was 
renamed the Defense Technical Sports Society. The new system 
trains personnel for specific military tasks in the Armenian 
forces, whereas previous training was a general preparation for 



74 



Members of Armenian Army parading in Victory Square, Erevan, 

Independence Day 1993 
Courtesy Azarian Churukian 

unknown assignments elsewhere in the Soviet Union. In 1993 
the society's schools gave instruction in thirteen military occu- 
pational specialties, including tank driving and repair, radio- 
telegraphy, and artillery and small arms repair. 

Like those of the regular military, the facilities of the 
reserves were cut back sharply at independence. At least nine 
reserve training facilities, including one technical school, were 
reassigned within the Ministry of Defense or to another minis- 
try. The Defense Technical Sports Society supports itself by sell- 
ing military gear and sports vehicles produced in its plants; it 
has established advisory relations with defense technical societ- 
ies in other CIS countries. 

The Russian Role 

After Armenian independence, Russia retained control of 
the Russian 7th Army in Armenia, which numbered about 
23,000 personnel in mid-1992. At that time, the 7th Army 
included three motorized rifle divisions. In the second half of 
1992, substantial parts of two divisions — the 15th Division and 
the 164th Division — were transferred to Armenian control. 
The other division remained intact and under full Russian 
command at Gyumri in early 1994. Meanwhile, Russia com- 
pleted withdrawal of the four divisions of its 4th Army from 
Azerbaijan in May 1993. Some Armenian warrant officers were 
assigned to the division at Gyumri, and the two countries dis- 
cussed assignment of Armenian recruits to Russian units. 

The Russian presence continued in 1994, with an opera- 
tional command in Erevan providing engineer, communica- 
tions, logistics, aviation, and training capabilities. Under the 



75 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

1992 Treaty on Collective Security, which apportioned Soviet 
weaponry among the former Soviet republics, Armenia was 
allotted 180 T-72 tanks, 180 BMP-IK armored fighting vehi- 
cles, sixty BTR-60 and BTR-70 armored personnel carriers, 
twenty-five BRM-1K armored fighting vehicles, thirty 9P-138 
and 9P-148 guided missiles, and 130 artillery pieces and mor- 
tars. An unknown number of weapons systems in the Osa, 
Strela, Igla, and Shilka classes were also designated for transfer. 
Much of this equipment was no longer serviceable by the time 
it was turned over, however. 

Internal Security 

In the early 1990s, internal security was endangered by 
growing radical opposition to the moderate domestic and for- 
eign policies of the Ter-Petrosian government. By 1993 a wide- 
spread breakdown of law and order in the republic had eroded 
the authority of the Armenian state. 

Shortly after independence, a special internal security force 
was formed under the Ministry of Internal Affairs, whose spe- 
cial status in the government alarmed many observers in the 
ensuing years. The original mission of the internal security 
force was to prevent guerrilla attacks on military installations in 
the first months of independence. Since that time, this militia 
also has acted as the sole general (and nominally apolitical) 
police force. As originally formed, the internal affairs unit had 
1,000 troops, including one assault battalion, two motorized 
patrol battalions, and one armored patrol battalion. Three spe- 
cialized companies, including a canine unit for drug detection, 
also were formed. Elements of the former KGB have remained 
active under Armenian direction. All police agencies are under 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs. 

Border patrols are administered by the Main Administration 
for the Protection of State Borders. Some of the patrols on the 
Iranian and Turkish borders are manned by Russian troops, 
whose presence is partially funded by Armenia. The rest of the 
border patrols are made up of Armenian troops serving under 
contract. 

In early 1994, Armenia completely reorganized the State 
Administration for National Security (SANS), the umbrella 
agency of the Ministry of Internal Affairs that heads all 
national security activities. All agency activities except border 
patrols were suspended for three months while staff were 
reevaluated and an announced focus on intelligence and coun- 



76 



Armenia 



terintelligence was introduced. The controversial measure may 
have been instigated by the assassination of Marius Yuzbashian, 
a former chief of the Armenian branch of the KGB; SANS had 
failed to investigate the assassination fully when it occurred, in 
the fall of 1993. 

Experts saw a serious long-term threat to internal security in 
the independent mercenary Fidain forces that had been 
trained and expanded by Armenian political parties to fight in 
Nagorno-Karabakh. The end of the Karabakh conflict would 
free these combat-hardened forces, which did the bulk of the 
fighting in Karabakh, for possible guerrilla activity within 
Armenia on behalf of their respective opposition parties. 

Crime 

Especially in the chaotic conditions that have existed during 
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Armenia has suffered steep 
increases in the gang activity of an organized mafia. Overall 
crime increased 11.5 percent from 1990 to 1991; then it 
increased 24.8 percent from 1991 to 1992. "Major" crimes 
(murder, robbery, armed robbery, rape, and aggravated 
assault) increased 3 percent from 1991 to 1992. The largest 
increases in that category were in murder, robbery, and armed 
robbery. White-collar crime (bribery and fraud) increased 
about 2 percent in that time, crimes by juveniles increased 
about 40 percent, and drug-related crimes increased 240 per- 
cent. According to one report, 80 percent of crimes committed 
in Armenia in 1992 were drug related. 

In 1992 and 1993, a police campaign temporarily limited 
the activity of a few large gangs, but gang leaders, whose identi- 
ties were commonly known in Armenian society, used influ- 
ence in parliament to stymie the efforts of the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs. Some deputies in parliament were implicated 
directly in white-collar crime, and some even had been con- 
victed prior to their election. From 1991 to 1993, six convicts 
were sentenced to death, but by early 1994 none had been exe- 
cuted. 

Prisons 

Three major prisons are in operation, at Sovetashen, Artik, 
and Kosh. Local jurisdictions also have jails. All prisons and 
jails are under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs. The Soviet prison system remains intact in Armenia. 
That system includes two general categories: labor colonies, 



77 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

and prison communities similar to Western prisons. Prison sys- 
tem reforms call for establishment of general and high-security 
reform schools for teenagers; general and high-security prisons 
for women; and four grades of prisons for men, from minimum 
to maximum security. The death penalty is applicable for mili- 
tary crimes, first-degree murder, rape of a minor, treason, espi- 
onage, and terrorism. 

In 1993 Armenia remained a weak state whose legal system 
was severely challenged by the activities of regional and family 
clans, criminal gangs with diverse operations, widespread cor- 
ruption, and occasional assassinations of political figures. In 
the absence of a secure rule of law, the stresses of war and 
material privation, uncertainty about the future, and popular 
suspicion about the legitimacy of the ruling elites threatened 
the stability of the new republic. 

* * * 

For general historical and cultural narratives on the Arme- 
nian nation and people, two books by David Marshall Lang are 
of special value: The Armenians: A People in Exile and Armenia: 
Cradle of Civilization. Ronald G. Suny's Armenia in the Twentieth 
Century covers that period, with an emphasis on social change. 
The Economic Profile of Armenia volume of the United States 
Department of Commerce's Business Information Service for 
the Newly Independent States and Armenia, an economic 
review by the International Monetary Fund, provide a picture 
of Armenia's economy after 1991; the latter source also 
includes tables on a variety of economic performance indica- 
tors in the Soviet and post-Soviet periods. 

Current information on Nagorno-Karabakh and conditions 
in Armenia is provided in the Monthly Digest of News from Arme- 
nia, published by the Armenian Assembly of America, and the 
Foreign Broadcast Information Service's Daily Report: Central 
Eurasia. These two publications emphasize political, economic, 
and national security topics. (For further information and 
complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



78 



Sixth-century water pitcher 



Country Profile 



Country 

Formal Name: Republic of Azerbaijan. 
Short Form: Azerbaijan. 
Term for Citizens: Azerbaijani (s). 
Capital: Baku. 

Date of Independence: October 18, 1991. 

Geography 

Size: Approximately 86,600 square kilometers. 

Topography: About half mountainous; surrounded by 
mountain ranges, most notably Greater Caucasus range to 
north. Flatlands in center and along Caspian Sea coast. 

Climate: Dry, semiarid steppe in center and east, subtropical in 
southeast, cold at high mountain elevations to north, 
temperate on Caspian Sea coast. 

Society 

Population: Mid-1994 estimate 7,684,456; 1994 annual growth 
rate 1.4 percent. Density in 1994 approximately eighty-eight 
persons per square kilometer. 

Ethnic Groups: Azerbaijanis 82.7 percent, Russians 5.6 percent, 
Armenians 5.6 percent, and Lezgians (Dagestanis) 3.2 percent, 
per 1989 census (Armenians and Russians much less in early 
1990s). 



NOTE — The Country Profile contains updated information as available. 



81 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

Languages: Azerbaijani 82 percent, Russian 7 percent, and 
Armenian 5 percent, per 1989 census (Armenian and Russian 
much less in early 1990s). 

Religion: In 1989* Muslim 87 percent (about 70 percent of 
which Shia), Russian Orthodox 5.6 percent, and Armenian 
Apostolic 5.6 percent (much less in early 1990s). Many 
mosques reopened or established after religious restrictions of 
Soviet period. 

Education and Literacy: Compulsory education through eighth 
grade. In 1970 literacy estimated at 100 percent (ages nine to 
forty-nine). After 1991 major reform program was begun to 
modify Soviet system, eliminate ideology, increase use of 
Azerbaijani language, and reintroduce traditional religious 
instruction. 

Health: Nominally universal health care available but facilities 
limited, especially after independence. Sanitation, pharmacies, 
health care delivery, and research and development at 
relatively low level; medicines and equipment in short supply. 

Economy 

Gross National Product (GNP): In 1992 estimated at US$18.6 
billion, or US$2,480 per capita. Average growth rate 1.9 
percent in 1980-91. Production dropped throughout early 
1990s because of adjustments to post-Soviet system and because 
of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. 

Agriculture: Main crops grapes, cotton, tobacco, citrus fruits, 
and vegetables. Livestock, dairy products, and wine also 
produced. Slow privatization hinders productivity increase, and 
production of most crops decreased in early 1990s. Irrigation 
and other equipment outmoded, although irrigation critical 
for many crops. 

Industry and Mining: Principal industries oil extraction, oil 
equipment manufacture, petrochemicals, and construction. 
Besides oil, large natural gas deposits and some iron ore, 
bauxite, cobalt, and molybdenum. Oil production in decline 
since 1980s. 

Energy: Abundant hydroelectric potential, but most of electric 
power generated by oil-fired plants. Domestic natural gas 
production meets 35 percent of domestic needs. Foreign 



82 



Azerbaijan 



assistance sought to rejuvenate oil extraction industry. 

Exports: In 1992 estimated at US$926 million to 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) nations and 
US$821 million outside CIS, of which 61 percent refined oil 
and gas products, 25 percent machinery and metal products, 
and 7 percent light industrial products (textiles and food 
products). Largest export markets Russia, Ukraine, Iran, 
Turkey, and Hungary. 

Imports: In 1992 estimated at US$300 million from outside 
CIS, of which 36 percent machine parts, 21 percent processed 
foods, and 12 percent nonfood light industrial products. 
Largest import sources Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine. 

Balance of Payments: In 1992 trade surplus approximately 
US$24 million. 

Exchange Rate: Manat, established in mid-1992 at ten rubles to 
the manat, was used together with ruble until end of 1993, 
after which manat became sole currency. October 1993 
exchange rate US$1=120 manats. 

Inflation: Estimated at 1,200 percent for 1993. 

Fiscal Year: Calendar year. 

Fiscal Policy: State budget consists of central government 
budget and budgets of sixty-eight local and regional 
government budgets. Tax system revised in 1992 to improve 
state income, and budgetary expenditures tightly controlled to 
minimize budget deficits. 

Transportation and Telecommunications 

Highways: In 1990 about 36,700 kilometers of roads, of which 
31,800 kilometers hard-surface. Generally poorly maintained. 

Railroads: 2,090 kilometers of rail line in 1990. Lines connect 
Baku with Tbilisi, Makhachkala (in Dagestan), and Erevan; rail 
line in Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic goes to Tabriz (in 
Iran). Operating costs high because of poor condition of 
equipment. Service disrupted by Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in 
early 1990s. 

Civil Aviation: Total of thirty-three usable airports, twenty-six 
with permanent-surface runways. Longest runway at Baku 
International Airport. National airline, Azerbaijan Airlines, 



83 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 
founded in 1992. 

Inland Waterways: Most rivers not navigable. 

Ports: Baku center of Caspian shipping lines to Iran and 
Turkmenistan. 

Pipelines: In 1994 crude oil pipeline 1,130 kilometers, 
petroleum products pipeline 630 kilometers, and natural gas 
pipeline 1,240 kilometers. 

Telecommunications: In 1991 total telephone lines 644,000 
(nine per 100 persons). Connections to CIS countries by cable 
and microwave. Connections to other countries through 
Moscow. International Telecommunications Satellite 
Organization (Intelsat) station in Baku gives access to 200 
countries through Turkey. Turkish and Iranian television 
stations received through satellite; domestic and Russian 
broadcasts received locally. 

Government and Politics 

Government: One autonomous republic, Nakhichevan 
Autonomous Republic; one autonomous region, Nagorno- 
Karabakh Autonomous Region (under dispute with Armenia) . 
Fifty-six districts and ten cities under direct central control. 
Executive branch includes president, elected by direct popular 
vote, and Council of Ministers, appointed by president with 
legislative approval; 350-member legislature, Azerbaijani 
Supreme Soviet, dissolved in May 1992, superseded by fifty- 
member Melli-Majlis (National Council). Regimes of early 
1990s unstable. Adoption of new constitution delayed by 
political turmoil. Judicial branch remains substantially 
unchanged from Soviet system, which offered limited rights to 
those accused. 

Politics: Azerbaijani Communist Party, previously only legal 
party, dissolved formally September 1991 but remained 
influential and was reconstituted December 1993. Major 
parties New Azerbaijan Party, led by President Heydar Aliyev; 
Azerbaijani Popular Front, major opposition party 1990-92; 
and National Independence Party, major opposition party 
1992-94. Several smaller parties influential in coalition politics 
of Melli-Majlis. 

Foreign Relations: Major goal countering worldwide Armenian 



84 



Azerbaijan 



information campaign on Nagorno-Karabakh. Policy toward 
Turkey and Russia varies with perception of support and 
mediation of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict; Aliyev government 
closer to Russia. Blockade of Armenia brought United States 
restriction of relations and aid in 1992. Recognized by 120 
countries by 1993. 

International Agreements and Membership: Member of 
Commonwealth of Independent States, United Nations, 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and 
International Monetary Fund. 

National Security 

Armed Forces: Military affairs overseen by Defense Council 
reporting to president, not by Ministry of Defense. Armed 
forces consist of army, air force, air defense forces, navy, and 
National Guard. In 1994 total of about 56,000 troops (about 
half of which conscripts), 49,000 of which allocated to ground 
forces, 3,000 to navy, and 2,000 each to air force and air 
defense forces. Paramilitary groups extensively used in 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in early 1990s, and volunteers 
widely sought abroad. All Russian forces withdrawn by 1993. 
Forced recruitment reported in 1993; discipline poor. 

Military Budget: Estimated expenditure in 1992 about 10.5 
percent (US$125 million) of state budget. 

Internal Security: Border Guards, established in 1992, limited; 
some Russian troops included. In 1993 major reform of 
Ministry of Internal Affairs, which controls 20,000 militia 
troops used as regular police. Customs service unable to 
prevent smuggling, especially of narcotics. 



85 



International boundary 

® National capital 

® Autonomous republic capital j 

• Populated place 

NOTE - Status of Nagorno-Karabakh 
under negotiation in 1994 

25 50 75 Kilometers 



RUSSIA 



GEORGIA 



ARMENIA 



[turkeyV 




Figure 8. Azerbaijan, 1994 



86 



UNDER THE DOMINATION of the Soviet Union for most of 
the twentieth century, Azerbaijan began a period of tentative 
autonomy when the Soviet state collapsed at the end of 1991. A 
culturally and linguistically Turkic people, the Azerbaijanis 
have retained a rich cultural heritage despite long periods of 
Persian and Russian domination. In the 1990s, the newly inde- 
pendent nation still faced strong and contrary religious and 
political influences from neighbors such as Iran to the south, 
Turkey to the west, and Russia to the north (see fig. 8) . Despite 
the country's rich oil reserves, Azerbaijan's natural and eco- 
nomic resources and social welfare system have been rated 
below those of most of the other former Soviet republics. Fur- 
thermore, in the early 1990s a long military and diplomatic 
struggle with neighboring Armenia was sapping resources and 
distracting the country from the task of devising post-Soviet 
internal systems and establishing international relations. 

Historical Background 

The territory of modern Azerbaijan has been subject to myr- 
iad invasions, migrations, and cultural and political influences. 
During most of its history, Azerbaijan was under Persian influ- 
ence, but as the Persian Empire declined, Russia began a 200- 
year dominance, some aspects of which have persisted into the 
1990s. 

Early History 

As a crossroads of tribal migration and military campaigns, 
Azerbaijan underwent a series of invasions and was part of sev- 
eral larger jurisdictions before the beginning of the Christian 
era. 

Persian and Greek Influences 

In the ninth century B.C., the seminomadic Scythians set- 
tled in areas of what is now Azerbaijan. A century later, the 
Medes, who were related ethnically to the Persians, established 
an empire that included southernmost Azerbaijan. In the sixth 
century B.C., the Archaemenid Persians, under Cyrus the 
Great, took over the western part of Azerbaijan when they sub- 
dued the Assyrian Empire to the west. In 330 B.C., Alexander 



87 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

the Great absorbed the entire Archaemenid Empire into his 
holdings, leaving Persian satraps to govern as he advanced east- 
ward. According to one account, Atropates, a Persian general 
in Alexander's command, whose name means "protected by 
fire," lent his name to the region when Alexander made him its 
governor. Another legend explains that Azerbaijan's name 
derives from the Persian words meaning "the land of fire," a 
reference either to the natural burning of surface oil deposits 
or to the oil-fueled fires in temples of the once-dominant Zoro- 
astrian religion (see Religion, this ch.). 

The Introduction of Islam and the Turkish Language 

Between the first and third centuries A.D., the Romans con- 
quered the Scythians and Seleucids, who were among the suc- 
cessor groups to the fragmented empire of Alexander. The 
Romans annexed the region of present-day Azerbaijan and 
called the area Albania. As Roman control weakened, the Sas- 
sanid Dynasty reestablished Persian control. Between the sev- 
enth and eleventh centuries, Arabs controlled Azerbaijan, 
bringing with them the precepts of Islam. In the mid-eleventh 
century, Turkic-speaking groups, including the Oghuz tribes 
and their Seljuk Turkish dynasty, ended Arab control by invad- 
ing Azerbaijan from Central Asia and asserting political domi- 
nance. The Seljuks brought with them the Turkish language 
and Turkish customs. By the thirteenth century, the basic char- 
acteristics of the Azerbaijani nation had been established. Sev- 
eral masterpieces of Azerbaijani architecture and literature 
were created during the cultural golden age that spanned the 
eleventh through the thirteenth centuries. Among the most 
notable cultural monuments of this period are the writings of 
Nezami Ganjavi and the mausoleum of Momine-Khatun in 
Nakhichevan (see The Arts, this ch.). 

Under the leadership of Hulegu Khan, Mongols invaded 
Azerbaijan in the early thirteenth century; Hulegu ruled Azer- 
baijan and Persia from his capital in the Persian city of Tabriz. 
At the end of the fourteenth century, another Mongol, Timur 
(also known as Tamerlane), invaded Azerbaijan, at about the 
time that Azerbaijani rule was reviving under the Shirvan 
Dynasty. Shirvan shah Ibrahim I ibn Sultan Muhammad briefly 
accepted Timur as his overlord. (In earlier times, the Shirvan 
shahs had accepted the suzerainty of Seljuk overlords.) 
Another extant architectural treasure, the Shirvan shahs' pal- 
ace in Baku, dates from this period. In the sixteenth century, 



88 



Icheri-Shekher 
Fortress, Baku 
Courtesy Tatiana 
Zagorskaya 




the Azerbaijani Safavid Dynasty took power in Persia. This 
dynasty fought off efforts by the Ottoman Turks during the 
eighteenth century to establish control over Azerbaijan; the 
Safavids could not, however, halt Russian advances into the 
region. 

Within the Russian Empire 

Beginning in the early eighteenth century, Russia slowly 
asserted political domination over the northern part of Azer- 
baijan, while Persia retained control of southern Azerbaijan. In 
the nineteenth century, the division between Russian and Per- 
sian Azerbaijan was largely determined by two treaties con- 
cluded after wars between the two countries. The Treaty of 
Gulistan (1813) established the Russo-Persian border roughly 
along the Aras River, and the Treaty of Turkmanchay (1828) 
awarded Russia the Nakhichevan khanates (along the present- 
day border between Armenia and Turkey) in the region of the 
Talish Mountains. The land that is now Azerbaijan was split 
among three Russian administrative areas — Baku and Elizavet- 
pol provinces and part of Yerevan Province, which also 
extended into present-day Armenia. 

Russian Influences in the Nineteenth Century 

In the nineteenth century, Russian influence over daily life 
in Azerbaijan was less pervasive than that of indigenous reli- 



89 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

gious and political elites and the cultural and intellectual influ- 
ences of Persia and Turkey. During most of the nineteenth 
century, the Russian Empire extracted commodities from Azer- 
baijan and invested little in the economy. However, the exploi- 
tation of oil in Azerbaijan at the end of the nineteenth century 
brought an influx of Russians into Baku, increasing Russian 
influence and expanding the local economy. 

Although ethnic Russians came to dominate the oil business 
and government administration in the late 1800s, many Azer- 
baijanis became prominent in particular sectors of oil produc- 
tion, such as oil transport on the Caspian Sea. Armenians also 
became important as merchants and local officials of the Rus- 
sian monarchy. The population of Baku increased from about 
13,000 in the 1860s to 112,000 in 1897 and 215,000 in 1913, 
making Baku the largest city in the Caucasus region. At this 
point, more than one-third of Baku's population consisted of 
ethnic Russians. In 1905 social tensions erupted in riots and 
other forms of death and destruction as Azerbaijanis and 
Armenians struggled for local control and Azerbaijanis resisted 
Russian sovereignty. 

The Spirit of Revolution 

The growth of industry and political influences from out- 
side prompted the formation of radical and reformist political 
organizations at the turn of the century. A leftist party calling 
itself Himmat, composed mainly of Azerbaijani intellectuals, 
was formed in 1903-4 to champion Azerbaijani culture and 
language against Russian and other foreign influences. A small 
Social Democratic Party (which later split into Bolshevik and 
Menshevik factions) also existed, but that party was largely 
dominated by Russians and Armenians. Some members of 
Himmat broke away and formed the Musavat (Equality party) 
in 1912. This organization aimed at establishing an indepen- 
dent Azerbaijani state, and its progressive and nationalist slo- 
gans gained wide appeal. Himmat's Marxist coloration involved 
it in wider ideological squabbles in the period leading up to the 
1917 Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. After several further 
splits, the remainder of Himmat was absorbed into the Russian 
Communist Party (Bolshevik) shortly before Azerbaijan was 
occupied by the Red Army in 1920. 

World War I and Independence 

After the Bolshevik Revolution, a mainly Russian and Arme- 
nian grouping of Baku Bolsheviks declared a Marxist republic 



90 



Azerbaijan 



in Azerbaijan. Muslim nationalists separately declared the 
establishment of the Azerbaijan People's Democratic Republic 
in May 1918 and formed the "Army of Islam," with substantial 
help from the Ottoman Turkish army, to defeat the Bolsheviks 
in Baku. The Army of Islam marched into the capital in Sep- 
tember 1918, meeting little resistance from the Bolshevik 
forces. After some violence against Armenians still residing in 
the city, the new Azerbaijani government, dominated by the 
Musavat, moved into its capital. Azerbaijan was occupied by 
Ottoman Turkish troops until the end of World War I in 
November 1918. British forces then replaced the defeated 
Turks and remained in Azerbaijan for most of that country's 
brief period of independence. 

Facing imminent subjugation by the Red Army, Azerbaijan 
attempted to negotiate a union with Persia, but this effort was 
rendered moot when the Red Army invaded Azerbaijan in 
April 1920. Russian leader Vladimir I. Lenin justified the inva- 
sion because of the importance of the Baku region's oil to the 
Bolsheviks, who were still embroiled in a civil war. The Red 
Army met little resistance from Azerbaijani forces because the 
Azerbaijanis were heavily involved in suppressing separatism 
among the Armenians who formed a majority in the Nagorno- 
Karabakh area of south-central Azerbaijan. In September 1920, 
Azerbaijan signed a treaty with Russia unifying its military 
forces, economy, and foreign trade with those of Russia, 
although the fiction of Azerbaijani political independence was 
maintained. 

Within the Soviet Union 

The invasion of 1920 began a seventy-one-year period under 
total political and economic control of the state that became 
the Soviet Union in 1922. The borders and formal status of 
Azerbaijan underwent a period of change and uncertainty in 
the 1920s and 1930s, and then they remained stable through 
the end of the Soviet period in 1991. 

Determination of Borders and Status 

In late 1921, the Russian leadership dictated the creation of 
a Transcaucasian federated republic, composed of Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, and Georgia, which in 1922 became part of the 
newly proclaimed Soviet Union as the Transcaucasian Soviet 
Federated Socialist Republic (TSFSR) . In this large new repub- 
lic, the three subunits ceded their nominal powers over foreign 



91 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

policy, finances, trade, transportation, and other areas to the 
unwieldy and artificial authority of the TSFSR. In 1936 the new 
"Stalin Constitution" abolished the TSFSR, and the three con- 
stituent parts were proclaimed separate Soviet republics. 

In mid-1920 the Red Army occupied Nakhichevan, an Azer- 
baijani enclave between Armenia and northwestern Iran. The 
Red Army declared Nakhichevan a Soviet socialist republic 
with close ties to Azerbaijan. In early 1921, a referendum con- 
firmed that most of the population of the enclave wanted to be 
included in Azerbaijan. Turkey also supported this solution. 
Nakhichevan's close ties to Azerbaijan were confirmed by the 
Russo-Turkish Treaty of Moscow and the Treaty of Kars among 
the three Transcaucasian states and Turkey, both signed in 
1921. 

Lenin and his successor, Joseph V. Stalin, assigned pacifica- 
tion of Transcaucasia and delineation of borders in the region 
to the Caucasian Bureau of the Russian Communist Party (Bol- 
shevik). In 1924, despite opposition from many Azerbaijani 
officials, the bureau formally designated Nakhichevan an 
autonomous republic of Azerbaijan with wide local powers, a 
status it retains today. 

The existence of an Azerbaijani majority population in 
northern Iran became a pretext for Soviet expansion. In 1938 
Soviet authorities expelled Azerbaijanis holding Iranian pass- 
ports from the republic. During World War II, Soviet forces 
occupied the northern part of Iran. The occupiers stirred an 
irredentist movement fronted by the Democratic Party of Azer- 
baijan, which proclaimed the communist Autonomous Govern- 
ment of Azerbaijan at Tabriz at the end of 1945. The Western 
powers forced the Soviet Union to withdraw from Iran in 1946. 
Upon the subsequent collapse of the autonomous government, 
the Iranian government began harsh suppression of the Azer- 
baijani culture. From that time until the late 1980s, contacts 
between Azerbaijanis north and south of the Iranian-Soviet 
border were severely limited. 

Stalin and Post-Stalin Politics 

During Stalin's dictatorship in the Soviet Union (1926-53), 
Azerbaijan suffered, as did other Soviet republics, from forced 
collectivization and far-reaching purges. Yet during the same 
period, Azerbaijan also achieved significant gains in industrial- 
ization and literacy levels that were impressive in comparison 



92 




with those of other Muslim states of the Middle East at that 
time. 

After Stalin, Moscow's intrusions were less sweeping but 
nonetheless authoritarian. In 1959 Nikita S. Khrushchev, first 
secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), 
moved to purge leaders of the Azerbaijani Communist Party 
(ACP) because of corruption and nationalist tendencies. 
Leonid I. Brezhnev, Khrushchev's successor, also removed ACP 
leaders for nationalist leanings, naming Heydar Aliyev in 1969 
as the new ACP leader. In turn, Mikhail S. Gorbachev removed 
Aliyev in 1987, ostensibly for health reasons, although later 
Aliyev was accused of corruption. 

After Communist Rule 

Azerbaijan was strongly affected by the autonomy that 
spread to most parts of the Soviet Union under Gorbachev's 
liberalized regime in the late 1980s. After independence was 
achieved in 1991, conflict with Armenia became chronic, and 
political stability eluded Azerbaijan in the early years of the 
1990s. 

Demands for Sovereignty and the Soviet Reaction 

In the fall of 1989, the nationalist opposition Azerbaijani 
Popular Front (APF) led a wave of protest strikes expressing 



93 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

growing political opposition to ACP rule (see Government and 
Politics, this ch.). Under this pressure, the ACP authorities 
bowed to opposition demands to legalize the APF and proclaim 
Azerbaijani sovereignty. In September 1989, the Azerbaijani 
Supreme Court passed a resolution of sovereignty, among the 
first such resolutions in the Soviet republics. The resolution 
proclaimed Azerbaijan's sovereignty over its land, water, and 
natural resources and its right to secede from the Soviet Union 
following a popular referendum. The Presidium of the 
Supreme Soviet, the legislative body of the Soviet Union, 
declared this resolution invalid in November 1989. Another 
manifestation of nationalist ferment occurred at the end of 
1989, when Azerbaijanis rioted along the Iranian border, 
destroying border checkpoints and crossing into Iranian prov- 
inces that had Azerbaijani majorities. Azerbaijani intellectuals 
also appealed to the CPSU Politburo for relaxation of border 
controls between Soviet and Iranian Azerbaijan, comparing the 
"tragic" separation of the Azerbaijani nation to the divisions of 
Korea or Vietnam. 

Meanwhile, Azerbaijanis unleashed a wave of violence 
against Armenian residents of Baku and other population cen- 
ters, causing turmoil that seemed to jeopardize ACP rule. In 
response, in January 1990 Moscow deployed forces of its Minis- 
try of Internal Affairs (Ministerstvo vnutrennikh del — MVD), 
Committee for State Security (Komitet gosudarstvennoi bezo- 
pasnosti — KGB), and the military in a brutal suppression of 
these riots. Moscow also began a crackdown on the APF and 
other opposition forces in Baku and other cities, and Soviet 
forces cooperated with Iranian authorities to secure the Azer- 
baijani-Iranian border. These actions further alienated the 
population from Moscow's rule. Ironically, the Soviet crack- 
down targeted the large and increasingly vocal Azerbaijani 
working class. In this process, martial law was declared, and the 
ACP leader was replaced by Ayaz Mutalibov, a former chairman 
of the Azerbaijani Council of Ministers. In May 1990, while 
martial law remained in effect, Mutalibov was elected president 
by the Azerbaijani Supreme Soviet; elections to the Supreme 
Soviet were held four months later. The APF, although 
declared illegal, retained immense popular appeal and visibil- 
ity. 

The Issue of Nagorno-Karabakh 

The Soviet Union created the Nagorno-Karabakh Autono- 
mous Region within Azerbaijan in 1924. At that time, more 



94 





Memorial to Azerbaijani victims of 1990 Russian invasion, Baku 
Courtesy David Dallas, United States Information Agency 
Soviet troops sent to quell Azerbaijani nationalist unrest, 1989-90 

Courtesy Jay Kempen 



95 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

than 94 percent of the region's population was Armenian (see 
fig. 3). (The term Nagorno-Karabakh originates from the Rus- 
sian for "mountainous Karabakh.") As the Azerbaijani popula- 
tion grew, the Karabakh Armenians chafed under 
discriminatory rule, and by 1960 hostilities had begun between 
the two populations of the region. 

On February 20, 1988, Armenian deputies to the National 
Council of Nagorno-Karabakh voted to unify that region with 
Armenia (see Population and Ethnic Composition, this ch.; 
Nagorno-Karabakh and Independence, ch. 1). Although Arme- 
nia did not formally respond, this act triggered an Azerbaijani 
massacre of more than 100 Armenians in the city of Sumgait, 
just north of Baku. A similar attack on Azerbaijanis occurred in 
the Armenian town of Spitak. Large numbers of refugees left 
Armenia and Azerbaijan as pogroms began against the minor- 
ity populations of the respective countries. In the fall of 1989, 
intensified interethnic conflict in and around Nagorno-Kara- 
bakh led Moscow to grant Azerbaijani authorities greater lee- 
way in controlling that region. The Soviet policy backfired, 
however, when a joint session of the Armenian Supreme Soviet 
and the National Council of Nagorno-Karabakh proclaimed 
the unification of Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia. In mid- 
January 1990, Azerbaijani protesters in Baku went on a ram- 
page against the remaining Armenians and the ACP. Moscow 
intervened, sending police troops of the MVD, who violently 
suppressed the APF and installed Mutalibov as president. The 
troops reportedly killed 122 Azerbaijanis in quelling the upris- 
ing, and Gorbachev denounced the APF for striving to estab- 
lish an Islamic republic. These events further alienated the 
Azerbaijani population from Moscow and from ACP rule. In a 
December 1991 referendum boycotted by local Azerbaijanis, 
Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh approved the creation of an 
independent state. A Supreme Soviet was elected, and 
Nagorno-Karabakh appealed for world recognition. 

Independence 

Mutalibov initially supported the August 1991 coup 
attempted in Moscow against the Gorbachev regime, drawing 
vehement objections from APF leaders and other political 
opponents. Once the coup failed, Mutalibov moved quickly to 
repair local damage and to insulate his rule from Moscow's ret- 
ribution by announcing his resignation as first secretary of the 
ACP. These moves by Mutalibov and his supporters were in line 



96 



Azerbaijan 



with the pro-independence demands of the APF, even though 
the two groups remained political adversaries. In September 
1991, Mutalibov was elected president without electoral opposi- 
tion but under charges from the APF that the election process 
was corrupt. 

Azerbaijan began the process of achieving formal indepen- 
dence October 18, when the Supreme Soviet passed a law on 
state independence, ratifying that body's August declaration of 
independence. Then in December, over 99 percent of voters 
cast ballots in favor of independence in a referendum on that 
issue. The constitution was duly amended to reflect the coun- 
try's new status. Immediately after the law was passed, the 
Supreme Soviet appealed to the world's nations and the United 
Nations (UN) for recognition of Azerbaijan. In December 
Mutalibov signed accords on Azerbaijan's membership in the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS — see Glossary), a 
move criticized by many Azerbaijani nationalists who opposed 
all links to Russia and Armenia. A year later, the Azerbaijani 
legislature repudiated the signature, rejecting membership in 
the CIS. Azerbaijan maintained observer status at CIS meet- 
ings, however, and it resumed full membership in late 1993. 

Political Instability 

The intractable conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh contributed 
to the fall of several governments in newly independent Azer- 
baijan. After a February 1992 armed attack by Armenians on 
Azerbaijani residents in Nagorno-Karabakh caused many civil- 
ian casualties, Mutalibov was forced by opposition parties to 
resign as president. The president of Azerbaijan's Supreme 
Soviet, Yakub Mamedov, became acting president. Mamedov 
held this position until May 1992, when he in turn was forced 
from power in the face of continuing military defeats in 
Nagorno-Karabakh. Mutalibov loyalists in the Supreme Soviet 
reinstated him as president, but two days later he was forced to 
flee the country when APF-led crowds stormed the government 
buildings in Baku. An interim APF government assumed power 
until previously scheduled presidential elections could be held 
one month later. APF leader and intellectual Abulfaz Elchibey, 
who won over 59 percent of the vote in a five-candidate elec- 
toral contest, then formed Azerbaijan's first postcommunist 
government. Elchibey served as president only one year, how- 
ever, before being forced to flee Baku in mid-June 1993 in the 
face of an insurrection led by a disgruntled military officer. 



97 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

Taking advantage of the chaos, Aliyev returned to power, and 
an election in October 1993 confirmed him as president. 

Efforts to Resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh Crisis, 1993 

By the end of 1993, the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh 
had caused thousands of casualties and created hundreds of 
thousands of refugees on both sides. In a national address in 
November 1993, Aliyev stated that 16,000 Azerbaijani troops 
had died and 22,000 had been injured in nearly six years of 
fighting. The UN estimated that nearly 1 million refugees and 
displaced persons were in Azerbaijan at the end of 1993. Medi- 
ation was attempted by officials from Russia, Kazakhstan, and 
Iran, among other countries, as well as by organizations includ- 
ing the UN and the Conference on Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (CSCE — see Glossary), which began sponsoring 
peace talks in mid-1992. All negotiations met with little success, 
however, and several cease-fires broke down. In mid-1993 
Aliyev launched efforts to negotiate a solution directly with the 
Karabakh Armenians, a step Elchibey had refused to take. 
Aliyev's efforts achieved several relatively long cease-fires within 
Nagorno-Karabakh, but outside the region Armenians occu- 
pied large sections of southwestern Azerbaijan near the Iranian 
border during offensives in August and October 1993. Iran and 
Turkey warned the Karabakh Armenians to cease their offen- 
sive operations, which threatened to spill over into foreign ter- 
ritory. The Armenians responded by claiming that they were 
driving back Azerbaijani forces to protect Nagorno-Karabakh 
from shelling. 

In 1993 the UN Security Council called for Armenian forces 
to cease their attacks on and occupation of a number of Azer- 
baijani regions. In September 1993, Turkey strengthened its 
forces along its border with Armenia and issued a warning to 
Armenia to withdraw its troops from Azerbaijan immediately 
and unconditionally. At the same time, Iran was conducting 
military maneuvers near the Nakhichevan Autonomous Repub- 
lic in a move widely regarded as a warning to Armenia. Iran 
proposed creation of a twenty-kilometer security zone along 
the Irani an- Azerbaijani border, where Azerbaijanis would be 
protected by Iranian firepower. Iran also contributed to the 
upkeep of camps in southwestern Azerbaijan to house and feed 
up to 200,000 Azerbaijanis fleeing the fighting. 

Fighting continued into early 1994, with Azerbaijani forces 
reportedly winning some engagements and regaining some ter- 



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Azerbaijan 



ritory lost in previous months. In January 1994, Aliyev pledged 
that in the coming year occupied territory would be liberated 
and Azerbaijani refugees would return to their homes. At that 
point, Armenian forces held an estimated 20 percent of Azer- 
baijan's territory outside Nagorno-Karabakh, including 160 
kilometers along the Iranian border. 

Physical Environment 

Three physical features dominate Azerbaijan: the Caspian 
Sea, whose shoreline forms a natural boundary to the east; the 
Greater Caucasus mountain range to the north; and the exten- 
sive flatlands at the country's center (see fig. 2). About the size 
of Portugal or the state of Maine, Azerbaijan has a total land 
area of approximately 86,600 square kilometers, less than 1 
percent of the land area of the former Soviet Union. Of the 
three Transcaucasian states, Azerbaijan has the greatest land 
area. Special administrative subdivisions are the Nakhichevan 
Autonomous Republic, which is separated from the rest of 
Azerbaijan by a strip of Armenian territory, and the Nagorno- 
Karabakh Autonomous Region, entirely within Azerbaijan. 
(The status of Nagorno-Karabakh was under negotiation in 
1994.) Located in the region of the southern Caucasus Moun- 
tains, Azerbaijan borders the Caspian Sea to the east, Iran to 
the south, Armenia to the southwest and west, and Georgia and 
Russia to the north (see fig. 1). A small part of Nakhichevan 
also borders Turkey to the northwest. The capital of Azerbaijan 
is the ancient city of Baku, which has the largest and best har- 
bor on the Caspian Sea and has long been the center of the 
republic's oil industry. 

Topography and Drainage 

The elevation changes over a relatively short distance from 
lowlands to highlands; nearly half the country is considered 
mountainous. Notable physical features are the gently undulat- 
ing hills of the subtropical southeastern coast, which are cov- 
ered with tea plantations, orange groves, and lemon groves; 
numerous mud volcanoes and mineral springs in the ravines of 
Kobystan Mountain near Baku; and coastal terrain that lies as 
much as twenty-eight meters below sea level. 

Except for its eastern Caspian shoreline and some areas bor- 
dering Georgia and Iran, Azerbaijan is ringed by mountains. 
To the northeast, bordering Russia's Dagestan Autonomous 
Republic, is the Greater Caucasus range; to the west, bordering 



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Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

Armenia, is the Lesser Caucasus range. To the extreme south- 
east, the Talish Mountains form part of the border with Iran. 
The highest elevations occur in the Greater Caucasus, where 
Mount Bazar-dyuzi rises 4,740 meters above sea level. Eight 
large rivers flow down from the Caucasus ranges into the cen- 
tral Kura-Aras lowlands, alluvial flatlands and low delta areas 
along the seacoast designated by the Azerbaijani name for the 
Mtkvari River and its main tributary, the Aras. The Mtkvari, the 
longest river in the Caucasus region, forms a delta and drains 
into the Caspian a short distance downstream from the conflu- 
ence with the Aras. The Mingechaur Reservoir, with an area of 
605 square kilometers that makes it the largest body of water in 
Azerbaijan, was formed by damming the Mtkvari in western 
Azerbaijan. The waters of the reservoir provide hydroelectric 
power and irrigation to the Kura-Aras plain. Most of the coun- 
try's rivers are not navigable. About 15 percent of the land in 
Azerbaijan is arable. 

Climate 

The climate varies from subtropical and dry in central and 
eastern Azerbaijan to subtropical and humid in the southeast, 
temperate along the shores of the Caspian Sea, and cold at the 
higher mountain elevations. Baku, on the Caspian, enjoys mild 
weather, averaging 4°C in January and 25°C in July. Because 
most of Azerbaijan receives scant rainfall — on average 152 to 
254 millimeters annually — agricultural areas require irrigation. 
Heaviest precipitation occurs in the highest elevations of the 
Caucasus and in the Lenkoran' Lowlands in the far southeast, 
where the yearly average exceeds 1,000 millimeters. 

Environmental Problems 

Air and water pollution are widespread and pose great chal- 
lenges to economic development. Major sources of pollution 
include oil refineries and chemical and metallurgical indus- 
tries, which in the early 1990s continued to operate as ineffi- 
ciently as they had in the Soviet era. Air quality is extremely 
poor in Baku, the center of oil refining. Some reports have 
described Baku's air as the most polluted in the former Soviet 
Union, and other industrial centers suffer similar problems. 

The Caspian Sea, including Baku Bay, has been polluted by 
oil leakages and the dumping of raw or inadequately treated 
sewage, reducing the yield of caviar and fish. In the Soviet 
period, Azerbaijan was pressed to use extremely heavy applica- 



100 



Azerbaijan 



tions of pesticides to improve its output of scarce subtropical 
crops for the rest of the Soviet Union. Particularly egregious 
was the continued regular use of the pesticide DDT in the 
1970s and 1980s, although that chemical was officially banned 
in the Soviet Union because of its toxicity to humans. Excessive 
application of pesticides and chemical fertilizers has caused 
extensive groundwater pollution and has been linked by Azer- 
baijani scientists to birth defects and illnesses. Rising water lev- 
els in the Caspian Sea, mainly caused by natural factors 
exacerbated by man-made structures, have reversed a decades- 
long drying trend and now threaten coastal areas; the average 
level rose 1.5 meters between 1978 and 1993. Because of the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, large numbers of trees were felled, 
roads were built through pristine areas, and large expanses of 
agricultural land were occupied by military forces. 

Like other former Soviet republics, Azerbaijan faces a gigan- 
tic environmental cleanup complicated by the economic 
uncertainties left in the wake of the Moscow-centered planning 
system. The Committee for the Protection of the Natural Envi- 
ronment is part of the Azerbaijani government, but in the early 
1990s it was ineffective at targeting critical applications of lim- 
ited funds, establishing pollution standards, and monitoring 
compliance with environmental regulations. Early in 1994, 
plans called for Azerbaijan to participate in the international 
Caspian Sea Forum, sponsored by the European Union (EU). 

Population and Ethnic Composition 

The majority of Azerbaijan's population consists of a single 
ethnic group whose problems with ethnic minorities have been 
dominated by the Armenian uprisings in Nagorno-Karabakh. 
Nevertheless, Azerbaijan includes several other significant eth- 
nic groups. The population of the country is concentrated in a 
few urban centers and in the most fertile agricultural regions. 

Population Characteristics 

In mid-1993 the population of Azerbaijan was estimated at 
7.6 million. With eighty-eight persons per square kilometer, 
Azerbaijan is the second most densely populated of the Trans- 
caucasian states; major portions of the populace live in and 
around the capital of Baku and in the Kura-Aras agricultural 
area. Baku's population exceeded 1.1 million in the late 1980s, 
but an influx of war refugees increased that figure to an esti- 
mated 1.7 million in 1993. In 1993 the estimated population 



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Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

growth rate of Azerbaijan was 1.5 percent per year. Gyandzha 
(formerly Kirovabad), in western Azerbaijan, is the second 
most populous city, with a population of more than 270,000, 
followed by Sumgait, just north of Baku, with a population of 
235,000; figures for both cities are official 1987 estimates. Since 
that time, Gyandzha and Sumgait, like Baku, have been swollen 
by war refugees. With 54 percent of Azerbaijanis living in urban 
areas by 1989, Azerbaijan was one of the most urbanized of the 
Muslim former Soviet republics. According to the 1989 census, 
the population of Nagorno-Karabakh was 200,000, of which 
over 75 percent was ethnically Armenian. 

In 1989 life expectancy was sixty-seven years for males and 
seventy-four years for females. According to legend and to 
Soviet-era statistics, unusually large numbers of centenarians 
and other long-lived people live in Nagorno-Karabakh and 
other areas of Azerbaijan. In 1990 the birth rate was twenty-five 
per 1,000 population. The fertility rate has declined signifi- 
cantly since 1970, when the average number of births per 
woman was 4.6. According to Western estimates, the figure was 
2.8 in 1990. 

In 1987 Azerbaijan's crude death rate was about twelve per 
1,000. As in other former Soviet republics, the rate was some- 
what higher than in 1970. In Azerbaijan, however, the death 
rate continued rising through 1992 because of the escalating 
number of accidents, suicides, and murders; fatalities caused by 
the conflict with Armenia were also a factor. 

According to the 1989 census, about 85 percent of the pop- 
ulation was Azerbaijani (5.8 million), 5.8 percent was Russian 
(392,300), and 5.8 percent was Armenian (390,500). The per- 
centage of Azerbaijanis has increased in recent decades 
because of a high birth rate and the emigration of Russians and 
other minorities. Between 1959 and 1989, the Azerbaijani 
share of the population rose by 16 percent. Since that time, 
however, growth of the Azerbaijani share of the population has 
accelerated with the addition of an estimated 200,000 Azer- 
baijani deportees and refugees from Armenia and the quicken- 
ing rate of Armenian emigration. About 13 million 
Azerbaijanis reside in the northern provinces of neighboring 
Iran. Smaller groups live in Georgia, the Dagestan Autono- 
mous Republic of Russia to Azerbaijan's north, Uzbekistan, 
Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. 



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Azerbaijan 



The Role of Women 

Although religious practice in Azerbaijan is less restrictive of 
women's activities than in most of the other Muslim countries, 
vestiges of the traditional female role remain. Particularly in 
rural communities, women who appear in public unaccompa- 
nied, smoke in public, drive automobiles, or visit certain the- 
aters and restaurants are subject to disapproval. Nevertheless, 
the majority of Azerbaijani women have jobs outside the home, 
and a few have attained leadership positions. In July 1993, 
Aliyev appointed surgeon Lala-Shovket Gajiyeva as his state sec- 
retary (a position equivalent at that time to vice president), 
largely because of her outspoken views on Azerbaijani political 
problems. Gajiyeva was a champion of women's rights and in 
late 1993 founded a political party critical of Aliyev's policies. 
In January 1994, she was moved from state secretary to perma- 
nent representative to the UN, presumably because of her con- 
troversial positions. 

Smaller Ethnic Minorities 

After the Azerbaijanis, Russians, and Armenians, the next 
largest group is the Lezgians (Dagestanis), the majority of 
whom live across the Russian border in Dagestan, but 171,000 
of whom resided in northern Azerbaijan in 1989 (see fig. 9). 
The Lezgians, who are predominantly Sunni (see Glossary) 
Muslims and speak a separate Caucasian language, have called 
for greater rights, including the right to maintain contacts with 
Lezgians in Russia. In October 1992, President Elchibey prom- 
ised informally that border regulations would be interpreted 
loosely to assuage these Lezgian concerns. 

In 1989 another 262,000 people belonging to ninety other 
nationalities lived in Azerbaijan. These groups include Avars, 
Kurds, Talish, and Tats. The Talish in Azerbaijan, estimates of 
whose numbers varied from the official 1989 census figure of 
21,000 to their own estimates of 200,000 to 300,000, are an Ira- 
nian people living in southeastern Azerbaijan and contiguous 
areas of Iran. Like the Lezgians, the Talish have called for 
greater rights since Azerbaijan became independent. 

In 1992 Elchibey attempted to reassure ethnic minorities by 
issuing an order that the government defend the political, eco- 
nomic, social, and cultural rights and freedoms of non-Azer- 
baijanis, and by setting up the Consultative Council on 
Interethnic Relations as part of the presidential apparatus. At 



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Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 




Figure 9. Ethnic Groups in Azerbaijan 

no point, however, were Armenians mentioned among the pro- 
tected ethnic minorities. 

Language, Religion, and Culture 

Although Azerbaijan's history shows the mark of substantial 
religious and cultural influence from Iran, linguistically and 
ethnically the country is predominantly Turkic. The republic 
was part of the Soviet Union for seventy years, but Russian cul- 
ture had only an incidental impact. 

Language 

The official language is Azerbaijani, a Turkic tongue 
belonging to the southern branch of the Altaic languages. In 



104 



Azerbaijan 



1994 it was estimated that some 82 percent of Azerbaijan's citi- 
zens speak Azerbaijani as their first language. In addition, 38 
percent of Azerbaijanis speak Russian fluently, reflecting Rus- 
sian domination of the economy and politics. Although official 
Soviet figures showed that about 32 percent of Russians living 
in Azerbaijan spoke Azerbaijani, the Russian population gener- 
ally was reluctant to learn the local language. Most Armenians 
living in Nagorno-Karabakh use Russian rather than Azer- 
baijani as their second language. 

The Azerbaijani language is part of the Oghuz, or Western 
Turkic, group of Turkic languages, together with Anatolian 
Turkish (spoken in Turkey) and Turkmen (spoken in Turk- 
menistan). The Oghuz tribes of Central Asia spoke this precur- 
sor language between the seventh and eleventh centuries. The 
three descendent languages share common linguistic features. 
Dialectical differences between Azerbaijani and Anatolian 
Turkish have been attributed to Mongolian and Turkic influ- 
ences. Despite these differences, Anatolian Turkish speakers 
and Azerbaijanis can often understand one another if they 
speak carefully. Spoken Azerbaijani includes several dialects. 
Beginning in the nineteenth century, Russian loanwords (par- 
ticularly technical terms) and grammatical and lexical struc- 
tures entered the Azerbaijani language in Russian-controlled 
Azerbaijan, as did Persian words in Iranian Azerbaijan. The 
resulting variants remain mutually intelligible, however. 

In the immediate pre-Soviet period, literature in Azerbaijan 
was written in Arabic in several literary forms that by 1900 were 
giving way to a more vernacular Azerbaijani Turkish form. In 
1924 Soviet officials pressured the Azerbaijani government into 
approving the gradual introduction of a modified Roman 
alphabet. Scholars have speculated that this decision was aimed 
at isolating the Muslim peoples from their Islamic culture, thus 
reducing the threat of nationalist movements. In the late 
1930s, however, Soviet authorities reversed their policy and dic- 
tated use of the Cyrillic alphabet, which became official in 
1940. Turkey's switch to a modified Roman alphabet in 1928 
may have prompted Stalin to reinforce Azerbaijan's isolation 
from dangerous outside influences by switching to Cyrillic. 
This change also made it easier for Azerbaijanis to learn Rus- 
sian. 

When the Soviet Union disintegrated, the alphabet question 
arose once again. Iran reportedly advocated use of Arabic as 
part of a campaign to expand the influence of Shia (see Glos- 



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Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

sary) Islam in Azerbaijan. Most Azerbaijani intellectuals ulti- 
mately rejected switching to Arabic, however, noting that Iran 
had not allowed proper study of the Azerbaijani language in 
northern Iran. Instead, the intellectuals preferred a modified 
Roman alphabet incorporating symbols for unique Azerbaijani 
language sounds. In December 1991, the legislature approved 
a gradual return to a "New Roman" alphabet. 

Religion 

The prophet Zoroaster (Zarathustra), who was born in the 
seventh century B.C. in what is now Azerbaijan, established a 
religion focused on the cosmic struggle between a supreme 
god and an evil spirit. Islam arrived in Azerbaijan with Arab 
invaders in the seventh century A.D., gradually supplanting 
Zoroastrianism and Azerbaijani pagan cults. In the seventh and 
eighth centuries, many Zoroastrians fled Muslim persecution 
and moved to India, where they became known as Parsis. Until 
Soviet Bolsheviks ended the practice, Zoroastrian pilgrims 
from India and Iran traveled to Azerbaijan to worship at sacred 
sites, including the Surakhany Temple on the Apsheron Penin- 
sula near Baku. 

In the sixteenth century, the first shah of the Safavid 
Dynasty, Ismail I (r. 1486-1524), established Shia Islam as the 
state religion, although large numbers of Azerbaijanis 
remained followers of the other branch of Islam, Sunni. The 
Safavid court was subject to both Turkic (Sunni) and Iranian 
(Shia) influences, however, which reinforced the dual nature 
of Azerbaijani religion and culture in that period. As elsewhere 
in the Muslim world, the two branches of Islam came into con- 
flict in Azerbaijan. Enforcement of Shia Islam as the state reli- 
gion brought contention between the Safavid rulers of 
Azerbaijan and the ruling Sunnis of the neighboring Ottoman 
Empire. 

In the nineteenth century, many Sunni Muslims emigrated 
from Russian-controlled Azerbaijan because of Russia's series 
of wars with their coreligionists in the Ottoman Empire. Thus, 
by the late nineteenth century, the Shia population was in the 
majority in Russian Azerbaijan. Antagonism between the Sun- 
nis and the Shia diminished in the late nineteenth century as 
Azerbaijani nationalism began to emphasize a common Turkic 
heritage and opposition to Iranian religious influences. At 
present, about three-quarters of Azerbaijani Muslims are at 



106 



Azerbaijan 



If ast nominally Shia (and 87 percent of the population were 
Muslim in 1989). 

Azerbaijan's next largest official religion is Christianity, rep- 
resented mainly by Russian Orthodox and Armenian Apostolic 
groups. Some rural Azerbaijanis retain pre-Islamic shamanist 
or animist beliefs, such as the sanctity of certain sites and the 
veneration of certain trees and rocks. 

Before Soviet power was established, about 2,000 mosques 
were active in Azerbaijan. Most mosques were closed in the 
1930s, then some were allowed to reopen during World War II. 
In the 1980s, however, only two large and five smaller mosques 
held services in Baku, and only eleven others were operating in 
the rest of the country. Supplementing the officially sanctioned 
mosques were thousands of private houses of prayer and many 
secret Islamic sects. Beginning in the late Gorbachev period, 
and especially after independence, the number of mosques 
rose dramatically. Many were built with the support of other 
Islamic countries, such as Iran, Oman, and Saudi Arabia, which 
also contributed Qurans (Korans) and religious instructors to 
the new Muslim states. A Muslim seminary has also been estab- 
lished since 1991. As in the other former Soviet Muslim repub- 
lics, religious observances in Azerbaijan do not follow all the 
traditional precepts of Islam. For example, drinking wine is 
permitted, and women are not veiled or segregated. 

During World War II, Soviet authorities established the Mus- 
lim Spiritual Board of Transcaucasia in Baku as the governing 
body of Islam in the Caucasus, in effect reviving the nine- 
teenth-century tsarist Muslim Ecclesiastical Board. During the 
tenures of Brezhnev and Gorbachev, Moscow encouraged Mus- 
lim religious leaders in Azerbaijan to visit and host foreign 
Muslim leaders, with the goal of advertising the freedom of 
religion and superior living conditions reportedly enjoyed by 
Muslims under Soviet communism. 

In the early 1980s, Allashukur Humatogly Pashazade was 
appointed sheikh ul-Islam, head of the Muslim board. With the 
breakup of the Soviet Union, the Muslim board became known 
as the Supreme Religious Council of the Caucasus Peoples. In 
late 1993, the sheikh blessed Heydar Aliyev at his swearing-in 
ceremony as president of Azerbaijan. 

The Arts 

Azerbaijanis have sought to protect their cultural identity 
from long-standing outside influences by fostering indigenous 



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Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

forms of artistic and intellectual expression. They proudly 
point to a number of scientists, philosophers, and literary fig- 
ures who have built their centuries-old cultural tradition. 

Literature and Music 

Before the eleventh century, literary influences included 
the Zoroastrian sacred text, the Avesta, Turkish prose-poetry, 
and oral history recitations (called dastans), such as The Book of 
Dede Korkut and Koroglu, which contain pre-Islamic elements. 
Among the classics of medieval times are the Astronomy of Abul 
Hasan Shirvani (written in the eleventh or twelfth century) 
and Khamseh, a collection of five long romantic poems written 
in Persian by the twelfth-century poet Nezami Ganjavi. Fuzuli 
(1494-1556) wrote poetry and prose in Turkish, most notably 
the poem Laila and Majnun, the satire A Book of Complaints, and 
the treatise To the Heights of Conviction. Fuzuli's works influ- 
enced dramatic and operatic productions in the early twentieth 
century. Shah Ismail I, who was also the first Safavid shah, 
wrote court poems in Turkish. Fuzuli and Ismail are still read in 
their original Turkish dialects, which are very similar to mod- 
ern literary Azerbaijani. 

In music an ancient tradition was carried into modern times 
by ashugs, poet-singers who presented ancient songs or verses 
or improvised new ones, accompanied by a stringed instru- 
ment called the kobuz. Another early musical form was the 
mugam, a composition of alternating vocal and instrumental 
segments most strongly associated with the ancient town of 
Shusha in Nagorno-Karabakh. 

Decorative Arts and Crafts 

Carpet and textile making, both of which are ancient Azer- 
baijani crafts, flourished during the medieval period, and Azer- 
baijani products became well known in Asia and Europe. 
Azerbaijani carpets and textiles were known for their rich vege- 
tation patterns, depictions from the poetry of Nezami Ganjavi, 
and traditional themes. Each region produced its own distinc- 
tive carpet patterns. Silk production became significant in the 
eighteenth century. During the Soviet period, carpets, textiles, 
and silk continued to be made in factories or at home. In medi- 
eval times, ornately chased weaponry was another major 
export. Azerbaijan was also famed for miniature books incor- 
porating elaborate calligraphy and illustrations. 



108 




Man and woman in 
traditional costume 
Courtesy Embassy of 



Azerbaijan, 
Washington 



Architecture 

Azerbaijani architecture typically combines elements of East 
and West. Many ancient architectural treasures survive in mod- 
ern Azerbaijan. These sites include the so-called Maiden Tower 
in Baku, a rampart that has been dated variously from the pre- 
Christian era to the twelfth century, and from the top of which, 
legend says, a distraught medieval maiden flung herself. 
Among other medieval architectural treasures reflecting the 
influence of several schools are the Shirvan shahs' palace in 
Baku, the palace of the Sheki khans in the town of Sheki in 
north-central Azerbaijan, the Surakhany Temple on the Apshe- 
ron Peninsula, a number of bridges spanning the Aras River, 
and several mausoleums. In the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, little monumental architecture was created, but dis- 
tinctive residences were built in Baku and elsewhere. Among 
the most recent architectural monuments, the Baku subways 
are noted for their lavish decor. 

The Cultural Renaissance 

In the second half of the nineteenth century and in the 
early twentieth century, Azerbaijan underwent a cultural 
renaissance that drew on the golden age of the eleventh to the 
thirteenth centuries and other influences. The patronage of 
the arts and education that characterized this movement was 



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Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

fueled in part by increasing oil wealth. Azerbaijan's new indus- 
trial and commercial elites contributed funds for the establish- 
ment of many libraries, schools, hospitals, and charitable 
organizations. In the 1880s, philanthropist Haji Zeinal Adibin 
Taghiyev built and endowed Baku's first theater. 

Artistic flowering in Azerbaijan inspired Turkic Muslims 
throughout the Russian Empire and abroad, stimulating 
among other phenomena the establishment of theaters and 
opera houses that were among the first in the Muslim world. 
Tsarist authorities first encouraged, then tolerated, and finally 
used intensified Russification against this assertion of artistic 
independence. 

Several artists played important roles in the renaissance. 
Mirza Fath Ali Akhundzade (also called Akhundov; 1812-78), a 
playwright and philosopher, influenced the Azerbaijani literary 
language by writing in vernacular Azerbaijani Turkish. His 
plays, among the first significant theater productions in Azer- 
baijan, continue to have wide popular appeal as models of 
form in the late twentieth century. The composer and poet 
Uzeir Hajibeyli (1885-1948) used traditional instruments and 
themes in his musical compositions, among which were the 
first operas in the Islamic world. The poet and playwright 
Husein Javid (1882-1941) wrote in Turkish about historical 
themes, most notably the era of Timur. 

Under Soviet rule, Azerbaijani cultural expression was cir- 
cumscribed and forcibly supplanted by Russian cultural values. 
Particularly during Stalin's purges of the 1930s, many Azer- 
baijani writers and intellectuals were murdered, and ruthless 
attempts were made to erase evidence of their lives and work 
from historical records. Cultural monuments, libraries, 
mosques, and archives were destroyed. The two forcible 
changes of alphabet in the 1920s and 1930s further isolated 
Azerbaijanis from their literary heritage. Never completely 
extinguished during the Soviet period, however, Azerbaijani 
culture underwent a modest rebirth during Khrushchev's 
relaxation of controls in the 1950s, when many who had been 
victims of Stalin's purges were posthumously rehabilitated and 
their works republished. In the 1970s and 1980s, another 
rebirth occurred when Moscow again loosened cultural restric- 
tions. Under Aliyev's first regime, publication of some mildly 
nationalist pieces was allowed, including serialization of Aziza 
Jafarzade's historical novel Baku 1501. 



110 



Azerbaijan 



In the late 1980s, Gorbachev's policy of glasnost (see Glos- 
sary) energized a major movement among Azerbaijani writers 
and historians to illuminate "blank pages" in the nation's past, 
such as Azerbaijani resistance to tsarist and Soviet power and 
Stalin's crimes against the peoples of the Soviet Union. 
Reprints of Azerbaijani historical and literary classics became 
more plentiful, as did political tracts on topics such as Azer- 
baijani claims to Nagorno-Karabakh. 

Education, Health, and Welfare 

When the Soviet Union crumbled, Azerbaijan, like other 
former Soviet republics, was forced to end its reliance upon the 
uniform, centralized system of social supports that had been 
administered from Moscow. In the early 1990s, however, Azer- 
baijan did not have the resources to make large-scale changes 
in the delivery of educational, health, and welfare services, so 
the basic Soviet-era structures remained in place. 

Education 

In the pre-Soviet period, Azerbaijani education included 
intensive Islamic religious training that commenced in early 
childhood. Beginning at roughly age five and sometimes con- 
tinuing until age twenty, children attended madrasahs, educa- 
tion institutions affiliated with mosques. In the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries, madrasahs were established as sepa- 
rate education institutions in major cities, but the religious 
component of education remained significant. In 1865 the first 
technical high school and the first women's high school were 
opened in Baku. In the late nineteenth century, secular ele- 
mentary schools for Azerbaijanis began to appear (schools for 
ethnic Russians had been established earlier), but institutions 
of higher education and the use of the Azerbaijani language in 
secondary schools were forbidden in Transcaucasia through- 
out the tsarist period. The majority of ethnic Azerbaijani chil- 
dren received no education in this period, and the Azerbaijani 
literacy rate remained very low, especially among women. Few 
women were allowed to attend school. 

In the Soviet era, literacy and average education levels rose 
dramatically from their very low starting point, despite two 
changes in the standard alphabet, from Arabic to Roman in the 
1920s and from Roman to Cyrillic in the 1930s (see Language, 
this ch.). According to Soviet data, 100 percent of males and 
females (ages nine to forty-nine) were literate in 1970. 



Ill 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

During the Soviet period, the Azerbaijani education system 
was based on the standard model imposed by Moscow, which 
featured state control of all education institutions and heavy 
doses of Marxist-Leninist ideology at all levels. Since indepen- 
dence, the Azerbaijani system has undergone little structural 
change. Initial alterations have included the reestablishment of 
religious education (banned during the Soviet period) and 
curriculum changes that have reemphasized the use of the 
Azerbaijani language and have eliminated ideological content. 
In addition to elementary schools, the education institutions 
include thousands of preschools, general secondary schools, 
and vocational schools, including specialized secondary 
schools and technical schools. Education through the eighth 
grade is compulsory. At the end of the Soviet period, about 18 
percent of instruction was in Russian, but the use of Russian 
began a steady decline beginning in 1988. A few schools teach 
in Armenian or Georgian. 

Azerbaijan has more than a dozen institutions of higher 
education, in which enrollment totaled 105,000 in 1991. 
Because Azerbaijani culture has always included great respect 
for secular learning, the country traditionally has been an edu- 
cation center for the Muslim peoples of the former Soviet 
Union. For that reason and because of the role of the oil indus- 
try in Azerbaijan's economy, a relatively high percentage of 
Azerbaijanis have obtained some form of higher education, 
most notably in scientific and technical subjects. Several voca- 
tional institutes train technicians for the oil industry and other 
primary industries. 

The most significant institutions of higher education are the 
University of Azerbaijan in Baku, the Institute of Petroleum 
and Chemistry, the Polytechnic Institute, the Pedagogical Insti- 
tute, the Mirza Fath Ali Akhundzade Pedagogical Institute for 
Languages, the Azerbaijan Medical Institute, and the Uzeir 
Hajibeyli Conservatory. Much scientific research, which during 
the Soviet period dealt mainly with enhancing oil production 
and refining, is carried out by the Azerbaijani Academy of Sci- 
ences, which was established in 1945. The University of Azer- 
baijan, established in 1919, includes more than a dozen 
departments, ranging from physics to Oriental studies, and has 
the largest library in Azerbaijan. The student population num- 
bers more than 11,000, and the faculty over 600. The Institute 
of Petroleum and Chemistry, established in 1920, has more 
than 15,000 students and a faculty of about 1,000. The institute 



112 



History class in 
elementary school, Sheki 
Courtesy Jay Kempen 




trains engineers and scientists in the petrochemical industry, 
geology, and related areas. 



Azerbaijan's health care system was one of the least effective 
in the Soviet republics, and it deteriorated further after inde- 
pendence. On the eve of the breakup of the Soviet Union in 
1991, the number of physicians per 1,000 people in Azerbaijan 
was about four, the number of hospital beds about ten, and the 
number of pharmacists about seven — all figures below the aver- 
age for the Soviet Union as a whole (see table 2, Appendix). 
According to reports, in the late 1980s some 736 hospitals and 
clinics were operating in Azerbaijan, but according to Soviet 
data some of those were rudimentary facilities with little equip- 
ment. Medical facilities also include several dozen sanatoriums 
and special children's health facilities. The leading medical 
schools in Azerbaijan are the Azerbaijan Medical Institute in 
Baku, which trains doctors and pharmacists, and the Institute 
for Advanced Training of Physicians. Several research institutes 
also conduct medical studies. 

After the breakup of the Soviet Union, Azerbaijan's declin- 
ing economy made it impossible for the Azerbaijani govern- 
ment to provide full support of the health infrastructure. 
Shortages of medicines and equipment have occurred, and 



Health 



113 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

some rural clinics have closed. In 1993 a Western report evalu- 
ated Azerbaijan's sanitation, pharmacies, medical system, medi- 
cal industry, and medical research and development as below 
average, relative to similar services in the other former Soviet 
republics. 

In 1987 the leading causes of death in order of occurrence 
were cardiovascular disease, cancer, respiratory infection, and 
accidents. The official 1991 infant mortality rate — twenty-five 
per 1,000 population — was by far the highest among the Trans- 
caucasian nations. International experts estimated an even 
higher rate, however, if the standard international definition of 
infant mortality is used. 

Social Welfare 

The traditional extended family provides an unofficial sup- 
port system for family members who are elderly or who are full- 
time students. The official social safety net nominally ensures 
at least a subsistence income to all citizens, continuing the 
practice of the Soviet era. Stated benefits include old-age, dis- 
ability, and survivor pensions; additional allowances for chil- 
dren and supported family members; sick and maternity leave; 
temporary disability and unemployment compensation for 
workers; food subsidies; and tax exemptions for designated 
social groups. Most of these benefits are financed by extrabud- 
getary funds; in 1992 more than 4.2 million rubles were trans- 
ferred from the budget to the State Pension Fund, however. 

The actual effect of the social welfare system has differed 
greatly from its stated goals. During the late Soviet period, 
Azerbaijanis complained that their social benefits ranked near 
the bottom among the Soviet republics. The economic disloca- 
tions that followed independence eroded those benefits even 
further. In December 1993, the government estimated that 80 
percent of the Azerbaijani population was living below the pov- 
erty level, even though about 15 percent of the gross domestic 
product (GDP — see Glossary) was spent on social security ben- 
efits. 

The minimum monthly wage is set by presidential decree, 
but several increases in the minimum wage in 1992-93 failed to 
keep pace with the high rate of inflation. Retirement pensions, 
based on years of service and average earnings, also fell behind 
the cost of living in that period. 

In the postcommunist era, government price controls have 
also been used to ease the transition from the centrally 



114 



Dentist's office, Baku 
Courtesy OlegLitvin, 
Azerbaijan International 




planned economy. In 1992 subsidies were introduced to keep 
prices low for such items as bread, meat, butter, sugar, cooking 
oil, local transportation, housing, and medical care (see table 
9; table 10, Appendix). At that point, the price-support safety 
net was expected to absorb at least 7 percent of the projected 
national budget. At the end of 1993, major increases in bread 
and fuel prices heightened social tensions and triggered riots 
because compensation to poor people, students, and refugees 
was considered inadequate. 

The Economy 

Azerbaijan possesses fertile agricultural lands, rich indus- 
trial resources, including considerable oil reserves, and a rela- 
tively developed industrial sector. Utilization of those resources 
in the Soviet period, however, was subject to the usual distor- 
tions of centralized planning. In the early 1990s, economic out- 
put declined drastically. The major factors in that decline were 
the deterioration of trade relations with the other former 
Soviet republics, the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, erosion of 
consumer buying power, and retention of the ruble alongside 
the national currency. In 1994 the economy remained heavily 
dependent on the other former republics of the Soviet Union, 
especially Russia. 



115 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

The Work Force 

According to Azerbaijani statistics, the work force num- 
bered 2.7 million individuals in 1992. Agriculture was the larg- 
est area of employment (34 percent), followed by industry (16 
percent) and education and culture (12 percent). In the indus- 
trial sector, the oil, chemical, and textile industries were major 
employers (see table 11, Appendix). In spite of the standard 
communist proclamation that employment was a right and 
employment was virtually full, large-scale, chronic unemploy- 
ment had already emerged in the late 1980s, especially among 
youth and the growing ranks of refugees and displaced persons 
(see table 12, Appendix). In 1992 unemployment was still offi- 
cially characterized as a minor problem, affecting some 
200,000 people, but in fact the Azerbaijani government vastly 
underreported this statistic. Underreporting was facilitated by 
the practice of keeping workers listed as employees in idled 
industries. Funds set aside by the government to deal with 
unemployment proved woefully inadequate. One Western eco- 
nomic agency estimated the 1992 gross national product 
(GNP — see Glossary) as US$18.6 billion and the average per 
capita GNP as US$2,480, placing Azerbaijan sixth and eighth in 
those respective categories among the former Soviet republics. 

Economic Dislocations 

The general economic dislocations within the Soviet Union 
in the late Gorbachev period hurt Azerbaijan by weakening 
interrepublic trade links. After the breakup of the Soviet 
Union, trade links among the former republics weakened fur- 
ther. Azerbaijani enterprises responded by establishing many 
new trade ties on an ad hoc basis. Although some moves were 
made toward a market economy, state ownership of the means 
of production and state direction of the economy still domi- 
nated in early 1994. 

Despite the economic turmoil caused in 1992 and 1993 by 
the demise of the Soviet Union and the conflict in Nagorno- 
Karabakh, the Azerbaijani economy remained in better condi- 
tion than those of its neighbors Armenia and Georgia and 
some of the Central Asian states. According to estimates by 
Western economists, gross industrial production plunged at 
least 26 percent in 1992 and 10 percent in 1993. 

In 1992 poor weather contributed to a decline in produc- 
tion of important cash crops. Crude oil and refinery produc- 



116 



Cultivation of tea in Lenkoran' Lowlands 
Courtesy Embassy of Azerbaijan, Washington 

tion continued a recent downward spiral, reflecting a lack of 
infrastructure maintenance and other inputs. Inflation took off 
in early 1992, when many prices were decontrolled, and accel- 
erated throughout the year, reaching an annual rate of 735 per- 
cent by October. Inflation for 1993 was estimated at 1,200 
percent, a figure exceeded only by rates for Russia and a few 
other CIS states. Officials tried unsuccessfully to protect the 
standard of living from inflation by periodically increasing 
wage payments and taking other measures. In his New Year's 
message in January 1994, Aliyev acknowledged that during 

1993 Azerbaijan had faced a serious economic crisis that led to 
further declines in the standard of living, but he promised that 

1994 would witness positive changes. 

Agriculture 

The major agricultural cash crops are grapes, cotton, 
tobacco, citrus fruits, and vegetables. The first three crops 



117 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

account for over half of all production, and the last two 
together account for an additional 30 percent. Livestock, dairy 
products, and wine and spirits are also important farm prod- 
ucts (see table 13, Appendix). 

In the early 1990s, Azerbaijan's agricultural sector required 
substantial restructuring if it were to realize its vast potential. 
Prices for agricultural products did not rise as fast as the cost of 
inputs; the Soviet-era collective farm system discouraged pri- 
vate initiative; equipment in general and the irrigation system 
in particular were outdated; modern technology had not been 
introduced widely; and administration of agricultural programs 
was ineffective. 

Most of Azerbaijan's cultivated lands, which total over 1 mil- 
lion hectares, are irrigated by more than 40,000 kilometers of 
canals and pipelines. The varied climate allows cultivation of a 
wide variety of crops, ranging from peaches to almonds and 
from rice to cotton. In the early 1990s, agricultural production 
contributed about 30 to 40 percent of Azerbaijan's net material 
product (NMP — see Glossary), while directly employing about 
one-third of the labor force and providing a livelihood to about 
half the country's population. In the early postwar decades, 
Azerbaijan's major cash crops were cotton and tobacco, but in 
the 1970s grapes became the most productive crop. An anti- 
alcohol campaign by Moscow in the mid-1980s contributed to a 
sharp decline in grape production in the late 1980s. In 1991 
grapes accounted for over 20 percent of agricultural produc- 
tion, followed closely by cotton. 

Production of virtually all crops declined in the early 1990s. 
In 1990 work stoppages and anti-Soviet demonstrations con- 
tributed to declines in agricultural production. The conflict in 
Nagorno-Karabakh, the site of about one-third of Azerbaijan's 
croplands, substantially reduced agricultural production begin- 
ning in 1989. In 1992 agriculture's contribution to NMP 
declined by 22 percent. This drop was attributed mainly to cool 
weather, which reduced cotton and grape harvests, and to the 
continuation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The conflict- 
induced blockade of the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic 
also disrupted agriculture there. 

An estimated 1,200 state and cooperative farms are in oper- 
ation in Azerbaijan, with little actual difference between the 
rights and privileges of state and cooperative holdings. Small 
private garden plots, constituting only a fraction of total culti- 
vated land, contribute as much as 20 percent of agricultural 



118 



Azerbaijan 



production and more than half of livestock production. Private 
landholders do not have equal access, however, to the inputs, 
services, and financing that would maximize their output. 

The Azerbaijani Ministry of Agriculture and Food runs pro- 
curement centers dispersed throughout the country for gov- 
ernment purchase of most of the tobacco, cotton, tea, silk, and 
grapes that are produced. The Ministry of Grain and Bread 
Products runs similar operations that buy a major portion of 
grain production. Remaining crops are sold in the private sec- 
tor. 

Industry 

During World War II, relocated and expanded factories in 
Azerbaijan produced steel, electrical motors, and finished 
weaponry for the Soviet Union's war effort. The canning and 
textile industries were expanded to process foodstuffs and cot- 
ton from Azerbaijan's fields. Azerbaijan's postwar industrial 
economy was based on those wartime activities. Among the key 
elements of that base were petrochemical-derived products 
such as plastics and tires, oil-drilling equipment, and processed 
foods and textiles (see table 14, Appendix). In 1991 the largest 
share of Azerbaijan's industrial output was contributed by the 
food industry, followed by light industry (defined to include 
synthetic and natural textiles, leather goods, carpets, and furni- 
ture), fuels, and machine building. Significant food processing 
and cotton textile operations are located in Gyandzha in west- 
ern Azerbaijan, and petrochemical-based industries are clus- 
tered near Baku. The city of Sumgait, just north of Baku, is the 
nation's center for steel, iron, and other metallurgical indus- 
tries. 

The Soviet-era Azerbaijan Oil Machinery Company 
(Azneftemash) controls virtually all of Azerbaijan's oil equip- 
ment industry. Once a major exporter of equipment to the rest 
of the Soviet Union, Azneftemash has remained dependent 
since 1991 on imports of parts from the other former Soviet 
republics. The economic decline and the breakup of the union 
has disrupted imports and caused an estimated output reduc- 
tion of 27 percent in the Azerbaijani oil equipment industry in 
1992. 

Energy 

Azerbaijan has ample energy resources, including major 
hydroelectric generating capacity and offshore oil reserves in 



119 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

the Caspian Sea. Despite what amounts to an overall excess of 
production capacity, fuel shortages and transport problems dis- 
rupted generation in the early 1990s. In 1991 Azerbaijan pro- 
duced 23 billion kilowatt-hours, but near the end of 1992 the 
country had produced only 16 billion kilowatt-hours. Electric- 
ity is generated at major hydroelectric plants on the Mtkvari, 
Terter (in western Azerbaijan), and Aras rivers (the last a joint 
project with Iran). A larger share of power comes from oil-fired 
electric power plants, however. In the late Soviet period, Azer- 
baijan's power plants were part of the Joint Transcaucasian 
Power Grid shared with Armenia and Georgia, but Azerbaijan 
cut off power to Armenia as a result of the conflict over 
Nagorno-Karabakh. 

Azerbaijan has exported oil and gas to Russia since the late 
nineteenth century. The birthplace of the oil-refining industry 
at the beginning of the twentieth century, Azerbaijan was the 
world's leading producer of petroleum. During World War II, 
about 70 percent of the Soviet Union's petroleum output came 
from the small republic. After World War II, when oil output 
from the Volga-Ural oil fields in Russia increased, Azerbaijan 
lost its position as a dominant producer of Soviet oil. When the 
Soviet Union disintegrated, Azerbaijan was producing 60 per- 
cent of Soviet oil extraction machinery and spare parts but less 
than 2 percent of the union's oil. 

Azerbaijan's four major offshore oil fields in the Caspian 
Sea are Gunesli, Cirak, Azeri, and Kepez. In 1992 the Gunesli 
field accounted for about 60 percent of Azerbaijani oil produc- 
tion. Crude oil production has decreased in recent years, 
mainly because of a weak global market, well maturity, inade- 
quate investment, and outdated equipment. According to Azer- 
baijani estimates, for the first seven months of 1993 compared 
with the same period in 1992, crude oil production declined 
7.1 percent, gasoline refining 2.8 percent, and diesel fuel pro- 
duction 19.9 percent. These rates of decline compare favor- 
ably, however, with those experienced in the oil production 
and refining industries of Russia, Turkmenistan, and other 
former Soviet republics in the early 1990s. 

Some oil is shipped by train to Black Sea ports in Russia and 
Ukraine, and some is shipped by tanker to northern Iran. Pipe- 
line shipment has been slowed by infrastructure problems. 
One old oil pipeline from Azerbaijan to the Georgian port of 
Batumi on the Black Sea is inoperable, and the Russian pipe- 
line is unavailable because that line is already at capacity. Azer- 



120 



Baku Harbor 
Courtesy Azerbaijan International 



baijan's oil production is processed at two refineries near Baku. 
Because domestic oil production has not matched refining 
capacity in recent years, the refineries also process Kazakh and 
Russian oil. 

Russia, Ukraine, and other former Soviet republics have 
been involved in contentious negotiations with Azerbaijan over 
oil payment. Azerbaijan has sought prices close to world mar- 
ket rates for its oil as large payment arrearages have developed 
with several customer states. Azerbaijanis seek "fair payment" 
for their oil from Russia, pointing out that during the Soviet 
period Azerbaijani oil was sold far below market prices to sup- 
port the Soviet economy. 

Azerbaijan has encouraged joint ventures and other agree- 
ments with foreign oil firms, and a consortium has been 
formed with Russia, Kazakhstan, and Oman to build an oil 
pipeline to Mediterranean, Persian Gulf, or Black Sea ports. In 



121 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

the planning stage, Russia advocated a Black Sea route, 
whereas Western oil companies, also interested in Azerbaijan's 
oil, preferred a Mediterranean terminus for a pipeline used in 
common. In March 1993, Turkey and Azerbaijan agreed on a 
pipeline traversing Iran, the Nakhichevan Autonomous Repub- 
lic, and southern Turkey to reach the Mediterranean. In 1993 
other negotiations defined terms of exploitation by eight West- 
ern oil companies in two Caspian oil fields and established a 
profit-sharing ratio between Azerbaijan and its partners. In late 
1993, Russia's role in the oil industry also increased with the 
signing of new bilateral agreements. 

Azerbaijan has proven natural gas reserves of 2 trillion cubic 
meters, and a much larger amount is present in association 
with offshore oil deposits. Although the price of natural gas in 
Azerbaijan has remained low compared with world prices, in 
1991 about half the gas brought to the surface was burned off 
or vented, while consumption of fuel oil increased. Since 1991 
Azerbaijan's production has declined to a level that meets only 
about 35 percent of domestic needs, which amounted to 17 bil- 
lion cubic meters per year in 1993. The major sources of natu- 
ral gas imports are Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Iran. 
Experts consider that exploitation of untapped natural gas 
deposits would enhance Azerbaijan's domestic fuel balance 
and provide substantial export income. 

Economic Reform 

Azerbaijan's prospects for movement toward a market econ- 
omy are enhanced by a fairly well-developed infrastructure, an 
educated labor force, diversity in both agricultural and indus- 
trial production, and yet-untapped oil reserves. Obstacles to 
reform include the rigidity of remaining Soviet economic 
structures, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, continued trade 
dependence on the other former Soviet republics, insufficient 
economic expertise to guide the transition, and capital stock 
that is inefficient and environmentally hazardous. 

Price Liberalization 

In January 1992, about 70 to 80 percent of producer and 
consumer prices were decontrolled, although prices for com- 
modities such as gasoline were artificially increased. Further 
rounds of price liberalization took place in April, September, 
and December 1992. Because most industries are still monopo- 
lies, price-setting is supervised by the Antimonopoly Commit- 



122 



Azerbaijan 



tee, which approves requests for price increases. Because the 
state still procures much of Azerbaijan's agricultural produc- 
tion, prices are set by negotiations between the state and pro- 
ducers. 

Retail price inflation surged after the first round of price 
liberalization in January 1992. Thereafter, the monthly rate 
eased somewhat, averaging about 24 percent during most of 

1992. According to official figures, in 1993 average living 
expenses exceeded income by about 50 percent. The ratio of 
expenses to income was about the same in Kazakhstan and 
worse in Armenia and Turkmenistan. Although prices for items 
such as bread and fuel remained controlled during 1993, in 
November 1993 the government announced price rises 
because commodities were being smuggled out of Azerbaijan 
to be sold elsewhere where prices were higher. By the end of 

1993, it was reported that the minimum weekly wage would not 
even buy one loaf of bread and that hundreds of thousands of 
refugees in Azerbaijan "simply face starvation," a situation that 
heightened social and political instability. 

Privatization 

From the earliest days of Azerbaijan's independence, the 
country had a vigorous, small-scale private economy whose 
most urgent need was unambiguous legislation that would 
legitimize its operations and allow expansion. A privatization 
law passed in January 1993 was not implemented fully in the 
year following. Privatization plans envisioned sales, auctions, 
and joint-stock enterprises. Small retail establishments would 
be privatized by auction, and medium-sized and large enter- 
prises would be privatized by a combination of auctions and 
joint-stock programs. Retail establishments were supposed to 
be privatized fully by the end of 1993, but this goal was not met. 
Housing was also to be privatized by transferring ownership to 
the present tenants. At the end of 1993, land redistribution was 
stalled by disagreement over the choice between private owner- 
ship and long-term leaseholding, over optimum terms for 
either of those arrangements, and over the distribution of agri- 
cultural equipment. 

The Budget 

To lessen the budgetary impact of losing subsidies from the 
Soviet Union, beginning in 1992 a value-added tax (VAT — see 
Glossary) and excise taxes were introduced to replace sales and 



123 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

turnover taxes. The new taxes enabled Azerbaijan to maintain 
only a small state budgetary deficit for 1992 (see table 15, 
Appendix). The deficit came mainly from increases in wages 
and from defense and refugee expenses related to the conflict 
in Nagorno-Karabakh. State-owned enterprises continued to 
survive on liberal bank credits and interenterprise borrowing, 
which caused the accumulation of sizable debts. Substantial 
increases in defense expenditures (from 1.3 percent of GDP in 
1991 to 7.6 percent in 1992) drastically reduced expenditures 
for consumer subsidies in bread and fuels, as well as govern- 
ment investment and other support for enterprises. Increased 
salaries for civil servants also increased the 1992 deficit. 

In mid-1992 Azerbaijan was not receiving enough printed 
rubles from Moscow to meet wage payments, so it introduced 
its own currency, the manat (for value of the manat — see Glos- 
sary). Because domestic financial transactions still involved 
Russian banks and because many rubles remained in circula- 
tion, the ruble remained as an alternate currency. After ruble 
notes became more plentiful in late 1992, the manat remained 
a small fraction of circulating currency. In September 1993, 
Azerbaijan planned to make the manat the sole national cur- 
rency, but the weakness of the Azerbaijani monetary and finan- 
cial systems forced postponement of that move. The manat 
finally became the sole currency in January 1994. 

Banking 

Under the Soviet system, Azerbaijani banks were subordi- 
nate to central banks in Moscow and elsewhere in Russia. Bank 
funds were distributed according to a single state plan, and 
republic banks had little input into the raising or allocation of 
funds. In early 1992, former Soviet banks were incorporated 
into the National Bank of Azerbaijan (NBA). The 1992 Law on 
Banks and Banking Activity and the Law on the National Bank 
established the NBA as the top level of the new system and 
commercial banks (state- and privately owned) on the second 
level. However, in 1993 the system was undermined by poor 
technology, large unresolved debts among state-owned enter- 
prises, irregular participation by enterprises, and bank delays 
in transferring funds. The main bank for the exchange of 
funds among private and state enterprises is the Industrial 
Investment Joint Stock Commercial Bank. 



124 



Azerbaijan 



Foreign Trade 

As during the Soviet era, Azerbaijan's economy depends 
heavily on foreign trade, including commerce with the other 
former Soviet republics. In the late 1980s, exports and imports 
averaged about 40 percent of GDP. At that time, Azerbaijan's 
exports to other Soviet republics averaged 46 percent of GDP 
and over 90 percent of total exports; its imports from those 
republics averaged 37 percent of GDP and nearly 80 percent of 
total imports. In the early 1990s, Azerbaijan's main trading 
partners in the CIS were Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and 
Belarus, in that order. 

In the last years of the Soviet Union, Azerbaijan showed a 
net trade surplus. After a sharp decline in the net trade surplus 
in 1990, oil sales outside the Soviet Union boosted the surplus 
in 1991 and 1992. In 1992 Azerbaijan made major gains in 
hard- currency exports, mainly from selling refined oil prod- 
ucts abroad at world prices. Trade with CIS countries, deter- 
mined by yearly bilateral agreements, declined significantly 
after 1991. Although products from those countries still domi- 
nated Azerbaijan's imports, less than half of exports went to 
them. Important obstacles were the bypassing of the state order 
system in the Baltic states and Russia, the high VAT on some 
items, and the complexity of central-bank credit systems in the 
transitional period. Trade agreements were negotiated for 
1993 with Belarus, Estonia, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Moldova, Russia, Turkmenistan, and Ukraine. 

In 1990 Azerbaijan's major trading partners outside the 
Soviet Union were led by Germany and Poland (see table 16, 
Appendix). In 1992 Azerbaijan's main non-CIS trading part- 
ners were Britain and Iran. According to government statistics 
for 1993, Azerbaijan had a large trade surplus with Russia, and 
more than US$60 billion was owed Azerbaijan by customers in 
Greece, Iran, and Turkey. Through 1993 Turkish enterprises, 
considered a primary source of new foreign capital, refrained 
from large-scale investment in Azerbaijan because of concerns 
about political instability in Baku. Disagreements with Russia 
and Turkey delayed construction of an oil pipeline that would 
connect Baku with the Mediterranean through Turkish terri- 
tory (see Energy, this ch.). 

In the early 1990s, increasing numbers of products were 
sold directly by Azerbaijani enterprises to foreign enterprises 
without government export licenses, although the inefficient 
state-managed trade system of the Soviet era remained in place. 



125 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

In 1993 the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations monitored 
all foreign trade and supervised the export of petroleum prod- 
ucts and other strategic items. In late 1993, government con- 
trol was tightened because most private firms were keeping 
hard-currency foreign-trade earnings outside Azerbaijan. 

Transportation and Telecommunications 

Azerbaijan's transportation system is extensive for a country 
of its size and level of economic development. Analysts 
attribute this advantage to the fact that when Azerbaijan was 
part of the Soviet Union, its economy was heavily geared to 
export of petroleum and to transshipment of goods across the 
Caucasus. The system is burdened by an extensive bureaucracy, 
however, that makes prompt equipment repair difficult, and 
the country's economic problems have delayed replacement of 
aging equipment and facilities. 

In 1990 Azerbaijan had 36,700 kilometers of roads, 31,800 
kilometers of which were paved. One of the country's two main 
routes parallels the Caspian Sea coast from Russia to Iran, pass- 
ing through Baku (see fig. 10). The other, Route M27, leads 
west out of the capital to the Georgian border. A major branch 
from this route heads south through Stepanakert, capital of 
Nagorno-Karabakh. All major towns have a paved road connec- 
tion with one of the principal routes. An extensive intercity bus 
service is the primary mode of intercity travel. Maintenance of 
the system has deteriorated since independence in 1991, how- 
ever, and one study estimated that 60 percent of the main high- 
ways were in bad condition, resulting in excessive wear on 
vehicles and tires and in poor fuel consumption. 

Azerbaijan had 2,090 kilometers of rail lines in 1990, exclud- 
ing several small industrial lines. Most lines are 1.520-meter 
broad gauge, and the principal routes are electrified. In the 
1990s, the rail system carried the vast majority of the country's 
freight. As with the highway system, one of the two main lines 
parallels the Caspian Sea coast from Russia to Iran before head- 
ing west to Turkey, and the other closely parallels Route M27 
from Baku to the Georgian border. A major spur also parallels 
the highway to Stepanakert. Another smaller rail line begins 
just west of Baku and hugs the Iranian border to provide the 
only rail link to Azerbaijan's Nakhichevan Autonomous Repub- 
lic, isolated southwest of Armenia. Passenger service from Baku 
to Erevan has been suspended, and service from Baku to Tbilisi 
has sometimes been disrupted because of the Nagorno-Kara- 



126 



Azerbaijan 



bakh conflict. In 1994 passenger service from Baku to Iran also 
was halted. Trains making the forty-three-hour trip to Moscow, 
however, still operate three times daily. The government esti- 
mates that 700 kilometers, or about one-third, of the rail system 
are in such poor condition that reconstruction is necessary. 
Much of the system has speed restrictions because of the poor 
condition of the rails. 

Baku has a modest subway system with twenty-nine kilome- 
ters of heavy-rail lines. The system has eighteen stations and is 
arranged in two lines that cross in the center of the city. 
Another seventeen kilometers, under construction in 1994, 
would add twelve more stations to the system. 

In 1992 Azerbaijan had twenty-six airfields with paved sur- 
faces. Baku International Airport, twenty-eight kilometers 
southwest of the city, is the country's principal airport. The 
number of international air passengers is higher in Azerbaijan 
than in Armenia and Georgia, with most air traffic moving 
between Baku and cities in the former Soviet Union. Besides 
flights to Russia, Azerbaijan Airlines provides service to Turkey 
and Iran, and direct flights on foreign carriers are available to 
Pakistan and Tajikistan. 

Although situated on an excellent natural harbor, Baku has 
not developed into a major international port because of its 
location on the landlocked Caspian Sea. The port serves mostly 
as a transshipment point for goods (primarily petroleum prod- 
ucts and lumber) crossing the Caspian Sea and destined for 
places to the west, or for passenger service to ports on the east- 
ern or southern shores of the Caspian Sea. The port has seven- 
teen berths, of which five are dedicated for transport of crude 
oil and petroleum products, two are used for passengers, and 
the remaining ten handle timber or other cargo. The port can 
accommodate ships up to 12,000 tons, and its facilities include 
portal cranes, tugboats, and equipment for handling petro- 
leum and petroleum products. The port area has 10,000 square 
meters of covered storage and 28,700 square meters of open 
storage. 

Baku is the center of a major oil- and gas-producing region, 
and major long-distance pipelines radiate from the region's oil 
fields to all neighboring areas. Pipelines are generally high- 
capacity lines and have diameters of either 1,020 or 1,220 milli- 
meters. The main petroleum pipeline pumps crude oil from 
the onshore and offshore Caspian fields near Baku west across 
Azerbaijan and Georgia to the Black Sea port of Batumi. 



127 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 




Figure 10. Transportation System of Azerbaijan, 1994 

There, the oil is either exported in its crude form or processed 
at Batumi's refinery. Two natural gas lines parallel the petro- 
leum line as far as Tbilisi, where they turn north across the 
Caucasus Mountains to join the grid of natural gas pipelines 
that supply cities throughout Russia and Eastern Europe. A 
spur extends off these main gas pipelines in western Azerbaijan 
to deliver gas to Nakhichevan. This spur crosses Armenian ter- 
ritory, however, and in 1994 its status was unclear. Altogether, 
in 1994 Azerbaijan had 1,130 kilometers of crude oil pipeline, 
630 kilometers of pipeline for petroleum products, and 1,240 
kilometers of natural gas pipeline. 

In 1991 some 644,000 telephone lines were in operation, 
providing nine telephones per 100 persons. At that time, 
200,000 Azerbaijanis were on waiting lists for telephone instal- 



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Azerbaijan 



lation. Azerbaijan's telephone system is connected with other 
CIS republics by cable and microwave, but connections to non- 
CIS countries go through Moscow. In 1992 Turkey provided 
support for installation of an International Telecommunica- 
tions Satellite Organization (Intelsat) satellite station in Baku, 
providing access to 200 countries through Turkey. Azerbaijan 
receives Turkish and Iranian television programming by satel- 
lite, and domestic and Russian broadcasts are received locally. 

Government and Politics 

In the late 1980s, the advent of Gorbachev's policy of glas- 
nost in Moscow encouraged vocal opposition to the ruling Azer- 
baijani Communist Party (ACP). In 1989 the central opposition 
role went to the Azerbaijani Popular Front (APF), which was 
able to capture the presidency in the 1992 election. But failure 
to resolve the disastrous conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh contin- 
ued to destabilize Azerbaijani regimes throughout the early 
1990s. Growing masses of disaffected refugees pressed vocifer- 
ously for military victory and quickly shifted their support from 
one leader to another when losses occurred, negating efforts to 
establish solid political institutions at home or to make conces- 
sions that might provide a diplomatic solution to the Nagorno- 
Karabakh conflict. In 1993 the APF leadership was overthrown, 
and former communist official Heydar Aliyev was installed as 
president. 

The Appearance of Opposition Parties 

The political and social groups that sprang up in Azerbaijan 
in the late 1980s were initially termed "informal organizations" 
because they were not yet recognized as legal under Soviet 
practice. By the end of 1988, about forty such organizations 
had emerged, many of them focused on nationalism or anti- 
Armenian issues. The ACP was increasingly regarded as illegiti- 
mate by the population, especially after the Soviet army inter- 
vened to protect the communist regime in January 1990. 

The Azerbaijani Popular Front 

Widespread discontent with ACP rule led to the formation 
of the APF in March 1989 by intellectuals, including journalists 
and researchers belonging to the Azerbaijani Academy of Sci- 
ences. The APF's founding congress in July 1989 elected Abul- 
faz Elchibey party chairman. The APF characterized itself as an 
umbrella organization composed of smaller parties and groups 



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Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

and like-minded individuals. A central plank of its program was 
rejection of self-determination for Nagorno-Karabakh and 
defense of Azerbaijani territorial integrity. In its initial policy 
statements, the APF advocated decentralization of economic 
and political power from Moscow to Baku rather than Azer- 
baijani independence from the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the 
ACP refused to recognize the APF. 

Within months of its founding, the APF had hardened its 
position, launching a series of industrial strikes and rail service 
disruptions calculated to force recognition by the ACP. By the 
fall of 1989, the APF was at the forefront of Azerbaijani public 
opinion on the issue of national sovereignty for Nagorno-Kara- 
bakh, and the ACP recognized the APF as an opposition party. 
The APF used its influence on the Azerbaijani Supreme Soviet, 
the republic's parliament, in advocating the Law on Sover- 
eignty that was passed in October 1989. In January 1990, APF- 
led demonstrations against the ACP brought Soviet military 
intervention. In early 1992, the APF played an important role 
in organizing demonstrations against then-president Ayaz 
Mutalibov. 

Party Configuration after 1991 

Two small parties, the Independent Democratic Party (IDP) 
and the National Independence Party (NIP), were formed by 
former members of the APF in early 1992. The IDP was led by 
Leyla Yunosova, a prominent intellectual who had helped form 
the APF, and the NIP was led by Etibar Mamedov, a frequent 
critic of Elchibey's rule and APF domination of the electoral 
process. Azerbaijani military defeats in March 1993 led Mame- 
dov to call for Elchibey's resignation. Mamedov initially 
approved Elchibey's ouster by Aliyev and the subsequent refer- 
endum on his rule. 

The ACP formally disbanded in September 1991 during a 
wave of popular revulsion against the role it played in support- 
ing the Moscow coup attempted against Gorbachev the previ- 
ous month. Nevertheless, former leaders and members of the 
ACP continue to play a role in the family- and patronage-based 
political system, and Aliyev's faction regained its preeminent 
position. The ACP was revived formally in December 1993 at a 
"restorative" congress, after which it reported having 3,000 
members. When Aliyev ran for president in 1993, he combined 
former communists and other minor groups into the New 



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Azerbaijan 



Azerbaijan Party, which became the governing party when 
Aliyev was elected. 

Under election legislation passed since Aliyev's accession, a 
party must have at least 1,000 members to be legally registered 
by the Ministry of Justice. Party membership is forbidden to 
government officials in agencies of the judiciary, law enforce- 
ment, security, border defense, customs, taxation, finance, and 
the state-run media. The president and members of the clergy 
are likewise enjoined. Parties are not allowed to accept foreign 
funding or to establish cells in government agencies. The gov- 
ernment has banned parties that reject Azerbaijan's territorial 
integrity or inflame racial, national, or religious enmity. 

Legislative Politics 

Parliamentary elections were held in September 1990, 
under a state of martial law (see After Communist Rule, this 
ch.). The opposition coalition led by the APF gained only 
about forty seats in the 350-seat Azerbaijani Supreme Soviet. 
Communists received the balance of seats in what the APF and 
others described as fraudulent elections. Most would-be inter- 
national observers had been expelled from the republic by 
September. Bowing to massive popular demonstrations calling 
for the dissolution of the communist-dominated Supreme 
Soviet and to concerted pressure by the APF and other opposi- 
tionists, in November 1991 the Azerbaijani Supreme Soviet 
voted to establish a fifty-deputy National Council, or Melli-Maj- 
lis. This council, a "mini-legislature" that met in continuous ses- 
sion, was divided equally between former communists and the 
opposition. Because of the Supreme Soviet's complicity in the 
effort to bring Mutalibov back to power in May 1992, the APF 
forced the Supreme Soviet to convene, elect APF official Isa 
Gambarov as acting president, dissolve itself, and cede its 
power to the Melli-Majlis pending new parliamentary elections. 

Having repeatedly postponed the elections, the Melli-Majlis 
remained the sole legislative authority within Azerbaijan in 
early 1994. The Melli-Majlis proved generally amenable to 
Elchibey's policies, but in 1993 the worsening military situation 
in Nagorno-Karabakh brought increasing criticism. In his first 
six months as president, Aliyev gained support from the Melli- 
Majlis for most of his proposals. 

The Presidential Election of 1992 

The presidential election of June 1992 was the first in more 
than seventy years not held under communist control. Five can- 



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Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

didates were on the ballot, seeking election to a five-year term. 
The election featured the unprecedented use of television, 
posters, and other media by multiple candidates to communi- 
cate platforms and solicit votes. The candidates included APF 
leader Elchibey, former parliament speaker Yakub Mamedov, 
Movement for Democratic Reforms leader and Minister of Jus- 
tice Ilias Ismailov, National Democratic Group leader Rank 
Abdullayev, and Union of Democratic Intelligentsia candidate 
Nizami Suleymanov. Two other candidates, from the NIP and 
the APF, withdrew from the race during the campaign. To reg- 
ister, each candidate had to collect at least 20,000 signatures 
and present them to the Central Electoral Commission. Aliyev 
was unable to run because of a constitutional provision barring 
candidates over sixty-five years of age. The government agreed 
to allow international observers to monitor the election. Etibar 
Mamedov, Elchibey's main rival in the polls, dropped out of the 
race a few days before the election, calling for rule by a coali- 
tion government and the postponement of balloting until 
Azerbaijan's state of war with Armenia ended. 

Elchibey's election as president signaled a break in commu- 
nist party dominance of Azerbaijani politics. He received 59.4 
percent of more than 3.3 million votes cast. The runner-up, 
Suleymanov, made a surprise showing of 33 percent of the vote 
by promising Azerbaijanis instant wealth and victory in 
Nagorno-Karabakh. No other candidate garnered as much as 5 
percent of the vote. 

Elchibey had been a student of Arabic philology, a transla- 
tor, and a college instructor. In 1975 the KGB imprisoned him 
for two years for anti-Soviet activities. In a postelection address 
to the nation, he announced a stabilization phase based on the 
transfer of power to his democratic faction. When that phase 
ended in 1993, constitutional, economic, and cultural reforms 
would be implemented, according to this plan. His top domes- 
tic policy priorities — creation of a national army and a national 
currency backed by gold reserves — were seen as necessary ele- 
ments for national sovereignty. Despite the new president's 
intentions, the war in Nagorno-Karabakh dominated politics, 
and Elchibey and his party steadily lost influence and popular 
appeal because of continual military losses, a worsening econ- 
omy, political stalemate, and government corruption. 

The Coup of June 1993 

In June 1993, an unsuccessful government attempt to dis- 
arm mutinous paramilitary forces precipitated the fall of Azer- 



132 



Abulfaz Elchibey, first elected 
president of Azerbaijan, 1992 
Courtesy S. Rasimindir, 
Azerbaijan International 



baijan's fourth government since independence and provided 
the opportunity for Aliyev's return to power. The erstwhile 
communist's reappearance was part of a trend in which mem- 
bers of the former elites in various parts of the old Soviet 
sphere reclaimed authority. Suret Huseynov, a one-time troop 
commander in Nagorno-Karabakh dismissed by Elchibey, led 
the paramilitary forces that triggered the president's removal. 
In support of one of Elchibey's rivals, Huseynov had amassed 
troops and weaponry (largely obtained from the departing 
Russian military) in his home territory. He then easily defeated 
army forces sent to defeat him and precipitated a government 
crisis by marching toward Baku with several thousand troops. 

Huseynov's exploits thoroughly discredited the Elchibey 
APF government in the minds of most Azerbaijanis. After sev- 
eral top government officials were fired or resigned and after 
massed demonstrators demanded a change in government, 
Elchibey endorsed Aliyev's election as chairman of the Melli- 
Majlis. After a brief attempt to retain the presidency, Elchibey 
fled Baku in midjune as Huseynov's forces approached. 

Aliyev announced his immediate assumption of power as 
acting head of state, and within a week a bare quorum of Melli- 
Majlis legislators, mostly former communist deputies, formally 
transferred Elchibey's powers to Aliyev until a new president 
could be elected. Aliyev then replaced Elchibey's ministers and 



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Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

other officials with his own appointees. Huseynov received the 
post of prime minister. The legislature also granted Huseynov 
control over the "power" ministries of defense, internal affairs, 
and security. 

In late July 1993, Aliyev convinced the legislature to hold a 
popular vote of confidence on Elchibey's moribund presidency 
and an extension of a state of emergency that had existed since 
April 1993 because of military setbacks. Although the APF boy- 
cotted the referendum, more than 90 percent of the electorate 
reportedly turned out to cast a 97 percent vote of no-confi- 
dence in Elchibey's rule. This outcome buttressed Aliyev's posi- 
tion and opened the way for new presidential elections. 

In early September 1993, the Melli-Majlis scheduled new 
presidential elections for October 3, 1993. Removal of the max- 
imum age requirement in the election law allowed Aliyev to 
run. Aliyev's position was strengthened further in August when 
paramilitary forces defeated a rebel warlord who had seized 
several areas of southern Azerbaijan and declared an autono- 
mous republic of Talish-Mugan. 

Early in his tenure as acting president, Aliyev stated that his 
political goals were to prevent civil war, regain territory lost to 
Armenia during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and ensure 
the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. Aliyev claimed that free- 
dom of speech and human rights would be respected in Azer- 
baijan, although he also called for continuing a state of 
emergency that would ban political rallies. Huseynov had 
stated in June that the Azerbaijani government would pursue a 
negotiated settlement in Nagorno-Karabakh, but, if that failed, 
a military victory was the goal. He added that the government 
focus would be on improving the Azerbaijani armed forces, sta- 
bilizing the economy, and securing food for the population. 

Aliyev and the Presidential Election of October 1 993 

Aliyev and two minor party candidates ran in presidential 
elections held in October 1993. Voter turnout was about 90 
percent, of which almost 99 percent voted for Aliyev. Many 
international observers declared the elections biased because 
no major opposition candidates ran, and reporting by the mass 
media favored Aliyev and failed to report views of the other 
candidates or of the APF. Aliyev was sworn in as Azerbaijan's 
president on October 10. 

Aliyev was born in 1923 in Nakhichevan of blue-collar Azer- 
baijani parents. He crowned a career in Soviet intelligence and 



134 



Azerbaijan 



counterintelligence services by reaching the post of chairman 
of the Azerbaijani branch of the KGB in 1967. Appointed first 
secretary of the ACP Central Committee beginning in 1969, 
Aliyev purged Azerbaijani nationalists and directed Russifica- 
tion and state economic development activities with notable 
success through the 1970s. His support of Soviet intervention 
in Afghanistan in 1979 brought recognition in Moscow and the 
Order of Lenin from First Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, and in 
1982 Aliyev became a full member of the Politburo of the Com- 
munist Party of the Soviet Union. From 1982 to 1987, he was 
also first deputy chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers. 

In 1987 Gorbachev ousted Aliyev from the Politburo and 
relieved him as party leader in Azerbaijan. Soon after returning 
to Nakhichevan in 1990, Aliyev was elected overwhelmingly to 
the Supreme Soviet of the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic 
on a nationalist platform. The next year, he resigned his com- 
munist party membership. After the failed August 1991 coup in 
Moscow, he called for total independence for Azerbaijan and 
denounced Mutalibov, who was then aspiring to the presidency, 
for supporting the coup. In late 1991, Aliyev built a power base 
as chairman of the Nakhichevan Supreme Soviet, from which 
he asserted Nakhichevan's near-total independence from Baku. 

The Constitution 

The preparation of a new constitution to replace the 1978 
document (which had been based on the 1977 Soviet constitu- 
tion) began in 1992, but adoption has been repeatedly delayed 
by civil and political turmoil. Pending the adoption of a new 
constitution, the fundamental document in the early 1990s was 
the October 18, 1991, Act of Independence, which government 
authorities have described as the basis for a new constitution. 
Meanwhile, the provisions of the 1978 constitution are valid if 
they do not violate or contradict the Act of Independence. The 
act declares that Azerbaijan is a secular, democratic, and uni- 
tary state, with equality of all citizens before the law. Freedoms 
enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
other international human rights documents are upheld, and 
the right to form political parties is stipulated. The Act of Inde- 
pendence also proclaims Azerbaijan's territorial integrity and 
its sovereignty over all its territory. In October 1993, the Melli- 
Majlis revised the existing constitution of 1978, retaining it for 
the time being. Finally deleted were the document's many ref- 



135 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

erences to "Soviet" and "communist" institutions and philoso- 
phy. 

The Court System 

The legal system of Azerbaijan has changed little from the 
system of the Soviet period. The national Supreme Court 
serves as a court of appeals; below it are two levels of judicial 
jurisdiction, the district and municipal courts. These courts, 
supposedly independent, are not immune to political manipu- 
lation, as evidenced by Aliyev' s ouster of the chief justice of the 
Supreme Court in July 1993 because of the judge's support for 
Elchibey and the APR 

Trials are generally public, and defendants have the right to 
choose their own attorney, to be present at their own trials, to 
confront witnesses, to present evidence, and to appeal the ver- 
dict. In cases involving national security or sex offenses, a judge 
may decide to hold a closed trial. Despite the other stipulated 
rights of the defendant, the presumption of innocence has not 
been incorporated specifically into the criminal code. Thus the 
decision of the state prosecutor to bring a case to trial has con- 
siderable bearing on the final verdict. 

Human Rights and the Media 

Ethnic conflict between Armenians and Azerbaijanis has 
resulted in widespread human rights violations by vigilante 
groups and local authorities. During the Elchibey period, the 
minister of internal affairs was replaced after admitting to 
numerous human rights abuses. Lezgians in Azerbaijan have 
complained of human rights abuses such as restrictions on edu- 
cational opportunities in their native language (see Smaller 
Ethnic Minorities, this ch.). In the early 1990s, Amnesty Inter- 
national and Helsinki Watch cited numerous cases of arbitrary 
arrest and torture, including incidents that had occurred since 
Aliyev assumed power in 1993. These organizations and several 
foreign governments protested against the arrest and beating 
of hundreds of APF and other political and government offi- 
cials and raids on APF offices, all after the change of govern- 
ment in mid-1993. At one point, Isa Kamber, a former speaker 
of the Melli-Majlis, was seized in the legislative chamber and 
held for two months. In late 1993, other APF officials were 
reportedly arrested for antigovernment activity, and Aliyev 
asserted that APF members were plotting an armed uprising 
against him. 



136 



Refugees from Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, summer 1993 
Courtesy OlegLitvin, Azerbaijan International 



Based on these and other incidents, in late 1993 the interna- 
tional human rights monitoring group Freedom House down- 
graded Azerbaijan to the rank of world states adjudged "not 
free." Nevertheless, Aliyev has proclaimed Azerbaijani adher- 
ence to international human rights standards, and in Decem- 
ber 1993 he signed the CSCE Paris Accords on democracy and 
human rights. 

News media censorship and other constraints on human 
rights, tightened after Aliyev came to power, were eased some- 
what in September 1993 with the lifting of the national state of 
emergency. In the face of a growing political crisis in late 1993 
caused by heavy military losses, however, many in the Azer- 
baijani government urged Aliyev to declare another period of 
emergency rule. Instead, he announced several measures to 
"tighten public discipline," including curfews and the creation 



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Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

of military tribunals to judge military deserters and draft evad- 
ers. 

In late November 1993, the legislature refused to pass an 
Aliyev-backed press bill restricting news media freedom in the 
name of ensuring national unity. Nevertheless, efforts to 
restrict the media continued, and passage of a law on military 
censorship in December 1993 raised concerns among journal- 
ists that new restrictions would be imposed on a broad scale. At 
the end of 1993, the only newspaper publishing house, Azer- 
baijan, was under government control. The state was able to 
curtail the supply of printing materials to independent publish- 
ers because most of those items came from Russia. Meanwhile, 
rising prices cut newspaper and magazine subscriptions by over 
50 percent in early 1994. Television, the preferred information 
source for most Azerbaijanis, was controlled by the govern- 
ment, which operated the only national television channel. 

Foreign Relations 

Azerbaijan carried out some diplomatic activities during its 
troubled first independence period between 1918 and 1920. In 
September 1920, newly formed Soviet Azerbaijan signed a 
treaty with Russia unifying the military forces, the economy, 
and the foreign trade of the two countries, although the fiction 
of Azerbaijani autonomy in conducting foreign affairs was 
maintained. At that time, Azerbaijan established diplomatic 
relations with six countries, sending diplomatic representatives 
to Germany and Finland. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 
Moscow initially used Azerbaijani diplomats to increase Soviet 
influence in the Middle East through missions in Turkey, Iran, 
and Afghanistan, but most transborder contacts by Azerbaijanis 
had been eliminated by the 1930s. In the post-World War II 
period, the Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs could issue 
limited visas for travel to Iran only. Iran also maintained a con- 
sulate in Baku. 

The Foreign Policy Establishment 

After regaining its independence in 1991, Azerbaijan faced 
reorganization of its minuscule foreign policy establishment. 
This process involved creating or upgrading various functional 
and geographical departments within the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, recruiting and training diplomats, and establishing and 
staffing embassies abroad. Because of the complexity of these 
tasks, few embassies were established during the first months of 



138 



Azerbaijan 



independence. Full diplomatic relations, including mutual 
exchanges of missions, were first established with Turkey, the 
United States, and Iran. 

Post-Soviet Diplomacy 

Even before the breakup of the Soviet Union, the Azer- 
baijani diplomatic establishment had become more active, pri- 
marily with the goal of countering a worldwide Armenian 
information campaign on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. Initia- 
tives in this policy included establishing contacts with Azer- 
baijani emigres living in the United States and reinforcing 
diplomatic connections with Turkey, Iran, and Israel. 

After the breakup of the Soviet Union, most nations moved 
quickly to recognize Azerbaijan's independence, and several 
established full diplomatic relations within the first year. The 
first to do so was Turkey in January 1992. During his presi- 
dency, Elchibey stressed close relations with Turkey, which he 
saw as the best hope for arbitrating an end to the Nagorno- 
Karabakh conflict. He also endorsed unification of the Azer- 
baijani populations of his country and northern Iran and, to 
that end, autonomy for the Iranian Azerbaijanis — a stand that 
alienated the Iranian government. 

During the June 1993 coup, Turkey expressed support for 
Elchibey, but Aliyev and Turkish authorities subsequently 
expressed willingness to continue cordial relations. Relations 
did cool somewhat in the second half of 1993 as Aliyev sought 
to improve relations with Iran and Russia, which had flagged 
under Elchibey. 

Meanwhile, the failure of arbitration efforts by the Minsk 
Group, which included Russia, Turkey, and the United States, 
had frustrated both Armenia and Azerbaijan by mid-1993. The 
Minsk Group was sponsored by the CSCE, which in the early 
1990s undertook arbitration in several Caucasus conflicts 
under the organization's broad mandate for peacekeeping in 
Europe (see Threats of Fragmentation, ch. 3). Aliyev's alterna- 
tive strategies included requesting personal involvement by 
Russia's President Boris N. Yeltsin, who began six months of 
shuttle diplomacy among the capitals involved, and initiation 
of direct talks with Armenian leaders in Nagorno-Karabakh, a 
step that Elchibey had avoided. Throughout the last half of 
1993, the new contacts ran concurrently with formal meetings 
convened by the Minsk Group to arrange a cease-fire. 



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Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

To broaden its relations with nations both East and West, 
Azerbaijan joined a number of international and regional orga- 
nizations, including the UN, the CSCE, the Organization of the 
Islamic Conference, the International Monetary Fund (IMF — 
see Glossary), the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, and the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Orga- 
nization. Azerbaijan has observer status in the General Agree- 
ment on Tariffs and Trade. 

In the early 1990s, the primary criterion governing Azer- 
baijan's relations with foreign states and organizations was their 
stance on Azerbaijani sovereignty in Nagorno-Karabakh. Most 
governments and international organizations formally support 
the concept of territorial integrity, so this criterion has not 
restricted most of Azerbaijan's diplomatic efforts. Relations 
with some states have been affected, however. For example, in 
1992 the United States Congress placed restrictions on United 
States aid to Azerbaijan pending the lifting of the Azerbaijani 
economic blockade on Armenia and cessation of offensive mil- 
itary actions against Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. 

In messages and interviews early in his administration, 
Aliyev asserted that his new government would not alter Azer- 
baijan's domestic and foreign policies and that his country 
would seek good relations with all countries, especially its 
neighbors, including Russia. He criticized the uneven relations 
that existed between Azerbaijan and Russia during the Elchi- 
bey regime. At the same time, Aliyev stressed that he viewed 
Azerbaijan as an independent state that should never again be 
"someone's vassal or colony." In the summer of 1993, Aliyev 
issued a blanket plea to the United States, Turkey, Russia, the 
UN, and the CSCE to work more resolutely toward settlement 
of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Later that year, he sought 
repeal of the Azerbaijan clause of the United States Freedom 
Support Act, which had been amended in 1992 to prohibit 
United States government assistance to Azerbaijan. 

Relations with Former Soviet Republics 

Although Elchibey stressed Azerbaijani independence from 
Moscow, he signed a friendship treaty with Russia on October 
12, 1992, calling for mutual assistance in the case of aggression 
directed at either party and pledging mutual protection of the 
rights of the other's resident citizens. Between that time and 
the coup of 1993, however, Elchibey accused Russia of aiding 
Armenia in Nagorno-Karabakh, and Russia accused Elchibey of 



140 



Azerbaijan 



mistreating the Russian minority in Azerbaijan. Relations 
improved with the return to power of Aliyev, who pledged to 
uphold and strengthen Azerbaijan's ties to Russia. Russia's offi- 
cial position on Nagorno-Karabakh was strict nonintervention 
barring an invitation to mediate from both sides; in the Russian 
view, Azerbaijani territory seized by Armenia was to be 
returned, however. In early 1994, seizure of property from Rus- 
sian citizens in Azerbaijan (mostly to house refugees from 
Nagorno-Karabakh) remained a source of irritation. 

Azerbaijan's role in the CIS changed drastically in the early 
1990s. After Azerbaijan signed the Alma-Ata Declaration as a 
founding member of the CIS in December 1991, the legislature 
voted in October 1992 against ratifying this membership. How- 
ever, Azerbaijan retained observer status, and its representa- 
tives attended some CIS functions. Aliyev's announcement in 
September 1993 that Azerbaijan would rejoin the CIS brought 
a heated debate in the legislature, which finally approved mem- 
bership. Aliyev then signed the CIS charter, its Treaty on Col- 
lective Security, and an agreement on economic cooperation. 
Relations with former Soviet republics in Central Asia also were 
uneven after independence. Elchibey's advocacy of the over- 
throw of President Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan caused partic- 
ular diplomatic problems with that country. In keeping with 
the policy of rapprochement with the CIS, Aliyev began 
improving ties with Central Asian leaders in the second half of 
1993. 

National Security 

From the very beginning of its existence as a post-Soviet 
independent republic, Azerbaijan faced a single compelling 
national security issue: its enduring struggle with Armenian 
forces in Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding territory. 
The withdrawal of Russian troops and materiel left an Azer- 
baijani army ill-equipped and poorly disciplined. Government 
efforts to build a new national defense force achieved only lim- 
ited results, and Armenian forces continued to advance into 
Azerbaijani territory during most of 1993. By the end of that 
year, the Aliyev regime had bolstered some components of the 
Azerbaijani military, however. 

Forming a National Defense Force 

Even before the formal breakup of the Soviet Union at the 
end of 1991, Azerbaijan had created its own Ministry of 



141 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

Defense and a Defense Council to advise the president on 
national security policy. The national armed forces of Azer- 
baijan were formed by presidential decree in October 1991. 
Subsequently,, the Azerbaijani Supreme Soviet declared that 
the Soviet 4th Army, which included most of the Soviet troops 
based in Azerbaijan, would be placed under Azerbaijani juris- 
diction. About the same time, the Azerbaijani Supreme Soviet 
summoned Azerbaijanis serving in the Soviet armed forces out- 
side Azerbaijan to return and serve in their homeland. By the 
end of 1991, the Supreme Soviet had enacted independently 
several statutes governing military matters. 

Formed in mid-1992, the Azerbaijani navy has about 3,000 
personnel in sixteen units from the former Soviet Caspian Flo- 
tilla and Border Guards. The navy has five minesweepers, four 
landing ships, and three patrol boats. The air force has about 
2,000 troops, forty-eight combat aircraft, and one helicopter 
squadron. 

According to legislation and a decree both promulgated in 
1991, the president serves as the commander in chief of the 
Azerbaijani armed forces. In this capacity, the president over- 
sees defense and security efforts undertaken by the prime min- 
ister and the ministers of defense, internal affairs, and security. 
Between 1991 and 1993, Azerbaijani presidents exercised this 
power by ousting several defense ministers because of alleged 
incompetence. Despite propitious legislation and decrees, how- 
ever, efforts to field a national army faced many challenges. 

In the pre-Soviet period, many Azerbaijanis graduated from 
Russian military academies, and Azerbaijani regiments of the 
imperial army were noted for their fighting skill. In the Soviet 
military system, however, Azerbaijanis were underrepresented 
in the top ranks of the armed forces, despite the presence of 
the Higher All Arms Command School and the Caspian High 
Naval School in Azerbaijan. Many Azerbaijani conscripts were 
assigned to construction battalions, in which military training 
was minimal and the troops carried out noncombat duties. Pre- 
induction military training in most Azerbaijani secondary 
schools was also reportedly less stringent than in other Soviet 
republics. For these and other reasons, the Azerbaijanis were 
not prepared for long-term warfare in Nagorno-Karabakh 
when independence arrived. 

Russian Troop Withdrawal 

The continued presence of Russian forces in Azerbaijan 



142 



Azerbaijan 



became problematic when Russian troops were alleged to have 
assisted Armenians in an attack that killed hundreds of civilians 
in the town of Khodzhaly, in southwestern Azerbaijan, in Feb- 
ruary 1992. In the face of widespread demands from the politi- 
cal opposition in Baku, components of a 62,000-member 
Russian force began to withdraw from Azerbaijan almost imme- 
diately. Striking a contrast to the protracted withdrawal of Rus- 
sian troops from the Baltic states, the last Russian unit, the 
104th Airborne Division, withdrew from Azerbaijan in May 
1993, about a year ahead of the schedule that the two countries 
had set in 1992. 

According to an agreement between Russia and the Trans- 
caucasian states calling for distribution of former Soviet mili- 
tary assets among the participating parties, Azerbaijan would 
receive most of the materiel of the 4th Army that had been sta- 
tioned there, together with part of the Caspian Flotilla. The 
Russians destroyed or removed much of their weaponry upon 
withdrawing, but a substantial amount was stolen, exchanged, 
or handed over to Azerbaijani forces. Some Russians answered 
appeals from Azerbaijani military leaders to serve in the Azer- 
baijani armed forces. By agreement with Russia, many former 
members of the Soviet Border Guards also continued their 
duties under Azerbaijani jurisdiction, with Russian assistance in 
training and weapons supplies. In January 1994, Russia and 
Azerbaijan discussed possible use of Russian forces to bolster 
Azerbaijan's border defenses. 

Force Levels and Performance 

During the late Soviet period, Azerbaijan had supplied as 
many as 60,000 conscripts per year to the Soviet armed forces. 
In August 1992, Elchibey announced projected personnel lev- 
els for the Azerbaijani armed forces. His projection called for a 
force of 30,000 troops by 1996, divided into ground units, air 
force and air defense units, and a navy. Half of this force would 
consist of conscripts, half of individuals serving under contract. 
In 1994 estimated total troop strength had reached 56,000, of 
which 49,000 were in the army, 3,000 in the navy, 2,000 in the 
air force, and 2,000 in the air defense forces. 

According to training plans, officers would graduate from a 
revamped Combined Forces Command School (formerly the 
Baku Higher Arms Command School) and the Caspian High 
Naval School. The new Azerbaijani armed forces would rely 
almost exclusively on transferred or purchased Soviet equip- 



143 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

ment, although Azerbaijani machine industries have the capa- 
bility to do some manufacturing and repairs. According to 
most Azerbaijani accounts, defense strategy for the near term is 
focused on territorial defense, the goals of which are defeating 
separatism in Nagorno-Karabakh and defending Azerbaijan's 
borders with Armenia. 

Despite Elchibey's ambitious plan, in 1992 and 1993 Azer- 
baijan was forced to seek military assistance elsewhere. Report- 
edly, a group of American mercenary advisers arrived in 
Azerbaijan in 1992, and some Americans were believed still in 
the country in early 1994. Iranian, Russian, and Turkish offic- 
ers also were training Azerbaijani forces in the early 1990s. In 
early 1993, Azerbaijan was able to field no more than a few 
thousand well-trained troops against Armenia, according to 
most accounts. In 1993 continued military defeats brought 
mass desertions. 

To meet the need for troops, Azerbaijani authorities 
encouraged the organization and fielding of up to thirty para- 
military detachments, which in late 1993 were heavily criticized 
by Aliyev for their lack of military discipline. Aliyev reported to 
the legislature that these detachments were abandoning posi- 
tions and weapons to the Armenians without an effort to 
defend them. About 1,000 former Afghan freedom fighters 
were hired in 1993, and volunteers from other Muslim coun- 
tries also reportedly enlisted. In late 1993, the government 
began forced recruitment of teenagers, who were said to be 
used in human-wave attacks against Armenian positions. 

Supply and Budgeting 

Azerbaijan reportedly receives weapons of uncertain origin 
from various Islamic nations to assist in the struggle to retain 
Nagorno-Karabakh. In late 1993, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs made an official report to the CSCE on the weapons at 
Azerbaijan's disposal, fulfilling the requirement of the 1991 
Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE Treaty — see Glos- 
sary). According to this report, during 1992 and 1993 Azer- 
baijan received more than 1,700 weapons — including tanks, 
armored personnel carriers, aircraft, artillery systems, and heli- 
copters — from Russia and Ukraine, far above the CFE Treaty 
limits. 

According to IMF and Azerbaijani government data, 
defense expenditures placed a severe burden on the national 
budget. In 1992 some US$125 million, or 10.5 percent of the 



144 



Azerbaijan 



total budget, went to defense. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict 
also raised expenses for internal security to 4 billion rubles in 

1992. By 1994 military expenditures officially reached US$132 
million, although unofficial estimates were much higher. 

Aliyev's National Security Reform 

In November 1993, Aliyev created the Defense Council to 
provide him direct oversight of military affairs and to curtail 
the loss of considerable Azerbaijani territory outside Nagorno- 
Karabakh. The new council, which reports to the president, 
also strengthened Aliyev's control over military and security 
affairs, which previously had been directed by Prime Minister 
Huseynov. At its first meeting, the Defense Council replaced 
the deputy defense ministers in charge of the Border Guards 
and the general staff, and the council criticized the Council of 
Ministers for neglecting urgent defense matters. At the end of 

1993, Aliyev continued his criticism of widespread draft eva- 
sion, appealing particularly to the 10,000 Afghan war veterans 
in Azerbaijan to reenlist. Penalties for draft evasion and deser- 
tion were tightened. At the same time, Aliyev ordered most 
officers with desk assignments to be deployed to the front lines. 

In 1993 Aliyev attempted to establish better relations with 
Russian military and political officials by rejoining the CIS and 
signing CIS agreements on multilateral peacekeeping and 
mutual security policy. He answered nationalist critics by citing 
the hope that Russia might coax or coerce Armenia and the 
Karabakh Armenians into reaching a suitable settlement of the 
conflict. Some APF members and others denounced these 
moves as jeopardizing Azerbaijani sovereignty more seriously 
than did the existing conflict. 

In November 1993, the Melli-Majlis approved the Law on 
Defense, ratifying Aliyev's proposed reforms. Paramilitary 
forces were officially disbanded, and strenuous efforts were 
undertaken to increase the size of the military. In early 1994, 
these measures appeared to help Azerbaijani forces to regain 
some territory that had been lost in late 1993. These successes 
were attributed to several factors: Aliyev's success in wooing vet- 
erans, including officers, back into military service; increased 
enlistments and a lower desertion rate; improved morale; a 
streamlined command system with Aliyev at its head; and train- 
ing assistance and volunteers from abroad. 



145 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

Crime and Crime Prevention 

In the early 1990s, crime in Azerbaijan generally intensified 
and expanded to new parts of society. In the confusion of eco- 
nomic reform, white-collar criminals absconded with invest- 
ment and savings funds entrusted to new and unproven 
financial institutions, and mass refugee movements and territo- 
rial occupation promoted the activities of armed criminal 
groups. At the same time, law enforcement agencies of the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs underwent several reorganizations 
that hindered effective crime prevention. 

Narcotics Trade 

According to United States and Russian sources, illegal nar- 
cotics, including opium, hashish, and marijuana, are assuming 
a large role in Azerbaijani exports, although official economic 
indicators do not reflect such commerce. In 1993 the United 
States Department of State reported that Azerbaijani criminal 
networks controlled 80 percent of drug distribution in Moscow. 
Only seven kilograms of narcotics were confiscated by customs 
officials at border points in 1993, however. According to offi- 
cial Russian sources, in 1993 some 38.6 percent of illegal drugs 
entering Russia from former Soviet republics came from Azer- 
baijan, and 82 percent of drug arrests in Moscow were of Azer- 
baijanis. The Russian government and Armenian authorities 
have alleged that Azerbaijani government officials are involved 
in drug trafficking, which they assert helps support Azerbaijani 
military operations in Nagorno-Karabakh. In 1993 Azerbaijan 
joined the International Association Against Narcotics Abuse 
and the Narcobusiness. 

Wartime conditions and expanded trade relations also 
increased other types of smuggling dramatically. Widespread 
corruption and poor organization in the Azerbaijani customs 
service fostered customs violations; in one two-month period in 
1994, customs officals seized 6,300 Iranian rials, US$23,700, 
forty truckloads of iron pipe, 1,633 tons of metal, 620 grams of 
mercury, and batches of military optics equipment. 

Crime Prevention Agencies 

Azerbaijan established a separate contingent of border 
troops in 1992, but the demands of the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict have limited staffing. In 1993 liaison was established 
with the border troop commands of Russia, Kazakhstan, and 



146 



Azerbaijan 



Ukraine for cooperative drug control and exchange of meth- 
odology. A small officer training program for border troops has 
been established at the Combined Forces Command School, 
with the intention of increasing enrollment once the issue of 
Nagorno-Karabakh is resolved. Long-term plans call for Euro- 
pean-style checkpoints after war damage is repaired and official 
borders are recognized. 

In 1993 the Ministry of Internal Affairs underwent a major 
reform, a significant aspect of which was abolition of its Admin- 
istration for the Struggle Against Terrorism and Banditry. That 
agency, nominally the spearhead of national crime prevention, 
had proven ineffective because of unclear jurisdiction and 
poor professional performance. Law enforcement cooperation 
with other CIS countries has been irregular. In restructuring its 
law enforcement operations, however, the government has con- 
sulted the ministries of internal affairs of Georgia, Iran, Kyr- 
gyzstan, Latvia, Russia, and Turkey. In 1993 the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs sent ninety employees to study law enforce- 
ment at education institutions in Russia and Ukraine. Also, 
contacts were strengthened with the International Criminal 
Police Organization (Interpol) and the national law enforce- 
ment agencies of neighboring countries. 

Despite Aliyev's reforms, the delicate state of Azerbaijani 
national security continued to affect all other aspects of the 
new nation's activities. Normal foreign relations and trade were 
blocked by the ramifications of other nations dealing with one 
side or the other of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. But 
despite the clear need for action, extreme nationalists sharply 
limited the president's range of options by holding the threat 
of ouster over his head for any step that might appear to be 
conciliatory toward the traditional enemy, Armenia. 

* * * 

For historical background on Azerbaijan, the best source is 
Audrey L. Alstadt's The Azerbaijani Turks: Power and Identity under 
Russian Rule. Earlier sources covering specific historical topics 
include J. D. Henry's Baku: An Eventful History (covering the 
exploitation of oil in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries); Russian Azerbaijan, 1905-1920: The Shaping of 
National Identity in a Muslim Community by Tadeusz Swieto- 
chowski (including an introductory chapter covering nine- 
teenth-century Russian rule); Ronald G. Suny's The Baku 
Commune, 1917-1918: Class and Nationality in the Russian Revolu- 



147 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

tion; and The Struggle for Transcaucasia, 1917-1921 by Firuz 
Kazemzadeh. Overviews of nationality issues include Tamara 
Dragadze's "Azerbaijanis" in The Nationalities Question in the 
Soviet Union, edited by Graham Smith, and Frank Huddle, Jr.'s 
"Azerbaidzhan and the Azerbaidzhanis" in Handbook of Major 
Soviet Nationalities, edited by Zev Katz. (For further information 
and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



148 



Chapter 3. Georgia 



Religious medallion bearing likeness of Saint George 



Country Profile 



Country 

Formal Name: Republic of Georgia. 
Short Name: Georgia. 
Term for Citizens: Georgian (s). 
Capital: Tbilisi. 

Date of Independence: April 9, 1991. 

Geography 

Size: Approximately 69,875 square kilometers. 

Topography: Extremely varied; Greater Caucasus and Lesser 
Caucasus ranges dominate northern and eastern regions. 
Many rivers flow through mountain gorges into Black Sea and 
Caspian Sea. Narrow lowland area along Black Sea. Plains 
region in east. 

Climate: Subtropical, humid along coast. Mountains protect 
country from northern influences and create temperature 
zones according to elevation. Eastern plains, isolated from sea, 
have continental climate. Year-round snow in highest 
mountains. 

Society 

Population: Mid-1994 estimate 5,681,025. Annual growth rate 
0.81 percent in 1994. Density seventy-nine persons per square 
kilometer in 1994. 



NOTE — The Country Profile contains updated information as available. 



151 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

Ethnic Groups: In early 1990s, Georgians 70.1 percent, 
Armenians 8.1 percent, Russians 6.3 percent, Azerbaijanis 5.7 
percent, Ossetians 3 percent, and Abkhaz 1.8 percent. 

Languages: In 1993 official language, Georgian, spoken by 71 
percent of population. Russian spoken by 9 percent, followed 
by Armenian with 7 percent and Azerbaijani with 6 percent. 

Religion: In 1993 Georgian Orthodox 65 percent, Muslim 11 
percent, Russian Orthodox 10 percent, and Armenian 
Apostolic 8 percent. 

Education and Literacy: Free and compulsory through 
secondary school. Previous Soviet system modified to eliminate 
ideology and strengthen Georgian language and history. Some 
teaching continues in minority languages. Nineteen 
institutions of higher learning. Literacy estimated at 100 
percent by 1980s. 

Health: Universal free health care, among best systems in 
Soviet period, but under severe stress after 1991. Reform 
program blocked by civil war and political instability in early 
1990s. Facilities overtaxed by refugee and emergency care 
requirements. 

Economy 

Gross National Product (GNP): Estimated at US$4.7 billion in 
1992, or approximately US$850 per person. Economic growth 
negative in early 1990s because of destruction of infrastructure, 
unavailability of inputs, and failure of economic 
reorganization. 

Agriculture: Very productive with irrigation of western 
lowlands, but efficiency hindered by post-Soviet misallocation 
of land and materials. Tea and citrus fruits produced in 
subtropical areas; also grain, sugar beets, fruits, wine, cattle, 
pigs, and sheep. Over half of cultivated land privatized as of 
early 1994. 

Industry and Mining: Indu, ct ry heavily dependent on inputs 
from other members of Com nonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS) and from abroad. Main products semifinished metals, 
vehicles, textiles, and chemicals. Coal, copper, and manganese 
principal minerals. 

Energy: Scant domestic fuel reserves; 95 percent imported 



152 



Georgia 



(mostly oil and natural gas) in 1990. Coal output dropped 
sharply through early 1990s. Hydroelectric potential high, but 
mainly untapped. Power output does not meet domestic needs. 

Exports: Estimated at US$32.6 million in 1992. Major exports 
citrus fruits, tea, machinery, ferrous and nonferrous metals, 
and textiles. Main markets Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, 
Czechoslovakia, Germany, Poland, Russia, and Turkey. 

Imports: Estimated at US$43.8 million in 1992. Major imports 
machinery and parts, fuels, transportation equipment, and 
textiles. Main suppliers Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, 
Russia, and Ukraine. 

Balance of Payments: Estimated as US$23.7 million deficit in 
1992. 

Exchange Rate: Coupon introduced in early 1993. November 
1994 exchange rate 1,625,000 coupons per US$1. 

Inflation: Estimated in January 1993 at 50 percent per month. 

Fiscal Year: Calendar year. 

Fiscal Policy: Centralized decision making, but large 
underground economy limits economic control. Extensive 
manipulation of tax structure in 1992-93 to shrink large 
budget deficits. Deficits remained high as revenue estimates 
fell short. Enterprise privatization slow. 

Transportation and Telecommunications 

Highways: In 1990 about 35,100 kilometers of roads, of which 
31,200 kilometers hard-surface. Four main highways radiate 
from Tbilisi, roughly in the cardinal directions, to Russia, 
Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Black Sea. Tbilisi hub of Caucasus 
region's highway system. 

Railroads: 1,421 kilometers of track in 1993. Main links with 
Russia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia. Substantial disruption in 
1992-93 by civil war and fuel shortages. Tbilisi hub of Caucasus 
region's rail transport. 

Civil Aviation: National airline, Orbis, provides direct flights 
from Tbilisi to some West European cities. Passenger and cargo 
service limited by fuel shortages in 1991-94. Nineteen of 
twenty-six airports with permanent-surface runways in 1993; 
longest runway, at Novo ale kseyevka near Tbilisi, about 2,500 



153 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 
meters long. 

Inland Waterways: None navigable by commercial shipping. 

Ports: Batumi, Poti, and Sukhumi on Black Sea, with 
international shipping connections to other Black Sea ports 
and Mediterranean ports. 

Pipelines: In 1992 approximately 370 kilometers of pipeline for 
crude oil, 300 kilometers for refined products, and 440 
kilometers for natural gas. Subject to disruption. 

Telecommunications: About 672,000 telephone lines in use in 
1991, or twelve per 100 persons; long waiting list for 
installation. International links overland to CIS countries and 
Turkey; low-capacity satellite earth station in operation. Three 
television stations and numerous radio stations broadcast in 
Georgian and Russian. 

Government and Politics 

Government: Two autonomous republics, Abkhazian 
Autonomous Republic and Ajarian Autonomous Republic; one 
autonomous region, South Ossetian Autonomous Region. 
Strong executive (head of state, who is also chairman of 
parliament) with extensive emergency powers in civil war 
period of 1992-93. Cabinet of Ministers selected by head of 
state; power of prime minister secondary to that of head of 
state. Unicameral parliament (Supreme Soviet, 225 deputies) 
elects head of state and has legislative power, but is plagued by 
disorder and fragmentation. Judicial branch, weak in 
communist era, under reform in early 1990s. 

Politics: Twenty-six parties represented in parliament in 1993, 
of which most seats held by Peace Bloc, October 1 1 Bloc, Unity 
Bloc, Green Party, and National Democratic Party. Shifting 
coalitions back individual programs. Reform slowed by 
influence of former communists, who are gradually dispersing. 
Union of Citizens of Georgia formed in November 1993 to 
support Eduard Shevardnadze government programs. 
Shevardnadze remained most popular politician in late 1994. 

Foreign Relations: In 1992-94 broad diplomatic campaign to 
establish relations with CIS nations, other neighbors, and West 
after isolation created by Zviad Gamsakhurdia government in 
1991. Balanced position maintained between warring Armenia 



154 



Georgia 



and Azerbaijan. Joined CIS in October 1993, after refusing to 
do so at first, to ensure Russian aid in ending civil war. 

International Agreements and Memberships: Member of 
United Nations, Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe, International Monetary Fund, European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, and International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development. 

National Security 

Armed Forces: Defense policy made by Council for National 
Security and Defense, chaired by head of state. Main forces — 
National Guard (15,000 troops) and paramilitary Rescue Corps 
(about 1,000 troops formerly known as the Mkhedrioni) — not 
fully under government control in 1994. Plans call for national 
force of 20,000 with two-year compulsory service. About 15,000 
Russian troops remained in mid-1993, supplemented in fall of 
1993 to prevent widening of civil war and to guard borders. In 
1993 Georgia joined CIS mutual security agreements. 

Major Military Units: Emphasis in early 1990s on establishing 
national ground forces, with small air force using training 
aircraft. Most equipment obtained from Soviet (later Russian) 
occupation forces — both legally, under official 1992 quota 
agreement, and illegally. 

Military Budget: In 1992 estimated at US$23.6 million, or 8.3 
percent of budgeted expenditures. 

Internal Security: Since 1992 intelligence operations under 
Information and Intelligence Service, chaired by head of state. 
Ministry of Internal Affairs combined security agencies in 
1993. Government police authority uneven; white-collar and 
highway crime rampant in some regions. 



155 



42 



RUSSIA 



.aspian 
Sea 

44^ 



Sukhumi j 

ABKHAZIAN \ \ 
AUTONOMOUS- 
REPUBLIC 




South Ossetian 

Autonomous 

Region 



Kutaisi 





International boundary 




Autonomous republic boundary 




Autonomous region boundary 


® 


National capital 


<§) 


Autonomous republic capital 


o 


Autonomous region capital 


• 


Populated place 





25 50 75 Kilometers 


25 50 75 Miles 




Figure 11. Georgia, 1994 



156 



GEORGIA'S LOCATION AT a major commercial crossroads 
and among several powerful neighbors has provided both 
advantages and disadvantages through some twenty-five centu- 
ries of history. Georgia comprises regions having distinctive 
traits. The ethnic, religious, and linguistic characteristics of the 
country as a unit coalesced to a greater degree than before 
under Russian rule in the nineteenth century. Then, beneath a 
veneer of centralized economic and political control imposed 
during seventy years of Soviet rule, Georgian cultural and 
social institutions survived, thanks in part to Georgia's relative 
distance from Moscow. As the republic entered the post-Soviet 
period in the 1990s, however, the prospects of establishing true 
national autonomy based on a common heritage remained 
unclear. 

Historical Background 

Although Saint George is the country's patron saint, the 
name Georgia derives from the Arabic and Persian words, Kurj 
and Gurj, for the country. In 1991 Georgia — called Sakartvelo in 
Georgian and Gruziia in Russian — had been part of a Russian 
or Soviet empire almost continuously since the beginning of 
the nineteenth century, when most of the regions that consti- 
tute modern Georgia accepted Russian annexation in order to 
gain protection from Persia. Prior to that time, some combina- 
tion of the territories that make up modern Georgia had been 
ruled by the Bagratid Dynasty for about 1,000 years, including 
periods of foreign domination and fragmentation. 

Early History 

Archaeological evidence indicates a neolithic culture in the 
area of modern Georgia as early as the fifth millennium B.C. 
Between that time and the modern era, a number of ethnic 
groups invaded or migrated into the region, merging with 
numerous indigenous tribes to form the ethnic base of the 
modern Georgian people. Throughout history the territory 
comprising the Georgian state varied considerably in size as 
foreign forces occupied some regions and as centrally ruled 
federations controlled others. 



157 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

Christianity and the Georgian Empire 

In the last centuries of the pre-Christian era, Georgia, in the 
form of the kingdom of Kartli-Iberia, was strongly influenced 
by Greece to the west and Persia to the east. After the Roman 
Empire completed its conquest of the Caucasus region in 66 
B.C., the kingdom was a Roman client state and ally for some 
400 years. In A.D. 330, King Marian Ill's acceptance of Chris- 
tianity ultimately tied Georgia to the neighboring Byzantine 
Empire, which exerted a strong cultural influence for several 
centuries. Although Arabs captured the capital city of Tbilisi in 
A.D. 645, Kartli-Iberia retained considerable independence 
under local Arab rulers. In A.D. 813, the Armenian prince 
Ashot I became the first of the Bagrationi family to rule Geor- 
gia. Ashot's reign began a period of nearly 1,000 years during 
which the Bagratids, as the house was known, ruled at least part 
of what is now Georgia. 

Western and eastern Georgia were united under Bagrat V (r. 
1027-72). In the next century, David IV (called the Builder, r. 
1099-1125) initiated the Georgian golden age by driving the 
Turks from the country and expanding Georgian cultural and 
political influence southward into Armenia and eastward to the 
Caspian Sea. That era of unparalleled power and prestige for 
the Georgian monarchy concluded with the great literary flow- 
ering of Queen Tamar's reign (1184-1212). At the end of that 
period, Georgia was well known in the Christian West (and 
relied upon as an ally by the Crusaders). Outside the national 
boundaries, several provinces were dependent to some degree 
on Georgian power: the Trabzon Empire on the southern 
shore of the Black Sea, regions in the Caucasus to the north 
and east, and southern Azerbaijan (see fig. 12). 

Occupation and Inclusion in the Russian Empire 

The Mongol invasion in 1236 marked the beginning of a 
century of fragmentation and decline. A brief resurgence of 
Georgian power in the fourteenth century ended when the 
Turkic conquerer Timur (Tamerlane) destroyed Tbilisi in 
1386. The capture of Constantinople by the Ottoman Turks in 
1453 began three centuries of domination by the militant Otto- 
man and Persian empires, which divided Georgia into spheres 
of influence in 1553 and subsequently redistributed Georgian 
territory between them (see fig. 13). By the eighteenth cen- 
tury, however, the Bagratid line again had achieved substantial 
independence under nominal Persian rule. In this period, 



158 



Georgia 



Georgia was threatened more by rebellious Georgian and Per- 
sian nobles from within than by the major powers surrounding 
the country In 1762 Herekle II was able to unite the east Geor- 
gian regions of Kartli and Kakhetia under his independent but 
tenuous rule. In this period of renewed unity, trade increased 
and feudal institutions lost influence in Georgia. 

In 1773 Herekle began efforts to gain Russian protection 
from the Turks, who were threatening to retake his kingdom. 
In this period, Russian troops intermittently occupied parts of 
Georgia, making the country a pawn in the explosive Russian- 
Turkish rivalry of the last three decades of the eighteenth cen- 
tury. After the Persians sacked Tbilisi in 1795, Herekle again 
sought the protection of Orthodox Russia. 

Within the Russian Empire 

Annexation by the Russian Empire began a new stage of 
Georgian history, in which security was achieved by linking 
Georgia more closely than ever with Russia. This subordinate 
relationship would last nearly two centuries. 

Russian Influence in the Nineteenth Century 

Because of its weak position, Georgia could not name the 
terms of protection by the Russian Empire. In 1801 Tsar Alex- 
ander I summarily abolished the kingdom of Kartli-Kakhetia, 
and the heir to the Bagratid throne was forced to abdicate. In 
the next decade, the Russian Empire gradually annexed Geor- 
gia's entire territory. Eastern Georgia (the regions of Kartli and 
Kakhetia) became part of the Russian Empire in 1801, and 
western Georgia (Imeretia) was incorporated in 1804. After 
annexation Russian governors tried to rearrange Georgian feu- 
dal society and government according to the Russian model. 
Russian education and ranks of nobility were introduced, and 
the Georgian Orthodox Church lost its autocephalous status in 
1811. In the second half of the nineteenth century, Russifica- 
tion intensified, as did Georgian rebellions against the process. 

Social and Intellectual Developments 

By 1850 the social and political position of the Georgian 
nobility, for centuries the foundation of Georgian society, had 
deteriorated. A new worker class began to exert social pressure 
in Georgian population centers. Because the nobility still rep- 
resented Georgian national interests, its decline meant that the 
Armenian merchant class, which had been a constructive part 



159 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 




Source: Based on information from Kalistrat Salia, History of the Georgian Nation, Paris, 
1983, 182-83. 

Figure 12. The Georgian Empire of Queen Tamar, ca. 1200 

of urban life since the Middle Ages, gained greater economic 
power within Georgia. At the same time, Russian political hege- 
mony over the Caucasus now went unopposed by Georgians. In 
response to these conditions, Georgian intellectuals borrowed 
the thinking of Russian and West European political philoso- 
phers, forging a variety of theoretical salvations for Georgian 
nationalism that had little relation to the changing economic 
conditions of the Georgian people. 

By the end of the nineteenth century, Russia, fearing 
increased Armenian power in Georgia, asserted direct control 
over Armenian religious and political institutions. In the first 
decade of the twentieth century, a full-fledged Georgian 
national liberation movement was established by Marxist fol- 
lowers of the Russian Social Democrat Party. Marxist precepts 
fell on fertile soil in Georgia; by 1900 migration from rural 
areas and the growth of manufacturing had generated a fairly 
cohesive working class led by a new generation of Georgian 
intellectuals, who called for elimination of both the Armenian 
bourgeoisie and the Russian government bureaucracy. The 
main foe, however, was tsarist autocracy. 



160 



Georgia 




Source: Based on information from Kalistrat Salia, History of the Georgian Nation, Paris, 
1983, 253. 

Figure 13. Georgia in the Sixteenth Century 

The Spirit of Revolution 

In 1905 a large-scale peasant revolt in western Georgia and 
general strikes in industrial centers throughout the Caucasus 
caused Russia to declare martial law. As elsewhere in the Rus- 
sian Empire, the political reforms of 1905 temporarily eased 
tensions between the Georgian population and the Russian 
government. For the next decade, the Georgian revolutionar- 
ies of the Social Democrat Party were split between the gradual- 
ist Menshevik and the radical Bolshevik factions, and the 
incidence of strikes and mass demonstrations declined sharply 
between 1906 and 1917. Mensheviks, however, occupied all the 
Georgian seats in the first two seatings of the Duma, the Rus- 
sian parliamentary institution established in 1905. In this 
period, Joseph V. Stalin (a Georgian who changed his name 
from Ioseb Jugashvili around 1910) became a leader of Bolshe- 



161 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

vik conspiracies against the Russian government in Georgia 
and the chief foe of Menshevik leader Noe Zhordania. 

World War I and Independence 

Because Turkey was a member of the Central Powers in 
World War I, the Caucasus region became a major battle- 
ground in that conflict. In 1915 and 1916, Russian forces 
pushed southwest into eastern Turkey from bases in the Cauca- 
sus, with limited success. As part of the Russian Empire, Geor- 
gia officially backed the Allies, although it stood to gain little 
from victory by either side. By 1916 economic conditions and 
mass immigration of war refugees had raised social discontent 
throughout the Caucasus, and the Russian Empire's decade-old 
experiment with constitutional monarchy was judged a failure. 

The revolution of 1917 in Russia intensified the struggle 
between the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks in Georgia. In May 
1918, Georgia declared its independence under the protection 
of Germany. Georgia turned toward Germany to prevent 
opportunistic invasion by the Turks; the move also resulted 
from Georgians' perception of Germany as the center of Euro- 
pean culture. The major European powers recognized Geor- 
gia's independence, and in May 1920, Russian leader Vladimir 
I. Lenin officially followed suit. 

To gain peasant support, Zhordania's moderate new Men- 
shevik-dominated government redistributed much of Georgia's 
remaining aristocratic landholdings to the peasants, eliminat- 
ing the long-time privileged status of the nobility. The few years 
of postwar independence were economically disastrous, how- 
ever, because Georgia did not establish commercial relations 
with the West, Russia, or its smaller neighbors. 

Within the Soviet Union 

In seven decades as part of the Soviet Union, Georgia main- 
tained some cultural independence, and Georgian nationalism 
remained a significant — though at times muted — issue in rela- 
tions with the Russians. In economic and political terms, how- 
ever, Georgia was thoroughly integrated into the Soviet system. 

The Interwar Years 

After independence was declared in 1918, the Georgian Bol- 
sheviks campaigned to undermine the Menshevik leader Zhor- 
dania, and in 1921 the Red Army invaded Georgia and forced 
him to flee. From 1922 until 1936, Georgia was part of a united 



162 



Georgia 



Transcaucasian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (TSFSR) 
within the Soviet Union. In 1936 the federated republic was 
split up into Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, which 
remained separate Soviet socialist republics of the Soviet 
Union until the end of 1991. 

Although Stalin and Lavrenti Beria, his chief of secret police 
from 1938 to 1953, were both Georgians, Stalin's regime 
oppressed Georgians as severely as it oppressed citizens of 
other Soviet republics. The most notable manifestations of this 
policy were the execution of 5,000 nobles in 1924 as punish- 
ment for a Menshevik revolt and the purge of Georgian intel- 
lectuals and artists in 1936-37. Another Georgian Bolshevik, 
Sergo Ordzhonikidze, played an important role in the early 
1920s in bringing Georgia and other Soviet republics into a 
centralized, Moscow-directed state. Ordzhonikidze later 
became Stalin's top economic official. 

World War II and the Late Stalin Period 

Georgia was not invaded in World War II. It contributed 
more than 500,000 fighters to the Red Army, however, and was 
a vital source of textiles and munitions. Stalin's successful 
appeal for patriotic unity eclipsed Georgian nationalism dur- 
ing the war and diffused it in the years following. Restoration 
of autonomy to the Georgian Orthodox Church in 1943 facili- 
tated this process. 

The last two decades of Stalin's rule saw rapid, forced urban- 
ization and industrialization, as well as drastic reductions in 
illiteracy and the preferential treatment of Georgians at the 
expense of ethnic minorities in the republic. The full Soviet 
centralized economic planning structure was in place in Geor- 
gia by 1934. Between 1940 and 1958, the republic's industrial 
output grew by 240 percent. In that time, the influence of tradi- 
tional village life decreased significantly for a large part of the 
Georgian population. 

Post-Stalin Politics 

Upon Stalin's death in 1953, Georgian nationalism revived 
and resumed its struggle against dictates from the central gov- 
ernment in Moscow. In the 1950s, reforms under Soviet leader 
Nikita S. Khrushchev included the shifting of economic 
authority from Moscow to republic-level officials, but the Rus- 
sian Khrushchev's repudiation of Stalin set off a backlash in 
Georgia. In 1956 hundreds of Georgians were killed when they 



163 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

demonstrated against Khrushchev's policy of de-Stalinization. 
Long afterward many Stalin monuments and place-names — as 
well as the museum constructed at Stalin's birthplace in the 
town of Gori, northwest of Tbilisi — were maintained. Only with 
Mikhail S. Gorbachev's policy of glasnost (see Glossary) in the 
late 1980s did criticism of Stalin become acceptable and a full 
account of Stalin's crimes against his fellow Georgians become 
known in Georgia. 

Between 1955 and 1972, Georgian communists used decen- 
tralization to become entrenched in political posts and to 
reduce further the influence of other ethnic groups in Geor- 
gia. In addition, enterprising Georgians created factories 
whose entire output was "off the books" (see The Under- 
ground Economy, this ch.). In 1972 the long-standing corrup- 
tion and economic inefficiency of Georgia's leaders led 
Moscow to sponsor Eduard Shevardnadze as first secretary of 
the Georgian Communist Party. Shevardnadze had risen 
through the ranks of the Communist Youth League (Komso- 
mol) to become a party first secretary at the district level in 
1961. From 1964 until 1972, Shevardnadze oversaw the Geor- 
gian police from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, where he 
made a reputation as a competent and incorruptible official. 

The First Shevardnadze Period 

As party first secretary, Shevardnadze used purges to attack 
the corruption and chauvinism for which Georgia's elite had 
become infamous even among the corrupt and chauvinistic 
republics of the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, a small group of dis- 
sident nationalists coalesced around academician Zviad Gamsa- 
khurdia, who stressed the threat that Russification presented to 
the Georgian national identity. This theme would remain at the 
center of Georgian-Russian relations into the new era of Geor- 
gian independence in the 1990s. Soviet power and Georgian 
nationalism clashed in 1978 when Moscow ordered revision of 
the constitutional status of the Georgian language as Georgia's 
official state language. Bowing to pressure from street demon- 
strations, Moscow approved Shevardnadze's reinstatement of 
the constitutional guarantee the same year. 

In the 1970s and early 1980s, Shevardnadze successfully 
walked a narrow line between the demands of Moscow and the 
Georgians' growing desire for national autonomy. He main- 
tained political and economic control while listening carefully 
to popular demands and making strategic concessions. She- 



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Georgia 



vardnadze dealt with nationalism and dissent by explaining his 
policies to hostile audiences and seeking compromise solu- 
tions. The most serious ethnic dispute of Shevardnadze's ten- 
ure arose in 1978, when leaders of the Abkhazian Autonomous 
Republic threatened to secede from Georgia, alleging unfair 
cultural, linguistic, political, and economic restrictions 
imposed by Tbilisi. Shevardnadze took a series of steps to dif- 
fuse the crisis, including an affirmative action program that 
increased the role of Abkhazian elites in running "their" 
region, despite the minority status of their group in Abkhazia. 

Shevardnadze initiated experiments that foreshadowed the 
economic and political reforms that Gorbachev later intro- 
duced into the central Soviet system. The Abasha economic 
experiment in agriculture created new incentives for farmers 
similar to those used in the Hungarian agricultural reform of 
the time. A reorganization in the seaport of Poti expanded the 
role of local authorities at the expense of republic and 
all-union ministries. By 1980 Shevardnadze had raised Geor- 
gia's industrial and agricultural production significantly and 
had dismissed about 300 members of the party's corrupt hier- 
archy. When Shevardnadze left office in 1985, considerable 
government corruption remained, however, and Georgia's offi- 
cial economy was still weakened by an extensive illegal "second 
economy." But his reputation for honesty and political courage 
earned Shevardnadze great popularity among Georgians, the 
awarding of the Order of Lenin by the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union (CPSU — see Glossary) in 1978, and appointment 
as minister of foreign affairs of the Soviet Union in 1985. 

Patiashvili 

Jumber Patiashvili, a nondescript party loyalist, succeeded 
Shevardnadze as head of the Georgian Communist Party. 
Under Patiashvili, most of Shevardnadze's initiatives atrophied, 
and no new policy innovations were undertaken. Patiashvili 
removed some of Shevardnadze's key appointees, although he 
could not dismiss his predecessor's many middle-echelon 
appointees without seriously damaging the party apparatus. 

In dealing with dissent, Patiashvili, who distrusted radical 
and unofficial groups, returned to the usual confrontational 
strategy of Soviet regional party officials. The party head met 
major resistance when he backed a plan for a new Transcauca- 
sian railroad that would cut a swath parallel to the Georgian 
Military Highway in a historic, scenic, and environmentally sig- 



165 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

nificant region. In a televised speech, Patiashvili called oppo- 
nents of the project "enemies of the people" — a phrase used in 
the 1930s to justify liquidation of Stalin's real and imagined 
opponents. By isolating opposition groups, Patiashvili forced 
reformist leaders into underground organizations and con- 
frontational behavior. 

After Communist Rule 

In Georgia, Gorbachev's simultaneous policies of glasnost 
and continued control energized the forces of nationalism, 
which pushed the republic out of the central state before the 
Soviet Union fell apart. The first years of independence were 
marked by struggle among Georgians for control of the gov- 
ernment and by conflict with ethnic minorities seeking to 
escape the control of Tbilisi. 

Nationalism Rises 

In April 1989, Soviet troops broke up a peaceful demonstra- 
tion at the government building in Tbilisi. Under unclear cir- 
cumstances, twenty Georgians, mostly women and children, 
were killed. The military authorities and the official media 
blamed the demonstrators, and opposition leaders were 
arrested. The Georgian public was outraged. What was after- 
ward referred to as the April Tragedy fundamentally radical- 
ized political life in the republic. Shevardnadze was sent to 
Georgia to restore calm. He arranged for the replacement of 
Patiashvili by Givi Gumbaridze, head of the Georgian branch of 
the Committee for State Security (Komitet gosudarstvennoi 
bezopasnosti — KGB) . 

In an atmosphere of renewed nationalist fervor, public opin- 
ion surveys indicated that the vast majority of the population 
was committed to immediate independence from Moscow. 
Although the communist party was discredited, it continued to 
control the formal instruments of power. In the months follow- 
ing the April Tragedy, the opposition used strikes and other 
forms of pressure to undermine communist power and set the 
stage for de facto separation from the Soviet Union. 

The Rise of Gamsakhurdia 

Partly as a result of the conspiratorial nature of antigovern- 
ment activity prior to 1989, opposition groups tended to be 
small, tightly knit units organized around prominent individu- 
als. The personal ambitions of opposition leaders prevented 



166 



Old salt baths and Narikala 
Fortress, Tbilisi 
Courtesy Michael W. Serafin 



Old Tbilisi seen from 
Mtkvari (Kara) River 
Courtesy Monica 
O'Keefe, United States 

Information Agency 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

the emergence of a united front, but Zviad Gamsakhurdia, the 
most widely honored and recognized of the nationalist dissi- 
dents, moved naturally to a position of leadership. The son of 
Georgia's foremost contemporary novelist, Gamsakhurdia had 
gained many enemies during the communist years in acrimoni- 
ous disputes and irreconcilable factional splits. 

Opposition pressure resulted in a multiparty election in 
October 1990. Despite guarantees written into the new law on 
elections, many prominent opposition parties boycotted the 
vote, arguing that their groups could not compete fairly and 
that their participation under existing conditions would only 
legitimize continuation of Georgia's "colonial status" within the 
Soviet system. 

As an alternative, the opposition parties had held their own 
election, without government approval, in September 1990. 
Although the minimum turnout for a valid election was not 
achieved, the new "legislative" body, called the Georgian 
National Congress, met and became a center of opposition to 
the government chosen in the official October election. In the 
officially sanctioned voting, Gamsakhurdia's Round Table/ 
Free Georgia coalition won a solid majority in the Supreme 
Soviet, Georgia's official parliamentary body. 

Arguably the most virulently anticommunist politician ever 
elected in a Soviet republic, Gamsakhurdia was intolerant of all 
political opposition. He often accused his opposition of trea- 
son or involvement with the KGB. The quality of political 
debate in Georgia was lowered by the exchange of such charges 
between Gamsakhurdia and opposition leaders such as Gia 
Chanturia of the National Democratic Party. 

After his election, Gamsakhurdia's greatest concern was the 
armed opposition. Both Gamsakhurdia's Round Table/Free 
Georgia coalition and some opposition factions in the Geor- 
gian National Congress had informal military units, which the 
previous, communist Supreme Soviet had legalized under pres- 
sure from informal groups. The most formidable of these 
groups were the Mkhedrioni (horsemen), said to number 
5,000 men, and the so-called National Guard. The new parlia- 
ment, dominated by Gamsakhurdia, outlawed such groups and 
ordered them to surrender their weapons, but the order had 
no effect. After the elections, independent military groups 
raided local police stations and Soviet military installations, 
sometimes adding formidable weaponry to their arsenals. In 
February 1991, a Soviet army counterattack against Mkhedri- 



168 



Georgia 



oni headquarters had led to the imprisonment of the Mkhedri- 
oni leader. 

Gamsakhurdia moved quickly to assert Georgia's indepen- 
dence from Moscow. He took steps to bring the Georgian KGB 
and Ministry of Internal Affairs (both overseen until then from 
Moscow) under his control. Gamsakhurdia refused to attend 
meetings called by Gorbachev to preserve a working union 
among the rapidly separating Soviet republics. Gamsakhurdia's 
communications with the Soviet leader usually took the form of 
angry telegrams and telephone calls. In May 1991, Gamsakhur- 
dia ended the collection in Georgia of Gorbachev's national 
sales tax on the grounds that it damaged the Georgian econ- 
omy. Soon Georgia ceased all payments to Moscow, and the 
Soviet government took steps to isolate the republic economi- 
cally. 

Rather than consent to participate in Gorbachev's March 
1991 referendum on preserving a federation of Soviet repub- 
lics, Gamsakhurdia organized a separate referendum on Geor- 
gian independence. The measure was approved by 98.9 
percent of Georgian voters. On April 9, 1991, the second anni- 
versary of the April Tragedy, the Georgian parliament passed a 
declaration of independence from the Soviet Union. Once the 
Soviet Union collapsed at the end of 1991, Georgia refused to 
participate in the formation or subsequent activities of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS — see Glossary), 
the loose confederation of independent republics that suc- 
ceeded the Soviet Union. 

The Struggle for Control 

In May 1991, Gamsakhurdia was elected president of Geor- 
gia (receiving over 86 percent of the vote) in the first popular 
presidential election in a Soviet republic. Apparently perceiv- 
ing the election as a mandate to run Georgia personally, Gam- 
sakhurdia made increasingly erratic policy and personnel 
decisions in the months that followed, while his attitude toward 
the opposition became more strident. After intense conflict 
with Gamsakhurdia, Prime Minister Tengiz Sigua resigned in 
August 1991. 

The August 1991 coup attempt against Gorbachev in Mos- 
cow marked a turning point in Georgian as well as in Soviet 
politics. Gamsakhurdia made it clear that he believed the coup, 
headed by the Soviet minister of defense and the head of the 
KGB, was both inevitable and likely to succeed. Accordingly, he 



169 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

ordered Russian president Boris N. Yeltsin's proclamations 
against the coup removed from the streets of Tbilisi. Gamsa- 
khurdia also ordered the National Guard to turn in its weap- 
ons, disband, and integrate itself into the forces of the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs. Opposition leaders immediately denounced 
this action as capitulation to the coup. In defiance of Gamsa- 
khurdia, National Guard commander Tengiz Kitovani led most 
of his troops out of Tbilisi. 

The opposition to Gamsakhurdia, now joined in an uneasy 
coalition behind Sigua and Kitovani, demanded that Gamsa- 
khurdia resign and call new parliamentary elections. Gamsa- 
khurdia refused to compromise, and his troops forcibly 
dispersed a large opposition rally in Tbilisi in September 1991. 
Chanturia, whose National Democratic Party was one of the 
most active opposition groups at that time, was arrested and 
imprisoned on charges of seeking help from Moscow to over- 
throw the government. 

In the ensuing period, both the government and extraparlia- 
mentary opposition intensified the purchase and "liberation" 
of large quantities of weapons — mostly from Soviet military 
units stationed in Georgia — including heavy artillery, tanks, 
helicopter gunships, and armored personnel carriers. On 
December 22, intense fighting broke out in central Tbilisi after 
government troops again used force to disperse demonstrators. 
At this point, the National Guard and the Mkhedrioni besieged 
Gamsakhurdia and his supporters in the heavily fortified parlia- 
ment building. Gunfire and artillery severely damaged central 
Tbilisi, and Gamsakhurdia fled the city in early January 1992 to 
seek refuge outside Georgia. 

The Military Council 

A Military Council made up of Sigua, Kitovani, and Mkhedri- 
oni leader Jaba Ioseliani took control after Gamsakhurdia's 
departure. Shortly thereafter, a Political Consultative Council 
and a larger State Council were formed to provide more deci- 
sive leadership (see Government and Politics, this ch.). In 
March 1992, Eduard Shevardnadze returned to Georgia at the 
invitation of the Military Council. Shortly thereafter, Shevard- 
nadze joined Ioseliani, Sigua, and Kitovani to form the State 
Council Presidium. All four were given the right of veto over 
State Council decisions. 

Gamsakhurdia, despite his absence, continued to enjoy sub- 
stantial support within Georgia, especially in rural areas and in 



170 



Georgia 



his home region of Mingrelia in western Georgia. Gamsakhur- 
dia supporters now constituted another extraparliamentary 
opposition, viewing themselves as victims of an illegal and 
unconstitutional putsch and refusing to participate in future 
elections. Based in the neighboring Chechen Autonomous 
Republic of Russia, Gamsakhurdia continued to play a direct 
role in Georgian politics, characterizing Shevardnadze as an 
agent of Moscow in a neocommunist conspiracy against Geor- 
gia. In March 1992, Gamsakhurdia convened a parliament in 
exile in the Chechen city of Groznyy. In 1992 and 1993, his 
armed supporters prevented the Georgian government from 
gaining control of parts of western Georgia. 

Threats of Fragmentation 

The autonomous areas of South Ossetia and Abkhazia 
added to the problems of Georgia's post-Soviet governments. 
By 1993 separatist movements in those regions threatened to 
tear the republic into several sections. Intimations of Russian 
interference in the ethnic crises also complicated Georgia's 
relations with its giant neighbor. 

South Ossetia 

The first major crisis faced by the Gamsakhurdia regime was 
in the South Ossetian Autonomous Region, which is largely 
populated by Ossetians, a separate ethnic group speaking a lan- 
guage based on Persian (see Population and Ethnic Composi- 
tion, this ch.). In December 1990, Gamsakhurdia summarily 
abolished the region's autonomous status within Georgia in 
response to its longtime efforts to gain independence. When 
the South Ossetian regional legislature took its first steps 
toward secession and union with the North Ossetian Autono- 
mous Republic of Russia, Georgian forces invaded. The result- 
ing conflict lasted throughout 1991, causing thousands of 
casualties and creating tens of thousands of refugees on both 
sides of the Georgian-Russian border. Yeltsin mediated a cease- 
fire in July 1992. A year later, the cease-fire was still in place, 
enforced by Ossetian and Georgian troops together with six 
Russian battalions. Representatives of the Conference on Secu- 
rity and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE — see Glossary) 
attempted mediation, but the two sides remained intractable. 
In July 1993, the South Ossetian government declared negotia- 
tions over and threatened to renew large-scale combat, but the 
cease-fire held through early 1994. 



171 




172 



Church and fortress on Georgian Military Highway at Ananuri 

Courtesy Gordon Snider 



173 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 
Abkhazia 

In the Abkhazian Autonomous Republic of Georgia, the 
Abkhazian population, like the Ossetians a distinct ethnic 
group, feared that the Georgians would eliminate their politi- 
cal autonomy and destroy the Abkhaz as a cultural entity On 
one hand, a long history of ill will between the Abkhaz and the 
Georgians was complicated by the minority status of the 
Abkhaz within the autonomous republic and by periodic Geor- 
gianization campaigns, first by the Soyiet and later by the Geor- 
gian government. On the other hand, the Georgian majority in 
Abkhazia resented disproportionate distribution of political 
and administrative positions to the Abkhaz. Beginning in 1978. 
Moscow had sought to head off Abkhazian demands for inde- 
pendence by allocating as much as 67 percent of party and gov- 
ernment positions to the Abkhaz. although., according to the 
1989 census, 2.5 times as many Georgians as Abkhaz lived in 
Abkhazia. 

Tensions in Abkhazia led to open warfare on a much larger 
scale than in South Ossetia. In July 1992. the Abkhazian 
Supreme Soviet voted to return to the 1925 constitution, under 
which Abkhazia was separate from Georgia. In August 1992, a 
force of the Georgian National Guard was sent to the Abkha- 
zian capital of Sukhumi with orders to protect Georgian rail 
and road supply lines and to secure the border with Russia. 
When Abkhazian authorities reacted to this transgression of 
their self-proclaimed sovereignty hundreds were killed in fight- 
ing between Abkhazian and Georgian forces, and large num- 
bers of refugees fled across the border into Russia or into other 
parts of Georgia. The Abkhazian government was forced to flee 
Sukhumi. 

For two centuries, the Abkhaz had viewed Russia as a protec- 
tor of their interests asrainst the Georgians: accordingly, the 
Georgian incursion of 1992 brought an Abkhazian plea for 
Russia to intervene and settle the issue. An unknown number 
of Russian military personnel and volunteers also fought on 
the side of the Abkhaz, and Shevardnadze accused Yeltsin of 
intentionally weakening Georgia's national security by support- 
ing separatists. .After the failure of three cease-fires, in Septem- 
ber 1993 Abkhazian forces besieged and captured Sukhumi 
and drove the remaining; Georgian forces out of Abkhazia. In 
the fall of 1993, mediation efforts bv the United Nations (UN) 
and Russia were slowed bv Georgia's struggle against Gamsa- 
khurdia's forces in Mingrelia. south of Abkhazia. In earlv 1994, 



174 



Georgia 



a de facto cease-fire remained in place, with the Inguri River in 
northwest Georgia serving as the dividing line. Separatist forces 
made occasional forays into Georgian territory, however. 

In September 1993, Gamsakhurdia took advantage of the 
struggle in Abkhazia to return to Georgia and rally enthusiastic 
but disorganized Mingrelians against the demoralized Geor- 
gian army. Although Gamsakhurdia initially represented his 
return as a rescue of Georgian forces, he actually included Ab- 
khazian troops in his new advance. Gamsakhurdia's forces took 
several towns in western Georgia, adding urgency to an appeal 
by Shevardnadze for Russian military assistance. In mid-Octo- 
ber the addition of Russian weapons, supply-line security, and 
technical assistance turned the tide against Gamsakhurdia and 
brought a quick end to hostilities on the Mingrelian front (see 
Foreign Relations, this ch.). His cause apparently lost, Gamsa- 
khurdia committed suicide in January 1994. 

Physical Environment 

Georgia is a small country of approximately 69,875 square 
kilometers — about the size of West Virginia. To the north and 
northeast, Georgia borders the Russian republics of Chechnya, 
Ingushetia, and North Ossetia (all of which began to seek 
autonomy from Russia in 1992). Neighbors to the south are 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey. The shoreline of the Black 
Sea constitutes Georgia's entire western border (see fig. 1). 

Topography 

Despite its small area, Georgia has one of the most varied 
topographies of the former Soviet republics (see fig. 2). Geor- 
gia lies mostly in the Caucasus Mountains, and its northern 
boundary is partly defined by the Greater Caucasus range. The 
Lesser Caucasus range, which runs parallel to the Turkish and 
Armenian borders, and the Surami and Imereti ranges, which 
connect the Greater Caucasus and the Lesser Caucasus, create 
natural barriers that are partly responsible for cultural and lin- 
guistic differences among regions. Because of their elevation 
and a poorly developed transportation infrastructure, many 
mountain villages are virtually isolated from the outside world 
during the winter. Earthquakes and landslides in mountainous 
areas present a significant threat to life and property. Among 
the most recent natural disasters were massive rock- and mud- 
slides in Ajaria in 1989 that displaced thousands of people in 
southwestern Georgia, and two earthquakes in 1991 that 



175 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

destroyed several villages in north-central Georgia and South 
Ossetia. 

Georgia has about 25,000 rivers, many of which power small 
hydroelectric stations. Drainage is into the Black Sea to the 
west and through Azerbaijan to the Caspian Sea to the east. 
The largest river is the Mtkvari (formerly known by its Azer- 
baijani name, Kura, which is still used in Azerbaijan), which 
flows 1,364 kilometers from northeast Turkey across the plains 
of eastern Georgia, through the capital, Tbilisi, and into the 
Caspian Sea. The Rioni River, the largest river in western Geor- 
gia, rises in the Greater Caucasus and empties into the Black 
Sea at the port of Poti. Soviet engineers turned the river low- 
lands along the Black Sea coast into prime subtropical agricul- 
tural land, embanked and straightened many stretches of river, 
and built an extensive system of canals. Deep mountain gorges 
form topographical belts within the Greater Caucasus. 

Climate 

Georgia's climate is affected by subtropical influences from 
the west and mediterranean influences from the east. The 
Greater Caucasus range moderates local climate by serving as a 
barrier against cold air from the north. Warm, moist air from 
the Black Sea moves easily into the coastal lowlands from the 
west. Climatic zones are determined by distance from the Black 
Sea and by altitude. Along the Black Sea coast, from Abkhazia 
to the Turkish border, and in the region known as the Kolkhida 
Lowlands inland from the coast, the dominant subtropical cli- 
mate features high humidity and heavy precipitation (1,000 to 
2,000 millimeters per year; the Black Sea port of Batumi 
receives 2,500 millimeters per year). Several varieties of palm 
trees grow in these regions, where the midwinter average tem- 
perature is 5°C and the midsummer average is 22°C. 

The plains of eastern Georgia are shielded from the influ- 
ence of the Black Sea by mountains that provide a more conti- 
nental climate. Summer temperatures average 20°C to 24°C, 
winter temperatures 2°C to 4°C. Humidity is lower, and rainfall 
averages 500 to 800 millimeters per year. Alpine and highland 
regions in the east and west, as well as a semiarid region on the 
Iori Plateau to the southeast, have distinct microclimates. 

At higher elevations, precipitation is sometimes twice as 
heavy as in the eastern plains. In the west, the climate is sub- 
tropical to about 650 meters; above that altitude (and to the 
north and east) is a band of moist and moderately warm 



176 



Georgia 



weather, then a band of cool and wet conditions. Alpine condi- 
tions begin at about 2,100 meters, and above 3,600 meters 
snow and ice are present year-round. 

Environmental Issues 

Beginning in the 1980s, Black Sea pollution has greatly 
harmed Georgia's tourist industry. Inadequate sewage treat- 
ment is the main cause of that condition. In Batumi, for exam- 
ple, only 18 percent of wastewater is treated before release into 
the sea. An estimated 70 percent of surface water contains 
health-endangering bacteria, to which Georgia's high rate of 
intestinal disease is attributed. 

The war in Abkhazia did substantial damage to the ecologi- 
cal habitats unique to that region. In other respects, experts 
considered Georgia's environmental problems less serious than 
those of more industrialized former Soviet republics. Solving 
Georgia's environmental problems was not a high priority of 
the national government in the post-Soviet years, however; in 
1993 the minister of protection of the environment resigned to 
protest this inactivity. In January 1994, the Cabinet of Ministers 
announced a new, interdepartmental environmental monitor- 
ing system to centralize separate programs under the direction 
of the Ministry of Protection of the Environment. The system 
would include a central environmental and information and 
research agency. The Green Party used its small contingent in 
the parliament to press environmental issues in 1993. 

Population and Ethnic Composition 

Over many centuries, Georgia gained a reputation for toler- 
ance of minority religions and ethnic groups from elsewhere, 
but the postcommunist era was a time of sharp conflict among 
groups long considered part of the national fabric. Modern 
Georgia is populated by several ethnic groups, but by far the 
most numerous of them is the Georgians. In the early 1990s, 
the population was increasing slowly, and armed hostilities 
were causing large-scale emigration from certain regions. The 
ethnic background of some groups, such as the Abkhaz, was a 
matter of sharp dispute. 

Population Characteristics 

According to the Soviet Union's 1989 census, the total popu- 



177 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

lation of Georgia was 5.3 million. The estimated population in 
1993 was 5.6 million. Between 1979 and 1989, the population 
grew by 8.5 percent, with growth rates of 16.7 percent among 
the urban population and 0.3 percent in rural areas. In 1993 
the overall growth rate was 0.8 percent. About 55.8 percent of 
the population was classified as urban; Tbilisi, the capital and 
largest city, had more than 1.2 million inhabitants in 1989, or 
approximately 23 percent of the national total. The capital's 
population grew by 18.1 percent between 1979 and 1989, 
mainly because of migration from rural areas. Kutaisi, the sec- 
ond largest city, had a population of about 235,000. 

In 1991 Georgia's birth rate was seventeen per 1,000 popula- 
tion, its death rate nine per 1,000. Life expectancy was sixty- 
seven years for males and seventy-five years for females. In 1990 
the infant mortality rate was 196 per 10,000 live births. Average 
family size in 1989 was 4.1, with larger families predominantly 
located in rural areas. In the 1980s and early 1990s, the Geor- 
gian population was aging slowly; the cohort under age nine- 
teen shrank slightly and the cohort over sixty increased slightly 
as percentages of the entire population during that period. 
The Georgian and Abkhazian populations were the subjects of 
substantial international study by anthropologists and geron- 
tologists because of the relatively high number of centenarians 
among them. 

Ethnic Minorities 

Regional ethnic distribution is a major cause of the prob- 
lems Georgia faces along its borders and within its territory 
(see fig. 14). Russians, who make up the third largest ethnic 
group in the country (6.7 percent of the total population in 
1989), do not constitute a majority in any district. The highest 
concentration of Russians is in Abkhazia, but the overall disper- 
sion of the Russian population restricts political representation 
of the Russians' interests. 

Azerbaijanis are a majority of the population in the districts 
of Marneuli and Bolnisi, south of Tbilisi on the Azerbaijan bor- 
der, while Armenians are a majority in the Akhalkalaki, Ninots- 
minda, and Dmanisi districts immediately to the west of the 
Azerbaijani-dominated regions and just north of the Armenian 
border. Despite the proximity and intermingling of Armenian 
and Azerbaijani populations in Georgia, in the early 1990s few 
conflicts in Georgia reflected the hostility of the Armenian and 
Azerbaijani nations over the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh 



178 



Georgia 



(see Nagorno-Karabakh and Independence, ch. 1; National 
Security, ch. 2). Organizations in Georgia representing the 
interests of the Armenian and Azerbaijani populations had rel- 
atively few conflicts with authorities in Tbilisi in the first post- 
communist years. 

Under Soviet rule, a large part of Georgian territory was 
divided into autonomous areas that included concentrations of 
non-Georgian peoples. The largest such region was the Abkha- 
zian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (Abkhazian ASSR); 
after Georgian independence, it was redesignated the Abkha- 
zian Autonomous Republic. The distribution of territory and 
the past policies of tsarist and Soviet rule meant that in 1989 
the Abkhaz made up only 17.8 percent of the population of the 
autonomous republic named for them (compared with 44 per- 
cent Georgians and 16 percent Russians). The Abkhaz consti- 
tuted less than 2 percent of the total population of Georgia. 
Although Georgian was the prevailing language of the region 
as early as the eighth century A.D., Abkhazia was an autono- 
mous republic of Russia from 1921 until 1930, when it was 
incorporated into Georgia as an autonomous republic. 

In the thirteenth century, Ossetians arrived on the south 
side of the Caucasus Mountains, in Georgian territory, when 
the Mongols drove them from what is now the North Ossetian 
Autonomous Republic of Russia. In 1922 the South Ossetian 
Autonomous Region was formed within the new Transcauca- 
sian republic of the Soviet Union. The autonomous region was 
abolished officially by the Georgian government in 1990, then 
reinstated in 1992. South Ossetia includes many all-Georgian 
villages, and the Ossetian population is concentrated in the cit- 
ies of Tskhinvali and Java. Overall, in the 1980s the population 
in South Ossetia was 66 percent Ossetian and 29 percent Geor- 
gian. In 1989 more than 60 percent of the Ossetian population 
of Georgia lived outside South Ossetia. 

The Ajarian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (Ajarian 
ASSR) in southwest Georgia was redesignated the Ajarian 
Autonomous Republic in 1992. The existence of that republic 
reflects the religious and cultural differences that developed 
when the Ottoman Empire occupied part of Georgia in the six- 
teenth century and converted the local population to Islam. 
The Ajarian region was not included in Georgia until the 
Treaty of Berlin separated it from the Ottoman Empire in 
1878. An autonomous republic within Georgia was declared in 
1921. Because the Ajarian population is indistinguishable from 



179 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 



Ethnic Groups 
Ab Abkhazian 
Ar Armenian 
Az Azerbaijani 
Gr Greek 
O Ossetian 
R Russian 
' / /\ Georgian 



ABKHAZIAN 
AUTONOMOUS 
REPUBLIC 



AJARIAN 
AUTONOMOUS 
REPUBLIC 




^ 

International boundary 




Autonomous republic boundary 








® National capital 
25 50 75 Kilometers 






25 50 75 Miles 


Bmmaatym 
mtmc0ss&t 



\ ARMENIA 
/ \ AZEI 



j IRAN ^AZER. } - C* 



Figure 14. Ethnic Groups in Georgia 



the Georgian population in language and belongs to the same 
ethnic group, it generally considers itself Georgian. Eventually, 
the term "Ajarian" was dropped from the ethnic categories in 
the Soviet national census. Thus, in the 1979 census the ethnic 
breakdown of the region showed about 80 percent Georgians 
(including Ajars) and 10 percent Russians. Nevertheless, the 
autonomous republic remains an administrative subdivision of 
the Republic of Georgia, local elites having fought hard to pre- 
serve the special status that this distinction affords them. 

The so-called Meskhetian Turks are another potential source 
of ethnic discord. Forcibly exiled from southern Georgia to 
Uzbekistan by Stalin during World War II, many of the esti- 
mated 200,000 Meskhetian Turks outside Georgia sought to 
return to their homes in Georgia after 1990. Many Georgians 



180 



Georgia 



argued that the Meskhetian Turks had lost their links to Geor- 
gia and hence had no rights that would justify the large-scale 
upheaval that resettlement would cause. However, Shevard- 
nadze argued that Georgians had a moral obligation to allow 
this group to return. 

Within the leading ethnic groups, the fastest growth between 
1979 and 1989 occurred in the Azerbaijani population and 
among the Kurds (see Glossary), whose numbers increased by 
20 percent and 30 percent, respectively. This trend worried 
Georgians, even though both groups combined made up less 
than 7 percent of the republic's population. Over the same 
period, the dominant Georgians' share of the population 
increased from 68.8 percent to 70.1 percent. Ethnic shifts after 
1989 — particularly the emigration of Russians, Ukrainians, and 
Ossetians — were largely responsible for the Georgians' 
increased share of the population. 

Language, Religion, and Culture 

For centuries, Georgia's geographic position has opened it 
to religious and cultural influences from the West, Persia, Tur- 
key, and Russia. The resultant diversity continues to character- 
ize the cultural and religious life of modern Georgia. However, 
the Georgian language displays unique qualities that cannot be 
attributed to any outside influence. 

Language 

Even more than religion, the issue of language was deeply 
entwined with political struggles in Georgia under communist 
rule. As elsewhere, language became a key factor in ethnic self- 
identification under the uniformity of the communist system. 
Written in a unique alphabet that began to exhibit distinctions 
from the Greek alphabet in the fifth century A.D., Georgian is 
linguistically distant from Turkic and Indo-European lan- 
guages. In the Soviet period, Georgians fought relentlessly to 
prevent what they perceived as the encroachment of Russian 
on their native language. Even the republic's Soviet-era consti- 
tutions specified Georgian as the state language. In 1978 Mos- 
cow failed to impose a constitutional change giving Russian 
equal status with Georgian as an official language when She- 
vardnadze yielded to mass demonstrations against the amend- 
ment (see Within the Soviet Union, this ch.). Nevertheless, the 
Russian language predominated in official documents and 
communications from the central government. In 1991 the 



181 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

Gamsakhurdia government reestablished the primacy of Geor- 
gian, to the dismay of minorities that did not use the language. 
In 1993 some 71 percent of the population used Georgian as 
their first language. Russian was the first language of 9 percent, 
Armenian of 7 percent, and Azerbaijani of 6 percent. 

Religion 

The wide variety of peoples inhabiting Georgia has meant a 
correspondingly rich array of active religions. The dominant 
religion is Christianity, and the Georgian Orthodox Church is 
by far the largest church. The conversion of the Georgians in 
A.D. 330 placed them among the first peoples to accept Chris- 
tianity. According to tradition, a holy slave woman, who 
became known as Saint Nino, cured Queen Nana of Iberia of 
an unknown illness, and King Marian III accepted Christianity 
when a second miracle occurred during a royal hunting trip. 
The Georgians' new faith, which replaced Greek pagan and 
Zoroastrian beliefs, was to place them permanently on the 
front line of conflict between the Islamic and Christian worlds. 
As was true elsewhere, the Christian church in Georgia was cru- 
cial to the development of a written language, and most of the 
earliest written works were religious texts. After Georgia was 
annexed by the Russian Empire, the Russian Orthodox Church 
took over the Georgian church in 1811. The colorful frescoes 
and wall paintings typical of Georgian cathedrals were white- 
washed by the Russian occupiers. 

The Georgian church regained its autonomy only when Rus- 
sian rule ended in 1918. Neither the Georgian Menshevik gov- 
ernment nor the Bolshevik regime that followed considered 
revitalization of the Georgian church an important goal, how- 
ever. Soviet rule brought severe purges of the Georgian church 
hierarchy and constant repression of Orthodox worship. As 
elsewhere in the Soviet Union, many churches were destroyed 
or converted into secular buildings. This history of repression 
encouraged the incorporation of religious identity into the 
strong nationalist movement in twentieth-century Georgia and 
the quest of Georgians for religious expression outside the offi- 
cial, government-controlled church. In the late 1960s and early 
1970s, opposition leaders, especially Zviad Gamsakhurdia, criti- 
cized corruption in the church hierarchy When Ilia II became 
the patriarch (catholicos) of the Georgian Orthodox Church 
in the late 1970s, he brought order and a new morality to 
church affairs, and Georgian Orthodoxy experienced a revival. 



182 



His Holiness Ilia II, 
Patriarch ofMtskheta and 
All Georgia, leader of 
Georgian Orthodox Church 
Courtesy Janet A. Koczak 




In 1988 Moscow permitted the patriarch to begin consecrating 
and reopening closed churches, and a large-scale restoration 
process began. In 1993 some 65 percent of Georgians were 
Georgian Orthodox, 11 percent were Muslim, 10 percent Rus- 
sian Orthodox, and 8 percent Armenian Apostolic. 

Non-Orthodox religions traditionally have received tolerant 
treatment in Georgia. Jewish communities exist throughout the 
country, with major concentrations in the two largest cities, 
Tbilisi and Kutaisi. Azerbaijani groups have practiced Islam in 
Georgia for centuries, as have the Abkhazian and Ajarian 
groups concentrated in their respective autonomous republics. 
The Armenian Apostolic Church, whose doctrine differs in 
some ways from that of Georgian Orthodoxy, has autocepha- 
lous status. 

The Arts 

In many art forms, Georgia has a tradition spanning millen- 
nia. The golden age of the Georgian Empire (early twelfth cen- 
tury to early thirteenth century) was the time of greatest 
development in many forms, and subsequent centuries of occu- 
pation and political domination brought decline or dilution. 
Folk music and dance, however, remain an important part of 
Georgia's unique culture, and Georgians have made significant 
contributions to theater and film in the late twentieth century. 



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Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 
Literature 

Among literary works written in Georgian, Shota Rustaveli's 
long poem The Knight in the Panther Skin occupies a unique 
position as the Georgian national epic. Supposedly Rustaveli 
was a government official during Queen Tamar's reign (1184- 
1212), late in the golden age. In describing the questing adven- 
tures of three hero-knights, the poem includes rich philosophi- 
cal musings that have become proverbs in Georgian. Even 
during communist rule, the main street of the Georgian capital 
was named after Rustaveli. 

Architecture 

Starting in its earliest days, Georgia developed a unique 
architectural style that is most visible in religious structures dat- 
ing as far back as the sixth century A.D. The cupola structure 
typical of Georgian churches probably was based on circular 
domestic dwellings that existed as early as 3000 B.C. Roman, 
Greek, and Syrian architecture also influenced this style. Per- 
sian occupation added a new element, and in the nineteenth 
century Russian domination created a hybrid architectural 
style visible in many buildings in Tbilisi. The so-called Stalinist 
architecture of the mid-twentieth century also left its mark on 
the capital. 

Painting, Sculpture, and Metalworking 

Like literature, Georgian mural painting reached its zenith 
during the golden age of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. 
Featuring both religious and secular themes, many monuments 
of this and the later Byzantine- and Persian-influenced periods 
were destroyed by the Russians in the nineteenth century. 
Examples of Georgian religious painting remain in some of the 
old churches. Stone carving and metalworking traditions had 
developed in antiquity, when Roman and Greek techniques 
were incorporated. In the golden age, sculpture was applied 
most often to the outside of buildings. In the twentieth cen- 
tury, several Georgian sculptors have gained international rec- 
ognition. Among them is Elguja Amasukheli, whose 
monuments are landmarks in Tbilisi. Metalworking was well 
established in the Caucasus among the ancestors of the Geor- 
gians as early as the Bronze Age (second millennium B.C.). 
This art form, applied to both religious and secular subjects, 
declined in the Middle Ages. 



184 



Georgia 



Music and Dance 

Georgia is known for its rich and unique folk dance and 
music. The Georgian State Dance Company, founded in the 
1940s, has traveled around the world performing spectacular 
renditions of traditional Georgian dances. Unique in folk-danc- 
ing tradition, Georgian male performers dance on their toes 
without the help of special blocked shoes. Georgian folk music, 
featuring complex, three-part, polyphonic harmonies, has long 
been a subject of special interest among musicologists. Men 
and women sing in separate ensembles with entirely different 
repertoires. Most Georgian folk songs are peculiar to individ- 
ual regions of Georgia. The inspiration is most often the 
church, work in the fields, or special occasions. The Rustavi 
Choir, formed in 1968, is the best known Georgian group per- 
forming a traditional repertoire. 

In modern Georgia, folk songs are most frequently sung 
around the table. The ceremonial dinner {supra), a frequent 
occurrence in Georgian homes, is a highly ritualized event that 
itself forms a direct link to Georgia's past. On such occasions, 
rounds of standardized and improvised toasts typically extend 
long into the night. Georgian cuisine, which includes a variety 
of delicate sauces and sharp spices, is also an important part of 
the culture that links the generations. In the Soviet period, the 
best restaurants in the large cities of other republics were often 
Georgian. 

Film and Theater 

In the postwar era, Georgian filmmaking and theater devel- 
oped an outstanding reputation in the Soviet Union. Several 
Georgian filmmakers achieved international recognition in 
this period. Perhaps the single most important film of the pere- 
stroika (see Glossary) period was Tengiz Abuladze's Repentance. 
This powerful work, which won international acclaim when 
released in 1987, showed the consequences of Stalin's Great 
Terror of the 1930s through a depiction of the reign of a fic- 
tional local dictator. In 1993, despite chaotic political condi- 
tions, Tbilisi hosted the Golden Eagle Film Festival of the Black 
Sea Basin Countries, Georgia's first international film festival. 
Georgians also excel in theater. The Tbilisi-based Rustaveli 
Theater has been acclaimed internationally for its stagings (in 
Georgian) of the works of William Shakespeare and German 
dramatist Bertolt Brecht. 



185 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

Education, Health, and Welfare 

In 1992 Georgia retained the basic structure of education, 
health, and social welfare programs established in the Soviet 
era, although major reforms were being discussed. Georgia's 
requests for aid from the West have included technical assis- 
tance in streamlining its social welfare system, which heavily 
burdens the economy and generally fails to help those in great- 
est need. 

Education 

In the Soviet era, the Georgian population achieved one of 
the highest education levels in the Soviet Union. In 1989 some 
15.1 percent of adults in Georgia had graduated from a univer- 
sity or completed some other form of higher education. About 
57.4 percent had completed secondary school or obtained a 
specialized secondary education. Georgia also had an extensive 
network of 230 scientific and research institutes employing 
more than 70,000 people in 1990. The Soviet system of free 
and compulsory schooling had eradicated illiteracy by the 
1980s, and Georgia had the Soviet Union's highest percentage 
of residents with a higher or specialized secondary education. 

During Soviet rule, the CPSU controlled the operation of 
the Georgian education system. Theoretically, education was 
inseparable from politics, and the schools were deemed an 
important tool in remaking society along Marxist-Leninist 
lines. Central ministries for primary and secondary education 
and for higher and specialized education transmitted policy 
decisions to the ministries in the republics for implementation 
in local and regional systems. Even at the local level, most 
administrators were party members. The combination of party 
organs and government agencies overseeing education at all 
levels formed a huge bureaucracy that made significant reform 
impossible. By the mid-1980s, an education crisis was openly 
recognized everywhere in the Soviet Union. 

In the early 1990s, Soviet education institutions were still in 
place in Georgia, although Soviet-style political propaganda 
and authoritarian teaching methods gradually disappeared. 
Most Georgian children attended general school (grades one 
to eleven), beginning at age seven. In 1988 some 86,400 stu- 
dents were enrolled in Georgia's nineteen institutions of 
higher learning. Universities are located in Batumi, Kutaisi, 
Sukhumi, and Tbilisi. In the early 1990s, private education 



186 




Elementary school children in English class, Children's Palace, Tbilisi 

Courtesy Janet A. Koczak 

institutes began to appear. Higher education was provided 
almost exclusively in Georgian, although 25 percent of general 
classes were taught in a minority language. Abkhazian and 
Ossetian children were taught in their native language until 
fifth grade, when they began instruction in Georgian or Rus- 
sian. 

Health 

The Soviet system of health care, which embraced all the 
republics, included extensive networks of state-run hospitals, 
clinics, and emergency first aid stations. The huge government 
health bureaucracy in Moscow set basic policies for the entire 
country, then transmitted them to the health ministries of the 
republics. In the republics, programs were set up by regional 
and local health authorities. The emphasis was on meeting 
national standards and quotas for patient visits, treatments pro- 



187 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

vided, and hospital beds occupied, with little consideration of 
regional differences or requirements. 

Under this system, the average Georgian would go first to 
one of the polyclinics serving all the residents of a particular 
area. In the mid-1980s, polyclinics provided about 90 percent 
of medical care, offering very basic diagnostic services. In addi- 
tion, most workplaces had their own clinics, which minimized 
time lost from work for medical reasons. The hospital system 
provided more complex diagnosis and treatment, although 
overcrowding often resulted from the admission of patients 
with minor complaints. Crowding was exacerbated by official 
standards requiring hospital treatment of a certain duration 
for every type of complaint. 

The Soviet system placed special emphasis on treatment of 
women and children; many specialized treatment, diagnostic, 
and advanced-study centers offered pediatric, obstetric, and 
gynecological care. Maternity services and prenatal care were 
readily accessible. Emergency first aid was provided by special- 
ized ambulance teams, most of which had only very basic 
equipment. Severe cases went to special emergency hospitals 
because regular hospitals lacked emergency rooms. Although 
this system worked efficiently in urban centers such as Tbilisi, it 
did not reach remote areas. Most Georgians cared for elderly 
family members at home, and nursing care was generally medi- 
ocre. Georgian health spas were a vital part of the Soviet 
Union's well-known sanatorium system, access to which was a 
privilege of employment in most state enterprises. 

When the Soviet Union dissolved, it left a legacy of health 
problems to the respective republics, which faced the necessity 
of organizing separate health systems under conditions of 
scarce resources. By 1990 the Soviet health system had become 
drastically underfunded, and the incidence of disease and acci- 
dents was increased by poor living standards and environmen- 
tal hazards. Nominally equal availability of medical treatment 
and materials was undermined by the privileged status of elite 
groups that had access to the country's best medical facilities. 
In 1990 the former republics also differed substantially in 
health conditions and availability of care (see table 2, Appen- 
dix). Subsequent membership in the Commonwealth of Inde- 
pendent States, to which Georgia committed itself in late 1993, 
did not affect this inequality. 

According to most standard indicators, in 1991 the health 
and medical care of the Georgian population were among the 



188 



Georgia 



best in the Soviet Union. The rate at which tuberculosis was 
diagnosed, 28.9 cases per 100,000 population in 1990, was third 
lowest, and Georgia's 140.9 cancer diagnoses per 100,000 pop- 
ulation in 1990 was the lowest rate among the Soviet republics. 
Georgia also led in physicians per capita, with 59.2 per 10,000 
population, and in dentists per capita. However, hospital bed 
availability, 110.7 per 10,000 population in 1990, placed Geor- 
gia in the bottom half among Soviet republics, and infant mor- 
tality, 15.9 per 1,000 live births in 1990, was at the average for 
republics outside Central Asia. 

Although illegal drugs were available and Georgia increas- 
ingly found itself on the international drug-trading route in 
the early 1990s, the drug culture was confined to a small per- 
centage of the population. The relatively high rate of delin- 
quency among Georgian youth, however, was frequently 
associated with alcohol abuse. 

In 1993 the Republic AIDS and Immunodeficiency Center in 
Tbilisi reported that sixteen cases of acquired immune defi- 
ciency syndrome (AIDS) had been detected; five victims were 
non-Georgians and were deported. Of the remaining eleven, 
two had contracted AIDS through drug use and one through a 
medical procedure. Despite the small number of cases, the 
AIDS epidemic has caused considerable alarm in the Georgian 
medical community, which formed a physicians' anti-AIDS asso- 
ciation in 1993. The AIDS center, located in a makeshift facility 
in Tbilisi, conducts AIDS research and oversees testing in 
twenty-nine laboratories throughout Georgia, stressing efforts 
among high-risk groups. 

As in other former Soviet republics, Georgia began devising 
health care reform strategies in 1992. Budget expenditures for 
health increased drastically once the Soviet welfare system col- 
lapsed. Theoretical elements of Georgian health reform were 
compulsory medical insurance, privatization and foreign 
investment in institutions providing health care, and stronger 
emphasis on preventive medicine. Little progress was made in 
the first two years of the reform process, however. In Georgia 
political instability and civil war have destroyed medical facili- 
ties while increasing the need for emergency care and creating 
a large-scale refugee problem (see Threats of Fragmentation, 
this ch.). 

Social Security 

In 1985 some 47 percent of Georgia's budget went to sup- 



189 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

port the food, health, and education needs of the population. 
Social services included partial payment for maternity leave for 
up to eighteen months and unpaid maternity leave for up to 
three years. State pensions were automatic after twenty years of 
work for women and twenty-five years for men. As inflation rose 
in the postcommunist era, however, a large percentage of older 
Georgians continued working because their pensions could 
not support them. In 1991 the social security fund — supported 
mainly by a payroll tax — provided pensions for 1.3 million per- 
sons. The fund also paid benefits for sick leave and rest homes, 
as well as allowances for families with young children. 

In 1992 subsidies were in place for basic commodities, pen- 
sions, unemployment benefits, and allowances for single moth- 
ers and children. At that time, a payroll tax of 3 percent was 
designated to support the national unemployment fund. Defi- 
cits in the social security fund were nominally covered by the 
state budget, but budget shortfalls elsewhere shifted that 
responsibility to the banking system. In 1992 increased benefit 
payments and the decision not to increase the payroll tax 
eroded the financial base of the fund. 

The Economy 

In the Soviet period, Georgia played an important role in 
supplying food products and minerals and as a center of tour- 
ism for the centralized state economy. However, the republic 
was also heavily dependent on imports to provide products vital 
to industrial support. In the post-Soviet years, the Georgian 
economy suffered a major decline because sources of those 
products were no longer reliable and because political instabil- 
ity limited the economic reorganization and foreign invest- 
ment that might support an internationalized, free-market 
economy. The net material product(NMP — see Glossary) 
already had declined by 5 percent in 1989 and by 12 percent in 
1990, after growing at an annual rate of 6 percent between 
1971 and 1985. In late 1993, Shevardnadze reported that indus- 
trial production had declined by 60.5 percent in 1993 and that 
the annual inflation rate had reached 2,000 percent, largely as 
a result of the economic disruption caused by military conflict 
within Georgia's borders. 

Conditions in the Soviet System 

Georgian nationalists contended that Georgia's role in the 
"division of labor" among Soviet republics was unfairly assigned 



190 



Georgia 



and that other republics, especially Russia, benefited from the 
terms of trade set by Moscow. Georgian manganese, for exam- 
ple, went to Soviet steel plants at an extremely low price, and 
Georgian agricultural goods also sold at very low prices in 
other republics. At the same time, Georgia paid high prices for 
machinery and equipment purchased elsewhere in the Soviet 
Union and in Eastern Europe. Despite Georgia's popularity as 
a tourist destination, the republic reaped few benefits because 
most hard-currency earnings from tourism went to Moscow 
and because Soviet tourists paid little for their state-sponsored 
"vacation packages." Georgia benefited, however, from energy 
prices that were far below world market levels. 

Despite the ambiguities of official statistics, all evidence indi- 
cates that after 1989 Georgia experienced a disastrous drop in 
industrial output, real income, consumption, capital invest- 
ment, and virtually every other economic indicator. For exam- 
ple, official statistics showed a decline in nadonal income of 34 
percent in 1992 from 1985 levels. 

Obstacles to Development 

Several noneconomic factors influenced the broad decline 
of the Georgian economy that began before independence was 
declared in 1991. National liberation leaders used strikes in 
1989 and 1990 to gain political concessions from the commu- 
nist leadership; a 1990 railroad strike, for instance, paralyzed 
most of the Georgian economy. In 1991 the Gamsakhurdia gov- 
ernment ordered strikes at enterprises subordinated to minis- 
tries in Moscow as a protest against Soviet interference in 
South Ossetia (see Ethnic Minorities, this ch.). 

Although combat in Georgia in the period after 1991 left 
most of the republic unscathed, the economy suffered greatly 
from military action. Railroad transport between Georgia and 
Russia was disrupted severely in 1992 and 1993 because most 
lines from Russia passed through regions of severe political 
unrest. Georgia's natural gas pipeline to the north entered Rus- 
sia through South Osseda and thus was subject to attack during 
the ethnic war that began in that region in late 1990. In west- 
ern Georgia, Gamsakhurdia's forces and Abkhazian separatists 
often stopped trains or blew up bridges in 1992. As a result, 
supplies could only enter Georgia through the Black Sea ports 
of Poti and Batumi or over a circuitous route from Russia 
through Azerbaijan. 



191 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

In both the Soviet and the post-Soviet periods, conflicts 
between Georgia and Moscow broke many vital links in the 
republic's economy. Official 1988 data showed imports to Geor- 
gia from other republics of more than 5.2 billion rubles and 
exports of more than 5.5 billion rubles. As a result of Gamsa- 
khurdia's policies, goods destined for Russia were withheld by 
Georgian officials. The Soviet leadership, encouraged by con- 
servative provincial leaders in the Russian regions bordering 
Georgia, responded with their own partial economic blockade 
of Georgia in late 1990 and 1991. All-union enterprises in 
Georgia stopped receiving most of their supplies from outside 
the republic. The strangling of energy resources forced much 
of Georgian industry to shut down in 1991. 

The Underground Economy 

Economic statistics for Georgia are difficult to evaluate for 
both the Soviet era and the post-Soviet period, primarily 
because of the country's large underground economy. Tradi- 
tional Georgian familial and clan relations have intensified the 
economic corruption that infused the entire communist sys- 
tem. Local elites in the communist party joined with under- 
ground speculators and entrepreneurs to form an economic 
mafia. Repeated efforts to eradicate this phenomenon, includ- 
ing an aggressive effort by Shevardnadze in the early 1970s, 
apparently had little impact. In the postcommunist period, 
struggles for economic control among competing mafias have 
been an important part of the political conflict plaguing Geor- 
gia. 

Wages and Prices 

Until 1991 Georgia's price system and inflation rate gener- 
ally coincided with those of the other Soviet republics. Under 
central planning, prices of state enterprise products were fixed 
by direct regulation, fixed markup rates, or negotiation at the 
wholesale level, with subsequent sanction by state authority. 
The prices of agricultural products from the private sector fluc- 
tuated freely in the Soviet system. 

Once it forsook the artificial conditions of the Soviet system, 
Georgia faced the necessity for major changes in its pricing pol- 
icy. Following the political upheaval of late 1991, which delayed 
price adjustments, the Georgian government raised the prices 
of basic commodities substantially in early 1992, to match 
adjustments made in most of the other former Soviet republics. 



192 



Jewelry-making and gun-repair stand in Tbilisi 
Courtesy A. James Firth, United States Department of Agriculture 



The price of bread, for example, rose from 0.4 ruble to 4.8 
rubles per kilogram. By the end of 1992, all prices except those 
for bread, fuel, and transportation had been liberalized in 
order to avoid distortions and shortages. This policy brought 
steep inflation rates throughout 1993. 

Beginning in 1991, a severe shortage of ruble notes 
restricted enterprises from acquiring enough currency to pre- 
vent a significant drop in real wages. In early 1992, public-sec- 
tor wages were doubled, and every Georgian received an 
additional 40 rubles per month to compensate for the rising 
cost of living. Such compensatory increases were far below 
those in other former Soviet republics, however. In 1992 the 
Shevardnadze government considered wage indexing or regu- 
lar adjustment of benefits to the lowest wage groups as a way of 
improving the public's buying power. 



193 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

In mid-1993 the majority of Georgians still depended on 
state enterprises for their salaries, but in most cases some form 
of private income was necessary to live above the poverty level. 
Private jobs paid substantially more than state jobs, and the dis- 
crepancy grew larger in 1993. For example, in 1993 a secretary 
in a private company earned the equivalent of US$30 per 
month, while a state university professor made the equivalent 
of US$4 per month. 

Banking, the Budget, and the Currency 

In the spring of 1991, Georgian banks ended their relation- 
ship with parent banks in Moscow. The National Bank of Geor- 
gia was created in mid-1991 as an independent central national 
bank; its main function was to ensure the stability of the 
national currency, and it was not responsible for obligations 
incurred by the government. The National Bank also assumed 
all debts of Georgian banks to the state banks in Moscow. 

In 1992 the national system included five specialized govern- 
ment commercial banks and sixty private commercial banks. 
The five government-owned commercial banks provided 95 
percent of bank credit going to the economy. They included 
the Agricultural and Industrial Bank of Georgia, the Housing 
Bank of Georgia, and the Bank for Industry and Construction, 
which were the main sources of financing for state enterprises 
during this period. Private commercial banks, which began 
operation in 1989, grew rapidly in 1991-92 because of favor- 
able interest rates; new banking laws were passed in 1991 to 
cover their activity. 

Under communist rule, transfers from the Soviet national 
budget had enabled Georgia to show a budget surplus in most 
years. When the Soviet contribution of 751 million rubles — 
over 5 percent of Georgia's gross domestic product (GDP — see 
Glossary) — became unavailable in 1991, the Georgian govern- 
ment ran a budget deficit estimated at around 2 billion rubles. 
The destruction of government records during the Tbilisi hos- 
tilities of late 1991 left the new government lacking reliable 
information on which to base financial policy for 1992 and 
beyond (see After Communist Rule, this ch.) . 

In 1992 the government assumed an additional 2 billion to 3 
billion rubles of unpaid debts from state enterprises, raising 
the deficit to between 17 and 21 percent of GDP (see table 17, 
Appendix). By May 1992, when the State Council approved a 
new tax system, the budget deficit was estimated at 6 billion to 



194 



Georgia 



7 billion rubles. The deficit was exacerbated by military expen- 
ditures associated with the conflicts in South Ossetia and Ab- 
khazia and by the cost of dealing with natural disasters. 

The 1992 budget was restricted by a delay in the broadening 
of the country's tax base, the cost of assuming defense and 
security expenses formerly paid by the Soviet Union, the dou- 
bling of state wages, and the cost of earthquake relief in the 
north. When the 1993 budget was proposed, only 11 billion of 
the prescribed 43.6 billion rubles of expenditures were covered 
by revenues. 

Tax reform in early 1992 added an excise tax on selected 
luxury items and a flat-rate value-added tax (VAT — see Glos- 
sary) on most goods and services, while abolishing the turn- 
over and sales taxes of the communist system. In 1992 tax 
revenues fell below the expected level, however, because of 
noncompliance with new tax requirements; a government 
study showed that 80 percent of businesses underpaid their 
taxes in 1992. 

In early 1993, Georgia remained in the "ruble zone," still 
using the Russian ruble as the official national currency. Efforts 
begun in 1991 to establish a separate currency convertible on 
world markets were frustrated by political and economic insta- 
bility. Beginning in August 1993, the Central Bank of Russia 
began withdrawing ruble banknotes; a new unit, designated 
the coupon (for value of the coupon — see Glossary), became 
the official national currency after several months of provi- 
sional status. Rubles and United States dollars continued to cir- 
culate widely, however, especially in large transactions. After 
the National Bank of Georgia had established weekly exchange 
rates for two months, the coupon's exchange rate against the 
United States dollar inflated from 5,569 to 12,629. In Septem- 
ber all salaries were doubled, setting off a new round of infla- 
tion. By October the rate had reached 42,000 coupons to the 
dollar. 

Industry 

In 1990 about 20 percent of Georgia's 1,029 industrial enter- 
prises, including the largest, were directly administered by the 
central ministries of the Soviet Union. Until 1991 Georgian 
industry was integrated with the rest of the Soviet economy. 
About 90 percent of the raw materials used by Georgian light 
industry came from outside the republic. The Transcaucasian 
Metallurgical Plant at Rustavi and the Kutaisi Automotive 



195 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

Works, as well as other centers of heavy industry, depended 
heavily on commercial agreements with the other Soviet repub- 
lics. The Rustavi plant, for example, could not operate without 
importing iron ore, most of which it received (and continues to 
receive) from Azerbaijan. The Kutaisi works depended on 
other republics for raw materials, machinery, and spare parts. 
Georgia contributed significantly to Soviet mineral output, par- 
ticularly of manganese (a component of steel alloy found in 
the Chiatura and Kutaisi regions in west-central Georgia) and 
copper. 

In the late 1980s, Georgia's main industrial products were 
machine tools, prefabricated building structures, cast iron, 
steel pipe, synthetic ammonia, and silk thread. Georgian refin- 
eries also processed gasoline and diesel fuel from imported 
crude oil. Georgian industry made its largest contributions to 
the Soviet Union's total industrial production in wool fabric, 
chemical fibers, rolled ferrous metals, and metal-cutting 
machine tools (see table 18, Appendix). 

Energy Resources 

The lack of significant domestic fuel reserves made the 
Georgian economy extremely dependent on neighboring 
republics, especially Russia, to meet its energy needs. Under 
the fuel supply conditions of 1994, only further exploitation of 
hydroelectric power could enhance energy self-sufficiency. In 
1990 over 95 percent of Georgia's fuel was imported. For that 
reason, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 caused an 
energy crisis and stimulated a search for alternative suppliers. 

The harsh winter of 1991-92 increased fuel demand at a 
time when supply was especially limited. Oil imports were 
reduced by the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, cold 
weather curtailed domestic hydroelectric production, and the 
price of fuel and energy imports from other former Soviet 
republics rose drastically because of Georgia's independent 
political stance and the new economic realities throughout the 
former union. Beginning in December 1991, industries 
received only about one-third of the energy needed for full- 
scale operation, and most operated far below capacity through- 
out 1992. 

Small amounts of oil were discovered in the Samgori region 
(southern Georgia) in the 1930s and in eastern Georgia in the 
1970s, but no oil exploration has occurred in most of the 
republic. In 1993 some 96 percent of Georgia's oil came from 



196 




Hydroelectric station on Georgian Military 
Highway between Tbilisi and Mtskheta 

Azerbaijan and Russia, although new supply agreements had 
been reached with Iran and Turkey. Oil and gas pipelines con- 
nect Georgia with Azerbaijan, Armenia, Russia, and Turkmeni- 
stan. Refinery and storage facilities in Batumi receive oil 
through a long pipeline from Baku in Azerbaijan. 

Coal is mined in Abkhazia and near Kutaisi, but between 
1976 and 1991 output fell nearly 50 percent, to about 1 million 
tons. The largest deposits, both of which are in Abkhazia, are 
estimated to contain 250 million tons and 80 million tons, 
respectively. Domestic coal provides half the Rustavi plant's 
needs and fuels some electrical power generation. In 1993 nat- 
ural gas, nearly all of which was imported, accounted for 44 
percent of fuel consumption. 

Georgia has substantial hydroelectric potential, only 14 per- 
cent of which was in use in 1993 in a network of small hydro- 
electric stations. In 1993 all but eight of Georgia's seventy-two 
power stations were hydroelectric, but together they provided 
only half the republic's energy needs. In the early 1990s, Geor- 
gia's total consumption of electrical energy exceeded domestic 
generation by as much as 30 percent. Georgian planners see 
further hydroelectric development as the best domestic solu- 
tion to the country's power shortage. 



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Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 
Agriculture 

Georgia's climate and soil have made agriculture one of its 
most productive economic sectors; the 18 percent of Georgian 
land that is arable provided 32 percent of the republic's NMP 
in 1990. In the Soviet period, swampy areas in the west were 
drained, and arid regions in the east were salvaged by a com- 
plex irrigation system, allowing Georgian agriculture to 
expand production tenfold between 1918 and 1980. Produc- 
tion was hindered in the Soviet period, however, by the misallo- 
cation of agricultural land (for example, the assignment of 
prime grain fields to tea cultivation) and excessive specializa- 
tion. Georgia's emphasis on labor-intensive crops such as tea 
and grapes kept the rural work force at an unsatisfactory level 
of productivity. Some 25 percent of the Georgian work force 
was engaged in agriculture in 1990; 37 percent had been so 
engaged in 1970 (see table 19, Appendix). In the spring of 
1993, sowing of spring crops was reduced by one-third on state 
land and by a substantial amount on private land as well 
because of fuel and equipment shortages. For the first half of 
1993, overall agricultural production was 35 percent less than 
for the same period of 1992. 

Land Redistribution 

Until the land-privatization program that began in 1992, 
most Georgian farms were state-run collectives averaging 428 
hectares in size. Even under Soviet rule, however, Georgia had 
a vigorous private agricultural sector. In 1990, according to offi- 
cial statistics, the private sector contributed 46 percent of gross 
agricultural output, and private productivity averaged about 
twice that of the state farms (see table 20, Appendix). Under 
the state system, designated plots were leased to farmers and 
town dwellers for private crop and livestock raising. As during 
the Soviet era, more than half of Georgia's meat and milk and 
nearly half of its eggs came from private producers. 

As was the case with enterprise privatization, Gamsakhurdia 
postponed systematic land reform because he feared that local 
mafias would dominate the redistribution process. But within 
weeks of his ouster in early 1992, the new government issued a 
land reform resolution providing land grants of one-half hect- 
are to individuals with the stipulation that the land be farmed. 
Commissions were established in each village to inventory land 
parcels and identify those to be privatized. Limitations were 
placed on what the new "owners" could do with their land, and 



198 



Georgia 



would-be private farmers faced serious problems in obtaining 
seeds, fertilizer, and equipment. By the end of 1993, over half 
the cultivated land was in private hands. Small plots were given 
free to city dwellers to relieve the acute food shortage that year. 

Crop Distribution 

In 1993 about 85 percent of cultivated land, excluding 
orchards, vineyards, and tea plantations, was dedicated to 
grains. Within that category, corn grew on 40 percent of the 
land, and winter wheat on 37 percent. The second most impor- 
tant agricultural product is wine. Georgia has one of the 
world's oldest and finest winemaking traditions; archaeological 
findings indicate that wine was being made in Georgia as early 
as 300 B.C. Some forty major wineries were operating in 1990, 
and about 500 types of local wines were made. The center of 
the wine industry is Kakhetia in eastern Georgia. Georgia is 
also known for the high quality of its mineral waters. 

Other important crops are tea, citrus fruits, and noncitrus 
fruits, which account for 18.3 percent, 7.7 percent, and 8.4 per- 
cent of Georgia's agricultural output, respectively. Cultivation 
of tea and citrus fruits is confined to the western coastal area. 
Tea accounts for 36 percent of the output of the large food- 
processing industry, although the quality of Georgian tea 
dropped perceptibly under Soviet management in the 1970s 
and 1980s. Animal husbandry, mainly the keeping of cattle, 
pigs, and sheep, accounts for about 25 percent of Georgia's 
agricultural output, although high density and low mechaniza- 
tion have hindered efficiency. 

Until 1991 other Soviet republics bought 95 percent of Geor- 
gia's processed tea, 62 percent of its wine, and 70 percent of its 
canned goods (see table 21; table 22, Appendix). In turn, 
Georgia depended on Russia for 75 percent of its grain. One- 
third of Georgia's meat and 60 percent of its dairy products 
were supplied from outside the republic. Failure to adjust these 
relationships contributed to Georgia's food crises in the early 
1990s. 

Transportation and Telecommunications 

Georgia's location makes it an important commercial transit 
route, and the country inherited a well-developed transporta- 
tion system when it became independent in 1991. However, 
lack of money and political unrest have cut into the system's 
maintenance and allowed it to deteriorate somewhat since 



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Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

independence. Fighting in and around the secessionist Abkha- 
zian Autonomous Republic in the northwest has isolated that 
area and also has cut some of the principal rail and highway 
links between Georgia and Russia. 

In 1990 Georgia had 35,100 kilometers of roads, 31,200 kilo- 
meters of which were paved (see fig. 15). Since the nineteenth 
century, Tbilisi has been the center of the Caucasus region's 
highway system, a position reinforced during the Soviet era. 
The country's four principal highways radiate from Tbilisi 
roughly in the four cardinal directions. Route M27 extends 
west from the capital through the broad valley between the 
country's two main mountain ranges and reaches the Black Sea 
south of Sukhumi. The highway then turns northwest along 
the Black Sea to the Russian border. A secondary road, Route 
A305, branches off Route M27 and carries traffic to the port of 
Poti. Another secondary road runs south along the Black Sea 
coast from Poti to the port of Batumi. From Batumi a short 
spur of about ten kilometers is Georgia's only paved connec- 
tion with Turkey. 

Route A301, more commonly known as the Georgian Mili- 
tary Highway, runs north from Tbilisi across the Greater Cauca- 
sus range to Russia. The route was first described by Greek 
geographers in the first century B.C. and was the only land 
route north into Russia until the late 1800s. The route contains 
many hairpin turns and winds through several passes higher 
than 2,000 meters in elevation before reaching the Russian 
border. Heavy snows in winter often close the road for short 
periods. The country's other two main highways connect Tbilisi 
with the neighboring Transcaucasian countries. Route A310 
runs south to Erevan, and Route A302 extends east across a 
lower portion of the Greater Caucasus range to Azerbaijan. All 
major routes have regular and frequent bus transport. 

Georgia had 1,421 kilometers of rail lines in 1993, excluding 
several small industrial lines. In the early 1990s, most lines were 
1.520-meter broad gauge, and the principal routes were electri- 
fied. The tsarist government built the first rail links in the 
region from Baku on the Caspian Sea through Tbilisi to Poti 
on the Black Sea in 1883; this route remains the principal rail 
route of Transcaucasia. Along the Black Sea, a rail route 
extends from the main east-west line into Russia, and two lines 
run south from Tbilisi — one to Armenia and the other to Azer- 
baijan. Spurs link these main routes with smaller towns in 
Georgia's broad central valley. Principal classification yards and 



200 



Georgia 



rail repair services are in Batumi and Tbilisi. Most rail lines 
provide passenger service, but in 1994 international passenger 
service was limited to the Tbilisi-to-Baku train. Because of fight- 
ing in Abkhazia, freight and passenger service to Russia has 
been suspended, with only the section from Tbilisi to the port 
of Poti still operative. Service on the Tbilisi-to-Erevan line has 
also been disrupted because the tracks pass through the area of 
armed conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. 

Tbilisi was one of the first cities of the Soviet Union to have a 
subway system. The system consists of twenty-three kilometers 
of heavy rail lines, most of which are underground. Three lines 
with twenty stations radiate from downtown, with extensions 
either planned or under construction in 1994. The system is 
heavily used, and trains run at least every four minutes 
throughout the day. In 1985, the last year of available statistics, 
145 million passengers were carried, about the same number 
of passengers that used Washington, D.C.'s Metrorail system in 
1992. 

Georgia's principal airport, Novoalekseyevka, is about eigh- 
teen kilometers northeast of downtown Tbilisi. With a runway 
approximately 2,500 meters long, the airport can accommo- 
date airplanes as large as the Russian Tu-154, the Boeing 72V, 
and the McDonnell Douglas DC-9. In 1993 the airport han- 
dled about 26,000 tons of freight. Orbis, the new state-run air- 
line, provides service to neighboring countries, flights to 
several destinations throughout Russia, and direct service to 
some European capitals. Between 1991 and 1993, fuel short- 
ages severely curtailed air passenger and cargo service, how- 
ever. Eighteen other airports throughout the country have 
paved runways, but most are used for minor freight transport. 

Georgia's Black Sea ports provide access to the Mediterra- 
nean Sea via the Bosporus. Georgia has two principal ports, at 
Poti and Batumi, and a minor port at Sukhumi. Although 
Batumi has a natural harbor, Poti's man-made harbor carries 
more cargo because of that city's rail links to Tbilisi. The port 
at Poti can handle ships having up to ten meters draught and 
30,000 tons in weight. Altogether, nine berths can process as 
much as 100,000 tons of general cargo, 4 million tons of bulk 
cargo, and 1 million tons of grain per year. Facilities include 
tugboats, equipment for unloading tankers, a grain elevator, 
22,000 square meters of covered storage area, and 57,000 
square meters of open storage area. Direct onloading of con- 
tainers to rail cars is available. The port primarily handles 



201 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 




Figure 15. Transportation System of Georgia, 1994 

imports of general cargo and exports of grain, coal, and ores. 
Poti is ice-free, but in winter strong west winds can make entry 
into the port hazardous. 

Batumi's natural port is located on a bay just northeast of the 
city. Eight alongside berths have a total capacity of 100,000 tons 
of general cargo, 800,000 tons of bulk cargo, and 6 million tons 
of petroleum products. Facilities include portal cranes, loaders 
for moving containers onto rail cars, 5,400 square meters of 
covered storage, and 13,700 square meters of open storage. 
The port lies at the end of the Transcaucasian pipeline from 
Baku and is used primarily for the export of petroleum and 
petroleum products. The port's location provides some protec- 
tion from the winds that buffet Poti. However, strong winds can 



202 



Georgia 



cause dangerous currents in the port area, forcing ships to 
remain offshore until conditions improve. 

Sukhumi, capital of the Abkhazian Autonomous Republic, is 
a small port that handles limited amounts of cargo, passenger 
ferries, and cruise ships. Imports consist mostly of building 
materials, and the port handles exports of local agricultural 
products, mostly fruit. Strong westerly and southwesterly winds 
make the port virtually unusable for long periods in the 
autumn and winter. Sukhumi has been unavailable to Georgia 
since Georgian forces abandoned the city during the conflict 
of the autumn of 1993. 

In 1992 Georgia had 370 kilometers of crude oil pipeline, 
300 kilometers of pipeline for refined petroleum products, and 
440 kilometers of natural gas pipeline. Batumi is the terminus 
of a major oil pipeline that transports petroleum from Baku 
across the Caucasus for export. Two natural gas pipelines 
roughly parallel the route of the oil pipeline from Baku to 
Tbilisi before veering north along the Georgian Military High- 
way to Russia. Pipelines are generally high-capacity lines and 
have a diameter of either 1,020 or 1,220 millimeters. 

Historically, Georgia was an important point on the Silk 
Road linking China with Europe. Since independence Geor- 
gians have discussed resuming this role by turning the republic 
into a modern transportation and communications hub. Such 
a plan might also make the republic a "dry Suez" for the trans- 
shipment of Iranian oil west across the Caucasus. 

In 1991 about 672,000 telephone lines were in use, provid- 
ing twelve lines per 100 persons. The waiting list for telephone 
installation was quite long in the early 1990s. Georgia is linked 
to the CIS countries and Turkey by overland lines, and one low- 
capacity satellite earth station is in operation. Three television 
stations, including the independent Iberia Television, and 
numerous radio stations broadcast in Georgian and Russian. 

Economic Reform 

Like all the former Soviet republics, Georgia recognized the 
need to restructure its economic system in the early 1990s, 
using national economic strengths to accommodate its own 
needs rather than the needs of central planners in Moscow. 
The road to reform has been full of obstacles, however: poor 
political leadership, the economic decline that began in the 
1980s, civil war, and a well-established underground economy 
that is difficult to control. 



203 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 
Price Policy 

Gamsakhurdia understood little about economics, and he 
postponed major economic reforms to avoid weakening his 
political position. In an effort to maintain popular support, he 
stabilized fares for public transportation and prices for basic 
consumer goods in state retail outlets (see table 22, Appendix). 
In March 1991, a new rationing system bound local residents to 
neighborhood shops. In April 1991, price controls were 
imposed in state stores. Price liberalization began only after 
Gamsakhurdia's departure as president, and it did not cover 
several basic consumer goods and services. Continued food 
subsidies were an additional factor contributing to the national 
budget deficit. In the interest of stimulating competition, a 
government decree removed restrictions on trade in May 1992, 
and at the same time taxes were eliminated on goods brought 
into Georgia. Persistent shortages of bread led the government 
to introduce ration cards for bread in December 1992. Under 
these conditions, inflation soared in private markets in 1991- 
92, although prices remained substantially lower than in Mos- 
cow for similar items. 

In 1993 wholesale prices increased especially quickly under 
the influence of falling productivity. In the second half of 1993, 
the construction industry was hit hard by material cost 
increases of up to thirty times, although gasoline prices rose 
only gradually. The prices of heavy engineering and ferrous- 
metallurgy products rose by three to five times in the second 
half of 1993. 

Enterprise Privatization 

Another key element of economic reform, privatization of 
state enterprises, was stifled under Gamsakhurdia. He feared 
that the "economic mafia," which already owned a significant 
share of the nation's wealth, would use that wealth to accumu- 
late state assets. Rapid growth had already occurred in the pri- 
vate retail sector, however, once cooperative enterprises began 
expanding in 1988. In 1990-91 privately run "commercial 
shops" began proliferating, often in place of state stores. Typi- 
cally, these shops offered consumer goods brought from Tur- 
key and resold at very high prices. The Law on Privatization of 
State Enterprises was adopted in August 1991 to outline gen- 
eral principles, and the Committee on Privatization was estab- 
lished in 1992. Under Shevardnadze, privatization began 
cautiously in August 1992 when the State Council adopted the 



204 



Georgia 



State Program on the Privatization of State Enterprises. The 
law copied Russia's approach to privatization by providing for 
several methods, including "popular privatization," consisting 
of a combination of vouchers distributed to the public and auc- 
tions of state enterprises. The country's political crises delayed 
meaningful measures, however. By 1993 few Georgian indus- 
tries had been privatized, although large numbers of small 
enterprises were scheduled for privatization in 1993 and 1994. 

Foreign Trade 

In the Soviet period, Georgian trade with the world outside 
the Soviet Union was severely restricted by Moscow's foreign 
economic policy (see table 23, Appendix). Almost all of Geor- 
gian foreign economic activity was conducted by fourteen cen- 
tral enterprises, most of which operated under the direct 
management of Moscow. Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Germany, 
Japan, and Poland were among the most important of Geor- 
gia's trading partners (see table 24, Appendix). Gamsakhurdia, 
suspicious of businessmen who sought to export Georgian 
goods, banned all export activity. The Shevardnadze govern- 
ment, however, created conditions for significant improvement 
of international investment and trade. In May 1992, licensing 
requirements for import or export activities were dropped 
except for the import of goods in the military and in medical 
categories. This change represented a significant expansion of 
the rights of enterprises to engage in foreign economic activity. 
Export of twelve commodities, mostly foodstuffs, was still pro- 
hibited at the end of 1992. Fees and other restrictions on the 
registration of joint ventures were removed, and the state tax 
on all imports was canceled. Import duties ranged from 5 to 55 
percent, and export duties from 5 to 90 percent, with an 
exemption for former Soviet republics; the VAT on exports 
dropped to 14 percent in late 1992. The National Bank of 
Georgia imposed a tax of 12 percent on exporters' hard-cur- 
rency earnings. In early 1993, new trade policies had not led to 
major increases in foreign trade and investment. Continued 
political instability, ethnic warfare, and extremely poor trans- 
portation and telecommunications facilities continued to dis- 
courage foreign investors in 1993. 

In the second half of 1993, continued military upheaval did 
not entirely deter progress in foreign investment. The Renault 
automobile company of France, the German Tee Kanes tea 
company, and British and Dutch liquor companies signed con- 



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Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

tracts in August, and officials of Mitsubishi and an American 
shipbuilder visited Georgia to assess investment conditions. 

Government and Politics 

In the late 1980s and the early 1990s, the tone of Georgian 
political life changed significantly. National elections held in 
1989, 1990, and 1992 reflected that change. The nature of gov- 
ernance in newly independent Georgia was most influenced by 
the personalities of two men, Zviad Gamsakhurdia and Eduard 
Shevardnadze. But democratic institutions evolved slowly and 
sporadically in the early 1990s. 

Establishing Democratic Institutions 

Prior to the 1989 elections, the Georgian Communist Party 
maintained tight control over the nomination process. Even in 
1989, candidates ran unopposed in forty-three of seventy-five 
races, and elsewhere pairings with opposition candidates were 
manipulated to guarantee results favoring the party. In Tbilisi 
grassroots movements succeeded in nominating three candi- 
dates to the Georgian Supreme Soviet in 1989. The leaders of 
these movements were mostly young intellectuals who had not 
been active dissidents. Many of those figures later joined to 
form a new political party, Democratic Choice for Georgia, 
abbreviated as DASi in Georgian. Because of expertise in local 
political organization, DASi played a leading role in drafting 
legislation for local and national elections between 1990 and 
1992. 

The death of the Tbilisi demonstrators in April 1989 led to a 
major change in the Georgian political atmosphere. Radical 
nationalists such as Gamsakhurdia were the primary beneficia- 
ries of the national outrage following the April Tragedy. In his 
role as opposition leader, Gamsakhurdia formed a new politi- 
cal bloc in 1990, the Round Table/Free Georgia coalition. 

In 1990 Georgia was the last Soviet republic to hold elections 
for the republic parliament. Protests and strikes against the 
election law and the nominating process had led to a six-month 
postponement of the elections until October 1990. Opposition 
forces feared that the political realities favored entrenched 
communist party functionaries and the enterprise and collec- 
tive farm officials they had put in place. According to reports, 
about one-third of the 2,300 candidates for the Supreme Soviet 
fell into this category. 



206 



Communist-built secular wedding chapel, Tbilisi 
Courtesy Michael W. Serafin 



The electoral system adopted in August 1990, which repre- 
sented a compromise between competing versions put forward 
by the Patiashvili government and the opposition, created the 
first truly multiparty elections in the Soviet Union. The new 
Georgian election law combined district-level, single-mandate, 
majority elections with a proportional party list system for the 
republic as a whole; a total of 250 seats would constitute the 
new parliament. On one hand, the proportional voting system 
required that a party gain at least 4 percent of the total votes to 
achieve representation in parliament. On the other hand, can- 
didates with strong local support could win office even if their 
national totals fell below the 4 percent threshold. When the 
elections finally were held, widespread fears of violence or 
communist manipulation (expressed most vocally by Gamsa- 
khurdia) proved unfounded. 



207 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

The 1 990 Election 

The 1990 parliamentary election was a struggle between 
what remained of the Georgian Communist Party, which still 
held power at that point, and thirty-one opposition parties con- 
stituting the Georgian national movement. The national move- 
ment was not completely represented in the official election, 
however, because many opposition parties organized separate 
elections to an alternative body called the Georgian National 
Congress. An important factor in the results was a provision in 
the election law that forbade members of the communist party 
to run simultaneously on the ticket of another party. (By con- 
trast, in this interim period other Soviet republics allowed even 
proponents of radical reform to retain their communist party 
memberships while representing popular fronts and similar 
organizations.) 

The election decisively rejected the communists and gave a 
resounding popular mandate to the Round Table/Free Geor- 
gia bloc that Gamsakhurdia headed. That coalition captured 
54 percent of the proportional vote to gain 155 seats out of the 
250 up for election, while the communists gained 64 seats and 
30 percent of the proportional vote. Communist strongholds 
remained in Azerbaijani and Armenian districts of southern 
Georgia. No other party reached the 4 percent share necessary 
for representation in the party-list system, and only a handful 
of candidates from other parties won victories in the individual 
district races. Boycotts prevented voting in two districts of 
Abkhazia and in two districts of South Ossetia. 

Gamsakhurdia raised initial hopes for compromise in his 
new government by withdrawing Round Table/Free Georgia 
candidacies from runoffs against the opposition Popular Front 
Party in twelve races. That move ensured the election of Popu- 
lar Front candidates as individuals in those contests; otherwise, 
the 4 percent rule would have precluded representation for 
the Popular Front. 

The Gamsakhurdia Government 

Gamsakhurdia's choice to head the new government, Tengiz 
Sigua, was almost universally praised. Sigua, formerly director 
of a metallurgy institute, had been an adroit and evenhanded 
deputy chairman of the Central Election Commission supervis- 
ing the 1990 election. The government formed by Gamsakhur- 
dia included many officials who lacked previous government 



208 



Georgia 



experience. Only one full minister was retained from the com- 
munist government, although former deputy ministers were 
frequently promoted to the top post in ministries concerned 
with the economy. Initially, the large number of remaining 
communist deputies formed no organized opposition bloc in 
the parliament. In fact, the communist party faded rapidly 
from the scene, and most of its property and publishing facili- 
ties were seized. The large, modern facility Shevardnadze had 
built for the party's Central Committee was taken over by the 
Cabinet of Ministers. The rapid decline of the communists 
showed that the major attraction of communist party member- 
ship had been the party's position of power; once that power 
was lost, the number of active communists dropped almost to 
zero. When the new first secretary of the party ran against 
Gamsakhurdia for president in 1991, he received less than 2 
percent of the vote. After the August 1991 coup in Moscow, 
Gamsakhurdia banned the communist party, and deputies 
elected to parliament on the communist ticket were deprived 
of their seats. 

Gamsakhurdia's Ouster and Its Aftermath 

A small but vocal parliamentary opposition to Gamsakhurdia 
began to coalesce after August 1991, particularly after govern- 
ment forces reportedly fired on demonstrators in September. 
At this time, several of Gamsakhurdia's top supporters in the 
Round Table/Free Georgia bloc joined forces with the opposi- 
tion. However, the opposition was unable to convince Gamsa- 
khurdia to call new elections in late 1991. The majority of 
deputies, most of whom owed their presence in parliament to 
Gamsakhurdia, supported him to the end. Indeed, a significant 
number of deputies followed Gamsakhurdia into exile in 
Chechnya, where they continued to issue resolutions and 
decrees condemning the "illegal putsch." 

In the aftermath of Gamsakhurdia's ouster in January 1992, 
parliament ceased to function, and an interim Political Consul- 
tative Council was formed. Its membership would include rep- 
resentatives of ten political parties, a select group of 
intellectuals, and several opposition members of parliament. 
This council was intended to serve as a substitute parliament, 
although it only had the right to make recommendations. Leg- 
islative functions were granted to a new and larger body, the 
State Council, created in early March 1992. By May 1992, the 
State Council had sixty-eight members, including representa- 



209 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

tives of more than thirty political parties and twenty social 
movements that had opposed Gamsakhurdia. Efforts were also 
made to bring in representatives of Georgia's ethnic minorities, 
although no Abkhazian or Ossetian representatives partici- 
pated in the new council. 

Almost immediately after Gamsakhurdia's ouster, Sigua 
resumed his position as prime minister and created a working 
group to draft a new election law that would legitimize the next 
elected government. Immediately after the overthrow of Gam- 
sakhurdia, the new government feared that Gamsakhurdia 
retained enough support in Georgia to regain power in the 
next election. As a result, in March the State Council adopted 
an electoral system based on the single transferable vote. The 
system would virtually guarantee representation by small par- 
ties and make it difficult for a party list headed by one promi- 
nent figure to translate a majority of popular votes into 
parliamentary control. 

New Parties and Shevardnadze's Return 

After his return to Georgia in March 1992, Shevardnadze 
constantly stressed the temporary nature of the new power 
structure and called for elections as soon as possible. But the 
leadership postponed balloting until October 1992 because it 
lacked effective political control over many regions of the 
country and because of factional wrangling over the new elec- 
tion law. Registration of political parties, which had been sus- 
pended by Gamsakhurdia in 1991, resumed early in 1992. 
Among new party registrants was the Democratic Union, a 
group consisting mostly of former members and officials of the 
communist party. Claiming a broad mass following, this party 
had organizations in most regions of the county. Although 
wooed by the Democratic Union and other parties, Shevard- 
nadze avoided party affiliation in order to maintain his inde- 
pendent position. The parliament that would be elected in 
October 1992 clearly would be an interim body given the task 
of writing a new constitution. Accordingly, the term of office 
was set for three years. 

The Election of 1 992 

After a series of last-minute changes, the electoral system for 
October 1992 was a compromise combination of single-mem- 
ber districts and proportional voting by party lists. To give 
regional parties a chance to gain representation, separate party 



210 



Burned-out headquarters building of Georgian Communist Party, 

Tbilisi, 1992 
Courtesy Michael W. Serafin 

lists were submitted for each of ten historical regions of Geor- 
gia. In a change from the 1990 system, no minimum percent- 
age was set for a party to achieve representation in parliament 
if the party did sufficiently well regionally to seat candidates. 
Forty-seven parties and four coalitions registered to participate 
in the 1992 election. For the first time, the Central Election 
Commission accepted the registration of every party that sub- 
mitted an application. 

The largest of the electoral alliances, and one of the most 
controversial, was the Peace Bloc (Mshvidoba). This broad coa- 
lition of seven parties ranged from the heavily ex-communist 
Democratic Union to the Union for the Revival of Ajaria, a 
party of the conservative Ajarian political elite. Ultimately, the 
strong programmatic differences among the seven parties 
would render the Peace Bloc ineffective as a parliamentary fac- 



211 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

tion. The Democratic Union filled as much as 70 percent of the 
places given the coalition on the party lists. In the 1992 elec- 
tion, the Peace Bloc drew a plurality of votes, thus earning the 
coalition twenty-nine seats in parliament. 

The second most important coalition, the October 11 Bloc, 
included moderate reform leaders of four parties. Members 
typically had academic backgrounds with few or no communist 
connections, and the median age of bloc leaders was about fif- 
teen years less than that of the Democratic Union leadership. 
The October 11 Bloc won eighteen seats, the second largest 
number in the 1992 election. 

A third coalition, the Unity Bloc (Ertoba), lost two of its four 
member parties before the election. Many of the leaders of the 
Liberal-Democratic National Party, one of the two remaining 
constituent parties of the Unity Bloc, were, like the leaders of 
the Democratic Union, former communist officials who contin- 
ued to hold influential posts in the Georgian government and 
the mass media. Both the Peace Bloc and the Unity Bloc put 
prominent cultural figures at the top of their electoral lists to 
gain attention. 

Shevardnadze's actions were crucial in building the founda- 
tion for the 1992 election. From the time of his return to Geor- 
gia, Shevardnadze enjoyed unparalleled respect and 
recognition. Because of his unique position, the State Council 
acted to separate Shevardnadze from party politics by creating 
a potentially powerful new elected post, chairman of parlia- 
ment, which would also be contested in the October elections. 
Because no other candidate emerged, Shevardnadze was con- 
vinced to forgo partisan politics and grasp this opportunity for 
national leadership. 

The elections took place as scheduled in October 1992 in 
most regions of the countrv. International monitors from ten 
nations reported that, with minor exceptions, the balloting was 
free and fair. Predictably, Gamsakhurdia declared the results 
rigged and invalid. Interethnic tensions and Gamsakhurdia's 
activity forced postponement of elections in nine of the eighty- 
four administrative districts, located in Abkhazia, South Osse- 
tia, and western Georgia. Voters in those areas were encour- 
aged to travel to adjoining districts, however, to vote in all but 
the regional races. Together, the nonvoting districts repre- 
sented 9.1 percent of the registered voters in Georgia. In no 
voting district did less than 60 percent of eligible voters partici- 
pate. 



212 



Georgia 



An important factor in the high voter turnout was the special 
ballot for Shevardnadze as chairman of the new parliament; a 
large number of voters cast ballots only for Shevardnadze and 
submitted blank or otherwise invalid ballots for the other 
races. Shevardnadze received an overwhelming endorsement, 
winning approximately 96 percent of the vote. In all, fifty-one 
of the ninety-two members of the previous State Council were 
elected to the new parliament. The four sitting members of the 
State Council Presidium (Shevardnadze, Ioseliani, Sigua, and 
Kitovani) also were reelected. 

Formation of the Shevardnadze Government 

An immediate goal after Shevardnadze's return was to avoid 
repeating the one-man rule imposed by Gamsakhurdia while 
keeping a sufficiently tight grip on central power to prevent 
regional separatism. The newly elected parliament convened 
for the first time in November 1992- The lack of dominant par- 
ties and the large number of independent deputies ensured 
that Shevardnadze would dominate parliamentary sessions. 
The precise role of Shevardnadze was not clear at the time of 
the elections; on November 6, the parliament ratified propos- 
als on this subject in the Law on State Power. Instead of reestab- 
lishing the post of president that had been created by — and 
was still claimed by — Gamsakhurdia, parliament gave Shevard- 
nadze a new title, head of state. In theory, parliament was to 
elect the holder of this office, although in practice the position 
was understood to be combined with the popularly elected post 
of chairman of the parliament. Thus an impasse between the 
executive and the legislative branches was avoided by giving the 
same person a top role in both, but the division of power 
between the branches remained unclear in early 1994. 

The Cabinet 

The government team selected by Shevardnadze, called the 
Cabinet of Ministers, was quickly approved by parliament in 
November 1992. Tengiz Sigua returned as prime minister. Four 
deputy prime ministers were chosen in November 1992, includ- 
ing Tengiz Kitovani, former head of the National Guard and 
minister of defense in the new cabinet. In December 1992, the 
Presidium of the Cabinet of Ministers was created. This body 
included the prime minister and his deputy prime ministers, as 
well as the ministers of agriculture, economics, finance, foreign 
affairs, and state property management. 



213 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

In December 1992, the Georgian government included eigh- 
teen ministries, four state committees, and fifteen depart- 
ments, which together employed more than 7,600 officials. 
Many appointees to top government posts, including several 
ministers, had held positions in the apparatus of the Georgian 
Communist Party. Although Shevardnadze's early appoint- 
ments favored his contemporaries and former associates, by 
late 1993 about half of the positions in the top state administra- 
tive apparatus were held by academics. Less than 10 percent 
were former communists, about 75 percent were under age 
forty, and more than half came from opposition parties. 

In September 1993, the cabinet included the following min- 
istries: agriculture and the food industry; communications; cul- 
ture; defense; economic reform; education; environment; 
finance; foreign affairs; health; industry; internal affairs; jus- 
tice; labor and social security; state property management; and 
trade and supply. Each of the five deputy prime ministers 
supervised a group of ministries. 

In practice, the Cabinet of Ministers was a major obstacle to 
reform in 1993. Pro-reform ministers were isolated by the dom- 
ination of former communists in the Presidium, which stood 
between Shevardnadze and the administrative machinery of 
the ministries. In 1993 Shevardnadze himself was reluctant to 
push hard for the rapid reforms advocated by progressives in 
parliament. The cabinet was superficially restructured in 
August 1993, but reformers clamored for a smaller cabinet 
under direct control of the head of state. 

Parliament 

In 1993 some twenty-six parties and eleven factions held 
seats in the new parliament, which continued to be called the 
Supreme Soviet. The legislative branch's basic powers were out- 
lined in the Law on State Power, an interim law rescinding the 
strict limits placed on legislative activity by Gamsakhurdia's 
1991 constitution. Thus in 1993 the parliament had the power 
to elect and dismiss the head of state by a two-thirds vote; to 
nullify laws passed by local or national bodies if they conflicted 
with national law; to decide questions of war and peace; to 
reject any candidate for national office proposed by the head 
of state; and, upon demand of one-fifth of the deputies, to 
declare a vote of no confidence in the sitting cabinet. 

Activity within the legislative body was prescribed by the 
Temporary Regulation of the Georgian Parliament. The parlia- 



214 



Georgia 



ment as a whole elected all administrative officials, including a 
speaker and two deputy speakers. Seventeen specialized com- 
missions examined all bills in their respective fields. The 
speaker had little power over commission chairs or over depu- 
ties in general, and parliament suffered from an inefficient 
structure, insufficient staff, and poor communications. The 
two days per week allotted for legislative debate often did not 
allow full consideration of bills. 

The major parliamentary reform factions — the Democrats, 
the Greens, the Liberals, the National Democrats, and the 
Republicans — were not able to maintain a coalition to promote 
reform legislation. Of that group, the National Democrats 
showed the most internal discipline. Shevardnadze received 
support from a large group of deputies from single-member 
districts, aligned with Liberals and Democrats. His radical 
opposition, a combination of several very small parties, was 
weakened by disunity, but it frequently was able to obstruct 
debate. The often disorderly parliamentary debates reduced 
support among the Georgian public, to whom sessions were 
widely televised. 

In November 1993, Shevardnadze was able to merge three 
small parties with a breakaway faction of the Republicans to 
form a new party, the Union of Citizens of Georgia, of which he 
became chairman. This was a new step for the head of state, 
who previously had refrained from political identification and 
had relied on temporary coalitions to support his policies. At 
the same time, Shevardnadze also sought to include the entire 
loose parliamentary coalition that had recently supported him, 
in a concerted effort to normalize government after the Abk- 
hazian crisis abated. 

The Chief Executive 

The 1992 Law on State Power gave Shevardnadze power 
beyond the executive functions of presidential office. As chair- 
man of parliament, he had the right to call routine or extraor- 
dinary parliamentary sessions, preside over parliamentary 
deliberations, and propose constitutional changes and legisla- 
tion. As head of state, Shevardnadze nominated the prime min- 
ister, the cabinet, the chairman of the Information and 
Intelligence Service, and the president of the National Bank of 
Georgia (although the parliament had the right of approval of 
these officials) . 



215 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

Without parliamentary approval, the head of state 
appointed all senior military leaders and provincial officials 
such as prefects and mayors. Additional power came from his 
control of the entire system of state administration, and he 
could form his own administrative apparatus, which had the 
potential to act as a shadow government beyond the control of 
any other branch. Key agencies chaired by Shevardnadze in 
1993 were the Council for National Security and Defense, the 
Emergency Economic Council, and the Scientific and Techni- 
cal Commission, which advised on military and industrial ques- 
tions. 

In response to calls by the opposition for his resignation dur- 
ing the Abkhazian crisis of mid-1993, Shevardnadze requested 
and received from parliament emergency powers to appoint all 
ministers except the prime minister and to issue decrees on 
economic policy without legislative approval. When the Sigua 
government resigned in August, parliament quickly approved 
Shevardnadze's nomination of industrialist Otar Patsatsia as 
prime minister. Although Shevardnadze argued that greater 
central power was necessary to curb turmoil, his critics saw him 
setting a precedent for future dictatorship and human rights 
abuses. 

The Judicial System 

When Georgia was part of the Soviet Union, the Supreme 
Court of Georgia was subordinate to the Supreme Court of the 
Soviet Union, and the rule of law in Georgia, still based largely 
on the Soviet constitution, included the same limitations on 
personal rights. Beginning in 1990, the court system of Georgia 
began a major transition toward establishment of an indepen- 
dent judiciary that would replace the powerless rubber-stamp 
courts of the Soviet period. The first steps, taken in late 1990, 
were to forbid Supreme Court judges from holding communist 
party membership and to remove Supreme Court activities 
from the supervision of the party. After the overthrow of Gam- 
sakhurdia, the pre-Soviet constitution of 1921 was restored, 
providing the legal basis for separation of powers and an inde- 
pendent court. Substantial opposition to actual independence 
was centered in the Cabinet of Ministers, however, some of 
whose members would lose de facto judicial power. 

The Supreme Court 

In 1993 the Supreme Court had thirty-nine members, of 



216 



Georgia 



whom nine worked on civil cases and thirty on criminal cases. 
All judges had been elected for ten-year terms in 1990 and 
1991. Shevardnadze made no effort to replace judges elected 
under Gamsakhurdia, although they had been seated under a 
different constitutional system. The Supreme Court's functions 
include interpreting laws, trying cases of serious criminal acts 
and appeals of regional court decisions, and supervising appli- 
cation of the law by other government agencies. 

The Procurator General 

The postcommunist judicial system has continued the multi- 
ple role of the procurator general's office as an agency of inves- 
tigation, a constitutional court supervising the application of 
the law, and the institution behind prosecution of crimes in 
court. In 1993 the procurator general's office retained a 
semimilitary structure and total authority over the investigation 
of court cases; judges had no power to reject evidence gained 
improperly. Advocates of democratization identified abolition 
of the office of procurator general as essential, with separation 
of the responsibilities of the procurator general and the courts 
as a first step. 

Prospects for Reform 

All parties in Georgia agreed that judicial reform depended 
on passage of a new constitution delineating the separation of 
powers. If such a constitution prescribed a strong executive sys- 
tem, the head of state would appoint Supreme Court judges; if 
a parliamentary system were called for, parliament would make 
the court appointments. In early 1994, however, the constitu- 
tion was the subject of prolonged political wrangling that 
showed no sign of abating. At that point, experts found a sec- 
ond fundamental obstacle to judicial reform in a national psy- 
chology that had no experience with democratic institutions 
and felt most secure with a unitary, identifiable government 
power. Reform was also required in the training of lawyers and 
judges, who under the old system entered the profession 
through the sponsorship of political figures rather than on 
their own merit. 

Regional Courts 

Until the Gamsakhurdia period, regional courts were 
elected by regional party Soviets; since 1990 regional courts 
have been appointed by regional officials. After the beginning 



217 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

of ethnic struggles in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, regional 
military courts also were established. The head of state 
appoints military judges, and the Supreme Court reviews mili- 
tary court decisions. The Tbilisi City Court has separate juris- 
diction in supervising the observance of laws in the capital city. 

The Constitution 

Under Gamsakhurdia, Georgia had continued to function 
under the Soviet-era constitution of 1978, which was based on 
the 1977 constitution of the Soviet Union. The first postcom- 
munist parliament amended that document extensively. In 
February 1992, the Georgian National Congress (the alternate 
parliament elected in 1990) formally designated the Georgian 
constitution of February 21, 1921, as the effective constitution 
of Georgia. That declaration received legitimacy from the sig- 
natures of Jaba Ioseliani and Tengiz Kitovani, at that time two 
of the three members of the governing Military Council. 

In February 1993, Shevardnadze called for extensive revi- 
sions of the 1921 constitution. Characterizing large sections of 
that document as wholly unacceptable, Shevardnadze pro- 
posed forming a constitutional commission to draft a new ver- 
sion by December 1993. According to Shevardnadze's 
timetable, the draft would be refined by parliament in the 
spring of 1994 and then submitted for approval by popular ref- 
erendum in the fall of 1994. 

Human Rights 

Human rights protection and media freedom have been hin- 
dered in postcommunist Georgia by the national government's 
assumption of central executive power to deal with states of 
political and military emergency and by the existence of semi- 
independent military forces. In 1993 the expression of opposi- 
tion views in the independent media was interrupted by official 
and unofficial actions against newspapers and broadcasters, 
despite a stated policy that expression of antigovernment views 
would be tolerated if not accompanied by violent acts. 

Both sides of the Abkhazian conflict claimed widespread 
interference with civilian human rights by their opponents. 
Among the charges were abuse of military prisoners, the taking 
of civilian hostages, and the shelling and blockading of civilian 
areas. In 1993 the Shevardnadze government began addressing 
claims of human rights abuses by its military forces and police, 
particularly against Gamsakhurdia partisans and the Abkhazian 



218 



Georgia 



population. In January the Parliamentary Commission on 
Human Rights and Ethnic Minority Affairs formed the Council 
of Ethnic Minorities, which met with representatives of the 
Meskhetian Turk exile population to resolve the grievances of 
that group. At the same time, the Interethnic Congress of the 
People of Georgia was formed to improve ethnic Georgians' 
appreciation of minority rights. 

Despite the government's efforts, the Abkhazian conflict 
continued the tension between necessary wartime controls and 
the need to protect human rights. In June 1993, the interna- 
tional human rights group Helsinki Watch cited Georgia for 
political persecution, media obstruction, and military abuses of 
civilian rights, and in October the United States listed human 
rights progress as a prerequisite for continued economic aid. 

The Media 

The 1992 Law on the Press nominally reversed the rigorous 
state censorship of the Soviet and Gamsakhurdia periods and 
guaranteed freedom of speech. In 1993 Georgian law con- 
tained no prohibition of public criticism of the head of state, 
and Shevardnadze was subjected to accusations and comments 
from every direction. Three television channels are in opera- 
tion; one, Ibervision, is run independently. Numerous inde- 
pendent newspapers are published; Sakartvelos Respublika (The 
Georgian Republic) presents the official government view in 
the daily press. 

Despite some liberalization, in 1994 national security 
remained a rationale for media restriction. During the crisis of 
September 1993, two pro-Gamsakhurdia newspapers were 
closed, and the office of an independent weekly was attacked 
by gunmen. The Free Media Association, an organization com- 
posed of eight independent newspapers, blamed a progovern- 
ment party for the attack. After his controversial decision in 
October to join the CIS, Shevardnadze threatened to close hos- 
tile newspapers, and no television channel discussed the wide- 
spread disagreement with the head of state's CIS initiative. 

Foreign Relations 

Georgia's long tradition as a crossroads of East-West com- 
merce was interrupted by the trade practices of the Soviet 
Union and then by Gamsakhurdia's isolationist policy. 
Although the Shevardnadze government sought to revive the 
national economy by reinstating ties with both East and West, 



219 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

in 1992 and 1993 domestic turmoil prevented major steps in 
that direction. In 1993 Shevardnadze traveled widely among 
the former Soviet republics (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Russia, 
and Turkmenistan) and elsewhere (Germany, China, and the 
headquarters of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Bel- 
gium) to solidify Georgia's international position and to solicit 
aid. By September, Georgia had diplomatic relations with sev- 
enty-eight countries and economic cooperation treaties with 
sixteen. 

The Soviet and Gamsakhurdia Periods 

Soviet policy effectively cut traditional commercial and dip- 
lomatic links to Turkey, which became a member of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO — see Glossary) in 1952, 
and to Iran, a United States ally until the late 1970s. Instead, 
virtually all transportation and commercial links were directed 
to Russia and the other Soviet republics. The same redirection 
occurred with diplomatic ties, which the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the Soviet Union controlled. Shevardnadze's pres- 
ence as Soviet foreign minister from 1985 to 1990 provided lit- 
tle direct benefit to Georgia aside from the large number of 
high-ranking guests who visited the republic in that period. 
That group included Britain's Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher and United States Secretary of State George Shultz. 

Under Gamsakhurdia, Georgia's efforts to break out of the 
diplomatic isolation of the Soviet period were stymied by the 
reluctance of the outside world to recognize breakaway repub- 
lics while the Soviet Union still existed. Romania, which 
granted recognition in August 1991, was one of the few coun- 
tries to do so during the Gamsakhurdia period. Several Geor- 
gian delegations came to the United States in 1991 in an effort 
to establish diplomatic ties, but Washington largely ignored 
those efforts. Given stable internal conditions, the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union in late 1991 would have released Georgia 
from its isolation, but by that time the revolt against Gamsa- 
khurdia was in full force. After the violent overthrow of Gamsa- 
khurdia, other governments were reluctant to recognize the 
legitimacy of his successors. This situation changed in March 
1992, when the internationally prominent Shevardnadze 
returned to Georgia and became chairman of the State Coun- 
cil. 

In 1992 and 1993, United States aid to Georgia totaled 
US$224 million, most of it humanitarian, placing Georgia sec- 



220 



Georgia 



ond in United States aid per capita among the former Soviet 
republics. In September 1993, Shevardnadze appealed directly 
to the United States Congress for additional aid. At that time, 
President William J. Clinton officially backed Shevardnadze's 
efforts to maintain the territorial integrity of Georgia. Reports 
of human rights offenses against opposition figures, however, 
brought United States warnings late in 1993 that continued 
support depended on the Georgian government's observance 
of international human rights principles. 

The Foreign Policy Establishment 

In his role as head of the State Council, Shevardnadze 
exerted a strong and direct influence on Georgia's foreign pol- 
icy prior to the 1992 election. The additional post of head of 
state, which he acquired after the election, gave him the right 
to conduct negotiations with foreign governments and to sign 
international treaties and agreements. In the Sigua cabinet, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs was headed by Alexander Chikh- 
vaidze, who had worked previously in the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the Soviet Union and was serving as Soviet ambassa- 
dor to the Netherlands at the time of his appointment in 
Tbilisi. The Council for National Security and Defense was cre- 
ated in late 1992 to formulate strategic and security policy 
under the chairmanship of the head of state (see National 
Security, this ch.). 

Revived Contacts in 1992 

Shevardnadze's diplomatic contacts and personal relation- 
ships with many of the world's leaders ended Georgia's interna- 
tional isolation in 1992. In March, Germany became the first 
Western country to post an ambassador to Georgia; Shevard- 
nadze's close relations with German foreign minister Hans- 
Dietrich Genscher were a key factor in that decision. Recogni- 
tion by the United States came in April 1992, and a United 
States embassy was opened in June 1992. Georgia became the 
179th member of the United Nations in July 1992; it was the 
last of the former Soviet republics to be admitted. By Decem- 
ber 1992, six countries had diplomatic missions in Tbilisi: 
China, Germany, Israel, Russia, Turkey, and the United States. 
Seventeen other countries began conducting diplomatic affairs 
with Georgia through their ambassadors to Russia or Ukraine. 
In August 1993, the United States granted Georgia most- 



221 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

favored-nation status, and the European Community offered 
technical economic assistance. 

Unlike some former Soviet republics such as Armenia, 
Lithuania, and Ukraine, Georgia lacked a large number of emi- 
grants in the West who could establish links to the outside 
world once internal conditions made such connections possi- 
ble. Small groups of Georgian exiles lived in Paris and other 
European capitals, but they were mostly descended from mem- 
bers of the Social Democratic government that had been 
forced into exile with the incorporation of Georgia into the 
Soviet empire in 1921. 

The only large group of emigrants that maintained contact 
with Georgia were Georgian Jews who had taken advantage of 
the Soviet Union's expansion of Jewish emigration rights in the 
1970s and 1980s. Because Jews had lived in Georgia for many 
centuries and because Georgia had no history of anti-Semitism, 
many Georgian Jews continued to feel an attachment to Geor- 
gia and its culture, language, and people. Largely as a result of 
these ties, relations between Georgia and Israel flourished on 
many levels. 

Relations with Neighboring Countries 

Of particular importance to Georgia's postcommunist for- 
eign policy and national security was the improvement of rela- 
tions with neighbors on all sides: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia, 
and Turkey. This goal was complicated by a number of ethnic 
and political issues as well as by historical differences. 

Armenia and Azerbaijan 

Among the former Soviet republics, the neighboring Trans- 
caucasian nations of Armenia and Azerbaijan have special sig- 
nificance for Georgia. Despite Georgia's obvious cultural and 
religious affinities with Armenia, relations between Georgia 
and Muslim Azerbaijan generally have been closer than those 
with Christian Armenia. Economic and political factors have 
contributed to this situation. First, Georgian fuel needs make 
good relations with Azerbaijan vital to the health of the Geor- 
gian economy. Second, Georgians have sympathized with Azer- 
baijan's position in the conflict between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan over the ethnic Armenian enclave of Nagorno-Kara- 
bakh because of similarities to Georgia's internal problems 
with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Both countries have cited the 
principle of "inviolability of state borders" in defending 



222 



Eduard Shevardnadze on 
official visit to the United 
States with President 
William J. Clinton, 
March 1994 
Courtesy White House 
Photo Office 



national interests against claims by ethnic minorities (see fig. 3; 
Nagorno-Karabakh and Independence, ch. 1; After Commu- 
nist Rule, ch. 2). 

In December 1990, Georgia under Gamsakhurdia signed a 
cooperation agreement with Azerbaijan affecting the eco- 
nomic, scientific, technical, and cultural spheres. In February 
1993, Georgia under Shevardnadze concluded a far-reaching 
treaty of friendship, cooperation, and mutual relations with 
Azerbaijan, including a mutual security arrangement and 
assurances that Georgia would not reexport Azerbaijani oil or 
natural gas to Armenia. In 1993 Azerbaijan exerted some pres- 
sure on Georgia to join the blockade of Armenia and to curb 
incursions by Armenians from Georgian territory into Azer- 
baijan. The issue of discrimination against the Azerbaijani 
minority in Georgia, a serious matter during Gamsakhurdia's 
tenure, was partially resolved under Shevardnadze. 

In the early 1990s, Armenia maintained fundamentally good 
relations with Georgia. The main incentive for this policy was 
the fact that Azerbaijan's blockade of Armenian transport 
routes and pipelines meant that routes through Georgia were 
Armenia's only direct connection with the outside world. 
Other considerations in the Armenian view were the need to 
protect the Armenians in Georgia and the need to stem the 
overflow of violence from Georgian territory. The official ties 



223 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

that Georgia forged with Azerbaijan between 1991 and 1993 
strained relations with Armenia, which was in an undeclared 
state of war with Azerbaijan throughout that period. Neverthe- 
less, Gamsakhurdia signed a treaty with Armenia on principles 
of cooperation in July 1991, and Shevardnadze signed a friend- 
ship treaty with Armenia in May 1993. With the aim of restor- 
ing mutually beneficial economic relations in the 
Transcaucasus, Shevardnadze also attempted (without success) 
to mediate the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict in early 1993. 

Russia 

Of all countries, Georgia's relations with Russia were both 
the most important and the most ambivalent. Russia (and pre- 
viously the Soviet Union) was deeply involved at many levels in 
theconflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and in 1993 Aja- 
rian leaders also declared Russia the protector of their national 
interests. Thus Russia seemingly holds the key to a resolution 
of those conflicts in a way that would avoid the fragmentation 
of Georgia. Trade ties with Russia, disrupted by Gamsakhur- 
dia's struggle with Gorbachev and by ethnic conflicts on Geor- 
gia's borders with Russia, also are critical to reviving the 
Georgian economy. 

Russia recognized Georgia's independence in mid-1992 and 
appointed an ambassador in October. In 1993 Russia's official 
position was that a stable, independent Georgia was necessary 
for security along Russia's southern border. The conditions 
behind that position were Russia's need for access to the Black 
Sea, which was endangered by shaky relations with Ukraine, 
the need for a buffer between Russia and Islamic extremist 
movements Russia feared in Turkey and Iran, the need to pro- 
tect the 370,000 ethnic Russians in Georgia, and the refugee 
influx and violence in the Russian Caucasus caused by turmoil 
across the mountains in Georgia. Although Shevardnadze was 
officially well regarded, Russian nationalists, many of them in 
the Russian army, wished to depose him as punishment for his 
initial refusal to bring Georgia into the CIS and for his role as 
the Soviet foreign minister who "lost" the former Soviet repub- 
lics in 1991. 

In pursuing its official goals, Russia offered mediation of 
Georgia's conflicts with the Abkhazian, Ajarian, and Ossetian 
minorities, encouraging Georgia to increase the autonomy of 
those groups for the sake of national stability. At the same time, 
Russian military policy makers openly declared Georgia's stra- 



224 



Georgia 



tegic importance to Russian national security. Such statements 
raised suspicions that, as in 1801 and 1921, Russia would take 
advantage of Georgia's weakened position and sweep the little 
republic back into the empire. 

Despite the misgivings of his fellow Georgians, in 1993 She- 
vardnadze pursued talks toward a comprehensive bilateral 
Georgian-Russian treaty of friendship. Discussions were inter- 
rupted by surges of fighting in Abkhazia, however, and rela- 
tions were cooled by Shevardnadze's claim that Russia was 
aiding the secessionist campaign that had begun in August. 

In September 1993, the fall of Sukhumi to Abkhazian forces 
signaled the crumbling of the Georgian army, and the return 
of Gamsakhurdia threatened to split Georgia into several parts. 
Shevardnadze, recognizing the necessity of outside military 
help to maintain his government, agreed to join the CIS on 
terms dictated by Russia in return for protection of govern- 
ment supply lines by Russian troops. Meanwhile, despite deni- 
als by the Yeltsin government, an unknown number of Russians 
still gave "unofficial" military advice and materiel to the Abkha- 
zian forces, which experts believed would not have posed a 
major threat to Tbilisi without such assistance. Shevardnadze 
defended CIS membership at home as an absolute necessity for 
Georgia's survival as well as a stimulant to increased trade with 
Russia. 

Turkey 

Despite a history of episodic Turkish invasions, Shevard- 
nadze courted Turkey as an economic and diplomatic partner. 
Georgians took advantage of the opening of border traffic with 
Turkey to begin vigorous commercial activities with their near- 
est "capitalist" neighbor. In 1992 Georgia became a member of 
the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization, which is 
based in Turkey. In December 1992, Turkey granted Georgia a 
credit equivalent to US$50 million to purchase wheat and 
other goods and to stimulate Turkish private investment in the 
republic. Georgia also signed several diplomatic agreements 
with Turkey in the early 1990s, including a Georgian pledge to 
respect existing common borders and official Turkish support 
of Georgian national integrity against the Abkhazian separatist 
movement. The issue of reinstatement of exiled Meskhetian 
Turks eased in 1993 when Georgia established official contacts 
with that minority (see Human Rights, this ch.). 



225 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

National Security 

Military forces have played a critical role in Georgian politics 
since 1989. In January 1992, Georgia's president was over- 
thrown by military force, and the Shevardnadze regime relied 
heavily on the armed forces to stay in power. Warfare in the 
autonomous regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, as well as 
armed resistance by Gamsakhurdia supporters in western 
Georgia, have further emphasized the military's major role in 
national security. 

The Military Establishment 

Almost from its inception in late 1990, the National Guard 
became directly involved in Georgian politics. By 1992 
repeated human rights offenses against Gamsakhurdia sup- 
porters brought calls to change this role. At the same time, the 
political rivalry between Ioseliani and Kitovani, the leaders of 
the Mkhedrioni (horsemen) and the National Guard, respec- 
tively, became one of the key conflicts in the Georgian govern- 
ment hierarchy, and many political parties continued to retain 
private armies in the guise of armed bodyguards or security 
teams. Discipline problems in the ranks of both the National 
Guard and the Mkhedrioni and their ineffectiveness as fighting 
forces led the Georgian government to plan for a professional 
army. In April 1992, the State Council adopted a resolution to 
form a unified armed force of up to 20,000 soldiers. 

At the time the government announced its plans for a pro- 
fessional army, however, neither existing military group had 
sufficient internal discipline to carry out major restructuring. 
Efforts to disband the National Guard and Mkhedrioni were 
delayed by continued violence in western Georgia, by an 
attempted coup in Tbilisi by Gamsakhurdia supporters, and by 
the political ambitions of Kitovani and Ioseliani. In May 1992, 
Kitovani was designated minister of defense in an effort to 
bring the National Guard under central control. Instead, dur- 
ing the following year Kitovani turned his position into a power 
center rivaling Shevardnadze's. In May 1993, Shevardnadze 
induced Kitovani and Ioseliani to resign from their powerful 
positions on the Council for National Security and Defense, 
depriving both men of influence over national security policy 
and enhancing the stature of the head of state. 

Shevardnadze complained in early 1993 that a unified army 
had still not been created. In May the National Guard was abol- 



226 



Georgia 



ished as a separate force, and individual distinguished units 
remained in existence with special guard status. In the second 
half of 1993, however, outside threats to national security 
caused Shevardnadze to rely once again on Ioseliani's paramili- 
tary Mkhedrioni, delaying consolidation of a national military 
force. In September, Shevardnadze's control over the military 
improved when parliament declared a two-month state of 
emergency, which had the effect of weakening the Mkhedrioni. 

The Russian Presence 

The Soviet Union had maintained a substantial military pres- 
ence in Georgia because the republic bordered Turkey, a mem- 
ber of NATO. The Transcaucasus Military District, which had 
coordinated Soviet military forces in the three republics of 
Transcaucasia, was headquartered in Tbilisi. In mid-1993 an 
estimated 15,000 Russian troops and border guards remained 
on Georgian territory. Georgia did not press Russian with- 
drawal as vigorously as did other former republics of the Soviet 
Union because it did not have enough personnel to patrol its 
entire border. At the same time, the continued presence of 
Russian troops energized the Georgian nationalist parties. In 
the fall of 1993, those groups saw Shevardnadze's call for Rus- 
sian military assistance, and the significant increase of Russian 
forces that resulted, as an admission that his national security 
policy had failed and a sign that the traditional enemy to the 
north was again threatening. 

Draft Policy 

The role of Soviet military and internal security forces in the 
April Tragedy made Georgian connections with those forces a 
primary target of anticommunist groups. As in other Soviet 
republics, opposition to the draft became an early focus of 
opposition activities. Of all the Soviet republics, Georgia had 
the lowest rate of recruitment in the fall of 1990, approxi- 
mately 10 percent of eligible citizens. One of the first acts 
passed by Gamsakhurdia's parliament ended the Soviet military 
draft on Georgian territory. 

In late 1990, Soviet conscription was replaced with the 
induction of eligible Georgian males into new "special divi- 
sions," under the control of the Georgian Ministry of Internal 
Affairs, for the maintenance of order within the republic. The 
new body, which became Kitovani's National Guard, was one of 
the first official non-Soviet military units in what was still the 



227 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

Soviet Union. Attempts to build a new Georgian national army 
in 1993 and 1994 were hindered by a very high percentage of 
draft evasion. 

Arms Supply 

Relatively little of the military industry of the Soviet Union 
was located in Georgia. One Tbilisi plant assembled military 
training aircraft that were the basis of a small Georgian air 
force. Most weapons obtained by the various armed units oper- 
ating in Georgia after 1990 apparently were purchased illegally 
from Soviet (and later Russian) officers and soldiers stationed 
in the Caucasus. In May 1992, leaders of the CIS set quotas for 
the transfer of Soviet military equipment to republic armed 
forces. According to this plan, Georgia was to receive 220 tanks, 
220 armored vehicles, 300 artillery pieces, 100 military aircraft, 
and fifty attack helicopters. Kitovani complained in December 
1992 that Georgia had not yet received any of its allotment. 

Internal Security 

The Georgian internal security agency having the closest ties 
to Moscow was the Georgian branch of the Committee for State 
Security (Komitet gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti — KGB). 
Beginning in 1990, the anticommunist independence move- 
ment exerted direct pressure on the Georgian KGB to accept 
independence. The first confrontation between Moscow and 
the Gamsakhurdia government came over appointments to top 
security posts in the republic. In November 1990, the Georgian 
parliamentary Commission on Security broke the tradition of 
Moscow-designated KGB chiefs by naming its own appointee. 
When Gorbachev threatened dire consequences, Gamsakhur- 
dia simply left the chairmanship vacant but named his candi- 
date first deputy chairman and thus acting chairman. At that 
point, top Georgian KGB officials voiced support for Gamsa- 
khurdia and protested Gorbachev's interference, signaling a 
service commitment to Tbilisi rather than to Moscow. 

As late as mid-1991, Moscow continued financing activities of 
the Georgian KGB and provided part of the budget of the 
Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs, which ran domestic intel- 
ligence and police agencies. Meanwhile, by 1991 the opposi- 
tion to Gamsakhurdia was accusing the president of using the 
Georgian KGB to investigate and harass political enemies. 

In May 1992, the Georgian KGB, which in the interim had 
been renamed the Ministry of Security, was formally replaced 



228 



Georgia 



by the Information and Intelligence Service. The new agency, 
established on the organizational foundation of the old KGB, 
was headed by Irakli Batiashvili, a thirty-year-old philosophy 
scholar who had been a National Democratic Party delegate to 
the National Congress. 

Civilian National Security Organization 

In November 1992, the parliament passed a law creating the 
Council for National Security and Defense. This body was 
accountable to parliament, but, as head of state and com- 
mander in chief of the armed forces, Shevardnadze was council 
chairman. Shevardnadze named Ioseliani and Kitovani deputy 
chairmen of the council; Tedo Japaridze, top expert on the 
United States in the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
became the chairman's aide. The powers of the council 
included the right to issue binding decisions on military and 
security matters. 

In May 1993, Shevardnadze disbanded the council to 
deprive Ioseliani and Kitovani of their government power 
bases. The council was then reconstituted, with Shevardnadze's 
chairmanship assuming greater power. 

Crime 

In the first postcommunist years, levels of crime and civil 
unrest in Georgia were quite high because of the proximity of 
the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, refugee movement and ter- 
rorism resulting from the Abkhazian conflict within Georgia, 
the gap between official wages and living standards, and the 
government's lack of police authority in many areas of the 
country. Crime statistics were unreliable, however, because the 
extent of law enforcement and reporting varied during 1993. 
Reported crimes dropped from 1,982 in May to 1,260 in July. In 
late 1993, however, numerous automobile thefts and kidnap- 
pings occurred on Georgian highways, and citizen insecurity 
prompted the proliferation of private detective agencies. 

The natural gas pipeline to Armenia was a frequent target of 
terrorist bombs in 1993, and several government figures appar- 
ently were the targets of unsuccessful bomb attacks. The Mkhe- 
drioni, who often were involved in criminal activity, usually 
escaped police control because the minister of internal affairs 
was a Mkhedrioni member. In September, Shevardnadze took 
personal control of the ministry to bolster police authority. 



229 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

Long-Term Security 

In late 1993, the primary consideration of Georgian national 
security continued to be the prevention of territorial gains by 
separatist national movements — a cause for which Russian mili- 
tary assistance was proving indispensable. Longer-term 
national security, however, would depend on Shevardnadze's 
ability to reestablish the structures of a viable, unified state: 
internal and international commercial activity, undisputed sov- 
ereignty over the national territory and its populace, and a 
shift back to government rule by statute rather than by emer- 
gency executive powers. In early 1994, all those preconditions 
remained in doubt, and Shevardnadze's reluctant recourse to 
Russian military assistance had set a precedent with unknown 
national security consequences. 

* * * 

For background on Georgian history, the best basic source is 
Ronald G. Suny's The Making of the Georgian Nation. Earlier his- 
tories on the Georgian people were written by David Marshall 
Lang (A Modern History of Soviet Georgia and The Georgians) and 
Kalistrat Salia (History of the Georgian Nation) . Several scholars 
have followed contemporary Georgian developments on a reg- 
ular basis; in addition to the present author, they include Eliza- 
beth Fuller, a writer for the BFE/RL Research Report; Stephen 
Jones, whose journal articles cover political and nationalist 
issues in the Caucasus; and Robert Parsons of the British 
Broadcasting Corporation. Human rights issues in Georgia are 
covered extensively in publications of the United States Con- 
gress's Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. 
Useful articles from Russian-language sources are translated in 
the Foreign Broadcast Information Service's Daily Report: Soviet 
Union (more recently titled Daily Report: Central Eurasia) . Stud- 
ies of Georgian culture and history appear occasionally in the 
Journal for the Study of Caucasia. And the Georgian Chronicle is a 
monthly bulletin on current events published by the Caucasian 
Institute for Peace, Democracy, and Development in Tbilisi. 
(For further information and complete citations, see Bibliogra- 
phy.) 



230 



Appendix 



Table 

1 Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 

2 Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Selected Health and 

Health Care Statistics, 1989, 1990, and 1991 

3 Armenia: Output of Major Industrial Products, 1989, 1990, 

and 1991 

4 Armenia: Durable Consumer Goods, 1989, 1990, and 1991 

5 Armenia: Employment by Economic Activity, 1989-92 

6 Armenia: Annual Per Capita Food Consumption, Selected 

Years, 1970-90 

7 Armenia: Government Budget, 1991 and 1992 

8 Armenia: Major Trading Partners, 1990 

9 Azerbaijan: Annual Per Capita Food Consumption, Select- 

ed Years, 1970-90 

10 Azerbaijan: Durable Consumer Goods, 1989, 1990, and 
1991 

11 Azerbaijan: Employment by Economic Activity, 1989, 1990, 
and 1991 

12 Azerbaijan: Population and Employment, 1988-91 

13 Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Share of Total Produc- 
tion of Major Agricultural Commodities in Former Soviet 
Union by Republic, 1986-90 Average 

14 Azerbaijan: Output of Selected Industrial Products, 1989, 
1990, and 1991 

15 Azerbaijan: Government Budget, 1988-92 

16 Azerbaijan: Major Trading Partners, 1990 

17 Georgia: Government Budget, 1991 and 1992 

18 Georgia: Output of Major Industrial Products, 1990, 1991, 
and 1992 

19 Georgia: Employment by Economic Activity, 1989, 1990, 
and 1991 

20 Georgia: Population and Employment, 1988-91 

21 Georgia: Annual Per Capita Food Consumption, Selected 
Years, 1970-90 

22 Georgia: Durable Consumer Goods, 1989, 1990, and 1991 

23 Georgia: External Trade, 1988, 1989, and 1990 

24 Georgia: Major Trading Partners, 1990 



231 



Appendix 



Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 



When you kow Multiply by To find 





0.04 


inches 


Centimeters 


0.39 


inches 


Meters 


3.3 


feet 


Kilometers 


0.62 


miles 


Hectares (10,000 m 2 ) 


2.47 


acres 


Square kilometers 


0.39 


square miles 


Cubic meters 


35.3 


cubic feet 


Liters 


0.26 


gallons 


Kilograms 


2.2 


pounds 




0.98 


long tons 




1.1 


short tons 




2,204.0 


pounds 


Degrees Celsius (Centigrade) 


1.8 and add 32 


degrees Fahrenheit 



233 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 



Table 2. Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Selected Health and 
Health Care Statistics, 1989, 1990, and 1991 



Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia 



Disease diagnosis 



Tuberculosis 17.6 36.2 28.9 

Viral hepatitis 279.0 310.5 226.3 

Cancer 223.1 224.9 140.9 

Hospital beds 2 89.4 99.4 110.7 

Doctors 2 42.8 38.9 59.2 

Pharmacists 3 7.0 6.7 14.3 

Infant mortality 4 17.1 25.0 15.9 



For tuberculosis and cancer, first diagnoses per 100,000 population in 1990; for viral hepatitis, registered 
cases per 100,000 population in 1989. 

Per 10,000 population: in 1990 for Georgia, in 1991 for Armenia and Azerbaijan. 
Per 10,000 population in 1989. 

Per 1,000 live births: in 1990 for Georgia, in 1991 for Armenia and Azerbaijan. 



Source: Based on information from Christopher M. Davis, "Health Care Crisis: The Former 
Soviet Union," RFE/RL Research Report [Munich], 2, No. 40, October 8, 1993, 36. 



234 



Appendix 



Table 3. Armenia: Output of Major Industrial Products, 1989, 
1990, and 1991 



Product 


1989 


1990 


1991 


Automobile tires (in thousands) 


1,338 


1,009 


914 


Cable (in kilometers) 


13,772 


8,459 


7,746 


Canned food (in thousands of cans) 


413,119 


267,425 


181,860 


Carpets (in thousands of square meters) 


1,585 


1,300 


947 




1,639 


1,466 


1,507 


Electric energy (in millions of kilowatt-hours) . . 


12,137 


10,377 


9,532 


Electric engines 


736,490 


823,295 


700,157 


Leather shoes (in thousands of pairs) 


17,952 


18,740 


11,340 


Natural textile items 


90,723 


85,473 


53,203 


Synthetic fibers (in tons) 


10,479 


9,351 


4,050 


Synthetic rubber (in tons) 


39,150 


1,141 


10,613 


Wine and cognac (in thousands of decaliters) . . 


7,104 


4,805 


4,852 



Source: Based on information from International Monetary Fund, Armenia, Washington, 1993, 
40. 



235 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 



Table 4. Armenia: Durable Consumer Goods, 1989, 1990, and 
1991 (items per 100 families J 



Product 1989 1990 1991 



Automobiles 33 34 39 

Refrigerators 81 81 80 

Sewing machines 54 52 50 

Tape recorders 42 46 49 

Televisions 93 95 93 

Washing machines 89 95 96 



Source: Based on information from United States, Central Intelligence Agency, Handbook of 
International Economic Statistics, 1993, Washington, 1993, 73. 



236 



Appendix 



Table 5. Armenia: Employment by Economic Activity, 1989-92 
(in thousands of people) 

Activity 1989 1990 1991 1992 1 

Agriculture 117 115 46 20 

Industry 417 398 359 344 

Construction 156 167 162 122 

Communications 13 13 12 20 

Transportation 65 64 69 51 

Health and social services 91 90 93 81 

Education 143 154 130 152 

Science and research and development 52 52 35 30 

Other '. 248 231 231 192 

TOTAL 1,302 1,284 1,137 1,012 

* January to June. 

Source: Based on information from International Monetary Fund, Armenia, Washington, 1993, 
44. 



237 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 



Table 6. Armenia: Annual Per Capita Food Consumption, Selected 

Years, 1970-90 
fin kilograms unless otherwise specified) 



Food 


1970 


1980 


1985 


1990 


Bread 


1 <A 

1j4 


140 


131 


126 




C\A 


1 AC 

146 


1 AO 

14s 


163 


Fish 


4 


4 


5 


8 


Meat 


34 


47 


49 


56 


Milk and dairy products 


328 


432 


433 


446 


Potatoes 


55 


55 


65 


58 




26 


31 


29 


39 




2 


3 


2 


3 


Vegetables 


101 


118 


135 


132 



Source: Based on information from World Bank, Food and Agricultural Policy Reforms in the 
Former USSR, Washington, 1992, 183-84. 



238 



Appendix 



Table 7. Armenia: Government Budget, 1991 and 1992 1 fin 
percentages of GNPJ 2 

1992 

1991 

First Second Third Fourth 

Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter 3 

Revenues 

Tax revenues 4 15.8 10.7 19.6 18.5 15.6 

Nontax revenues 10.2 6.0 5.6 5.1 5.3 

Total revenues 26.0 16.7 25.2 23.5 20.9 

Expenditures 
Current expenditures 

Wages . . n.a. 5 5.6 7.3 6.4 8.9 

External interest n.a. 14.7 9.7 9.3 10.7 

Pension and child allowances n.a. 15.1 13.1 8.9 11.7 

Other 255 _JA _2O0 20.7 

Total current expenditures n.a. 60.9 37.6 44.5 52.1 

Capital expenditures n.a . 4.8 8,7 4.6 5.6 

Total expenditures 27.9 65.7 46.4 49.1 57.6 

Accrued deficit -1.9 -49.0 -21.2 -25.6 -36.7 

Net change in arrears * n.a . 34.1 10.2 11.8 16.5 

Cash deficit -1.9 -14.9 -11.0 -13.7 -20.2 

1 Figures may not add to totals because of rounding. 

2 GNP — gross national product. 

3 Projected. 

4 Includes value-added tax; excise, enterprise, and personal income taxes; collection of back taxes; and other 
taxes. 

5 n.a. — not available. 

Source: Based on information from International Monetary Fund, Armenia, Washington, 1993, 
51. 



239 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 



Table 8. Armenia: Major Trading Partners, 1990 



Country 




Value 1 


Percentage of Total 


Exports 


Imports 


Exports 


Imports 


Europe 


69 


585 


66.9 


66.8 


Bulgaria 


12 


67 


11.7 


7.6 


Britain 


3 


10 


2.9 


1.1 


Hungary 


6 


49 


5.8 


5.6 


Italy 


4 


20 


3.9 


2.3 


Poland 


7 


84 


6.8 


9.6 




4 


20 


3.9 


2.3 


Germany 


11 


139 


10.7 


15.8 


Finland 


3 


22 


2.9 


2.5 




3 


27 


2.9 


3.1 


Czechoslovakia 


9 


80 


8.7 


9.1 




2 


28 


1.9 


3.2 




11 


148 


10.3 


16.9 


India 


2 


25 


1.9 


2.9 


China 


2 


24 


1.9 


2.7 




1 


33 


1.0 


3.8 


North America 


8 


98 


7.7 


11.2 


Cuba 


6 


51 


5.8 


5.8 


United States 


1 


32 


1.0 


3.6 



In millions of rubles. 



Source: Based on information from World Bank, Statistical Handbook: States of the Former 
USSR, Washington, 1992, 40. 



240 



Appendix 



Table 9. Azerbaijan: Annual Per Capita Food Consumption, 
SelectedYears, 1970-90 
(In kilograms unless otherwise specified) 



Food 


1970 


1980 


1985 


1990 


Bread 


155 


160 


158 


151 


Eggs (in units) 


90 


134 


155 


143 


Fish 


3 


3 


5 


5 


Meat 


26 


32 


35 


34 


Milk and dairy products . . . 


227 


281 


293 


292 


Potatoes 


25 


25 


28 


27 


Sugar 


33 


40 


37 


36 


Vegetable oil 


2 


2 


3 


3 


Vegetables 


47 


72 


62 


67 


Source: Based on information from World Bank, Food and Agricultural Policy Reforms in the 


Former USSR, Washington, 1992, 183-84. 








Table 10. Azerbaijan: Durable Consumer Goods, 1989, 1990, 




and 1991 










(items per 100 families J 






Product 




1989 


1990 


1991 


Automobiles 




16 


17 


16 


Refrigerators 




83 


83 


82 


Sewing machines 




62 


60 


58 


Tape recorders 




36 


39 


40 


Televisions 




101 


102 


101 


Washing machines 




48 


51 


52 



Source: Based on information from United States, Central Intelligence Agency, Handbook of 
International Economic Statistics, 1993, Washington, 1993, 75. 



241 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 



Table 11. Azerbaijan: Employment by Economic Activity, 1989, 
1990, and 1991 
(in thousands of peoplej 



Activity 


1989 


1990 


1991 


Agriculture 


905 


914 


934 


Forestry 


6 


5 


5 


Industry 


483 


469 


463 


Construction 


243 


251 


248 


Transportation and communications 


133 


143 


143 


Trade and commercial services 


232 


230 


233 


Housing and municipal services 


108 


99 


101 


Science and research and development 


60 


58 


60 


Education and culture 


329 


338 


341 


Health and social welfare 


168 


170 


173 


Government 


61 


62 


62 


Other 


67 


71 


73 


TOTAL 1 


2,794 


2,808 


2,839 



Figures may not add to totals because of rounding. 

Source: Based on information from The Europa World Year Book 1993, 1, London, 1993, 442. 



242 



Appendix 



Table 12. Azerbaijan: Population and Employment, 1988-91 
fin thousands of people,) 





1988 


1989 


1990 


1991 


Total population 


6,963 


7,064 


7,117 


7,175 


Urban 


3,768 


3,829 


3,843 


3,858 


Rural 


3,195 


3,235 


3,274 


3,317 


Total labor force 


3,932 


3,959 


3,977 


3,986 


Total employed 


2,753 


2,795 


2,808 


2,839 




2,209 


2,200 


2,173 


2,171 




304 


308 


312 


325 


Self-employed 


236 


241 


260 


265 


Other 


4 


46 


63 


78 


Students of working age 


325 


308 


306 


307 


Employed in households 


815 


721 


729 


707 



Source: Based on information from World Bank, Azerbaijan: From Crisis to Sustained 
Growth, Washington, 1993, 159. 



243 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 



Table 13. Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Share of Total 
Production of Major Agricultural Commodities in Former Soviet 
Union by Republic, 1986-90 Average 
fin percentages) 



Commodity Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia 

Citrus fruits 0.0 0.0 96.3 

Cotton 0.0 7.7 0.0 

Eggs 0.7 1.2 1.0 

Fruits and berries 2.0 4.3 6.8 

Grains 0.2 0.6 0.3 

Grapes 3.1 22.6 11.0 

Meat 0.5 0.9 0.9 

Milk : 0.5 1.0 0.7 

Potatoes 0.3 0.3 0.5 

Sugar beets 0.1 0.0 0.1 

Sunflowers 0.0 0.0 0.1 

Vegetables 1.8 3.1 2.0 

Wool 0.8 2.3 1.4 



Source: Based on information from World Bank, Food and Agricultural Policy Reforms in the 
Former USSR, Washington, 1992, 194. 



244 



Appendix 



Table 14. Azerbaijan: Output of Selected Industrial Products, 
1989, 1990, and 1991 
fin thousands of tons unless otherwise specified) 



Product 


1989 


1990 


1991 


Aviation fuel 


114 


89 


58 




167 


146 


113 




219 


160 


171 


Diesel oil 


4,236 


3,899 


3,635 


Electric energy (in millions of kilowatt-hours) 


23,300 


23,200 


23,300 


Fuel oil 


7,555 


6,686 


7,207 


Jet kerosene 


1,519 


1,290 


1,205 


Lubricants 


934 


818 


763 




1,522 


1,479 


1,174 


Naphtha 


550 


341 


427 


Petroleum coke 


230 


179 


161 


Steel 


696 


501 


462 


Sulfuric acid 


768 


603 


552 



Source: Based on information from The Europa World Year Book, 1993, 1, London, 1993, 443. 



245 



Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia: Country Studies 



Table 15. Azerbaijan: Government Budget 1988-92 1 
Cm percentages of GNP)~ 



: 9 ; s 



- 



Revenues 
Tax revenues 

Indirect taxes 3 , 

Direct taxes 4 

Total tax revenues 

Nontax revenues 

Total revenues 

Expenditures 

National economy 5 

Science 

Education 

Health 

Culture and sports 

Social security 

Internal security and defense 

Consumer subsidies 

Other 

Total expenditures 

Balance 



10.3 


10.7 


12.5 


13.0 


20.4 


8.4 


7.9 


8.6 


8.1 


s : 


18.7 


18.6 


21.1 


21.1 


28.4 


3.5 


3.8 


5.3 


4.4 


3.6 


22.3 


22.3 


26.4 


255 


32.0 


9.5 


10.6 


15.1 


9.9 


2.4 


0.0 


0.4 


0.4 


0.2 


0.5 


6.9 


6.7 


7.7 


7.0 


10.3 


2.3 


2.5 


2.9 


2.9 


4.0 


0.1 


0.1 


0.1 


1.0 


1.0 


3.0 


3.2 


4.0 


6.6 


2.6 


0.3 


0.3 


05 


1.3 


7.6 


0.0 


0.0 


0.0 


0.0 


3.7 


1.1 


0.7 


1.3 


1.7 


5.6 


23.1 


24.4 


31.9 


:-: 5 


;-" : 


-0.9 


-2.0 


-5.5 


-5.0 


-5.6 



1 Figures may not add to totals because of rounding. 
" GXP — gross national product. 

3 Turnover, sales, excise, and export-import taxes: value-added tax: and duties. 

4 Profit, income, and property taxes. 

5 Investment bv budgetary institutions and transfers to the enterprise sector 



Source: Based on information from World Bank. Azerbaijan: From Crisis to Sustained 
Growth. Washington. 1993. 193. 



246 



Appendix 



Table 16. Azerbaijan: Major Trading Partners, 1990 



Country 




Value 1 


Percentage of Total 




Exports 


Imports 


Exports 


Imports 


Europe 




836 


62.7 


65.3 


Bulgaria 




92 


9.0 


7.2 






12 


3.1 


0.9 


Hungary 


27 


60 


5.9 


4.7 






54 


2.4 


4.2 




26 


140 


5.7 


10.9 


Romania 


16 


30 


3.5 


2.3 






172 


10.7 


13.4 


Finland 


10 


39 


2.2 


3.0 






22 


2.6 


1.7 


Czechoslovakia 


33 


109 


7.2 


8.5 


Yugoslavia 


11 


53 


2.4 


4.1 


Asia 


72 


262 


15.9 


20.5 


India 


9 


57 


2.0 


4.5 


China 


8 


28 


1.9 


2.7 


Japan 


11 


53 


2.4 


4.1 




31 


131 


6.9 


10.2 


Cuba 


26 


67 


5.7 


5.2 


United States 


4 


39 


0.9 


3.0 



In millions of rubles. 



Source: Based on information from World Bank, Statistical Handbook: States of the Former 
USSR, Washington, 1992, 68. 



247 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 



Table 1 7. Georgia: Government Budget, 1991 and 1992 fin 

millions of rubles) 

1991 1992 

Budget Actual Budget Actual 

Revenues 

Tax revenues 3,972 4,631 22,202 15,218 

Nontax revenues 1,295 1,567 2.898 3,655 

Total revenues 5,267 6,198 25,100 18,873 

Expenditures 

National economy 1 2,979 2,878 11,885 20,815 

Social and cultural 

Education and culture 2 n.a. 2 1,520 n.a. 8,421 

Health and sports n.a. 812 n.a. 2,996 

Social security n.a. 120 n.a. 34 

Science n.a. 74 n.a. 874 

Total social and cultural 2,717 2,526 10,082 12,325 

Administration and law enforcement 

State administration n.a. 124 n.a. 1,288 

Internal security and defense n.a. 118 n.a. 5.282 

Total administration and law enforcement . 245 242 2,631 6,570 

Other 327 276 1.765 2.972 

Total expenditures 6,268 5,922 26,363 42,682 

Extrabudgetary factors 3 n.a. 1,000 12,713 -23,320 

Interest on foreign debt 21.714 

Balance -1,001 -724 -13,976 -68,843 

1 Investment by budgetary institutions and transfers to the enterprise sector. 

2 n.a. — not available. 

3 Errors and omissions and extrabudgetary expenditures for social security fund and net lending. 

Source: Based on information from World Bank, Georgia: A Blueprint for Reforms, Washing- 
ton, 1993, 120; and The Europa World Year Book, 1993, 1, London, 1993, 50. 



248 



Appendix 



Table 18. Georgia: Output of Major Industrial Products, 1990, 
1991 and 1992 
fin thousands of tons unless otherwise specified) 



Product 


1990 


1991 


1992 1 


Beer (in thousands of decaliters) 


9,477 


6,011 


3,288 


Cigarettes (in millions) 


11,200 


9,800 


5,100 


Cotton fabric (in millions of square meters) 


34 


17 


13 


Diesel fuel 


658 


495 


111 


Footwear (in millions of pairs) 


13 


12 


3 


Heavy oil (mazut) 


898 


737 


189 


Machine tools (in units) 


1,565 


1,417 


1,149 


Margarine 


34 


16 


2 


Motor fuel 


399 


324 


72 


Steel 


1,316 


962 


535 


Synthetic fibers 


32 


20 


5 


Synthetic resins and plastics 


40 


26 


8 




14 


7 


0.1 


Wine (in thousands of decaliters) 


16,283 


12,166 


7,130 



Estimated. 



. Source: Based on information from The Europa World Year Book, 1993, 1, London, 1993, 
1236; and United States, Central Intelligence Agency, Handbook of International 
Economic Statistics, 1993, Washington, 1993, 76. 



249 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 



Table 19. Georgia: Employment by Economic Activity, 1989, 1990, 

andl991 
fin thousands of people) 



Activity 


1989 


1990 


1991 


Agriculture 


656 


695 


671 


Forestry 


, , 12 


12 


11 


Industry 


537 


560 


488 




266 


281 


225 




123 


115 


104 


Trade and commercial services 


267 


257 


227 


Housing and municipal services 


123 


131 


110 


Science and research and development 


73 


73 


63 




301 


310 


290 


Health, social welfare, and sports 


189 


184 


186 


Banking and financial 


12 


12 


12 


Government 


55 


52 


48 


Other services 


86 


82 


79 


TOTAL 1 


2,700 


2,763 


2,514 



Figures may not add to totals because of rounding. 



Source: Based on information from The Europa World Year Book, 1993, 1, London, 1993, 
1235. 



250 



Appendix 



Table 20. Georgia: Population and Employment, 1988-91 
(in thousands of people) 





1988 


1989 


1990 


1991 


Total population 


5,396 


5,414 


5,422 


5,421 


Males 


2,561 


2,571 


2,579 


n.a. 1 


Females 


2,835 


2,843 


2,843 


n.a. 


Urban 


2,989 


3,014 


3,029 


3,024 


Rural 


2,407 


2,400 


2,393 


2,397 


Total employed 


2,650 


2,635 


2,685 


2,543 






1,414 


n.a. 


n.a. 


Females employed 


n.a. 


1,221 


n.a. 


n.a. 


In state sector 


2,205 


2,148 


2,087 


1,886 


In collective farms 


249 


218 


200 


154 


Self-employed 


177 


211 


229 


356 


Other 


19 


58 


169 


147 



n.a — not available. 



Source: Based on information from World Bank, Georgia: A Blueprint for Reforms, Washing- 
ton, 1993, 109-10. 



251 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 



Table 21. Georgia: Annual Per Capita Food Consumption, Selected 

Years, 1970-90 
(in kilograms unless otherwise specified) 



Food 


i Q7n 


Lyov 


1 QQ< 


i onn 


Bread ^ 


195 


190 


190 


183 


Eggs (in units) 


85 


135 


148 


140 


Fish 


6 


8 


9 


9 


Meat 


31 


43 


47 


46 


Milk and dairy products 


235 


309 


309 


289 


Potatoes 


38 


46 


49 


41 


Sugar 


35 


45 


43 


39 


Vegetable oil 


3 


5 


6 


6 


Vegetables 


51 


79 


87 


82 



Source: Based on information from World Bank, Food and Agricultural Policy Reforms in the 
Former USSR, Washington, 1992, 183-84. 



Table 22. Georgia: Durable Consumer Goods, 1989, 1990, and 
1991 (items per 100 families J 



Product 


1988 


1989 


1990 




31 


31 


34 


Refrigerators 


95 


95 


95 


Sewing machines 


63 


63 


61 




44 


48 


52 


Televisions 


102 


106 


112 


Washing machines 


76 


81 


86 



Source: Based on information from United States, Central Intelligence Agency, Handbook of 
International Economic Statistics, 1993, Washington, 1993, 77. 



252 



Appendix 



Table 23. Georgia: External Trade, 1988, 1989, and 1990 
fin millions of rubles,) 



1988 1989 1990 



Exports 







68 


68 


Ferrous metallurgy 


375 


376 


318 


Chemical fuels 


316 


343 


339 


Machines and processed metals 


848 


869 


804 


Nonfood light industrial products 


1,275 


1,285 


1,260 


Processed foods 


2,438 


2,573 


2,387 


Other industrial products 


258 


275 


310 




280 


190 


404 


Other 


11 


105 


__93 


Total exports 


5,901 


6,084 


5,983 


To other Soviet republics 


5,508 


5,719* 


5,724 




393 


465 1 


259 


Imports 










413 


360 


285 


Ferrous metallurgy 


489 


443 


430 


Nonferrous metallurgy 


102 


106 


97 


Chemical fuels 


541 


544 


576 


Machines and processed metals 


1,533 


1,522 


1,580 


Timber and wood products 


248 


244 


279 




155 


148 


117 


Nonfood light industrial products 


1,221 


1,287 


1,372 




, . , 1,204 


1,142 


1,174 




212 


212 


291 




348 


358 


498 


Other 


_27 


103 


140 



253 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 



Table 23. Georgia: External Trade, 1988, 1989, and 1990 
(in millions of rubles J 





1988 


1989 


1990 


Total imports 


6,493 


6,469 


6,839 


From other Soviet republics 


5,218 


4,888 


4,948 


From other countries 


1,275 


1,581 


1,891 



As published. 

Source: Based on information from The Europa World Year Book, 1994, 1, London, 1994, 
1237. 



254 



Appendix 



Table 24. Georgia: Major Trading Partners, 1990 



Country 




Value 1 


Percentage of Total 




Exports 


Imports 


Exports 


Imports 


Europe 


213 


1,687 


71.4 


71.2 




5 


53 


2.0 


2.2 




32 


202 


10.7 


8.5 


Hungary 


18 


144 


6.0 


6.1 


Italy 


13 


53 


4.4 


2.2 




25 


256 


8.4 


10.8 




32 


420 


10.7 


17.7 




7 


76 


2.3 


3.2 




23 


227 


7.7 


9.6 


Yugoslavia 


8 


64 


2.7 


2.7 






j 1 1 


15.2 


15.9 






A.9. 
to 


2.0 


2.0 


China 


6 


34 


1.9 


2.7 




1 


76 


0.2 


3.2 


Japan 


12 


115 


4.0 


4.9 


North America 


22 


192 


7.3 


8.1 


Cuba 


16 


114 


5.4 


4.8 


United States 


3 


37 


1.0 


1.6 



In millions of rubles. 



Source: Based on information from World Bank, Statistical Handbook: States of the Former 
USSR, Washington, 1992, 152. 



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Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 



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asia.) 



268 



Glossary 



Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) — Official desig- 
nation of the former republics of the Soviet Union that 
remained loosely federated in economic and security mat- 
ters of common concern after the Soviet Union disbanded 
as a unified state in 1991. Members in early 1994 were 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyr- 
gyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. 

Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) — The official 
name of the communist party in the Soviet Union after 
1952. Originally the Bolshevik (majority) faction of a pre- 
revolutionary Russian party, the party was named the Rus- 
sian Communist Party (Bolshevik) from 1918 until it was 
renamed in 1952. 

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) — 
Originating in Helsinki in 1975, a grouping of all Euro- 
pean nations (the only exception, Albania, joined in 1991) 
that has sponsored joint sessions and consultations on 
political issues vital to European security. 

Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE Treaty) — An 
agreement signed in 1990 by the members of the Warsaw 
Treaty Organization (Warsaw Pact — q.v.) and the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO — q.v.) to establish 
parity in conventional weapons between the two organiza- 
tions from the Atlantic to the Urals. Included a strict sys- 
tem of inspections and information exchange. 

coupon — Generic term for bank-issued national currency cer- 
tificates of Georgia, introduced in early 1993. After intro- 
duction, value declined rapidly; in January 1994, the 
exchange rate was approximately 186,000 coupons per 
US$1. 

dram — National currency of Armenia, officially established for 
use concurrent with the Russian ruble in November 1993, 
became single official currency in early 1994. In February 
1994, the exchange rate was approximately 15 drams per 
US$1. A second national unit, the luma (100 to the dram), 
was introduced in February 1994. 

glasnost — Russian term, literally meaning "openness." Applied 
in the Soviet Union beginning in the mid-1980s to official 



269 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

permission for public discussion of issues and public 
access to information. Identified with the tenure of 
Mikhail S. Gorbachev as leader of the Soviet Union. 

gross domestic product (GDP) — The total value of goods and 
services produced exclusively within a nation's domestic 
economy, in contrast to the gross national product (q.v.). 
Normally computed over one-year periods. 

gross national product (GNP) — The total value of goods and 
services produced within a country's borders and the 
income received from abroad by residents, minus pay- 
ments remitted abroad by nonresidents. Normally com- 
puted over one-year periods. 

International Monetary Fund (IMF) — Established in 1945, a 
specialized agency affiliated with the United Nations and 
responsible for stabilizing international exchange rates 
and payments. Its main business is providing loans to its 
members when they experience balance of payments diffi- 
culties. 

Kurds — A mainly Muslim people speaking an Indo-European 
language similar to Persian. Kurds constitute significant 
minorities in Iran, Iraq, and Turkey, with smaller groups in 
Armenia and Syria. Despite international proposals in 
response to minority persecution, never united in a single 
state. 

manat — National currency of Azerbaijan. Introduced in mid- 
1992 for use concurrent with the ruble; became sole offi- 
cial currency in January 1994. Classified in 1994 as a "soft" 
currency, hence nonconvertible. 

millet — In the Ottoman Empire, the policy for governance of 
non-Muslim minorities. The system created autonomous 
communities ruled by religious leaders responsible to the 
central government. 

net material product (NMP) — In countries having centrally 
planned economies, the official measure of the value of 
goods and services produced within the country. Roughly 
equivalent to the gross national product (q.v.), NMP is 
based on constant prices and does not account for depre- 
ciation. 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) — During the post- 
war period until the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 
1991, the primary collective defense agreement of the 
Western powers against the military presence of the War- 
saw Pact (q.v.) nations in Europe. Founded 1949. Its mili- 



270 



Glossary 



tary and administrative structure remained intact after 
1991, but early in 1994 the Partnership for Peace proposed 
phased membership to all East European nations and 
many former republics of the Soviet Union. 

perestroika — Russian term meaning "restructuring." Applied in 
the late 1980s to an official Soviet program of revitalization 
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU — q.v.), 
the economy, and the society by adjusting economic, 
social, and political mechanisms in the central planning 
system. Identified with the tenure of Mikhail S. Gorbachev 
as leader of the Soviet Union. 

Shia — The smaller of the great two divisions of Islam, support- 
ing the claims of Ali to leadership of the Muslim commu- 
nity, in opposition to the Sunni (q.v.) view of succession to 
Muslim leadership — the issue causing the central schism 
within Islam. 

Sunni— The larger of the two fundamental divisions of Islam, 
opposed to the Shia (q.v.) on the issue of succession of 
Muslim leadership. 

value-added tax (VAT) — A tax applied to the additional value 
created at a given stage of production and calculated as a 
percentage of the difference between the product value at 
that stage and the cost of all materials and services pur- 
chased or introduced as inputs. 

Volunteer Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force, and 
Navy (DOSAAF) — In the Soviet national defense system, 
the agency responsible for paramilitary training of youth 
and reserve components. 

Warsaw Pact — Informal name for the Warsaw Treaty Organiza- 
tion, a mutual defense organization founded in 1955. 
Included the Soviet Union, Albania (which withdrew in 
1968), Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic 
Republic (East Germany), Hungary, Poland, and Roma- 
nia. The Warsaw Pact enabled the Soviet Union to station 
troops in the countries of Eastern Europe to oppose the 
forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO — 
q.v.). The pact was the basis for the invasions of Hungary 
(1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968). Disbanded in July 
1991. 

World Bank — Informal name for a group of four affiliated 
international institutions: the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD); the Interna- 
tional Development Association (IDA); the International 



271 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 

Finance Corporation (IFC); and the Multilateral Invest- 
ment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). The four institutions are 
owned by the governments of the countries that subscribe 
their capital for credit and investment in developing coun- 
tries; each institution has a specialized agenda for aiding 
economic growth in target countries. To participate in the 
World Bank group, member states must first belong to the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF — q.v.). 



272 



Index 



Abdullayev, Rafik, 132 

Abkhazian Autonomous Republic, 165, 
174-75; Abkhaz in, 179; cease-fire in, 
xxviii, xlv, xlix, 175; elections in, 208, 
212; ethnic groups in, 179, 218; Geor- 
gians in, liii, 179; language in, 179, 
187; materiel for, 225; military advisers 
in, 225; mining in, 196; peace talks, 
liv-lv; Russians in, 179; Russian sup- 
port for, 174, 224; separatist move- 
ment in, xxv, xxvii, xliii, 171; war in, 
xxvii-xxviii, liii, 65, 174, 177, 195, 200, 
201,216, 218-19, 224, 225 

Abkhaz people, 174; in Abkhazia, 179; 
ethnic background of, 177; life spans 
of, 178 

Abovian, Khachatur, 37 

Abuladze, Tengiz, 185 

ACP. ^Azerbaijani Communist Party 

acquired immune deficiency syndrome 
(AIDS): in Armenia, 41; in Georgia, 
189 

Act of Independence (1991) (Azer- 
baijan), xxxviii, 135 

Administration for the Struggle Against 
Terrorism and Banditry (Azerbaijan), 
147 

administrative districts: of Armenia, 61 
Adoian, Vosdanik. See Gorky, Arshile 
Afghanistan: Azerbaijan's relations with, 
138 

agricultural production: in Armenia, 42, 
44; in Azerbaijan, xxxvii, 116-17, 118; 
in Georgia, 165, 198; as percentage of 
net material product, 118; under 
Soviet Union, 42, 198 

agricultural products (see also under indi- 
vidual crops): of Armenia, 45; of Azer- 
baijan, 99, 117-18; citrus fruit, 99, 
117-18, 199; cotton, 117-18, 119; dis- 
tribution of, 199; export of, 199; of 
Georgia, 191, 198-99; grain, 199; 
grapes, 117-18, 119, 198; import of, 
199; prices for, 118, 191; tea, 99, 119, 
198, 199 



agriculture: in Armenia, 42, 44-45; in 
Azerbaijan, xxxvii, 91, 115, 116, 117- 
19, 122; collectivized, xxv, 92; diversity 
in, 122; employment in, 51, 116; in 
Georgia, 165, 191, 198-99; privatiza- 
tion in, xxv, 198; problems in, 199; 
reform in, 165; women in, 45; work 
force in, 44 

Agriculture and Industrial Bank of Geor- 
gia, 194 

AID. See United States Agency for Inter- 
national Development 

AIDS. See acquired immune deficiency 
syndrome 

air force. See under armed forces 

airports: in Armenia, 55-56; in Azer- 
baijan, 127; in Georgia, 201 

Aivazovsky, Ivan, 37 

Ajarian Autonomous Republic, 179-80 
Akhundov. See Akhundzade, Mirza Fath 
Ali 

Akhundzade, Mirza Fath Ali (Akhun- 
dov), 110 

Akstafa River valley, 26 

Alaverdy Metallurgical Plant: pollution 
caused by, 29 

alcohol abuse, 189 

Aleksandropol'. See Gyumri 

Alexander the Great, 87-88 

Alexander I, 159 

Aliyev, Heydar: as Azerbaijani Commu- 
nist Party leader, 93, 135; background 
of, 134-35; platform of, 134; as presi- 
dent, xxxi, xxxiii, xxxix, lii, liii, 65, 98, 
107, 129, 134; removed from power, 
93, 135; returned to power, xxxvii, 
xxxviii, 25, 133-34, 135 

Alma-Ata Declaration (1991), 67, 141 

Amasukheli, Elguja, 184 

American Bar Association, 70 

American Telephone and Telegraph 
Company, 56 

American University of Armenia, 50 

Amnesty International, 136 

Anatolia: ancient peoples in, 9; Arme- 



273 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 



nians in, xxviii, 1 1 , 35 
Antimonopoly Committee (Azerbaijan), 
122-23 

APR See Azerbaijani Popular Front 
APM. See Armenian Pannational Move- 
ment 

April Tragedy (1989), 166, 206, 227 

Arabic language: Azerbaijani literature 
in, 105; broadcasts in, 56 

Arab rule: of Armenia, 10-11; of Azer- 
baijan, 88; of Georgia, 158 

Aras hydroelectric plant, 120 

Aras River, 26, 100 

Aras River valley, 26 

Archaemenid Empire, 88 

architecture: in Armenia, 36-37; in Azer- 
baijan, 88, 109; in Georgia, 184 

area: of Armenia, 15, 26; of Azerbaijan, 
99; of Georgia, 1 75 

ARE See Armenian Revolutionary Feder- 
ation 

Argentina: Armenian trade with, 57 
armed forces of Armenia, xxxii, 1, 70, 
72-76; conscription into, 73; desertion 
of, 73; mercenaries in, 77; missions of, 
72; officers in, 73; reserves, 74-75; size 
of, 72, 74; structure of, 72-73; training 
of, 74 

armed forces of Azerbaijan , 141; 
attempts to form, xxxix, 141-42; com- 
mander in chief of, 142; conscripts in, 
143; defense strategy of, 144; deser- 
tion of, 145; materiel of, 142, 144; 
mercenaries in, 143, 144; military 
assistance to, 143; officers of, 143; size 
of, 142, 143; structure of, 143; training 
of, 142, 143 

armed forces of Georgia, liv; attempt to 
form, xlv, xlviii, 226-27, 228; conscrip- 
tion for, 227-28; ineffectiveness of, 
xliv; materiel of, 228; recruitment rate 
of, 227 

armed forces of the Soviet Union, 227; 
Azerbaijan is in, 142, 143 

Armenian Apostolic Church: authority 
of, 11; doctrine of, 34; founders of, 33; 
in Georgia, 183; language used in, 33; 
members of, 35, 107; religious train- 
ing by, 35; role in maintaining Arme- 
nian culture, 34; structural 
organization of, 34-35; ties with Arme- 
nian Revolutionary Federation, 34 



Armenian diaspora, xxviii, 30, 35-36 

Armenian Electrical Machine Plant, li 

Armenian emigres, 11, 15, 19, 30, 34, 35, 
65, 96, 102; as citizens of Armenia, 23; 
financial assistance from, 50 

Armenian Empire, 10; conquered by 
Romans, 10 

Armenian language, xxiv, 9, 32, 33; 
alphabet for, 10, 33; broadcasts in, 56; 
classical, 33; dialects of, 33; publica- 
tions in, 63; restrictions on, 19; spoken 
by Georgians, 182 

Armenian Orthodox Academy, 35 

Armenian Orthodox Church. See Arme- 
nian Apostolic Church 

Armenian Pannational Movement 
(APM), xxxiv; in elections of 1990, 22; 
in elections of 1995, xxxiv; formed, 
21, 59; and Nagorno-Karabakh con- 
flict, 21; publications of, 63; support 
for, 62; work of, on constitution, 61 

Armenian people: in Azerbaijan, 30, 
102; conflict with Azerbaijanis, 21, 96; 
distribution of, 35-36; early, 9; eco- 
nomic power of, 160; etymology of 
term for, 9; expelled from Nagorno- 
Karabakh, 25; in Georgia, 30, 65, 178; 
living standards of, 19; massacres of, 
14-15, 20, 29, 30, 35, 38, 61, 94, 96; as 
merchants, 159-60; in Nagorno-Kara- 
bakh, 19, 96, 102; origins of, 29-30; 
outside of Armenia, xxiii; protests by, 
20; as refugees, 15, 99; terrorism by, 
71; in urban areas, 26, 30, 178 

Armenian Plateau, 26; migration to, 9 

Armenian question, 13 

Armenian Revolutionary Federation 
(ARF), 14; autonomy program of, 15; 
in election of 1992, 61; founded, 61; 
members of, 61; platform of, 14, 61, 
64-65; publications of, 63; support for, 
61, 62; ties with Armenian Apostolic 
Church, 34; work on constitution, 61 

Armenian Union of Writers, 63 

Armenia Railways, 53 

Armenpress, 63 

army. See armed forces 

Army of Islam (Azerbaijan), 91 

Arpa River, 29 

Arsacid dynasty, 1 

arts: in Armenia, 11, 32, 36-37; in Azer- 
baijan, 107-9; in Georgia, 183-85 



274 



Index 



Artavazd II, 10 

Artik prison, 77 

AshotI (the Great), 11, 158 

Ashot the Great See Ashot I 

Ashot V. See Ashot I 

ashugs, 108 

Astronomy (Shirvani), 108 
Ataturk, Kemal, 16 

Atomic Power Station at Metsamor, 
xxxiii, li, 47; capacity of, 48; environ- 
mental problems caused by, 18-19; 
reconstruction of, 24, 47-48 

Atropates, 88 

Australia: Armenian trade with, 57 
autonomous areas: of Georgia, 1 79 
Autonomous Government of Azerbaijan: 

proclaimed, 92 
Avangard (Armenia), 63 
Avar people, 103 
Avesta, 108 

Aviation Training Center (Armenia) , 74 
Azerbaijan Airlines, 127 
Azerbaijani Academy of Sciences, 112, 
129 

Azerbaijani Communist Party (ACP): dis- 
banded, 130; opposition to, 93-94, 
129; purge of, 93; revived, xxxviii, 130 

Azerbaijani language, xxiv, 19, 104-5, 
112; alphabet of, 105-6, 110, 111; dia- 
lects of, 105; spoken by Georgians, 182 

Azerbaijani people: in Armenia, 29, 31, 
32; conflict with Armenians, 21, 96; 
demonstrations by, 21; in Georgia, 
102, 178, 181, 223; in Iran, xxiii, 92, 
102; in Nagorno-Karabakh, 96; riots 
by, 94; terrorism by, 24 

Azerbaijani Popular Front (APF) , xxx- 
viii, Hi, 129-30; coup against, 25; in 
elections of 1990, 131; formed, 129; 
government of, 66; KGB crackdown 
on, 94; platform of, 21, 130; protests 
by, 93-94; struggle with communists, 
24; support for, 129 

Azerbaijan Medical Institute, 112, 113 

Azerbaijan Oil Machinery Company 
(Azneftemash) , 119 

Azerbaijan People's Democratic Repub- 
lic: established, 91 

Azeri oil field, 120 

Azneftemash. See Azerbaijan Oil 
Machinery Company 



Babajanian Military Boarding School 

(Armenia) , 73-74 
BagratV, 158 
Bagratian, Hrant, 24, 51 
Bagratid dynasty, 157, 158; established, 

11 

Baku, 99; Armenian refugees in, 15; 
Azerbaijani demonstrations in, 21; 
industry in, 119; massacre of 1989 in, 
94; oil exploitation in, 30, 99; pollu- 
tion in, 101; population of, 90, 101; 
port of, 127; refugees in, 101; riots of 
1905 in, 90; subways in, 109, 127 

Baku 1501 (Jafarzade), 110 

Baku Higher Arms Command School, 
143 

Baku International Airport, 127 

Bank for Foreign Economic Affairs 
(Armenia) , 52 

Bank for Industry and Construction 
(Georgia), 194 

banking: in Armenia, 52; in Azerbaijan, 
124; in Georgia, xlvii, 194 

Bargushat River, 26 

Bartholomew (apostle), 33 

Basic Law on the Environment (Arme- 
nia), 28 

Basilia, Temur, liv 

Batiashvili, Irakli, 229 

Batumi: port of, 176, 201, 202-3; univer- 
sity in, 186 

Bazbeukh-Melikian, Alexander, 37 

Belarus: Azerbaijan's trade with, 125; 
military training of Armenians by, 74 

Beria, Lavrenti: purges by, 1 8 

birth defects: in Azerbaijan, 101 

birth rate: in Armenia, 31; in Azerbaijan, 
102 

Bishkek Protocol, xxxiii, xxxix-xl, xli 
black market. See economy, informal 
Black Sea, 27; oil explorations in, xlvii; 

pollution in, 177 
Black Sea Economic Cooperation Orga- 
nization: Azerbaijan's membership in, 
140; Georgia's membership in, 225 
blockade: of Armenia by Azerbaijan, xxv, 
xxviii, xxx, xxxviii, xlix, 21, 140; eco- 
nomic effects of, 24, 41, 50, 53, 56; 
environmental effects of, 29; of Geor- 
gia, 192; health effects of, xxix, 40 
Bolsheviks, 90; Marxist republic declared 
by, 90-91; struggle with Mensheviks, 



275 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 



162-63 

Book of Complaints, A (Fuzuli), 108 

Book ofDedeKorkut, The, 108 

Border Guards (Soviet Union), 142, 143 

borders: of Armenia, 25-26, 72, 99, 175; 
of Azerbaijan, 25-26, 92, 99, 175; of 
Georgia, 25-26, 99, 175 

border security: of Armenia, 76; of Azer- 
baijan, 143, 146 

Brecht, Bertold, 185 

Brezhnev, Leonid I., 93 

Britain: Azerbaijan's trade with, 125; 
occupation of Azerbaijan by, 91 

Budapest agreement (November 1994), 
Hi 

budget, government: of Armenia, 52-53; 
of Azerbaijan, 123-24; of Georgia, liv, 
194-95 

budget deficit: in Armenia, xxix, 41 , 53; 
in Azerbaijan, lii, 124; in Georgia, 
194-95; in Nagorno-Karabakh, xxix 

Bulgaria: Georgia's trade with, 205 

Buzand, Pavstos, 37 

Byzantine Empire: Armenia in, 10; influ- 
ence on Georgia by, xxiv,158, 184; 
invasion of Armenia by, 11 



Cabinet of Ministers (Georgia), liv, 213- 
14; nomination of, 215; obstacles to 
reform in, 214; Presidium of, 213; 
restructured, 214 
Canada: trade with Armenia, 57 
canals: in Armenia, 42, 45 
carpets: in Azerbaijan, 108, 119 
Caspian Flotilla (Soviet Union), 142, 143 
Caspian High Naval School, 142, 143 
Caspian Sea, 99; oil deposits in, xlii; pol- 
lution in, 100 
Caspian Sea Forum, 101 
Caucasian Bureau, 92 
Caucasus Mountains, xxxvi, 175 
Central Bank of Armenia, xxxv, 52 
Central Bank of Russia, 67, 195 
Central Election Commission (Georgia), 
208, 211 

Central Electoral Commission (Azer- 
baijan), 132 

CFE Treaty. See Conventional Forces in 
Europe Treaty 

Chanturia, Gia, 168, 170; assassination 



of, liv 

Chechen Autonomous Republic, lii, liii; 
border of, with Georgia, 175; Gamsa- 
khurdia in, 171, 209 

Chernobyl' disaster, 27 

Chikhvaidze, Alexander, 221 

China, People's Republic of: Georgia's 
relations with, 221 

Christianity {see also under individual 
denominations), 10-11; Armenia's con- 
version to, xxiv, 10, 33; in Azerbaijan, 
107; Georgia's conversion to, xxiv, 158, 
182 

Cirak oil field (Azerbaijan), 120 

civil code (Armenia), 58 

climate: of Armenia, 27; of Azerbaijan, 
100; of Georgia, 176-77; influences 
on, 176; precipitation, 27, 100, 176; 
temperature, 27, 176 

Clinton, William J., xxxiii, 221 

coal, 48 

Combined Forces Command School 
(Azerbaijan), 143, 147 

Commission on Human Rights and Eth- 
nic Minority Affairs (Georgia), 219 

Commission on Security (Georgia), 228 

Committee for State Security (Komitet 
gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti — KGB) , 
166; in Armenia, 63, 76, 77; crack- 
down by, on Azerbaijani Popular 
Front, 94; in Georgia, 228 

Committee for the Protection of the Nat- 
ural Environment (Azerbaijan), 101 

Committee of Union and Progress. See 
Young Turks 

Commonwealth of Independent States 
{see also Russia; Soviet Union): Arme- 
nia as member of, xxxi, 67; arms sales 
to, 46; Azerbaijan as member of, 68, 
97, 141, 145; Georgia as member of, 
68, 188, 219, 225; military agreements 
in, 70; peace negotiations sponsored 
by, xxxii, xxxiii, xxxix, 65; relations 
with Armenia, 67-68 

communications. See telecommunica- 
tions 

Communist Party of Armenia (CPA), 48, 
61; under Great Terror, 18; newspaper 
of, 63; police terror under, 17-18 

Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 
61 

Communist Youth League (Komsomol), 



276 



Index 



164 

Conference on Security and Coopera- 
tion in Europe (CSCE), 24; Azer- 
baijan's membership in, 140, 144; 
peace negotiations sponsored by, 
xxviii, xxxiii, xxxix, 24, 25, 65, 67, 98, 
139,171 

cognac production, 42, 45 

conflicts: between Armenia and Azer- 
baijan, xxxii, xxxvi, 69, 93, 141 , 143 

Congress of Berlin: Armenian delega- 
tion to, 13 

Congress of People's Deputies: elections 
for, 20 

constitution of Armenia, xxx, xxxiv, 13, 
60-61; drafting of, 61; lack of consen- 
sus on, xxx, xxxiv, 58 
constitution of Azerbaijan , xxxviii, 135- 

36; drafting of, 135 
constitution of Georgia, 216, 218 
constitution of 1863 (Armenia), 13 
constitution of 1921 (Georgia), 216, 218 
constitution of 1936 (Soviet Union) , 92 
constitution of 1978 (Soviet Union), 60, 

135-36, 218 
construction: Armenian employment 

in, 51; in Georgia, 204 
Consultative Council on Interethnic 

Relations (Azerbaijan), 103 
consumer goods: in Armenia, 46 
consumption: in Armenia, 51; in Geor- 
gia, 191 

Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty 

(CFE Treaty), 68, 144 
copper, 42, 44 

corruption: in Armenia, xxxii, 17, 18, 
48-50, 56; in Azerbaijan, xxxix, 93, 
146; in Georgia, xliv, 164, 182, 192 

cotton: production of, 119 

Council for National Security and 
Defense (Georgia), 216, 221, 229; dis- 
banded, 229 

Council of Chalcedon (451), 34 

Council of Ethnic Minorities (Georgia), 
219 

Council of Ministers (Armenia), 28, 58; 
disagreements within, 59; members of, 
59 

Council of Ministers (Azerbaijan) , 94 
coup d'etat: of 1993 in Azerbaijan, xxx- 
viii, 25, 132-34 
coupon. See currency 



coups d'etat, attempted: in Azerbaijan 
(1994), xli; by Gamsakhurdia support- 
ers, 226; against Gorbachev (1991), 
23, 96, 130, 169-70 

court system: in Armenia, 60; in Azer- 
baijan, 94, 136; in Georgia, 217-18 

CPA. See Communist Party of Armenia 

crafts: in Azerbaijan, 108 

crime: in Armenia, xxxii, 77; in Azer- 
baijan, xxxix, 146-47; drug-related, 
77, 145; in Georgia, xlv, xlix, 229; pre- 
vention, 146-47 

criminal code (Armenia), 58 

Crusaders, 158 

CSCE. See Conference on Security and 

Cooperation in Europe 
cuisine: Armenian, 38; Georgian, 185 
culture: Armenian, 16, 34, 36-38; Azer- 
baijani, 90, 92, 109-11; Georgian, 183, 
185 

currency: in Armenia, xxx, xxxv, 52; in 
Azerbaijan, xlii, 115, 124; foreign, 195; 
in Georgia, xlvi-xlvii, liv, 193, 195; 
shortage of, xlvi, 52, 193 

customs: corruption in, 146 

Cyprus: Armenians in, 11 

Cyrus the Great, 87 

Czechoslovakia: Georgia's trade with, 
205 



Dagestan Autonomous Republic: Azer- 

baijanis in, 102 
Dagestanis. See Lezgians 
dance: in Georgia, 183, 185 
DAS. See Democratic Choice for Georgia 
Dashnak. See Armenian Revolutionary 

Federation 
David IV (the Builder) , xliii, 158 
death rate: in Armenia, 31; in Azer- 
baijan, 102 
Debet River valley, 26 
Defense Council (Azerbaijan), 142, 145 
defense industry: in Armenia, 43, 46, 70 
defense spending: in Armenia, 52; in 
Azerbaijan, 124, 144-45; in Georgia, 
195 

Defense Technical Sports Society (Arme- 
nia), 74-75 
Demirchian, Karen, 18 
democracy: Armenian steps toward, 



277 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 



xxx; promises of, in Azerbaijan, xxx- 
viii; lack of experience with, in Geor- 
gia, xliii 

Democratic Choice for Georgia (DAS), 
206 

Democratic Party of Azerbaijan, 92 
Democratic Union (Georgia), 210, 211, 
212 

demonstrations. See political demonstra- 
tions 

de-Stalinization, 164 

Diocese of the Armenian Church in 
America, 69 

disease: environmental causes of, 177; 
incidence of, 39-40, 189 

district attorneys: in Armenia, 60 

drainage: in Armenia, 26; in Azerbaijan, 
100; in Georgia, 176 

dram. See currency 

drug addiction: in Georgia, 189 

drug trafficking: in Armenia, 77; in Azer- 
baijan, xxxix, 146, 147; in Georgia, 
xlix; to Russia, 146 



earthquakes: in Armenia, 26; in Georgia, 
175; in 1988, xxix, 20, 26, 39, 41, 46, 
48-50, 55; in 1991, 175-76 

EC. See European Community 

Echmiadzin, 34 

economic development: obstacles to, in 

Georgia, 191-92 
economic mafia: in Georgia, xlv, 191, 

204 

economic reform: in Armenia, xxxv, 1, 
48-51 , 59; in Azerbaijan, Hi, 122-24; in 
Georgia, liv, 203-5; obstacles to, 122, 
203; resistance to, 48 

economy: Armenian, xxix, xxxv, 12, 24, 
41-57; in Azerbaijan, xxxvii, 122-24; 
capitalist, 12; command, xxix, xxxv, 
42, 116; in Georgia, xlv, xlvi, 190-206; 
informal, xlvi, 18, 48, 164, 165, 191, 
203; market, xxix, xxxv, xlii, xlix, 48, 
122; under Russian Empire, 12; under 
Soviet Union, 42 

education (see also schools): in Armenia, 
38-39; in Azerbaijan, 111-13; curric- 
ula in, 38, 112; employment in, 51, 
116; in Georgia, 186-87; human rights 
in, 62; improvements in, 18; languages 



in, 38, 187; postsecondary, 39, 186; 
promotion of Armenian, 16; religious, 
111, 112; under Stalin, 18; of women, 
111 

Egishe, Agathangelos, 37 

Egypt: Armenians in, 11 

Elchibey, Abulfaz: background of, 132; 
in elections of 1992, xxxviii, 132; 
exiled, 133; as opposition leader, liii; 
ousted, 132-33; as party chair, 129; 
policies of, xxxviii, 132; as president, 
97, 103, 132 

elections in Armenia: of 1989, 20; of 
1990, 22; of 1991, 23, 58; of 1992, 61, 
62; of 1995,xxxiv 

elections in Azerbaijan, 131; announced 
for 1995, xli; international observers 
in, 131, 132; of 1990, 131; of 1991, 97; 
of 1992, xxxvii, 131-32; of 1993, xxx- 
viii, 134-35; postponement of, xxxviii, 
regulations of, 131 

elections in Georgia, 207, 210-11; inter- 
national observers in, 212; of 1989, 
206; of 1990, 168, 206, 208; elections 
of 1992, 206, 210-13 

electric power: capacity, 119; distribution 
of, 48; hydro, 28, 47, 119-20, 176; in 
rural areas, 45 

elite class: in Armenia, 18, 62; corrup- 
tion among, 18, 19; in Soviet Union, 
18 

Emergency Committee (Georgia), xlviii 
Emergency Coordinating Commission 

(Georgia), xlviii 
Emergency Economic Council (Geor- 
gia), 21 6 

energy: in Armenia, 28, 42, 44,46-48, 67; 
in Azerbaijan, 30, 90, 99, 115, 119-22; 
in Georgia, 176, 196-97; imports of, 
xxix, 46; prices of, 191; production, 
46, 120 

energy resources (see also under individual 
energy sources): in Armenia, xxix, 46- 
48; in Azerbaijan, 119-20; coal, 48; in 
Georgia, 196-97; imported, 196; 
nuclear, 18-19, 24, 27; oil, 48, 119; 
pollution caused by, 18-19, 27; subsi- 
dies for, 124; trees cut for, 24, 28, 101 

energy shortage: in Armenia, xxix, 1, 24, 
47-48, 50, 51, 53; in Azerbaijan, 120; 
in Georgia, xlv, xlvii, 196; economic 
effects of, 50 



278 



Index 



English language: broadcasts in, 56 
environmental problems: in Armenia, 
18-19, 24, 27-29, 43; attempts to 
address, 28, 29; in Azerbaijan, 100- 
101; in Erevan, 27, 28; in Georgia, 177; 
pesticides as, 101; water pollution, 99, 
100 

Erevan, 26; anarchy in, 22; architecture 
of, 37; population of, xxviii, 30; sub- 
way system of, 55 

Erevan Architecture and Civil Engineer- 
ing Institute, 39 

Erevan Health Department, 40 

Erevan State University, 39 

Erevan Stock Exchange, xxxv 

Ertoba. See Unity Bloc 

ethnic minorities: in Armenia, 31-32, 35, 
65; in Azerbaijan, 103-4; distribution 
of, 178; in Georgia, xxiii, xliii, 102, 
178-81, 210,223 

ethnic tensions: in Georgia, 165, 177, 
212, 218; in Transcaucasia, xxvii, 15 

EU. See European Union 

Europe: Armenian exports to, 57; Arme- 
nians in, 35 

European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development: aid to Armenia, xxxi; 
Azerbaijan's membership in, 140 

European Community (EC): aid to 
Georgia from, 222 

European Union (EU), xxxi, 101 

executive branch: of Armenia, xxx, 59- 
60; of Azerbaijan, 131-35; of Georgia, 
xlviii, 215-16 

exports {see also under individual prod- 
ucts): by Armenia, 57; by Azerbaijan, 
xlii, 120, 125; of energy, 120; by Geor- 
gia, 205; as percentage of gross domes- 
tic product, 125; restrictions on, 205 



families: in Armenia, 31, 38; in Georgia, 
1 78; laws regarding, 59 

farms: collective, 44, 118-19 

Fidain (Armenia) , 22, 77 

film: in Georgia, 183, 185 

financial structure: of Armenia, xxxv, 
52-53; of Azerbaijan, 123-24; of Geor- 
gia, xlvii, 194-95 

Finland: Azerbaijan's relations with, 138 

food: import of, 44, 46; processing, 119, 



190; production, 46; rationing of, 204; 
service, 51; shortages of, 51, 53; subsi- 
dies for, 114, 115, 124, 204 
foreign assistance: to Armenia, xxxi- 
xxxii, xxxv, 41, 42, 48-50, 67, 69; 
Armenian requests for, 67; and cor- 
ruption, 48-50; Georgian requests for, 
186,221 

foreign influences: on Armenia, 10, 13; 
on Azerbaijan, 87-88, 89-90, 115; on 
Georgia, 158, 181, 184 

foreign investment: in Armenia, 50; in 
Azerbaijan, xlii, li; in Georgia, xliv, 
xlvii, 191, 225 

foreign policy establishment: of Azer- 
baijan, 138-39; of Georgia, 221 

foreign relations (Armenia): with Azer- 
baijan, 21, 64-65, 70, 96; with Britain, 
xxxiii; with the Commonwealth of 
Independent States, xxxi, 67-68; with 
the European Union, xxxi; with Geor- 
gia, xxxiv, 65-66, 70, 222-24; with 
Iran, 1, 66, 70; with Russia, xxxiii, 67; 
with Turkey, xxxi, xxxiv, 65, 66, 71; 
with Turkmenistan, xxxv, 1 — li; with the 
United States, xxxi, xxxiii, 68-70 

foreign relations (Azerbaijan): with 
Afghanistan, 138; under Aliyev, xlii; 
with Armenia, 21, 64-65; 69, 70, 93, 
96, 141, 143; with Finland, 138; with 
former Soviet republics, xlii, 140-41; 
with Georgia, 222-24; with Germany, 
138; with Iran, xxxviii, xl, 25, 30, 92, 
94, 127, 138, 139; with Russia, xxxi, 
xxxvii, xxxviii, lii, 139, 140-41; with 
Saudi Arabia, xl; with Turkey, xxxi, 
xxxvii, xxxviii, 70, 71, 138, 139; with 
the United States, xxxiii, xl, 139; with 
Uzbekistan, 141; with the West, xxxvii 

foreign relations (Georgia) , 219-25; with 
Armenia, 64-65, 70, 158, 222-24; with 
Azerbaijan, 222-24; with China, 221; 
with Germany, 221; with Iran, 220; 
with Israel, 221, 222; with Romania, 
220; with Russia, 220, 221, 224-25; 
under Shevardnadze, xliv; with Tur- 
key, 220, 221, 225; with the United 
States, 219, 220, 221 

forestry: Armenian employment in, 51 

France: Armenians in, 11, 30 

Freedom House, 137 

freedom of speech: in Armenia, 62; in 



279 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 



Azerbaijan, 134; in Georgia, 219 
Free Media Association of Georgia, liv, 
219 

French language: broadcasts in, 56 
Fuzuli, 108 



Gajiyeva, Lala-Shovket, 103 
Gambarov, Isa, 131 

Gamsakhurdia, Zviad, xxvii, 212; back- 
ground of, 168; as dissident, 164, 168, 
182, 206; economy under, 204; ene- 
mies of, 168; exiled, 170, 209; foreign 
relations under, 219, 220-21; influ- 
ence of, 206; opposition to, 170, 209, 
228; overthrown, xxvii, xliv, 170, 209; 
parliament in exile of, 171; as presi- 
dent, 169-70, 208-9; reaction to coup 
attempt, 169-70; return to Georgia, 
175; rise of, 166-69; suicide of, 175; 
support for, 170-71; xenophobia of, 
65, 219 

Ganjavi, Nezami, 108 

gas, natural: in Armenia, xxxv, 44, 67; in 
Azerbaijan, xxxvii, 122; export of by 
Azerbaijan, 120; import of, 48, 56, 57, 
67, 122; price of, 122; production of, 
122; reserves, 122; from Turkmeni- 
stan, xxxv 

gas pipelines, 48, 56, 127-28, 196; in 
Armenia, 72; attacks on, xxxiv, 24, 48, 
65-66, 191, 229; in Georgia, 1, 203, 
223; laid, 42 

GATT. See General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade 

GDP. See gross domestic product 

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT): Azerbaijan's membership in, 
140 

general prosecutor: in Armenia, 60 
Genscher, Hans-Dietrich, 221 
geopolitical situation: of Armenia, 15, 

70-72; of Georgia, 224 
George, Saint, 157 

Georgian Communist Party, 206, 208; 

demise of, 209 
Georgianization campaign, 174 
Georgian language, xxiv, xliii, 181-82; in 

Abkhazia, 179; alphabet of, 181; 

broadcasts in, 203; education in, 187; 

as state language, 164, 181-82; writ- 



ten, 182 

Georgian Military Highway, 200, 203 
Georgian National Congress, 208, 218 
Georgian Orthodox Church, 159, 163, 
182; corruption in, 182; members of, 
183; restoration of, 183; under Rus- 
sian Empire, 182; under Soviet Union, 
182 

Georgian people: in Abkhazia, 179; 

diaspora of, xxiii, 179; ethnic base of, 

157; life spans of, 178 
Georgian State Dance Company, 185 
Germany: Azerbaijan's relations with, 

138; Azerbaijan's trade with, 125; 

Georgia's relations with, 221; Geor- 
gia's trade with, 205 
glasnost: in Azerbaijan, 111; effects of, 20, 

166; in Georgia, 164 
GNP. See gross national product 
golden age, xxiv; first (Armenia), 10, 36; 

Georgian, xliii, 158, 183; second 

(Armenia) , 1 1 , 36 
Golden Eagle Film Festival of the Black 

Sea Basin Countries (1993), 185 
Golos Azatamart (Struggle for Freedom) , 

63 

Gorbachev, Mikhail S.: attempted over- 
throw of, 23, 96; Azerbaijan under, 93; 
proposals for Nagorno-Karabakh, 21; 
reforms introduced by, 20, 48, 164 
Gorky, Arshile (Vasdanik Adoian) , 37 
Gosbank Armenia. See State Bank of 
Armenia 

Gosplan. See State Planning Committee 
government: of Armenia, 20, 21, 58-60, 
61, 63, 96; of Azerbaijan, 94, 131, 142, 
145; of Georgia, 213-16 
Grachev, Pavel, xxxii, 67 
Grakan Tert (Literary Paper) , 63 
Greater Caucasus mountain range, 99, 

175, 176 
Great Terror (1936-37), 18, 185 
Greece: Azerbaijan's trade with, 125; 
influence on Armenia, 10; influence 
on Azerbaijan, 87-88; influence on 
Georgia, xxiv, 184 
Greeks: in Armenia, 31 
green groups: in Armenia, 27 
Green Party (Georgia), 177 
Gregorian Church. See Armenian Apos- 
tolic Church 
Gregory the Illuminator, Saint, 10, 33 



280 



Index 



gross domestic product, Hi; defense 
spending, 124; spent on social secu- 
rity, 114; trade, 125 

gross national product (GNP): in Arme- 
nia, 1, 41; in Azerbaijan, 116 

Group of Russian Troops in the Cauca- 
sus (GRTC),xlvi 

Guliyev, Rusul, liii 

Gumbaridze, Givi, 166 

Gunesli oil field, 120 

Gyandzha: industry in, 119; population 
of, 102 

Gyumri, 26 



Housing Bank of Georgia, 194 
Hovannisian, Raffi, 66 
Hovnatanian, Hacop, 37 
Hulegu Khan, 88 

human rights: abuses, 63, 136, 218-19, 
221, 226; in Armenia, 62-63; in Azer- 
baijan, 134, 136-38; in Georgia, liii-liv, 
218-19, 221 

Hurrian people, 9 

Huseynov, Suret, 133; coup attempt by, 
xli; as prime minister, 134; hydroelec- 
tric power: in Armenia, 28, 42, 47; 
construction of, 47; in Georgia, 176, 
196; potential, 196 



hai, 9 

Haiastan, 9 

Hairikian, Pariur, 62 

Hajibeyli, Uzeir, 110 

Harutiunian, Suren: resignation of, 22 

Hayastani Hanrapetutiun (Republic of 

Armenia) , 63 
Hayk, 9 

Hayk (Armenia) , 63 

Hazatamart (Battle for Freedom) , 63 

Hazg (Nation), 63 

health (see also disease): in Armenia, 39- 
41; in Azerbaijan, 99, 113-14; employ- 
ment in, 51; in Georgia, 187-89 

health care: in Armenia, 40-41; in Azer- 
baijan, 113-14; in Georgia, 187-89; 
reform of, 189; shortages in, 113-14; 
specialized, 188; spending on, 189; 
subsidies for, 115 

health care professionals: in Azerbaijan, 
113; in Georgia, 189; training for, 113 

health facilities: in Armenia, 40; in Azer- 
baijan, 99; in Georgia, 187-89; min- 
eral springs, 99; sanatoriums, 188 

Hellenic culture: Armenia as center of, 
10; influence on Armenia, xxiv; influ- 
ence on Georgia, xxiv 

Helsinki Assembly, 63 

Helsinki Watch, 63, 136, 219 

Herekle II, 159 

Higher All Arms Command School, 142 
Himmat party (Azerbaijan) , 90 
holidays: in Armenia, 37-38 
homelessness: in Armenia, 51 
housing: laws regarding, 59; privatization 
of, 123; subsidies for, 115 



Iberian Television, 203 
Iber vision, 219 

Ibrahim I ibn Sultan Muhammad, 88 
IDR See Independent Democratic Party 
Ilia II, 182 

Imeretia: annexed by Russia, 159 
Imereti mountain range, 175 
IMR See International Monetary Fund 
imports: by Armenia, 57; by Azerbaijan, 
xlii, 125; of consumer goods, 46; of 
food, 44; by Georgia, 192, 205; as per- 
centage of gross domestic product, 
125; taxes on, 205 
income: in Armenia, 41, 51-52; in Geor- 
gia, 191, 194; sources of, 194 
independence: of Armenia, xxiii, xxviii- 
xxix, 13, 15, 22, 23-25, 57; of Azer- 
baijan, xxiii-xxiv, xxviii-xxix, 94, 96, 
97; of Georgia, xxiii, xxviii, 162, 166, 
169 

independence, declaration of: by Arme- 
nia, 15, 22, 24, 57; by Georgia, 162, 
169 

independence movement: in Armenia, 
13, 23-25; in South Ossetia, 171 

Independent Democratic Party (IDP) 
(Azerbaijan), 130 

India: Armenians in, 35; Azerbaijanis in, 
106; Parsis in, 106 

Indo-Europeans, 29 

industrial infrastructure (Armenia): 
damage to, 46; deterioration of, 43; 
under Stalin, 18, 42 

Industrial Investment Joint Stock Com- 
mercial Bank (Azerbaijan), 124 



281 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 



industrialization: environmental prob- 
lems caused by, 18-19, 100; in Geor- 
gia, 163; by Soviet Union, xxv, xxix; 
under Stalin, 17, 18, 163 

industrial output: in Armenia, li, 46; in 
Azerbaijan, xxxvii, xlii, 116; in Geor- 
gia, xliv-xlv, 163, 165, 190, 191, 196 

industry: in Armenia, 45-46; in Azer- 
baijan, 115, 116, 119, 122; chemical, 
45, 57; diversity in, 122; employment 
in, 42, 51, 116; in Georgia, 163, 165, 
190, 191, 195-96; scientific research 
in, 45, 50; under Soviet Union, 195 

infant mortality: in Armenia, 40; in Azer- 
baijan, 113; in Georgia, 178, 189 

inflation: in Armenia, 41 , 51, 53; in Azer- 
baijan, xxxvii, lii, 117, 123; in Georgia, 
xlvi.liv, 190, 193, 195, 204 

Information and Intelligence Service 
(Georgia), 215,229 

infrastructure: in Armenia, xxix, 18, 42, 
43, 44, 46; in Azerbaijan, 122; in Geor- 
gia, 175 

Inguri River, xlv 

Ingushetia: border of, with Georgia, 1 75 

Institute for Advanced Training of Physi- 
cians (Azerbaijan), 113 

Institute of Petroleum and Chemistry 
(Azerbaijan), 112-13 

intellectuals: in Armenia, 13; in Azer- 
baijan, 110; in Georgia, 160 

intelligentsia: emergence of, in Armenia, 
12, 13 

Interethnic Congress of the People of 
Georgia, 219 

internal security: in Armenia, xxxii, 76- 
77; in Georgia, xlv, xlviii, xlix, 228-29 

Intelsat. See International Telecommuni- 
cations Satellite Corporation 

International Covenant of Civil and 
Political Rights, 62 

International Monetary Fund (IMF): 
relations with Armenia, xxxi, xxxv, 50- 
51; relations with Azerbaijan, xlii, 139 

International Telecommunications Sat- 
ellite Corporation (Intelsat), 127 

invasion: of Armenia, 11, 23; of Azer- 
baijan, 22, 88, 91; of Georgia, 158-59, 
162, 179; of Transcaucasia, xxiii 

Iori Plateau, 176 

Ioseliani, Jaba, xlviii, 218; in Council for 
National Security and Defense, 229; 



forced to resign, 226, 229; in Military 
Council, 170; rivalry of, with Kitovani, 
226; in State Council Presidium, 170 
Iran: Armenians in, 30; Azerbaijani riots 
against, 94; Azerbaijanis in, 66, 92, 
102; Azerbaijan's trade with, 125; bor- 
der maneuvers by, 66, 98; border with 
Armenia, 26, 72; border with Azer- 
baijan, 99; exports to, 120; imports 
from, 122; military training by, 144; 
peace negotiations sponsored by, 24, 

65, 66, 98; relations with Armenia, 25, 

66, 70; relations with Azerbaijan, 138, 
139; relations with Georgia, 220; reli- 
gious assistance to Azerbaijan from, 
107; television broadcasts from, 127; 
suppression of Azerbaijani culture in, 
92; trade with, 57 

irrigation: in Armenia, xxix, 28, 45; in 
Azerbaijan, 100, 118; in Georgia, 198 

Islam: conflict in, 106; introduction of, 
in Azerbaijan, xxiv, 88-89, 106; secret 
sects in, 107; Shia, 106, 107; Sunni, 
106 

Ismail I, 106, 108 
Ismailof, Ilias, 132 

Israel: Georgia's relations with, 221, 222 



Jafarzade, Aziza, 110 

Japaridze, Tedo, 229 

Japheth, 29 

Javid, Husein, 110 

Jews: in Georgia, 183, 222 

Joint Transcaucasian Power Grid, 46, 120 

joint ventures: in Armenia, 50; in Azer- 
baijan, 121; in Georgia, xlvii 

journalists: in Armenian independence 
movement, 13; in Azerbaijani political 
parties, 129 

judges: in Armenia, 60; in Georgia, 216, 
217 

judiciary (see also court system): in Arme- 
nia, 60; in Georgia, 216-18 

Jugashvili, Iakob. See Stalin, Joseph V. 

jurisprudence: development in Armenia, 
11 

juvenile delinquency: in Georgia, 189 



282 



Index 



Kachazuni, R.I., 15 

Kakhetia: annexed by Russia, 159; united 

with Kartli, 159 
Kamber, Isa, 1 36 

Karabakh. See Nagorno-Karabakh 
Karabakh Committee, 20, 59; leaders of, 

arrested and released, 20 
Karabakh National Council, 21 
Karabakh Self-Defense Army, 74 
Karimov, Islam, 141 

Kartli: annexed by Russia, 159; united 
with Kakhetia, 159 

Kardi-Kakhetia, kingdom of, 1 59 

Kartli-Iberia, kingdom of, 158 

Kazakhstan: Azerbaijanis in, 102; Azer- 
baijan's trade with, 125; in energy con- 
sortium, 121-22; imports from, 122; 
military cooperation with Armenia, 
67, 71; peace talks sponsored by, 98 

Kepez oil field, 120 

KGB. See Committee for State Security 

Khamseh (Ganjavi), 108 

Khatisian, A.I., 15 

Khorenatsi, Movses, 37 

Khrushchev, Nikita S., 18; demonstra- 
tions against, 164; purges by, 93; 
reforms by, 163, 163 

Kirovabad. See Gyandzha 

Kitovani, Tengiz, liii, 170, 218; in Coun- 
cil for National Security and Defense, 
229; as deputy prime minister, 213; 
forced to resign, 226, 229; in Military 
Council, 170; rivalry with Ioseliani, 
226; in State Council Presidium, 170 

Knight in the Panther Skin, The (Rustaveli) , 
184 

kobuz, 108 

Kobystan Mountain, 99 
Kolkhida Lowlands, 176 
Komitet gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti. 

See Committee for State Security 
Komsomol. See Communist Youth 

League 
Koroglu, 108 
Kosh prison, 77 

Kurdish language: broadcasts in, 56 
Kurds: in Armenia, 31, 35; in Azerbaijan, 

103; in Georgia, 181 
Kutaisi: Jews in, 183; population in, 178; 

university in, 186 
Kutaisi Automotive Works, 195-96 
Kyrgyzstan: military cooperation with 



Armenia, 67, 71 



Lachin: corridor, xxix; region, Hi 
Laila and Majnun (Fuzuli) , 1 08 
Lake Sevan, 26; drop of water level in, 
28-29, 47 

land: arable, xxix, xli, 44, 45, 100, 198; 
area, 99, 175; privatization, xxix, xli, 
44; redistribution, xxv, 123, 162, 198- 
99; tenure, 59 

language (see also under individual lan- 
guages): in Armenia, 9, 19, 32, 33, 38, 
62; in Azerbaijan, 88-89, 103, 104-6; 
in Georgia, 179, 181-82, 187, 203 

Latvia: Azerbaijan's trade with, 125 

Law on Banks and Banking Activity 
(1992) (Azerbaijan), 124 

Law on Defense (1993) (Azerbaijan), 
145 

Law on Mineral Resources (1994) 

(Armenia) , 28 
Law on Privatization of State Enterprises 

(1991) (Georgia), 204 
Law on Sovereignty (1989) (Azerbaijan), 

130 

Law on State Power (1992) (Georgia), 
213, 214, 215 

Law on the National Bank (1992) (Azer- 
baijan), 124 

Law on the Press (1992) (Georgia), 219 

Law on the Program of Privatization and 
Destatization of Incompletely Con- 
structed Facilities (1992) (Armenia), 
50 

lawyers: in Armenia, 60; in Georgia, 217 
LDP. See Liberal Democratic Party 

(Armenia) 
League of Human Rights, 63 
Lebanon: Armenians in, 30 
legislative branch: in Armenia, xxx, 58; 

in Azerbaijan, xxxviii, 131; in Georgia, 

207, 208 

Lenin, Vladimir I., 91, 162; economy 

under, 42 
Leninakan: population of, 31 
Lesser Armenia, 11, 36 
Lesser Caucasus mountain range, 26, 

100, 175 
Lezgians (Dagestanis), 103, 136 
Liberal-Democratic National Party, 212 



283 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 



Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) (Arme- 
nia), 62; founded, 62; platform of, 62; 
support for, 62 

libraries: destruction of, 110 

life expectancy: in Armenia, 31; in Azer- 
baijan, 102; in Georgia, 178 

literacy rate: in Armenia, 38; in Azer- 
baijan, 111; in Georgia, 186; improve- 
ments in, 18, 186; under Stalin, 18 

literature: of Armenia, 10, 11, 36-37; of 
Azerbaijan, 88, 105, 108; of Georgia, 
158, 184 

Lithuania: Azerbaijan's trade with, 125 

livestock: in Azerbaijan, 118 

living expenses: in Armenia, 123; in 
Azerbaijan, 123 

living standards: in Armenia, xxx, 51-52; 
of Armenians in Azerbaijan, 19; in 
Azerbaijan, xli, 19, 117; in Georgia, liv 



madrasahs, 111 

Maiden Tower (Baku), 109 

Main Administration for Aviation 
(Armenia), 56 

Main Administration for the Protection 
of State Borders (Armenia), 76 

Main Administration for the Protection 
of State Secrets in the Press (Azer- 
baijan), xli 

Major, John, xxxiii 

Mamedov, Etibar, 1 30 

Mamedov, Yakub: in elections of 1992, 
132; as president, 97 

Mamluk Turks: invasion of Armenia by, 
11 

Manukian, Vazgan, 72 

Marian III, 158, 182 

marriage: Armenian laws regarding, 58 

martial law: under Russia, 131, 161 

Marxists: in Azerbaijan, 90-91; in Geor- 
gia, 160 

Mashtots. See Mesrop 

massacres of Armenians, 30; in Azer- 
baijan (1989), 20, 94, 96; in Russia 
(1905), 14; in Turkey (1895), 14, 29; 
in Turkey (1915), xxxi, 14-15, 29, 35, 
38, 61 

materiel, military: of Armenia, 70, 71, 
76; of Azerbaijan, 71, 143, 144; of 
Georgia, 71, 228; from the Soviet 



Union, 143, 228 

media: in Armenia, 13, 56, 63-64; in 
Azerbaijan, xl, 129, 137-38; censor- 
ship of, xl, xlviii, liv, 137, 138, 219; in 
Georgia, xlviii, liv, 203, 219; under 
Soviet Union, 63 

Mediterranean Sea, 27 

Melli-Majlis. See National Council (Azer- 
baijan) 

Mensheviks: struggle of, with Bolsheviks, 

162-63 
merchant class, 30, 159-60 
Meskhetian Turks, 180-81, 219, 225 
Mesrop (Mashtots), Saint, 10 
metalworking: in Armenia, 36-37, 45; >n 

Georgia, 184 
Middle Ages: Armenia during, 1 1 
middle class, 30 

migration: from Armenia, 29, 30, 32; of 
Armenians, 11; of Azerbaijanis, 29, 32; 
to France, 11, 30; from Georgia, 177; 
to India, 106; to Iran, 30; to Lebanon, 
30; of Muslims, 106; of proto-Arme- 
nians, 9; to Syria, 30; to the United 
States, 30 

military assistance: to Azerbaijan, 143, 

144; to Georgia, 227, 230 
military conscription: in Armenia, 73; in 

Azerbaijan, xxxix, 145; in Georgia, 

xlviii, 227-28 
Military Council (Georgia), 170-71: 

members of, 1 70 
military doctrine: of Armenia, 72 
military officers: in Armenia, 73; in Azer- 
baijan, 143 
millet system: in Armenia, 1 1 , 34 
minerals: export of, 190 
Mingechaur Reservoir, 100 
mining: in Abkhazia, 196; in Armenia, 

42; of copper, 42; in Georgia, 190, 191 
Ministry of Agriculture (Armenia), 59- 

60 

Ministry of Agriculture (Georgia), 213 

Ministry of Agriculture and Food (Azer- 
baijan), 119 

Ministry of Agriculture and the Food 
Industry (Georgia), 214 

Ministry of Architecture and Urban 
Planning (Armenia), 59 

Ministry of Communications (Armenia) , 
59 

Ministry of Communications (Georgia), 



284 



Index 



214 

Ministry of Construction (Armenia), 59 
Ministry of Culture (Armenia) , 60 
Ministry of Culture (Georgia), 214 
Ministry of Defense (Armenia), 46, 60, 
72-73 

Ministry of Defense (Azerbaijan), 141— 
42 

Ministry of Defense (Georgia), xlviii, 214 
Ministry of Economic Reform (Geor- 
gia), 214 

Ministry of Economics (Armenia), 50, 60 
Ministry of Economics (Azerbaijan), xli 
Ministry of Economics (Georgia), 213 
Ministry of Education (Armenia), 60 
Ministry of Education (Georgia), 214 
Ministry of Energy and Fuel (Armenia), 
60 

Ministry of Environment (Armenia) , 60 
Ministry of Finance (Armenia), 60 
Ministry of Finance (Azerbaijan) , xli 
Ministry of Finance (Georgia), 213, 214 
Ministry of Food and State Procurement 

(Armenia), 60 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Armenia) , 

60 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Azerbaijan), 
144 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Georgia), 

213,214, 221 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Soviet), 138, 

220 

Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations 

(Azerbaijan), 126 
Ministry of Grain and Bread Products 

(Azerbaijan), 119 
Ministry of Health (Armenia), 40, 60 
Ministry of Health (Georgia), 214 
Ministry of Higher Education and Sci- 
ence (Armenia), 60 
Ministry of Industry (Armenia) , li, 60 
Ministry of Industry (Georgia), 214 
Ministry of Internal Affairs (Armenia) , 
xxxii, 60, 77; collective security force 
of, 76 

Ministry of Internal Affairs (Azerbaijan), 
94; reorganization of, xxxix, 146, 147 

Ministry of Internal Affairs (Georgia), 
xlix, 214, 227, 228 

Ministry of Internal Affairs (Soviet 
Union), 164 

Ministry of Justice (Armenia) , 60 



Ministry of Justice (Georgia), 214 
Ministry of Labor and Social Security 

(Armenia) , 41 
Ministry of Labor and Social Security 

(Georgia), 214 
Ministry of Light Industry (Armenia) , 60 
Ministry of National Security (Armenia), 

60 

Ministry of Natural Resources (Arme- 
nia) , 60 

Ministry of Protection of the Environ- 
ment (Azerbaijan), 177 

Ministry of Security (Georgia), 228 

Ministry of State Property Management 
(Georgia), 213,214 

Ministry of the Environment (Armenia) , 
28 

Ministry of the Environment (Georgia), 
214 

Ministry of Trade (Armenia), 60 
Ministry of Trade and Supply (Georgia), 
214 

Ministry of Transportation (Armenia), 
60 

Minsk Group, 1, 65, 67, 139 
Mirza Fath Ali Akhundradzade Pedagog- 
ical Institute for Languages, 112 
Mitsubishi, 205 

Mkhedrioni, xlv, xlviii, 168, 227, 229; 
attempts to disband, 226; counterat- 
tack against, 168-69; discipline prob- 
lems in, 226 
Moldova: Azerbaijan's trade with, 125 
Momine-Khatun mausoleum, 88 
Mongols: invasion of Azerbaijan by, 88; 
invasion of Georgia by, 158; invasion 
of Russia by, 179 
mosques: in Azerbaijan, 107, 110 
mountains: in Armenia, 26; in Georgia, 
175 

Mount Ararat, 26, 28 

Mount Bazur-dyuzi, 100 

Movement for Democratic Reforms: in 

elections of 1992, 132 
Mshvidoba. See Peace Bloc 
Mtkvari hydroelectric plant, 1 20 
Mtkvari River, 100, 176 
mugam, 108 

Musavat (Equality party) (Azerbaijan), 
90 

music: in Azerbaijan, 108, 110; in Geor- 
gia, 183, 185 



285 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 



Muslims (see also Islam): in Armenia, 31, 
35; in Azerbaijan, 103, 106-7; emigra- 
tion by, 106; in Georgia, 183; as per- 
centage of population, in Azerbaijan 
107-7 

Muslim Ecclesiastical Board, 107 
Muslim Spiritual Board of Transcauca- 
sia, 107 

Mutalibov, Ayaz, 94; as president, 94, 96, 
97, 130; resignation of, 96, 97 



Nadibaidze, Vardiko, liv 

Nagorno-Karabakh (see also Karabakh), 
20-25; Armenian concerns about, 
xxix, 19, 20-21, 62; Armenian occupa- 
tion of, 24—25; Armenian population 
in, 19, 96, 102; Armenian protests in, 
20; Armenian support for, xxix; Azer- 
baijanis in, 96; control of, 19; declared 
part of Armenia, xxviii, 21, 22, 96; as 
foreign policy issue, xxxi, Hi, 64, 140, 
141; Gorbachev's proposals for, 21; 
government of, 65; independence 
declared by, 65; information cam- 
paigns on, 139; nationalist movements 
in, xxviii, 20-21; as national security 
issue, 141; population of, 102; seces- 
sion from Azerbaijan by, 21 

Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous 
Region, xxv, xxviii, xxxvi, 19, 94, 99 

Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, xxv, xxviii, 

xxxii, xxxvi, xxxix, 24; casualties in, 
64, 98; cease-fires in, xxxii, xxxiii, xlix, 
25, 65, 67, 98; economic effects of, 50, 
51, 115, 118, 120, 122; efforts to 
resolve, lii-liii, 65, 67, 98-99, 129, 139, 
145; escalation of, 21-22; and nation- 
alism, 20; peace negotiations in, xxxii- 

xxxiii, xxxix, xl, 1, lii, 24, 65, 66, 98, 
224; political effects of, 130; transpor- 
tation disrupted by, 1 26-27,1 30 

Nairit Chemical Plant, li; pollution 
caused by, 29 

Nakhichevan: Armenian population in, 
19; autonomy of, 21; Red Army occu- 
pation of, 92 

Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic, 
xxxvi, 98, 99, 135; blockade of, 118; 
border with Armenia, 26, 72 

Nana (queen), 182 



National Alliance (Armenia), 62 
National Bank of Azerbaijan (NBA), xlii, 
124 

National Bank of Georgia, 194, 195, 205, 
215 

National Congress (Georgia), 168; mili- 
tia of, 168 

National Council (Melli-Majlis) (Azer- 
baijan), xxxviii, xli, 131 

National Council of Nagorno-Karabakh, 
21,22,96 

National Democratic Group (Azer- 
baijan): in elections of 1992, 132 

National Democratic Party (Georgia), 
liv, 168, 170 

National Guard (Georgia) , xlv, 168, 174, 
227-28; attempts to disband, xlv, 170, 
226; discipline problems in, 226; polit- 
ical involvement of, 226 

National Independence Party (NIP) 
(Azerbaijan), 130 

nationalism: anti-Armenian, 20; in 
Armenia, 13-14, 18-20, 23; in Azer- 
baijan, 20; in Georgia, 160, 162, 163, 
166; under Soviet rule, 18-20; sup- 
pression of, 1 7 

nationalist movements: in Armenia, 27; 
in Georgia, 160; in Nagorno-Kara- 
bakh, 20-21 

nationalization: in Armenia, 42 

National Liberation Front (Georgia), liii 

National Resistance Movement (Azer- 
baijan), xli 

national security: of Armenia, xxxii, 70, 
71; in Azerbaijan, xxxviii, 145; censor- 
ship for, 219; of Georgia, 229, 230; and 
Nagorno-Karabakh, 141; reform of, 
145 

National Self-Determination Union 
(Armenia) , 63; platform of, 62; sup- 
port for, 62 

NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Orga- 
nization 

natural resources: in Armenia, 44 
navy. See under armed forces 
Nazarbayev, Nursultan, liii 
NBA. See National Bank of Azerbaijan 
Nero, 10 

Netherlands: Armenians in, 11 
net material product (NMP): in Arme- 
nia, 43; in Azerbaijan, 1 18; in Georgia, 
190 



286 



Index 



New Azerbaijan Party, 130-31 

New Economic Policy (1921-27), 42; 

end of, 17 
newspapers {see also journalists; media): 

in Armenia, 63; in Azerbaijan, 138; in 

Georgia, 219 
Nezami Ganjavi: writings of, 88 
Nino, Saint, 182 

NIP. See National Independence Party 
NMP. See net material product 
North America: Armenians in, 35 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO), xxxi, 65; Partnership for 

Peace, xxxiii, xl 
North Ossetian Autonomous Republic, 

179; border, with Georgia, 175 
Novoalekseyevka airport, 201 



October 11 Bloc, 212 

oil: in Armenia, 44; in Azerbaijan, xxxvi, 
xxxvii, li, 30, 90, 99, 115; exploration 
for, 196; exports of, 120; fields, 120; in 
Georgia, xlvii, 196; imports of, 57, 67, 
196; offshore, xlii, xlvii, li; prices, 121; 
production of, xxxvii, 116-17, 120, 
121; refineries, xlvii, 196 

oil pipelines, li, 127-28, 196; blown up, 
24; construction of, 121-22, 125; in 
Georgia, 203, 223; problems in, 120 

Oman: in energy consortium, 121-22; 
religious assistance to Azerbaijan 
from, 107 

Operation Provide Hope, 69 

Operation Winter Rescue, 40 

opposition groups: in Armenia, xxxiv; in 
Azerbaijan, xxx; viii, xli; Georgia, 
xlviii, liii, 166-68 

Ordzhonikidze, Sergo, 163 

Organisation for Security and Coopera- 
tion in Europe (OSCE), 1, lii 

Organization of the Islamic Conference: 
Azerbaijan's membership in, 140 

OSCE. See Organisation for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe 

Ossetian language, 171, 187 

Ossetian people, 171; migration of, 179, 
181; separatist movement of, xxvii 

Ottoman Empire {see also Turkey): mas- 
sacre of Armenians in (1895), xxviii, 
14; reform in, 13; struggle of, for con- 



trol of Transcaucasia, xxiii, xxiv, 12 
Ottoman Turks: invasion of Armenia by, 
11; occupation of Azerbaijan by, 91; 
occupation of Georgia by, 158-59, 179 



palace of the Sheki khans, 109 
palace of the Shirvan shahs, 88, 109 
paramilitary groups: in Azerbaijan, 144, 
145; in Georgia, xxvii-xxviii, xlv, xlviii, 
168, 170, 174, 218 
Paris Accords (1993), 137 
Paris Peace Conference (1919), 16 
parliament (Armenia) {see also Supreme 
Soviet), 58-59; chairman of, 58; com- 
mittees in, 58, 63; legislation by, 58- 
59; members of, 58; power struggle, 
with president, 58; quorum in, 58; Pre- 
sidium of, 58; sessions of, 58; terms in, 
58 

parliament (Georgia), 214-15; chair of, 
212; number of seats in, 207; powers 
of, 214; terms in, 210 

Parsis, 106 

Parthian s, 10 

Party of Democratic Freedom (Arme- 
nia) , 63 

Pashazade, Allashukur Humatogly, 107 

Patiashvili,Jumber, 165-66 

Patsatsia, Otar, 216 

Peace Bloc (Mshvidoba), 211-12 

Peace Corps: in Armenia, 70 

peasants: revolt in Georgia (1905), 161; 

under Soviet Union, 42 
Pedagogical Institute (Azerbaijan), 112 
pensions: in Azerbaijan, 114; in Georgia, 

190 

perestroika: effects of, 20 

periodicals: Armenian, 63-64; Azer- 
baijani, 138; journals, 63-64; maga- 
zines, 63, 138 

Persian Empire: Armenia under, 11; 
Georgia under, 158-59; influence on 
Azerbaijan, xxiv, 87-88; influence on 
Georgia, 181, 184; struggle for control 
of Transcaucasia, xxiii, xxiv, 12; Tbilisi 
sacked by, 1 59 

Persian language: broadcasts in, 56 

petroleum. See oil 

Phrygians, 29 

pogroms, 96 



287 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 



Poland: Armenians in, 35; Azerbaijan's 
trade with, 125; Georgia's trade with, 
205 

police force: in Armenia, xxxii, 76 
Political Consultative Council (Georgia): 

formed, 170, 209; members of, 170, 

209 

political demonstrations: in Armenia, 
xxxiv, 10, 20, 21, 24; in Azerbaijan, 21, 
130, 131; in Georgia, 161, 164, 170, 
206; about Nagorno-Karabakh, 20, 21, 
130 

political instability: in Azerbaijan, xxxvii, 

97-98; in Georgia, xliv 
political parties (see also under individual 
parties): in Armenia, xxxiv, 58, 61-62; 
in Azerbaijan, 90, 92, 129-31; in Geor- 
gia, 160, 208, 210-11; opposition, 
129-31, 208; regulations on, 131 
political unrest: in early Armenia, 10; in 

Georgia, 161, 170 
political violence: anti-Armenian, 20; in 

Azerbaijan, 20 
pollution. See environmental problems 
Polytechnic Institute (Azerbaijan), 112 
Popular Front Party (Georgia) , 208 
population: age distribution in Georgia, 
178; of Armenia, 16, 26, 30, 31, 40, 
178; of Azerbaijan, xxxvi, 19, 90, 96, 
101,102, 107; of Baku, 90, 101; density 
in Armenia, 30; density in Azerbaijan, 
101; distribution in Armenia, 26; dis- 
tribution in Azerbaijan, 101; distribu- 
tion in Soviet Union, 30; of Erevan, 
30; of Georgia, 178; of Gyandzha, 102; 
of Leninakan, 31; of Nagorno-Kara- 
bakh, 102; Russians in, 90; of Sumgait, 
102; urban, xxxvi, 26, 178 
population percentages: Armenians in 
Armenia, 16; Armenians in Azer- 
baijan, xxxvi; Armenians in Nagorno- 
Karabakh, xxxvi, 19, 96; Armenians in 
Nakhichevan, 19; Armenians in Soviet 
Union, 30; Armenians in Turkey, 15, 
30; Azerbaijanis in Azerbaijan, xxxvi; 
Azerbaijanis in Nagorno-Karabakh, 
96; Muslims in Azerbaijan, 107; in pov- 
erty, 114 

population statistics: birth rate, 31, 102, 
178; death rate, 31, 102; fertility rate, 
102; growth rate, 102, 178; infant mor- 
tality rate, 40, 114, 178, 189; life 



expectancy, 31, 102, 178; maternal 
mortality, 40 

Poti, port of, 176, 201-2; reorganization 
of, 165 

poverty: in Azerbaijan, 114 

press See journalists; media; newspapers 

prices: adjustments to, 192-93; agricul- 
tural, 1 1 8; in Armenia, xxx, xxxv, 1, 53; 
in Azerbaijan, xli, lii, 117, 118; con- 
trols on, 114, 117, 204; of fuel, 56; in 
Georgia, xlvi, liv, 192-93, 204; liberal- 
ization of, 122-23, 204 

prime minister (Armenia), 58, 59 

prime minister (Georgia), 215 

prison system: in Armenia, 77-78; 
reform of, 78 

privatization, xxvii, xxxv; in Armenia, li, 
50, 51; in Azerbaijan, 123; in Georgia, 
xlv, xlvi, liv, 204-5; under Gorbachev, 
48; of land, 44; problems with, 50 

Project Hope, 40 

Protestants: in Armenia, 35 

purges: by Aliyev, 135; in Azerbaijan, 93, 
110, 135; under Khruschev, 93; under 
Shevardnadze, 164; under Stalin, 92, 
110 



radio: in Armenia, 56, 63; in Georgia, 

203 

railroads, 165; in Armenia, 55; in Azer- 
baijan, 126-27, 130; destruction of, 
65, 126-27, 130; in Georgia, 65, 191, 
200-201; from Russia, lii 

Razdan Hydroelectric Plant, 47 

Razdan River, 26 

Red Army: Georgians in, 163; invasion of 
Azerbaijan by, 91 ; invasion of Georgia 
by, 162; occupation of Nakhichevan 
by, 92 

referendum to secede: in Armenia, 23; 
in Azerbaijan, 97; in Georgia, 169 

refugees: in Armenia, 42; Armenian, 15, 
25, 30, 42, 96; from Armenia, 102; 
from Azerbaijan, xl, 30; in Azerbaijan, 
lii, 98, 101, 116, 124, 129, 146; Azer- 
baijani, 30, 96, 99, 102; in Baku, 101; 
from Central Asia, 30; from Georgia, 
30; in Georgia, xlv, xlvii-xlviii, 189; 
Ossetian, 171; from Russia, 30; in 
Sumgait, 102; from Turkey, 42; unem- 



288 



Index 



ployment among, 116 

religion {see also under individual sects): 
animist, 107; in Armenia, 10, 11, 31, 
32-35; in Azerbaijan, 88-89, 103, 106- 
7; in Georgia, 158, 159, 163, 182-83 

Renault, 205 

Repentance (Abuladze) , 1 85 

Republic AIDS and Immunodeficiency 

Center (Georgia), 189 
revolution of 1908 (Turkey), 14 
Ria Taze (New Way) , 63 
Rioni River, 176 

rivers: in Armenia, 26; in Azerbaijan, 

100; in Georgia, 176 
roads: in Armenia, 53-56; in Azerbaijan, 

126; in Georgia, 200; vehicles on, 54- 

55, 126 

Roman Catholics: in Armenia, 35 
Roman Empire: Armenia in, 10; Georgia 

in, xxiv, 158; influence of, on Georgia, 

184 

Romania: Georgia's relations with, 220 

Round Table/Free Georgia, 168, 208; 
formed, 206; militia of, 168 

rural areas: electricity in, 45 

Russia (see also Commonwealth of Inde- 
pendent States; Soviet Union): Arme- 
nian dependence on, 70, 71; 
Armenians in, 30, 35; arms sales to, 
46; Azerbaijan's dependence on, 115; 
Azerbaijan's trade with, 125; discrimi- 
nation against Armenians, 14; eco- 
nomic blockade of Georgia by, 192; in 
energy consortium, 121^22; energy 
from, 46; exports to, 57, 120; hege- 
mony of, 68; imports from, 196; influ- 
ence on Armenia, xxiii, xxvi, 13; 
influence on Azerbaijan, xxiii, xxvi, 
89-90; influence on Georgia, xxiii, 
xxvi, 181, 184; Karabakh peace plan 
of, xxvii, xxxiii, lii, 67; law enforce- 
ment training in, 147; martial law 
declared by, 161; massacre of Arme- 
nians in (1905), 14; military assistance 
from, xxviii, 227, 230; military cooper- 
ation with Armenia, 67, 71, 143; mili- 
tary presence in Abkhazia, xlv; 
military presence in Armenia, xxxii, 
70; military presence in Azerbaijan, 
xxviii-xxxix, xliv, 141-43; military 
presence in Georgia, xlv, xlvi, 227; mil- 
itary training by, 74, 75-76, 143; oil 



from, 196; peace negotiations spon- 
sored by, xxxii, 24, 25, 65, 67-68, 98, 
139, 174, 224; relations with Armenia, 
xxxi, xxxiii, 67, 70, 71, 143; relations 
with Azerbaijan, xxxviii, lii, 139, 140- 
41; relations with Georgia, 220, 221, 
224-25; strategic importance of Geor- 
gia to, 225; support for Abkhazia, xxv- 
xxvi, 174, 224; television broadcasts 
from, 127 

Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik). 
See Bolsheviks 

Russian Empire: Armenia in, 12-13; 
Azerbaijan in, 89, 110; control of 
Transcaucasia by, xxiii, xxiv-xxv, 12; 
Georgiaannexed by, 159-62, 182; 
influence of, 11-13; occupation of 
Georgia by, 159 

Russian language: broadcasts in, 56, 203; 
publications in, 63; as school subject, 
38; spoken by Armenians, 19, 33, 38; 
spoken by Azerbaijanis, 105; spoken 
by Georgians, 182 

Russian Orthodox Church: in Azer- 
baijan, 107; in Georgia, 183; Georgian 
Orthodox Church under, 1 82 

Russian people: in Abkhazia, 178, 179; in 
Armenia, 31; in Azerbaijan, xxxvi, 102; 
in Baku, 90; in Georgia, 178; migra- 
tion of, 181 

Russian revolution (1917), 162 

Russian Social Democratic Party, 160 

Russification: under Aliyev, 135; of Azer- 
baijan, 110, 135; of Georgia, 159, 164 

Rustaveli, Shota, 1 84 

Rustaveli Theater, 1 85 

Rustavi Choir, 185 



Safavid Dynasty, 89, 106 

Safavid Persia. See Persian Empire 

Sakartvelos Respublika (The Georgian 

Republic), 219 
Sakharov Fund, 63 

SANS. See State Administration for 

National Security 
Sarkisian, Vazgan, 72 
Saudi Arabia: religious assistance to 

Azerbaijan from, 107 
Scientific and Technical Commission, 

216 



289 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 



schools: in Armenia, 38-39; in Azer- 
baijan, 111, 112; closed, 47; enroll- 
ment in, 38, 112; in Georgia, 186-87; 
private, 186-87; religious, 111 

Seljuk Turks: invasion of Armenia by, 11; 
invasion of Azerbaijan by, 88 

Shakespeare, William, 185 

Shevardnadze, Eduard, xxviii, 210; 
career of, 164-65; as chairman of par- 
liament, 212; economy under, 204-5; 
as first secretary of Georgian Commu- 
nist Party, 164-65; foreign relations 
under, 220; as head of state, xliv, xlviii, 
liii, 66, 212, 213-16, 218, 221; influ- 
ence of, 206; power of, 215; purges by, 
164; reforms under, 165, 204; role of, 
213; in State Council Presidium, 170 

Shir van Dynasty, 88 

Shirvani, Abul Hasan, 108 

Shultz, George, 220 

Shusha region, lii 

Sigua, Tengiz, liii, 169, 170, 208; in Mili- 
tary Council, 170; as prime minister, 
210, 213; in State. Council Presidium, 
170 

silk, 108 

Social Democratic Hnchak party: dis- 
solved, 13-14 

Social Democratic Party (Azerbaijan), 90 

social welfare: in Armenia, 41; in Azer- 
baijan, 114-15; in Georgia, 198-90 

South Ossetian Autonomous Region, 
179; earthquake in, 176; elections in, 
208, 212; ethnic tensions in, 218; 
Georgians in, 179; Ossetians in, 179; 
protests in, 191; refugees from, 171; 
separatist movement in, xxvii, xliii, 
171; war in, 171, 191, 195,224 

Sovetashen prison, 77 

Soviet Union (see also Commonwealth of 
Independent States; Russia): Armenia 
in, 16-23; Armenians in, 30; Arme- 
nian opposition to, 20; Azerbaijan in, 
16; banking under, 124; corruption in, 
17, 18; economy under, 42, 190-91; 
elite class in, 18; foreign relations 
under, 138, 219, 220-21; Georgia in, 
16, 219; Georgian Orthodox Church 
under, 182; health care under, 187-88; 
imperialism of, 15-16; industry under, 
195; invasion by, of Armenia, 23; inva- 
sion by, of Azerbaijan, 22; legislation 



of, 58; media under, 63; military sys- 
tem of, 142; political parties under, 61; 
prison system of, 77-78 
Sovietization, xxv 

Spanish language: broadcasts in, 56 
Special Administrative Committee, 21 
Spitak: attack on Azerbaijanis in, 96 
Stalin, Joseph V., 17, 161-62; architec- 
ture under, 184; communications 
under, 1 8; agriculture under, 92; econ- 
omy under, 42; education under, 18; 
executions by, 18, 163; forced reloca- 
tions under, xxvii, 180; industry under, 
18, 92; literacy under, 18, 92; purges 
by, 92, 110, 163 
Stalinist restructuring, 17-18, 92-93 
standard of living. See living standards 
State Administration for National Secu- 
rity (SANS) (Armenia), 76-77 
State Airline Company of Armenia, 55- 
56 

State Bank of Armenia (Gosbank Arme- 
nia), 52 

State Committee for Television and 
Radio Broadcasting (Armenia), 56 

State Council (Georgia): formed, 170, 
209; members of, 170, 209-10 

State Duma, li 

state enterprises, xxvii; in Azerbaijan, xli, 
124; in Georgia, xlvi, 194, 204-5; priva- 
tization of, 204-5 

State Planning Committee (Gosplan), 56 

State Program on the Privatization of 
State Enterprises (Georgia), 205 

State Security Service (Georgia), xlix 

strikes, 161; by Azerbaijani Popular 
Front, 93-94, 130; in Georgia, 161, 
166, 191,206 

subsidies: in Azerbaijan, 114, 115; for 
energy, 124; for food, 114, 115, 124, 
204; in Georgia, 1, 190, 204 

suffrage. See voting 

Sukhumi: port of, 201, 203; university in, 
186 

Suleymanov, Nizami, 132 

Sumgait: industry in, 119; massacre of 
Armenians in, 20, 96; population of, 
102; refugees in, 102 

Supreme Court (Armenia) , 60 

Supreme Court (Azerbaijan), 136; sover- 
eignty declared by, 94 

Supreme Court (Georgia), 216-17 



290 



Index 



Supreme Religious Council of the Cau- 
casus Peoples, 107 

Supreme Soviet (Abkhazia), 174 

Supreme Soviet (Armenia), xxx, 58, 96; 
elections for, 20; and Nagorno-Kara- 
bakh conflict, 21; newspaper of, 63 

Supreme Soviet (Azerbaijan), 94; elec- 
tions for, 131 

Supreme Soviet (Georgia), 168, 214-15 

Surakhany Temple, 106, 109 

Surami mountain range, 175 

Syria: Armenians in, 30; influence of, on 
Georgia, 184; trade with, 57 



Taghiyev, Haji Zeinal Adibin, 110 
Tajikstan: military cooperation with 

Armenia, 67, 71 
Talish Mountains, 100 
Talish people, 103 
Tamara, Queen, 158 
Tamerlane. See Timur 
Tanzimat (reform), 13 
Tatars, 14 
Tat people, 103 

taxes: in Armenia, 52; in Azerbaijan, 
123-24, 125; in Georgia, 190, 195, 205 

Tbilisi: Armenian refugees in, 15; Arme- 
nians in, 65; destruction of, 158, 159; 
Jews in, 183; oil exploitation in, 30; oil 
refinery in, xlvii; population of, 178; 
subway system of, 201; university in, 
186 

Tbilisi City Court, 218 

teachers: in Armenian independence 

movement, 13 
Tee Kanes tea company, 205 
telecommunications: in Armenia, 56; in 

Azerbaijan, 128-29; employment in, 

51; in Georgia, xlvii, 203; under Stalin, 

18 

telephones: in Armenia, 56; in Azer- 
baijan, 128-29; in Georgia, 203 

television: in Armenia, 56; in Azerbaijan, 
129, 138; in Georgia, 203, 219 

Temporary Regulation of the Georgian 
Parliament, 214-15 

Ter-Grigoriants, Norat, 72 

Ter-Petrosian, Levon: background of, 59; 
conflict with parliament, 58; as chair- 
man of Supreme Soviet, 22, 23, 58; 



power of, 59; as president, xxx, xxxiii, 
xxxiv, liii, 24, 40, 58, 59, 64 

terrorism: by Armenians, 71; by Azer- 
baijanis, xxxiv, 24 

Terter hydroelectric plant, 120 

Thaddeus (apostle), 33 

Thatcher, Margaret, 220 

theater: in Azerbaijan, 110; in Georgia, 
183, 185 

Tigran II (Tigranes), 10 

Tigranes. See Tigran II 

Tigran the Great. See Tigran II 

Timur (Tamerlane): invasion of Azer- 
baijan by, 88; invasion of Georgia by, 
158 

TiridatesI, 10 

Tiridates III: Christianity accepted by, 10 
topography: of Armenia, 26; of Azer- 
baijan, 99-100; of Georgia, 175-76 
To the Heights of Conviction (Fuzuli), 108 
tourism: environmental threats to, 177; 

in Georgia, 177, 190 
Trabzon Empire, 158 
trade (see also exports; imports): by 
Armenia, 56-57; by Azerbaijan, xlii, Hi, 
57, 115, 120, 125-26, 196; deficit, 57; 
by former Soviet republics, 116; by 
Georgia, 192, 205-6, 219, 224; obsta- 
cles to, 125; Soviet system of, 41, 56- 
57, 125 

Transcaucasia, xxiii, xxv, xxxv-xxxvi; eth- 
nic tensions in, 15; imperial struggles 
over, 12 

Transcaucasian federation, 15 

Transcaucasian Metallurgical Plant at 
Rustavi, 195-96 

Transcaucasian railroad, 165 

Transcaucasian Soviet Federated Social- 
ist Republic (TSFSR), xxv; Armenia 
in, 16, 91-92, 163; Azerbaijan in, 16, 
91-92, 163; dissolved, 16, 92, 163; 
Georgia in, 16, 91-92, 163 

Transcaucasus Military District, 227 

transportation: air, 127; in Armenia, 
xxix, 53-56; in Azerbaijan, 126-28, 
130; employment in, 51; in Georgia, 
65, 175, 191, 199-203, 223; infrastruc- 
ture, 44, 175; maintenance of, 199; 
railroads, 55, 191; roads, 53-54; subsi- 
dies for, 115; subways, 109, 127, 201 

Treaty of Aleksandropol' (1920), 16 

Treaty of Berlin (1878), 179 



291 



Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies 



Treaty of Gulistan (1813), 89 

Treaty of Kars (1921), 92 

Treaty of Moscow (1921), 92 

Treaty of Sevres (1920), 16 

Treaty of Turkman chay (1828), 89 

Treaty on Collective Security, 70, 76, 141 

Tsereteli, Irakli, xlviii 

TSFSR. See Transcaucasian Soviet Feder- 
ated Socialist Republic 

Turkey: Armenians in, 11, 15, 30, 35; 
Armenian terrorism in, 71; Azer- 
baijan's trade with, 125; border 
maneuvers by, 98; border with Arme- 
nia, 26; border with Georgia, 175; for- 
eign policy of, 71; imperialism of, 16; 
influence on Georgia, 181; investment 
in Georgia, 225; massacre of Arme- 
nians in (1895), 14, 29; massacre of 
Armenians in (1915), 14-15, 29, 35, 
38, 66; military training by, 144; peace 
negotiations sponsored by, 24, 64, 139; 
peace plan of, 67; recovery of territory 
from, 23; relations with Armenia, xxxi, 
xxxiv, 65, 66, 71; relations with Azer- 
baijan, xxxi, 70, 71, 138, 139; relations 
with Georgia, 220, 221, 225; television 
broadcasts from, 127; trade with, 57, 
225 

Turkic influence: on Azerbaijan, xxiv 
Turkish language: broadcasts in, 56; 

introduction of, in Azerbaijan, 88-89 
Turkmenistan: Azerbaijanis in, 102; 
Azerbaijan's trade with, 125; natural 
gas from, xxxv, xlvii, 1-li, 48, 122 
Turks, Mamluk. See Mamluk Turks 
Turks, Ottoman. See Ottoman Turks 
Turks, Seljuk. See Seljuk Turks 



Ukraine: Azerbaijanis in, 102; Azer- 
baijan's trade with, 125; exports to, 
120; law enforcement training in, 147 

Ukrainian people: in Armenia, 31; 
migration of, 181 

unemployment: in Armenia, xxx, 41, 51; 
in Azerbaijan, xxxvii, 114, 116; bene- 
fits, 41, 190; in Georgia, xlvi; among 
refugees, 116 

Union for the Revival of Ajaria, 211 

Union of Democratic Intelligentsia: in 
elections of 1992, 132 



United Nations: Azerbaijani representa- 
tive to, 103; Azerbaijan's membership 
in, 140; Georgia's membership in, 221; 
observers from, xlv; peace negotia- 
tions sponsored by, liv-lv, 1 74 

United States: aid from, liv, 40, 42, 68, 
220-21; Armenians in, 30, 34; Arme- 
nian trade with, 57, 68; military assis- 
tance from, 144; peace plan of, 67, 68, 
139; relations with Armenia, xxxi, 
xxxiii, 68, 69-70; relations with Azer- 
baijan, xxxiii, xl, 139; relations with 
Georgia, liv, 219, 220, 221; trade with 
Azerbaijan, 68 

United States Agency for International 
Development (AID), 70 

United States Department of Agricul- 
ture, 69 

United States Department of State, 146 
United States Freedom Support Act 

(1992), 140 
United States Information Agency 

(USIA),70 
Unity Bloc (Ertoba), 212 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 

135 

universities, 47 

university of Azerbaijan ,112 

Urartu, kingdom of, 9, 29; arts in, 36-37 

urban areas: Armenians in, 30; popula- 
tion in, 26, 178 

urbanization: in Armenia, 18, 30; envi- 
ronmental problems caused by, 18-19; 
in Georgia, 163 

USIA. See United States Information 
Agency 

Uzbekistan: Azerbaijanis in, 102; Azer- 
baijan's relations with, 141; military 
cooperation of, with Armenia, 67, 71 

Uzeir Hajibeyli Conservatory, 112 



Vanadzor Chemical Combine: pollution 

caused by, 29 
Vartan, Saint: statue of, 18 
Vazgen I, 34 

Venice: Armenians in, 11 

Verk Haiastani (The Wounds of Armenia) 

(Abovian), 37 
volcanoes, 99 

Volunteer Society for Assistance to the 



292 



Index 



Army, Air Force, and Navy, 74 



wages: adjustments to, 193; in Azer- 
baijan, xli; in Georgia, xlvi, 193-94; 
minimum, xli, xlvi, 1 14 

Warsaw Pact, 65 

Western influence: on Armenia, 13; on 
Georgia, 181 

wine: in Azerbaijan, 118 

women: in agriculture, 45; education of, 
111; maternity leave for, 190; rights of, 
in Azerbaijan, 103; roles of, in Azer- 
baijan, 103 

workforce: percentage of, in agriculture, 
44, 118; in Armenia, 51-52; in Azer- 
baijan, 116; laws regarding, 59; per- 
centage in industry, 42 

working class: in Georgia, 160 

World Bank: and Armenia, xxxi, 1, 50- 
51; and Azerbaijan, xlii 

World War I: Armenia in, 15-16, 42; 
Azerbaijan in, 90-91; realignment fol- 
lowing, 15-16 



World War II: Georgia in, 163 

writers: in Armenian independence 

movement, 13; in Azerbaijan, 111; 

purged, 110 



Yeltsin, Boris N., lii, 65, 67, 139, 170 
Yerokoian Yerevan (Evening Erevan), 63 
Yezidi (Christian Kurds): in Armenia, 31 
Young Turks, 14-15; genocide by, 14-15, 

35, 38; revolution by, 14 
Yunosova, Leyla, 130 
Yuzbashian, Marius, 62, 77 



Zangezur region, 72 
Zarathustra. See Zoroaster 
Zhordania, Noe, 162; exiled, 162 
Zoroaster (Zarathustra), 106 
Zoroastrianism, xxiv, 88, 182 
Zvartnots airport, 55 



293 



Contributors 



Glenn E. Curtis is Senior Research Analyst for Eastern Europe 
and Central Eurasia in the Federal Research Division, 
Library of Congress. 

James Nichol is a specialist in the Caucasus and Central Asia for 
the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. 

Darrell Slider is Associate Professor in the Department of Gov- 
ernment and International Affairs, University of South 
Florida. 

Ronald G. Suny is Professor of History and holder of the Arme- 
nia Chair at the University of Michigan. 



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